TELOS

Number 59 Spring 1984

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THE POLITICS OF THE RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

by José Casanova

If Zarathustra were to descend once again from the mountain, what would he make of the recent religious revival? Would he admit that he had been wrong, that "Deus absconditus" has now reappeared? Does this revival mean that the Enlightenment theory of religion was wrong? In view of the significance of religion,[1] it is necessary to reassess that Enlightenment theory of religion and to inquire into the possible role of religion in a reconstructed project of modernity. Yet, to overestimate the importance of religion in the modern world can result in two extreme and equally unsatisfactory consequences. An unreconstructed secularism, assuming that the criticism of religion is not yet complete, would postulate again the criticism of religion as the premise and the primary task of critique.[2] The other extreme seems more widespread and problematic. A belated discovery of religion's transformative potential leads into a dissolution of secular critique into "religious criticism." Discouraged by the impotence of radical politics to challenge the system, religion becomes the last hope for transcendence, the last source of negativity, the only protection against secular banality. There is even a call to "return to the sacred" as a solution to the contemporary crisis of modernity.[3]

Before evaluating this revival, one should differentiate the various phenomena that make it up. Although many of these phenomena can be related to general transformations in the world system,[4] the differences are more significant than the similarities and it might be premature to attempt to understand all of them in terms of a single systemic logic. It makes little sense to ask whether religion "by nature" has an emancipatory potential. Religion has no

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1. To get a feeling of this renewed significance, one may browse through recent monographic issues of *Social Compass* dedicated to topics such as "Social Dissension of Young People and New Religious Movements," "Religion and Church's Function in Socialist Countries," "The Religions of the Working Class," "Politics and Religion in Latin America," "Islam and Society," "Charismatic and Socio-Political Movements," "Marxism and the Sociology of Religion," "Religion and Peace," "New Religious Movements in the U.S.A.," "Sociology of Religion in the U.S.S.R."

2. See "Symposium on Religion," *Telos* 58 (Winter 1983-84), pp. 115-157. Judging from the responses of the participants in this symposium, this does not seem to be a dominant trend, perhaps because even those who identify themselves more closely with militant Enlightenment or atheist-secular positions do not seem to take religion very seriously, even though they may view the religious revival as a regretable regression.

3. Cf. Daniel Bell, "The Return of the Sacred? The Argument on the Future of Religion," in *British Journal of Sociology,* 28:4 (1977); Franco Ferrarotti, "The Destiny of Reason and the Paradox of the Sacred," in *Social Research,* 46:4 (1979); Alain Bourdin, Mircill Sain-Cricq and Monique Hirschhorn, "The Wood and the Tree: Reflections on the Return of the Sacred," in *Social Compass,* 29:4 (1982); Bryan Wilson, "The Return of the Sacred," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* 18:3 (1979).

4. See Robert Wuthnow, "Religious Movements and the Transition in World Order," in Jacob Needleman and George Baker, eds., *Understanding the New Religions* (New York, 1978).

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nature. Religion, or rather, religions, have history. If one does not ask whether, by nature, economy is alienating or emancipatory, but rather one talks of economic modes of production or of socio-economic formations, I do not see why one should not equally talk of historical modes of symbolic production or of religious formations, whether in the context of a non-evolutionary comparative sociology of religions (Weber, Nelson), in the context of a theory of internal religious evolution (Bellah), or in the context of general systems evolution (Parsons, Döbert, Habermas).[5] Only in such a context can one talk meaningfully of the "emancipatory" potential of religion.[6]

So what is meant by the "return of religion" in the West? Some people want to view it as a return of "the sacred," as an indication that the process of secularization has come to a halt. The problem with such interpretations lies in the ambiguity of the concept of "secularization."[7] Indeed, this concept can

5. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 3 vols. (Tübingen, 1920-21); Benjamin Nelson, *On the Roads to Modernity. Conscience, Science and Civilization* (Totowa, N.J., 1981); Robert Bellah, *Beyond Belief* (New York, 1970); Talcott Parsons, *Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs, 1966); *The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, 1971); Rainer Döbert, *Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme* (Frankfurt, 1973); Jürgen Habermas, "History and Evolution," *Telos* 39 (1979); and *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston, 1976); Constans Seyfarth and Walter M. Sprondel, eds., *Seminar: Religion und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung* (Frankfurt, 1973).

6. Even though Ernst Bloch seems to be talking of the "utopian" potential of religion in the abstract, he always does so implicitly in the context of the Judeo-Christian tradition. See Ernst Bloch, *Man on His Own* (New York, 1970), and *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 1959).

7. Cf. Bryan Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society* (London, 1979); Sabino Acquaviva, *The Decline of the Sacred in Industrial Society* (New York, 1979); Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy* (Garden City, N.Y., 19679); David Martin, *The Religious and the Secular* (London, 1969); and *A General Theory of Secularization* (New York, 1978); Harvey Cox, *The Secular City* (New York, 1965) and *The Seduction of the Spirit* (London, 1974); Andrew Greeley, *Unsecular Man; The Persistence of Religion* (New York, 1972); Thomas Luckman, *The Invisible Religion* (New York, 1967); Richard Fenn, *Toward a Theory of Secularization* (Storrs, Conn., 1978); Peter E. Glasner, *The Sociology of Secularisation: A Critique of a Concept* (London, 1977); Herman Lübke, *Säkularisierung, Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs* (Freiburg, 1965); Hans Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt, 1966). Hill has analyzed six different meanings of this concept: 1) The decline of religion. This is the more encompassing definition, indicating that religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance in modern societies. At the end of the process would lie a religionless society. 2) Shift from otherworldly to this-worldly orientations, in the sense used by Weber in the context of his analysis of the tensions between religion and the world. 3) Disengagement of society from religion. This refers to the process of structural differentiation by which the secular spheres (economy, polity, science, art, ethics, etc.) gain autonomy from the religious sphere. Correlated with this process of structural differentiation one finds the parallel process of specialization of the religious sphere, or rather, of the privatization, marginalization and loss of function of religion within the entire system. Religion loses its public role of social legitimation and the dominant institutional spheres (economy, polity) develop their own principles of legitimation. 4) Transposition of beliefs and activities from a divine to a secular point of reference. Here one could place the whole range of individual religions of salvation and self-realization, as well as the collective identities and ideologies which serve as religious surrogates or as functional equivalents of religion, that is, as all-embracing systems of meaning and integrated ways of life. 5) The *Entzauberung der Welt*, that is, the de-magicization and disenchantment of the natural and the social worlds, as the end result of the universal-historical process of rationalization. 6) The change from a sacred to a secular society. This is Howard Becker's pair of polar concepts, similar to the ones developed by Tönnies, Durkheim, Maine, Spencer, Weber, Parsons and others, in an attempt to conceptualize systematically the process of modernization or the process of transformation from traditional to

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not be understood independently of general theories of modernity.[8]

The materialist critique of religion is the other main ideological component of the concept of secularization. But again, it is more than that. Marx's claim that "man makes religion" is not only "the basis of irreligious criticism," but also the fundamental premise of the sociology of religion and of the sociology of knowledge.[9] To be sure, Marx held an extreme version of the secularization thesis. Secularization not only describes the capitalist process which "melts into the air all that is solid and profanes all that is holy." Secularization was also seen as a normative project: "the task of history." A rational society will no longer reflect illusions, but true reality. The world consciousness of a rational world will no longer be a religious false consciousness, but a fully rational one. In such a world, religion disappears as ideology and is no longer necessary as utopia.[10]

Until very recently, most objections to the secularization theory were derived from the special case of religion in America. In fact, there was little

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modern societies. Becker's conceptualization stresses the dissolution of tradition and the readiness and capacity to change. See Michael Hill, *A Sociology of Religion* (London, 1973). For yet another interpretation, see Luciano Parinetto, "The Legend of Marx's Atheism," *Telos* 58 (Winter 1983-84), pp. 7-19.

8. Luckmann has even argued that although it has empirical points of reference, the secularization theory "is primarily a mythological account of the emergence of the modern world." This is partially correct in so far as the concept of secularization emerged in the context of ideologies of secularism which expressed the self-understanding of the Enlightenment, particularly of 19th-century positivism (Comte, Tylor, Spencer), of the materialist critique of religion (Feuerbach, Marx) and of psychological critiques of religion (Freud, Nietzsche). But even those later theorists (Weber, Durkheim, Malinowski) who de-ideologized the positivist conception of religion and magic as primitive or fetishist forms of science and, thus, opened up the functionalist, structuralist and phenomenological analyses of religion, they also assumed that the theory of secularization was an adequate conceptualization of a historical process. See Thomas Luckmann, "Theories of Religion and Social Change," *The Annual Review of the Social Sciences of Religion,* 1 (1977); and Talcott Parsons, "The Theoretical Development of the Sociology of Religion," in *Essays in Sociological Theory* (New York, 1964).

9. Marx and Engels, *On Religion* (New York, 1964), p. 41. Indeed, the young Marx's anthropological-philosophical theory of religion as alienation and the critique of religion as "an inverted world-consciousness" of an "inverted world," "the general theory of that world," is a much richer formulation than the later reductionist interpretations of religion as reflex, mystical veil, epiphenomenon or legitimating ideology of the real world. Compare the formulation "The religious world is but the reflex of the real world," in *Capital,* Vol. I (New York, 1967), p. 79, with the formulation in Marx's doctoral dissertation, "The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature:" "That which I represent to myself as real [*realiter*] is a real representation for me, which acts upon me. In this sense, all gods, heathen as well as Christian, have had real existence." Karl Marx-Ausgabe. *Werke. Schriften. Briefe.* Vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1962), p. 75.

10. As Marx writes in *Capital:* "The religious reflex of the real world can, in any case, only then finally vanish, when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellowmen and Nature." "The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan." See Karl Marx, *Capital,* I, pp. 79-80. On the Marxist theory of religion, see the special issue on "Marxism and the Sociology of Religion," *Social Compass* 23:3-4 (1975), particularly the "Introduction" and "Marxist Analysis and Sociology of Religions" by Otto Maduro. Further, Otto Maduro, "New Marxist Approaches to the Relative Autonomy of Religion," *Sociological Analysis,* 38 (1977). For an insightful analysis of Marx's theory of religion in the context of an analysis of the Critical Theory of religion, see Ingo Mörth, "La sociologie de la religion comme Théorie Critique," *Social Compass,* 27:1 (1980).

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dispute concerning the two main aspects of secularization, namely, a) the structural differentiation of the institutional spheres, the autonomy of the secular spheres and the marginalization of the religious sphere in modern societies, and b) the disenchantment of the world and the rationalization of scientific and secular world views. The shift from "other-worldly" to "this-worldly" orientations and the general transformation from a "sacred" to a "secular" society can be subsumed under these two main aspects. What has been unclear is the extent to which traditional church-oriented religiosity has declined, is declining and will continue to decline, and whether this decline spells the end of religion itself or only the end of one of its historical forms.

Basically, there are three clear-cut positions in the secularization debate. The first position, best represented by Bryan Wilson and Peter Berger, argues that the decline of traditional religion and the loss of its social relevance is an inevitable concomitant of the process of modernization.[11] Wilson argues that the closer people are involved in industrial production, the less religious they become. He shows that people in the city are less religious than those in the country, men are less religious than women, men and women of working age are less religious than the very young and the old, classes directly connected with modern industrial production are less religious than those of more traditional occupations (artisans, shopkeepers, etc.), the more industrialized countries are less religious than the less industrialized ones, and so on. Similarly, according to Berger, the structural differentiation of modern societies leads irremediably to a pluralism of norms, values and world views originating in the various autonomous spheres. This pluralism, in turn, by undermining the absolute truth-claims of traditional religious world views ends up creating "the problem of plausibility." In those societies in which the established church loses its religious monopoly and has to complete with other religious world views, the problem of plausibility becomes even more severe. The very condition of pluralism undermines the credibility of all so that world views are relativized and deprived of their taken-for-granted status. The result, for Berger, is that religion can no longer be imposed but must be marketed. "The pluralistic situation is, above all, a *market situation.* In it, the religious institutions become marketing agencies and the religious traditions become consumer commodities."[12]

In order to survive in the competitive market, the religious communities have to become efficient religious organizations, thus creating the need for bureaucratic rationalization. Internally, this means the bureaucratization of the religious organization, the expansion of purposive-rational action, the spread of bureaucratic roles and the formation and selection of bureaucratic personality structures within the religious institution. Externally, free, untrammeled competition becomes "irrational" even in purely economic

11. Bryan Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society,* and *Contemporary Transformations of Religion* (London, 1976); Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy.*

12. Berger, *op.cit.,* p. 138.

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terms, thus creating the need for religious "cartellization," that is, the need to organize the religious market more rationally through mergers and mutual agreements. In such a situation, "ecumenicity" becomes a requirement of market rationalization. In relation to their religious "clients," the market situation introduces the dynamics of consumer preference into the very process of production of religious world views. Although Berger admits that there is still "strong 'product loyalty' among certain groups of 'old customers,' " the commodification of religious beliefs and practices introduces a principle of changeability that is "intrinsically inimical to religious traditionalism."[13] The dynamics of consumer preference subject the religious content to the logic of fashion and the religious institutions to the logic of stratification. Niebuhr had already deplored this logic as the "evil of denominationalism." Unable to resist the bureaucratic temptation to make their own self-preservation and extension the primary object of their endeavor, the churches abandon their universalistic claims and adapt to the needs of their clients, thus becoming denominations, i.e., particularistic class and status groups.[14] Religion survives, but only by adopting the logic of its society. Religion itself becomes secularized.

By emphasizing the persistence of church religiosity in the U.S. and by minimizing the secularization of religion, Greeley has argued against "the secularization myth." Admittedly, he bases his argument solely on the American case, but rather than accepting the view that America is an exceptional case, he argues that if the most modern among industrial societies is also the most religious, this undermines the tendential law of secularization. Greeley does not question the institutional differentiation of the secular spheres nor the dominance of these spheres in modern society. What he questions is the implication that this process of secularization spells the end of church religiosity, the emergence of "secular man," or the social irrelevance of religion. On the contrary, church membership statistics in the U.S. show no tendential falling rate. They show rather a clear tendency to rise from 20 percent in the 1880s to 60 percent in the 1950s. Recent Gallup religious opinion polls also point to the persistence of traditional religious beliefs among all Americans. From this, Greeley infers that the secularization of society by no means implies the secularization of consciousness. For Greeley, modern man is "unsecular man." The American case would show that the more there is a clear differentiation of the religious and the secular spheres, the more religion has the possibility of thriving unimpeded in its own sphere. Greeley attributes American developments primarily to the fact that in America there never was an "established church" on the federal level. The churches accepted a situation of religious pluralism that implied giving up their monopolistic claims and becoming simply denominations, catering to the needs of their members. However, instead of viewing this development as an indication of the growing social irrelevance of religion, Greeley interprets it as a confirmation

13. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
14. H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York, 1929), p. 24.

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of the relevance of the denomination for the modern atomized individual. The resilience of American religious organizations would demonstrate that they provide meaning and a sense of belonging to the individual.[15] The demonimation becomes a paradigm of the kind of intermediary society or secondary organ advocated by Durkheim in order to save the individual and modern society from meaninglessness and widespread anomie. What Greeley fails to see is that, for Durkheim, in order to fulfill this function, it was essential that these intermediary societies "become a definite and recognized organ of public life, instead of remaining a private group legally permitted but politically ignored."[16]

The denomination may offer a haven for the individual but, like the family, it is a marginalized, private "haven in a heartless world." As Berger points out, this haven is exposed to commodification, bureaucratization and rationalization — forces against which religion cannot resist. The denomination may be able to transcend the solipsist egotism of the private self by generating bonds of solidarity among fellow members. The question is whether these bonds are strong enough to create something more than what Greeley himself calls a "quasi-Gemeinschaft" and whether they can transcend Niebuhr's "evil of denominationalism." Wilson has rightly asked whether, in such a situation, religious communities amount to "more than voluntary associations of the like-minded for weekly acknowledgement of their shared intellectual, moral and emotional disposition."[17]

Religion in America has survived to a larger extent than in other modern industrial societies by completely adapting to its environment, i.e., by blending into the dominant secular, capitalist culture. In this sense, religion has also served to legitimate, at least indirectly, this culture, becoming in the process a vehicle for its transmission — particularly among new immigrant groups.[18] Thus, President Eisenhower could state that he "didn't care what kinds of religious commitments were maintained so long as each American had *a* religious commitment,"[19] indicating that religious commitment had become a certificate of loyalty to the system. Half a century earlier, a traveling salesman had offered a similar response to Weber's comment regarding "the still impressively strong church-mindedness" he had witnessed while traveling through America. "Sir," he remarked, "for my part everybody may believe or not believe as he pleases; but if I saw a farmer or a businessman not belonging to any church at all, I wouldn't trust him with fifty cents. Why pay

15. Andrew Greeley, *The Denominational Society* (Glenview, Ill., 1972), p. 2. Cf. also his *Religion in the Year 2000* (New York, 1969).

16. Emile Durkheim, *Suicide* (New York, 1951), p. 379.

17. Wilson, "The Return of the Sacred," *op.cit.*, p. 280.

18. Cf. Will Herbert, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew* (New York, 1955). Herberg has shown how all three major denominations had survived and thrived in America by becoming the embodiment of "the American way of life" and a main vehicle of socialization of new immigrant groups into this way of life. In spite of significant differences in religious beliefs and practices, for Herberg, all three main denominations stood for the same ethos.

19. Robertson, "Religious Movements and Modern Societies: Towards a Progressive Problemshift," in *Sociological Analysis*, 40:4 (1979), p. 307.

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me, if he doesn't believe in anything?"[20] Weber interpreted this as an indication that religious commitment had become a certificate of moral qualification and especially of business morals for the individual. The ascetic sects that had first served as the historical agents of social transformation, breaking through the traditionalist ethic and institutionalizing a new economic ethos more adequate to capitalist rationalization, had now succumbed to the very process of secularization and had become the transmission belt of the by now secularized business ethic.[21] Evangelical, revivalist, charismatic, pentecostal and similar sects have played similar functions for the lower classes.[22]

Religion in the modern world does not disappear; it is "transformed." This is the gist of the "functionalist" thesis, the third position in the secularization debate. Building on the Durkheimian functionalist theory of religion, Luckmann and Bellah have offered two different versions of the thesis. Once functionalist theory "defines" religion as the institution that creates and recreates the normative consensus and the feeling of solidarity that supposedly hold any society together, then religion cannot disappear without also bringing down that society in its wake. If religion is indeed declining and yet society is not disintegrating, there are two ways out of the functionalist antinomy. Either one discards the functionalist definition of religion as circular or one concludes that a "new" religion has had to emerge unnoticed to displace the old one. Luckmann calls it "the Invisible Religion." Bellah calls it "Civil Religion."[23] Many have pointed out the circular character of the functionalist definition of religion as well as what Wilson calls its "dubious propositions," i.e., the difficulty of showing clearly when a society is holding together and when it is falling apart, of ascertaining what constitutes the necessary value-consensus, and of indicating at what social level this value-consensus must operate.[24] Despite their functionalist framework and, in the case of Bellah, despite its clear ideological overtones, both accounts offer some unusual

20. Max Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," in Hans Gerth and C.W. Mills, *From Max Weber* (New York, 1958), p. 303.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 308; and Stephen Berger, "The Sects and the Breakthrough into the Modern World: On the Centrality of the Sects in Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis," *The Sociological Quarterly,* 12 (Autumn 1971).

22. Cf. Niebuhr, *op.cit.,* and Bryan Wilson, *Religious Sects* (New York, 1970). As Baum writes approvingly: "New Christian sects . . . supply people of the lower classes, devoid of formal education, with new, spiritual self-confidence, transform them into disciplined, hard-working and reliable persons, and thus enable them to do well as industrial workers, to become successful businessmen in a competitive world, and to rise on the social scale. These sects still teach people to be frugal, to save their money and to invest it wisely." A Catholic priest and sociologist like Greeley, Baum views this and similar phenomena as indications of the originality, creativity and the important social function of religion in America. It would explain why religion has survived in the midst of a secular society and thus falsify the secularization thesis. What is being debated is not "the facts" but their "meaning." The same facts that Weber, Niebuhr, Berger and Wilson interpret as a sign of the secularization of American religion become for Greeley and Baum signs of religious strength in the face of secularization. See Gregory Baum, *Religion and Alienation. A Theological Reading of Sociology* (New York, 1975), p. 152.

23. Luckmann, *op.cit.,*; Robert Bellah, *op.cit.,* and *The Broken Covenant. American Civil Religion in Time of Trial* (New York, 1975); Russell Richey and Donald Jones, eds., *American Civil Religion* (New York, 1974).

24. Wilson, "The Return of the Sacred," *op.cit.,* p. 271.

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insights, not only into the fate of religion in the modern world, but also into the antinomies of modernity.

Luckmann criticizes the usual identification between religion and one of its historical institutional forms, the church. This church bias is "ideological" since it uncritically accepts the religions institution's official definition of the situation and leads into an exclusive concern with church-oriented religiosity. It is, moreover, also self-defeating for, according to Luckmann, it leads into a neglect of "the conditions under which 'transcendent,' super-ordinated and 'integrating' structures of meaning are socially objectivated."[25] According to Luckmann, religion is to be found where the symbolic self-production and reproduction of society takes place. In modern societies, this process does not take place in churches. Indeed, he presents a radical version of the secularization thesis. In Europe traditional church religion has been "pushed to the periphery of 'modern' life," while in America it has survived and become "modern," "by undergoing a process of internal secularization."[26] Luckmann's analysis, like Berger's, centers around the process of institutional specialization and around the role this process plays in undermining official religious values, which are becoming increasingly irrelevant. As a result, religion becomes increasingly "subjective" and "private." But if the norms of traditional religious institutions no longer serve as the superordinated cosmos of meaning, "what is the hierarchy of significance in the world views of contemporary industrial societies? Is that hierarchy articulated in a sacred cosmos and, if so, how distinct and consistent is this articulation?"[27] Luckmann's answer is that the process of structural differentiation and specialization leads to a sharp segmentation of the various institutional domains, whereby each domain becomes an automonous sphere governed by its own "functionally rational" norms, best fitting the "functional" requirements of the particular institution. Since the individual's social existence becomes a series of unrelated performances of anonymous specialized social roles, the institutional segmentation is reproduced in the segmentation within the individual's consciousness.

The person *qua* person becomes irrelevant for the functionally rational domains which come to depend more and more on abstract, replaceable role performances. Whether the individual is able to integrate the segmented performances into "a system of *subjective* significance" is not a relevant question for the dominant economic and political institutions — at least not as long as it does not affect adversely their efficient functioning. The individual is on his own in his private efforts to patch together the fragments of a shattered world into a subjectively meaningful whole. This is what determines the modern quest for salvation. Instead of focusing, however, on the influence which the Protestant Reformation had on the bourgeois concept of freedom or on the concept of the self, Luckmann analyzes the way in which "self-expression"

25. Luckmann, *op.cit.*, p. 26.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

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and "self-realization" have become the invisible religion of modernity. In this sense, Luckmann's analysis anticipates the emergence of "new religious movements" as well as later analyses of narcissism.[28]

While Berger analyzed the commodification of religion from the perspective of the religious organizations being transformed into competitive marketing agencies, Luckmann analyzes another side of this phenomenon from the perspective of the individual consumer. The consumer orientation that characterizes the relation of the individual to culture also "pervades the relation of the 'autonomous' individual to the sacred cosmos."[29] As a buyer, the individual confronts a wide assortment of "religious" representations, traditional religious ones as well as secular new ones, manufactured, packaged and sold by specialized religious service agencies, out of which the individual constructs and reconstructs — either alone or in congregation with like-minded isolated selves — a necessarily precarious private system of ultimate meanings. According to Luckmann, the fundamental difference between the emerging social form of religion and all previous forms is the fact that the primary public institutions (economy, polity) "do not maintain the sacred cosmos; they merely regulate the legal and economic frame within which occurs the competition of the 'ultimate' significance market."[30] No overall ideology can survive the differentiation of the autonomous spheres or what Bell has called the "disjunction of realms" and the differentiation of their autonomous normative systems."[31]

Luckmann may have exaggerated the quasi-absolute autonomy which he attributes to the private religious sphere. Thus, Robertson has pointed out that the relation between the privatized realm of individual religiosity and the world is becoming increasingly problematic, forcing public agencies to intervene in the regulation and in the definition of what constitutes authentic religion, i.e., "socially acceptable religiosity."[32] The autonomy of the private realm is respected only as long as it does not challenge the dominant spheres nor endangers their smooth functioning. Moreover, Luckmann also shows that, at least indirectly, the sanctification of subjective "autonomy" and the retreat of the individual to the private sphere also serve a legitimating function by reinforcing the autonomy of primary institutions: "By bestowing a sacred quality upon the increasing subjectivity of human existence it supports not only the secularization but also what we called the dehumanization of the social structure."[33] In this sense, the "autonomy of the primary institutions," "subjective autonomy" and "the anomie of the social order" are related. There lie the antinomies and the ambivalence of modernity. Confronted with economic and political institutions that control role performances in their realms, the individual recognizes the limits of his autonomy and confines the

28. See "Symposium on Narcissism," *Telos* 44 (Summer 1980), pp. 49-126.
29. Luckmann, *op.cit.*, p. 98.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
31. Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, 1976).
32. Robertson, *op.cit.*, pp. 308-313.
33. Luckmann, *op.cit.*, p. 116.

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quest for self-realization to the private sphere. Thus, human consciousness, i.e., "inner man," becomes liberated from the social structure. But this unprecedented freedom and the withdrawal of the individual to a private world also make it unlikely that a new objectified sacred cosmos could originate from this private world and humanize the social structure. In this sense, for Luckmann, modern man is condemned to anomie. His analysis concludes with the pessimistic note: "it is unlikely that the trend we have tried to describe is reversible — even if such a reversal were considered desirable."[34]

If Luckmann's pessimistic resignation fits within the context of the German Lutheran tradition of the doctrine of the two realms, a realm of freedom and one of unfreedom, Bellah's work has to be understood within the more optimist Anglo-Saxon, ascetic-activist Puritan tradition of world transformation in accordance with the divine plan. Bellah also takes as his point of departure the decline of established religion. In his search for functional equivalents of old religions, Bellah has found two different, though not unrelated, "modern" religions. The first one is individual religiosity or, rather, the religion of the autonomous self, a conception similar to Luckmann's. This individual form of religion serves to integrate the private systems of meaning. The other form of religion, "civil religion," is a collective one that serves social integration and the production and reproduction of collective myths and identities.

The first conception of modern religion is developed by Bellah in the context of his theory of religious evolution. The basic premise of the theory is that "religious symbolization . . . tends to change over time, at least in some instances, in the direction of more differentiated, comprehensive and, in Weber's sense, more rationalized formulations."[35] At each stage a characteristic symbol system emerges and, related with it, a different conception of religious action, of the religious actor, of religious organization and of the place of religion in society. Moreover, religious evolution is related to the general process of sociocultural evolution. Bellah distinguishes five stages in the evolution of religion: primitive, archaic, historic, early modern and modern. While the first three stages are conceptualized as general ideal types drawn from a variety of cases, early modern religion is a historical ideal type based on its historical paradigmatic form, the Protestant Reformation. Modern religion is the result of a further intellectual rationalization and self-reflective elaboration of early modern religion.

According to Bellah, the seeds of modern religion are to be found in historical religion (Weber's "world religions"), because it is there that "a clearly structured conception of the self" emerges out of the identity diffusion of the previous stages. The *differentia specifica* of historical religions is their "dualism"

34. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

35. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," in *Beyond Belief*, p. 24. It appeared first in *The American Sociological Review* (29:3, 1964) together with Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society" and S.N. Eisenstadt, "Social Evolution," and marked the emergence of the new evolutionary trend in structural-functionalism.

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and "transcendentalism" which break through the cosmological monism of archaic religion. Some kind of rejection or transcendence of this world in the direction of the other world now determines the quest for salvation. Man is defined as being capable of salvation, making possible for the first time to conceive of man as such. At least in this relative sense, all historical religions are universalistic. The differentiation of religious organizations, however, introduces a new dualistic differentiation between religious elites and laymen.

Early modern religion breaks through the dualism of historical religion. The hierarchical structuring of this world and the other world collapses and although a tension remains between the two worlds, salvation is no longer to be found in withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities. The Reformation also broke through the Catholic mediated system of salvation, declaring universal priesthood and universal salvation (potentially) available to all believers irrespective of their station or calling. With the disappearance of the structures of mediation, "early modern *religious symbolism* concentrates on the direct relation between the individual and transcendent reality . . . and religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life."[36] The stress on faith rather than on particular religious acts and the demand to integrate the whole of life in the service of God furthers the process of identity unification, while the acceptance of the world as the arena in which to prove one's calling in working out the divine command crystallizes into world-transforming ascetisism. "Religious impulses give rise to a variety of institutional structures, from the beginning or very soon becoming fully secular." However, the impact of religious orientations on society is not direct but "mediated by a variety of worldly institutions in which religious values have been expressed."[37] Society, to be sure, becomes secular. But in an ironic reversal of the secularization thesis, Bellah, following Parsons, sees the structural differentiation and the original development of modern society in almost cultural deterministic terms, as the progressive institutionalization of Christian religious values in all subsystems and spheres of life.[38]

In such a conception, the very distinction between religious and secular becomes irrelevant. Modern religion advances this process even further by undermining the traditional hierarchic dualistic religious symbol system. The return to primitive monism, however, is impossible and "an infinitely multiplex world" comes to replace the single duplex structure. In such a condition, religion can no longer ground itself metaphysically and is forced to ground itself in ethical life. The process of symbolization becomes self-reflective and every fixed position becomes open to question. Like Luckmann, Bellah also thinks that any analysis which concentrates on church religiosity misses the true nature of modern religion for, "the symbolization of man's relation to the ultimate conditions of his existence is no longer the

36. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
38. Talcott Parsons, "Christianity and Modern Industrial Society," in E. Tiryakian, ed., *Sociological Theory, Values and Socio-Cultural Change* (Glencoe, Ill., 1963); and "The Symbolic Environment of Modern Economies," *Social Research*, 46:3 (1979).

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monopoly of any groups explicitly labeled religious.[39] Each individual has to appropriate and reinterpret those ultimate meanings. Troeltsch's "individual mysticism" becomes the religions organization of the future, if not yet of the present — a form of religiosity expressed paradigmatically in Payne's expression "My mind is my church" or in Jefferson's "I am a sect to myself." Although traditional religious symbolisms may persist, each man is ultimately responsible for the choice of his symbolism or for the personal appropriation of traditional symbolisms. In this sense, modern religion serves to ground and legitimate the autonomy of the self. But while Luckmann recognized that this autonomy was restricted to the private sphere of the inner self, Bellah's conception of the autonomous individual is much more sanguine. "The fundamental symbolization of modern man and his situation," writes Bellah, "is that of a dynamic multidimensional self capable, within limits, of continual self-transformation and capable, again within limits, of remaking the world, including the very symbolic forms with which he deals with it, even the forms that state the unalterable conditions of his own existence."[40]

What permits Bellah to have such a view of individual autonomy is his idealist conception of modern social structures as the institutionalized expression of religious values. Where Luckmann saw disjunct autonomous spheres functioning in accordance with their own principles and devoid of any overarching principle or higher coordination, Bellah sees a multiplicity of structures functionally integrated into a meaningful system. Such a system, however, cannot be simply integrated through the aggregation of "dynamic multidimensional selves." It needs also a collective system of ultimate symbols to integrate social structure, culture and personality into a meaningful whole. This is what Bellah calls civil religion.[41] It is not necessary to discuss here Bellah's unabashedly ideological and theological conception of the American nation, its collective identity and its principles as "The Promised Land" and "The Chosen People," whose divine mission and manifest destiny it is to show the way to the rest of the world. Bellah himself always insisted that civil religion was an ideal, that American society was far from having realized those principles. Yet, Bellah argued that as long as the civil religion had some hold upon its believers, its norms could always serve as the basis for an immanent critique of existing reality. But the Vietnam War, the student revolt, the counter-culture, racial conflicts and, finally, Watergate, all served to shatter the illusion that the civil religion was anything but an ideological veil. It was in this mood of disillusion that Bellah wrote *The Broken Covenant.* "Today," he writes, "the American civil religion is an empty and broken shell."[42]

Behind the theological rhetoric one can find a clearly and forcefully developed argument stating that the project of American modernity, a project that Bellah's analysis unfolds from America's "myth of origin" through its

39. Bellah, *Beyond Belief,* p. 42.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Robert Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Daedalus,* 96:1 (1967); Russell Richey and Donald Jones, eds., *op.cit.*
42. Bellah, *The Broken Covenant,* p. 142.

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transformations into the present, has failed and that it is necessary to reassess the American past, present and future in this light. Bellah's analysis can be read as a self-reflective analysis of the crisis of modernity. His own conception of modernity makes him keenly aware of the dialectics of religious rationalization. Moreover, as a student of comparative religion within a historical, evolutionary and civilizational framework, Bellah is equally aware of the difficulties of reconstructing any religious tradition in the modern world. He himself has been an avid participant and critical observer of it.[43] Yet, despite his deep religious convictions, he is much more aware of its limits than many who have just discovered the transformation potential of religion. Before analyzing this revival, it may be helpful to describe the situation of religion in the modern world prior to it. The first step in any analysis would have to be to separate the different components of the revival. In terms of religious form, content or symbolism one would have to distinguish between four different phenomena: a) new religious movements; b) new forms of religiosity or private secular quests for salvation; c) the fundamentalist revival; and d) the renewal of the established churches, particularly of Catholicism.

A) *New Religious Movements*

The emergence of new religious movements has particularly been an American phenomenon, but is now also spreading through Europe.[44] The emergence of new religious sects and religious revivals and reawakenings have been constant in American history. What is new about the religious sects and movements that emerged in the 1960s is their appeal to youth, especially its most educated and privileged sectors, and their predominantly non-Biblical origins. Most of the new religions, like the Healthy-Happy-Holy Organization, the Hare Krishna, the Divine Light Mission of the Maharai Ji and the like, come from the East, from different variants of the Hinduist, Buddhist and Taoist traditions. Some of them, however, like The Church of Satan, Scientology, the Jesus People and the People's Temple, may have their roots either in repressed traditions of satanism and witchcraft, in modern scientistic traditions or in the Western Christian tradition. Moreover, although this is a significantly different phenomenon, there have also appeared among oppressed groups and marginal minorities, new or revived versions of messianic and doomsday cults, which have their roots in either the Judeo-Christian millenarian tradition or in nativistic cults.[45]

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43. Charles Y. Glock and Robert Bellah, eds., *The New Religious Consciousness* (Berkeley, 1976).

44. J. Needleman and G. Baker, eds., *Understanding the New Religions* (New York, 1978); Eileen Barker, ed., *New Religious Movements* (New York, 1982); Roy Wallis, *The Rebirth of the Gods? Reflections on the New Religions in the West* (Belfast, 1978); "Social Dissension of Young People and New Religious Movements," *Social Compass*, 30:1 (1983); I. Zaretsky and M. Leone, eds., *Religious Movements in Contemporary America* (Princeton, 1974); Thomas Robbins, Dick Anthony and James Richardson, "Theory and Research on Today's 'New Religions,'" *Sociological Analysis*, 39:2 (1978).

45. Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults* (New York, 1963).

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The most significant of the new religions originated in the counter-culture of the '60s and were in many respects the counterpart of the New Left and of radical politics. They shared with the latter the rejection of the capitalist world, the critique of the establishment and its logic of bureaucratic domination, instrumental rationalization, one-dimensionality and commodification, as well as the critique of bourgeois ideologies of possessive individualism, utilitarianism, careerism and the repressive work ethic. But the direction of this rejection was altogether different. Eschewing any attempt to transform or even to confront the world through radical politics, the new religions opted for a flight into innerworldly mysticism either through meditation techniques imported from the East or through altered individual experiences. Most of the new religions faded away in the '70s together with the counter-culture and with radical politics — and for the same combination of reasons: the repressive tolerance of the system, the logic of consumerism which converted them into fashionable fads and the prolonged economic crisis. As it became soon evident on campuses and throughout society, the values of civil and familial-vocational privatism reasserted themselves in an even more cynical form. Some of the movements, especially the most explicitly religious and totalitarian ones, have survived the counter-culture, playing a rescue-mission function for those disoriented by the drug culture or disillusioned with radical politics.[46]

But the impact of the new religions on modern culture was considerable, even though it was primarily a negative impact, eroding even further not only bourgeois ideologies but the modern idea of progress and Western tradition as a whole. In this sense, the new religions were both symptoms of and contributed further to not only the legitimation crisis of advanced capitalism but the general crisis of modernity.[47] At first, Eastern religions and forms of spirituality provided a more radical source of negativity than did biblical religions, since the latter were viewed as part, indeed as the very source of the tradition being rejected. Inner experience, harmony with nature and intense relation to a guru became the paradigmatic expressions of the negation of external achievement, the exploitation of nature and impersonal organization. The distinction between God, self and nature, which is central to the biblical traditions and had served to ground "transcendence," "autonomy," and the instrumental "rational" attitude towards nature, became diffused through immanentist, pantheistic conceptions that emphasized the experience of mystical illumination and the search for unity with nature and the universe in the attempt to overcome all subject-object dualisms. But instead of bringing the return of the sacred and a halt to the process of secularization, the new religions contributed even further to the erosion of Western religious traditions which now had to compete with new additions to the religious

46. Robert Bellah, "New Religious Consciousness and the Crisis in Modernity," in Glock and Bellah, eds., *op.cit.*, pp. 342ff.

47. Gabriel Almond, Marvin Chodorow and Roy Harvey Pearce, eds., *Progress and its Discontents* (Berkeley, 1982).

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supermarket. The choice of the individual religious consumer has, no doubt, been enriched and spiritual insights from the East have been incorporated into the Western religious tradition, but this has not led to a re-strengthening either of religion or of tradition, but has only served to make more visible the plausibility problem for both.

Moreover, if the inability of the established religions to fulfill the demand for meaning, belonging and deep religious experience were the ground for the favorable reception of the new religions, those religions have ultimately also proved unable to satisfy those needs that now, like all consumer needs, only continue expanding with greater satisfaction. The reception of Eastern religiosity in the West also signaled the globalization of culture that accompanies the internalization of capital. But instead of testifying to the "universal significance" of Western civilization, it only shows the particular nature of all civilizations. There will be many attempts to build new eclectic mixtures of East and West, but such eclecticism only makes it more unlikely that a new monolithic credo may emerge out of the modern religious pantheon, though there may be some authoritarian attempts to impose unity. The Unification Church of the Rev. Sun Myung Moon is one of the most prominent and paradigmatic examples of that eclecticism that has been able to unify the most negative elements of East and West.[48]

The new religions signified furthermore not only the loss of appeal of the old religions and their inability to provide meaning even to those seeking religious salvation, but also the crisis of Western rationality, not so much at the philosophical-theoretical level, where it had already become evident at the turn of the century, but at the level of everyday life. Early Christian theology, i.e., the theoretical reflection on the Christian faith and praxis, developed in a complex confrontation with Hellenistic philosophy, Gnosticism, the mystery cults and Roman state religion. Christian theology found its own identity in confrontation with each of them, though in turn it borrowed from them all. Although from the viewpoint of the history of ideas it is the confrontation between faith and reason that is usually stressed, it was the confrontation with religious competitors that from a socio-historical perspective was more relevant in the formation of Christianity's self-identity. The opposition between faith and reason was never absolute. From Greek philosophy, Christian theology learned the obligation to give an intellectual account of its faith and to validate its claims through rational discourse, even though this discourse has remained consistently distorted by dogmatic foundations and by inquisitorial church politics. But against the initiate and ineffable character of the doctrines of the mystery cults, Christianity stressed the Logos of the Incarnate Word, Jesus Christ. The mystery of the Cross had nothing secret or ineffable about it. It was rather a scandal, the public and most radical expression of the confrontation of Jesus with the logic of this world. Eastern mysticism, by contrast,

48. Dick Anthony and Thomas Robbins, "The Effect of Detente on the Rise of New Religions: The Unification Church of Reverend Sun Myung Moon," in Needleman and Baker, eds., *op.cit.*

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stresses the ineffable character of the religious experience. The emphasis is rather on direct experience, unmediated by reflective thinking. The surrender of reflective conscience and the extreme authoritarian patterns of the oriental sects that have proliferated in the West go hand in hand. But the Eastern sects are not the only ones with authoritarian tendencies. The authoritarian record of Western religion is bleak enough and the tragedy of the People's Temple in Jonestown, a sectarian degeneration of the Western millenarian tradition, shows the demonic power latent in all religions.

B) *New Forms of Individual Religiosity: The Human Potential Movement*

If the new religions express above all the quest for community and security, and the surrender of individual autonomy, the diverse manifestations of the so-called "Human potential movement" are more typical expressions of the modern secular quest for salvation.[49] Although in terms of spiritual techniques and doctrines, many of the consciousness-raising, body-awareness and mind-control groups that constitute the human potential movement or the encounter culture have many similarities with the new Eastern religions: their main differences are organizational. While the latter are generally rigid organizations that often demand conversion and total commitment from their members, the former are usually "cults," i.e., loose associations of people with a private, eclectic religiosity or, sometimes, no more than service agencies marketing all kinds of psychotherapies of salvation, which combine psychologistic doctrines with a veneer of scientific ideology, Eastern spiritual insights, and meditation techniques. Encounter groups such as Gestalt Awareness Training, Transactional Analysis, Transcendental Meditation, Est, *Primal Therapy*, *Psychosynthesis*, *Bioenergetics*, *Silva Mind Control* and numerous other brand names offer techniques for personal salvation and self-enhancing lifestyles based on the sacralization of the narcissist self. Puritan self-abasement has been replaced by self-indulgence.

While the new religions did not share the political confrontational strategy of the New Left nor their project of structural change, their strategy of withdrawal from society in order to establish separate social and cultural enclaves, often meant as exemplary anticipations of the future society, could still testify to religion's power of negativity. The new religion of narcissism makes each person a God unto himself and reduces the size of the religious covenant to a single believer. But even though it is a subjective search for subjectivity that reflects the loss of subjectivity and the diffusion of self generated by capitalist rationalization, each individual still needs the mirror image of other individuals to reconfirm his faith in the truth of his own self. Any transcending reference beyond the self, to God, human solidarity, public responsibility, civic morality or even personal reciprocal obligations tends to disappear. That any public philosophy, not to speak of the return of the sacred, could emerge from this is preposterous.

To these psychologistic forms of religiosity, one would have to add the

49. Donald Stone, "The Human Potential Movement," in Glock and Bellah, eds., *op.cit.*

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regressions to primitive and archaic forms of religiosity, such as astrology, spiritism, occultism, satanism, UFO cults and the like.[50] This regression testifies to the disintegration of reason in the rationally administered society. But it is even less unlikely that such a regression could lead to the reconstitution of the sacred or to the re-enchantment of the world. Modern man's surrender of his inner autonomy to mysterious psychical, natural or celestial forces may be correlated with the surrender of his external autonomy to equally unknown social forces. But neither these mysterious forces nor the magical techniques used to conjure them, manifest the serious and absolute nature that Durkheim attributed to things sacred.[51]

C) *The Fundamentalist Revival*

The new religious phenomena analyzed so far may be the most typical expression of modern religiosity and one may ask with Durkheim "if they are not destined to be the pre-eminent form of the religious life and if the day will not come when there will be no other cult than that which each man will freely perform within himself."[52] Nevertheless, in terms of membership figures and of social influence, fundamentalism and the established churches are still much more significant religious phenomena in the modern world. Fundamentalist revivals and reawakenings have been common in American history, and although there are some fundamentalist trends in contemporary Catholicism and Judaism, fundamentalism is still a predominantly Protestant phenomenon.[53] Lipsitz has already analyzed the nature of the contemporary fundamentalist revival. The question is whether the present fundamentalist revival could be viewed as the newest manifestation of the cyclically recurrent revivals, typical of American religious history, which as in the past will eventually lead to a realignment of religion and society in a new established religion, or whether, as Lipsitz argues, "the current relation between revival religion and the right wing may in fact backfire into a social practice more conducive to opposition to the right than support of it."[54]

Pritchard has developed an analytical framework for the study of the Second Great Awakening (1820-1860) which she thinks is applicable to all revivals including the present one. She divides the Second Awakening into four stages: "In Stage One, social and economic changes undermined established religion, that is, religion as it was constituted prior to the Second Great Awakening. In Stage Two, new theological perspectives and religious practices, emerging out of the specific social changes of the period, began to

50. Cf. E. Tiryakian, ed., *On the Margins of the Visible* (New York, 1974).

51. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (New York, 1965), pp. 51-63.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

53. Sidney Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven, 1972); Linda K. Pritchard, "Religious Change in Nineteenth-Century America," in Glock and Bellah, eds., *op.cit.*; Meredith McGuire, *Control of Charisma: A Sociological Interpretation of the Catholic Pentecostal Movement* (Philadelphia, 1981); Bernard Martin, ed., *Movement and Issues in American Judaism: An Analysis and Sourcebook of Developments Since 1945* (Westport, Conn., 1978).

54. George Lipsitz, "The Drum Major Instinct and Fundamentalist Religion in the United States," *Telos* 58 (Winter 1983-84), p. 96; Lowell Streiker and Gerald Strober, *Religion and the New Majority: Billy Graham, Middle America and the Politics of the 70s* (New York, 1972).

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challenge established religion. In Stage Three, a host of new sects developed in response to the new social structure. In Stage Four, the religious upheaval culminated in the development of a new established religion that realigned religion and society."[55] Since the 1960s we have gone through the first three stages. The question is whether Stage Four is likely to arrive and, if so, whether fundamentalism is the most likely candidate to play this function.

Ahlstrom speaks of the 1960s as the end of the Puritan epoch in America — an argument anticipated by Tillich. According to Tillich, "the Protestant principle is in contradiction to the newly emerging principles of social organization,"[56] meaning that the tendency towards the bureaucratic centralized administration of society undermines the Protestant principle of individual autonomy. Though in 1937 Tillich was primarily referring to the rise of communism and fascism and to the authoritarian tendencies of the capitalist state, his analysis anticipates the erosion of the Protestant-bourgeois ethic by state interventionism, welfare politics, corporate capitalist organizations and the consumer industry. Following this erosion, established religion began to be challenged on two fronts. From the inside, new theological perspectives emerged — secular theology, Death of God Theology, secular ethics — which in their haste to adapt to new socio-historical changes, offered uncritical religious legitimations of secular processes as manifestations of the hidden designs of Divine Providence or accepted self-destruction and the end of all transcendence as the logical and, therefore, legitimate culmination of Christian intellectual rationalization.[57] In the process, religion lost its critical negativity. From the outside, new religious movements began to proliferate and to compete with established religions. These new religions either were more attuned to the new ethos required by advanced capitalism or reasserted the critical force of religious negation *vis-à-vis* a meaningless and unholy world.

This is the context within which the Protestant fundamentalist backlash has to be understood. It is a traditionalist reaction against the internal and external attacks on the American Protestant tradition. But it is a special kind of religious tradition it defends. If it were an authentic defense of religion against the forces of secularization, it would at least give testimony to the power of negation of religion, not unlike Karl Barth's "neo-orthodox" post-WWI reaction against the capitulation of German liberal theology to the secular trends of the modern world.[58] By stressing the absolute transcendence of God and the radical separation between the sacred and the profane, Barth was con-

55. Pritchard, *op.cit.*, p. 299.

56. Ahlstrom, *op.cit.*; Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era* (Chicago, 1957), p. 222.

57. Harvey Cox, *The Secular City* (New York, 1965); John Robinson, *Honest to God* (London, 1963); Thomas Altizer and William Hamilton, *Radical Theology and the Death of God* (Indianapolis, 1966); Thomas Altizer, ed., *Toward a New Christianity: Readings in the Death of God Theology* (New York, 1967).

58. Karl Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man* (London, 1928). For a good review of modern theology and its relation to history, progress and secularization see Martin E. Marty, "The Idea of Progress in Twentieth Century Theology," in G. Almond, M. Chodorow and R.H. Pearce (eds.), *op. cit.*

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demning man's temptation to use religion to legitimate his own secular works. Fundamentalism makes a virtue out of this temptation. Since the premise of American fundamentalism is the sacralization of particular bourgeois values and institutions that corresond to the liberal phase of capitalism but have no longer an affinity with advanced capitalism and the interventionist welfare state, there is a certain logic to the fundamentalist political and economic agenda, in its attempt to redress the socio-structural changes and to realign the economy and the state with fundamentalist principles.

But there are also some serious inconsistencies. Of course, the dismantling of the interventionist state and the return to the liberal phase of capitalism may be structurally impossible and the fundamentalist rhetoric serves only as an ideological screen to rearrange the priorities of state intervention in an effort to find a solution to the fiscal crisis and to the crisis of crisis management. More importantly, in the fundamentalist model there is a contradiction between a free unregulated market economy and an administered culture, between the demand that the state take its hands off the economy and the attempt to regulate private morality through legislation. This is the main difference between contemporary fundamentalism and previous fundamentalist awakenings. Recognizing its powerlessness to convert sinners to its moral vision and unable to maintain its monopolistic advantage in the religious market, fundamentalism wants to conquer the state and impose its vision on the rest of the population. The social system model of fundamentalism presupposes mercantilism in the private sphere, liberalism in the economic sphere and technocracy in the political sphere. It is doubtful that such a curious blend of antinomic principles can solve the cultural contradictions of advanced capitalism. Instead of signaling the return of religion, the fundamentalist revival again shows the triumph of secularization over religion. It is not only the secularization of techniques of conversion and the management of charisma, so typical of electronic evangelicalism, that may serve as an indication, but the way in which the symbols themselves and the religious contents have been secularized. Moreover, the confusion of cause and effect leads to propose as remedy to the spiritual-moral crisis the very same moral principles that were eroded by the process of capitalist rationalization and which now are presented as the condition for further capitalist rationalization.[59]

I do not think we are entering into Stage Four, nor that fundamentalism is likely to become the new established religion able to realign religion and society. One should not underestimate the political dangers implied in the fundamentalist attempt to impose its religion on society, thus creating a different kind of realignment than the one envisioned by Pritchard. But the attempt is likely to fail, if only because, as Lipsitz points out, any attempt to reimpose a fundamentalist version of civil religion would have to meet the prophetic challenges of other versions of the civil religion coming from the

59. See Jürgen Habermas, "Neoconservative Culture Criticism in the United States and West Germany" *Telos* 56, Summer 1983.

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same biblical tradition. This irreducibly ambiguous nature of civil religion, combining both an integrative and a transformative function, a conservative as well as a utopian element, has been emphasized by Bellah, who now proposes a new socialist version of the American civil religion in order to mend the broken covenant.[60]

Lipsitz's argument also deals with other significant aspects of the fundamentalist revival, i.e., the ambiguous nature of the repoliticization of religion and the remoralization of politics implied by it. On the one hand, the politicization of religion could contribute to the repoliticization of certain issues that have been excluded from a shrinking public sphere and displaced either into the inner private sphere (value decisionism) or into a depoliticized administrative sphere (technocracy). By again opening up those issues to public discourse, the repoliticization of religion could contribute to the repoliticization of civil society. On the other hand, however, the repoliticization of religion could also lead into its opposite. If those issues are not laid open to public discourse, but are rather subjected to the authority of tradition, dogma, or the literal reading of the Bible, the politicization of religion could lead to the destruction of the autonomy of both the private and the public sphere. This is the central question in any discussion of the emancipatory potential of religion. Relevant is not whether a particular church sides with the left or with the right on a particular issue, but whether it allows the issue to be made public, i.e., open to deliberasion through rational discourse. Otherwise, one is in danger of using a double standard in welcoming the Catholic involvement in politics in favor of nuclear disarmament, while attacking the fundamentalist right wing's involvement as a dangerous interference in the political arena that threatens the separation of church and state.

D) *The Renewal of the Established Churches: Catholicism*

The argument so far may be interpreted as an attempt to deny the transformative potential of religion. This would be a misreding. Anybody who has studied seriously Weber's sociology of religion knows of the great transformative potential of religion in the past. What is at issue is whether the process of secularization has left this transformative potential undiminished and whether such a socio-religious transformation is desirable, assuming it is still possible. It may be true that, as Bellah says, "we certainly need a new 'Great Awakening' " to get out of the present cultural malaise, or one may think with Bell that the return of the sacred could overcome the nihilism of modernist culture.[61] But since the Spirit moves whenever and wherever It wills and the Sacred does not lend itself to manipulation, only those who believe in the hidden designs of Providence working through history or those who feel awe and fascination towards the *mysterium tremendum* are entitled to welcome unreservedly such a reawakening or such a return. Anything else is political irrespon-

60. Bellah, *The Broken Covenant*, particularly the last two chapters, "The American Taboo on Socialism" and "The Birth of New American Myths."

61. *Ibid.*, p. 162; Daniel Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?" *op. cit.*

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sibility, for we do not know whether religious politics may not have dangerous unintended consequences. Heilbroner, for instance, has also observed the increasing difficulty of business civilization to provide social morale and suspects that a new religious orientation may be a major force for the transformation of this civilization. He thinks, however, that "a high degree of political authority will ble inescapable" in the future and that "the deification of the state . . . seems therefore the most likely replacement for the deification of materialism that is the unacknowledged religion of our business culture."[62]

Today, the emancipatory potential of religion refers primarily to the established churches' ability to challenge the powers that be, to the recent development of theologies of liberation, and to the demonstrated moral commitment of religious people to the struggle for justice, peace and freedom in this world. Without favoring one church over others, I have decided to analyze the Catholic renewal for various reasons. First and most simply, because it happens to be the church I know best. Second, because lately it has been more active in political struggles throughout the world than any other church. Finally, because Catholicism has a greater universal significance than Judaism, Eastern Orthodoxy or the many Protestant denominations, not only because of its greater global expansion but precisely because of its "catholic," i.e., universal, claims. No other religion represents all classes, nations, continents and races as does Catholicism. Moreover, this universality is tied to a notion that is not only theoretical but actually felt of being a concrete, substantive people, i.e., an actual historical community with a living tradition. Notwithstanding the universal potential and world-historical significance of its religious message, as an institutionalized religion, Judaism has been unable to transcend its tribal identity.[63] This is not meant to underestimate the crucial significance of the Jewish defense of its particular tradition nor its at times heroic resistance against the structural forces working to reduce the other to uniformity and to subsume the particular into the universal. As for Protestantism, it is tied much more than Catholicism to Western civilization and to a particular stage of that civilization, i.e., the bourgeois-capitalist epoch. Thus, it is less likely that Protestantism may play a creative role in any attempt to transcend the bourgeois-capitalist project of modernity.[64] Today, of course,

62. Robert Heilbroner, *Business Civilization in Decline* (New York, 1976), pp. 119-120.

63. Benjamin Nelson, *The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood* (Chicago, 1969).

64. The Protestant theologian, Langdon Gilkey captures well the situation of present-day Protestantism: "The reason for this apparent lack of creative potential is not so much the paucity of good theological minds in Protestantism as the evident weakness of present Protestantism as a form of communal church life. Related essentially to the bourgeois middle-class worlds of Europe, Britain and America, and in the last two to the wasp worlds of small towns and suburbs, Protestantism seems despite its conservative and neo-conservative theologies of transcendence, to have been so engulfed in that world as merely to reproduce the individualistic, quantitive, moralistic, nonemotional, and in many respects naturalistic bourgeois world in ecclesiastical form. Its sense of community is weak, or else defined entirely by its middle class, white parameters; its liturgical life and its experiential potential are almost nonexistent; its experience of the holy in sermon, sacrament or common prayer is fleeting at best; and its ethical existence is largely an anachronistic individual moralism subscribed to by all in theory but practiced only by its cleri-

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one also has to deal with the lively ferment introduced by feminist theology, the wider expansion of political theologies and theologies of revolution that have entered into creative dialogue with Latin American liberation theology and, most importantly, the renewal of the Protestant churches in Europe in connection with their involvement with the peace movement, which has prompted them to enter, for the first time in many years, into a dialogue with youth and to reflect theologically upon vital issues.[65] Yet, the overall negative appraisal is still accurate.

At any rate, it is in the Catholic confrontation with modernity that one may find a new creative synthesis of modernity and the Gospel. Indeed, the long resistance of Catholicism to modernity and its residual and ambiguous ambivalence towards it, even after it had officially recognized it in the Second Vatican Council, is the source of Catholicism's strength and potential, but also the cause for caution — at least for those who want to maintain and to further the achievements of modernity. The Council officially put an end to the Counter-Reformation, to counter-revolution and to counter-modernity. As such, the Council only legitimated a process of theological reflection and praxis that had gained impetus after World War II, though it had earlier roots.[66] The change, nonetheless, was sudden and radical. Until the 1950s the language predominantly used in Catholic seminaries and universities was that of medieval scholastic philosophy and theology. Ten years later, no young priest understood that language anymore. The language and the metaphysical world view on which it was based collapsed, putting an end to the typical dualism of "historical" religion. Catholicism became this-worldly.

Catholic theologians and intellectuals began to search for new modes of theological expression entering into a creative dialogue with Protestant theology, but also with modern philosophies and social theories. To a large extent,

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cal leaders . . . Only in the pentecostal communities — which Protestantism seems to become when it is not middle-class — in the black churches, in the inner-city experiments, and in some very lively but restricted academic and seminary communities, does Protestantism at the present seem to possess a communal spiritual life strong enough to provide a matrix for such a valid intellectual synthesis; and none of those fringe communities to mainline Protestantism are for a variety of intelligible reasons capable of effecting that creative synthesis." Langdon Gilkey, *Catholicism Confronts Modernity. A Protestant View* (New York, 1975) p. 14.

65. Carol P. Christ, "The New Feminist Theology; A Review of the Literature," in *Religious Studies Review* 3, October 1977; Mary Daly, *Beyond God the Father* (Boston, 1973); and *Gyn/Ecology: The Meta-Ethics of Radical Feminism* (Boston, 1978); Gayraud S. Wilmore and James H. Cone (eds.), *Black Theology: A Documentary History, 1966-1979* (Maryknoll, 1979); Dorothee Sölle, *Political Theology* (Philadelphia, 1974); and *Revolutionary Practice* (Maryknoll, 1977); Jürgen Moltmann, *Religion, Revolution and the Future* (New York, 1969); *Hope and Planning* (London, 1971) and *The Crucified God* (London, 1974); Frederick Herzon (ed.), *The Future of Hope. Theology as Eschatology* (New York, 1970); Wolfgang Pannenberg, *Theology and the Kingdom of God* (Philadelphia, 1969); Trutz Rendtorf — Heinz Eduard Tödt, *Theologie der Revolution. Analysen und Materialien* (Frankfurt, 1968); Brian Mahan and L. Dale Richesin (ed.) The *Challenge of Liberation Theology: A First World Response* (Maryknoll, 1981); John C. Raines and Thomas Dean (eds.), *Marxism and Radical Religion* (Philadelphia, 1970); Alistair Kee (ed.), *A Reader in Political Theology* (Philadelphia, 1974); Timothy Garton Ash, "Swords into Ploughshares: the Unofficial 'Peace Movement' and the Churches in East Germany," in *Religion in Communist Lands*, 11, 3, 1983; Klaus Ehring and Martin Dallwitz, *Schwerter zu Pflugscharen: Friedensbewegungen in der DDR* (Hamburg, 1982).

66. See Giuseppe Chiarante, "From Pius XII to John Paul II," in *Telos* (Winter 1983-84), pp. 75-82.

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the Catholic *aggiornamento* amounts to a process of Protestantification, but not completely or solely. Certain elements from traditional Catholicism have been maintained while other elements from Protestantism have not been adopted. Catholicism has finally recognized the legitimacy of modernity and accepted the autonomy of the secular spheres. However, it does not recognize this autonomy as absolute, nor does it accept the relegation of religion and morality to the private sphere. It maintains an organicist conception of society that demands that all its parts work toward the common good and be subordinated to higher moral principles. In this sense, it maintains the principle of communal ethical life. Therein lies the political nature of Catholicism as a religion which, however, can work both ways, in an integrative direction as a conservative ideology of legitimation or in a transformative direction when it confronts powers it considers illegitimate, i.e., immoral. Historically, we have been accustomed to the conservative function of Catholicism. Lately, we are becoming more aware of its transformative potential. Even in the U.S., where a heavily Protestantified and insecure Catholicism had lost its critical voice, it has regained it and, perhaps under the influence of the activist papacy of Karol Wojtila and following the example of other Catholic churches, particularly in Latin America, the American hierarchy has begun to speak out on public and private issues, on national and international ones. This is an important development since it opens up for public discussion issues that had been reserved either to the decision of the private conscience or to the administrative discretion of increasingly privatized public bodies. However, the fact that it is the hierarchy that speaks also indicates the limits of the emancipatory potential of unreformed Catholicism.

This emancipatory potential, moreover, will change from place to place depending on the type of domination from which emancipation is called forth and on the position of the church within the particular society. One can distinguish at least three different types of societies, in terms of the required types of emancipation or liberation. There are, first, those societies in which the primary task is emancipation from poverty caused by internal and external socio-economic oppression. Many Latin American societies are the paradigmatic example and it is here that the Catholic liberation theology has emerged in full force.[67] Actually, the intellectual roots of liberation theology may be found in Protestant social gospel and political theologies. However, in the bourgeois setting of Protestant societies these ideas failed to take root,[68] while they have blossomed in the social soil of Latin America. The most significant aspect of Latin American liberation theology is the fact that, unlike European Catholic political theology, it is not just the intellectual product of

67. Gustavo Guitérrez Merino, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation* (Maryknoll, 1973); Hugo Assman, *Teología de la praxis de la liberación: Ensayo teológico de la América dependiente* (Salamanca, 1973); José Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation* (Philadelphia, 1975); Rosino Gibellini (ed.), *Frontiers of Theology in Latin America* (Maryknoll, 1979); Juan Segundo, *A Theology for Artisans of a New Human City* 5 Vols. (Maryknoll, 1973-75); Alfredo Fierro, *The Militant Gospel* (Maryknoll, 1977).

68. H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America* (New York, 1937).

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theologians but is actually a social movement that encompasses intellectuals as well as *comunidades de base,* bishops as well as priests and nuns. In this sense, it is a social force to be reckoned with.

The impetus behind the movement was similar to the one behind the Second Vatican Council and the theological task was fundamentally the same: that of defining the situation of the Church in the world in order to formulate the meaning of the gospel for the present. In this endeavor, however, the Latin American bishops, particularly in the Medellin Conference and in later pronouncements, reached a different perception of the world than that worked out by Western theologians, who were largely identified with bourgeois culture and shared the optimism and belief in progress of their societies. Latin American priests who studied in European universities and Latin American bishops who took part in the Vatican Council confronted the new theological categories with Latin American social reality and came to very different conclusions than their European counterparts. They confronted a sinful (unjust) world dominated by evil structures (a system of exploitation) which denied salvation (freedom and well-being). Radical political impetus was gained from the realization that Catholicism in Latin America had played since colonial times a crucial ideological role in the political legitimation of these oppressive structures. Marxism provided the categories of class and socio-economic analysis as well as the model of a future liberated society. Theology was redefined as "critical reflection on praxis" and this reflection led to "the real demanding discovery of the world of the other: the poor, the marginal, exploited class of society."[69] This discovery led to the demand for a commitment to change the world. Paraphrasing Marx's 11th thesis on Feuerbach, Gutierrez argues that reflection and prophetic critique is not enough, "the social system itself, which creates and justifies this situation, is not really questioned unless a share is taken in the efforts to transform it radically and forge a different order."[70]

Although liberation theology has crucial relevance for emancipatory praxis, some critical issues require further reflection. One is the uncritical reception of Marxism as "a science of history" that hides its ideological functions. The other is the tendency to identify the Kingdom of God with a concrete socialist model of the future — a tendency that converts liberation theology into a science of legitimation undermining its utopian critical role. When Gutierrez writes that following "the change from the capitalist mode of production to the socialist model . . . man will have controlled nature, created the conditions for a socialized production of wealth, done away with private acquisition of excessive wealth and established socialism," liberation theology reproduces the economistic and productivistic logic of historical materialism.[71] When Cardenal writes: "For me, the Cuban experience was truly

69. Gustavo Gutiérrez, "Liberation Theology and Proclamation," in Quentin L. Quade (ed.), *The Pope and Revolution. John Paul II Confronts Liberation Theology* (Washington, D.C., 1982), p. 18.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

71. Guitérrez, *A Theology of Liberation,* p. 30.The fashionable attempts by Christian-Marxists to endow the Biblical faith with a "materialist" theoretical basis tend to be as utterly "reductionist"

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a revolution. I realized that Marxism was the solution, the only solution for Latin America" or "The new Cuban man is the same as the new Christian man" or "The Church has a very important mission to fulfill today in Latin America, that of proclaiming communism" or "Marx's communism is the same thing as that which we Christians understand by the Kingdom of God on earth,"[72] the theology of liberation has already become an ideology of legitimation. This does not mean that by acquiring this "scientific" legitimation religion loses its transformative potential. On the contrary, this potential is enhanced. But religion certainly loses its utopian transcendence. When Cardenal, the minister of culture in Nicaragua, admits that in Cuba there is no freedom of the press but adds that "the capitalist freedom of the press is not freedom but monopoly of thought and manipulation," that "the fact that there is no parliament nor presidential elections does not mean that there is no freedom . . . (since) the parliamentary system is nothing but formal democracy," and that "the power which Fidel has is the power of the people," one can no longer support unreservedly the Nicaraguan revolution.[73] Emancipation and liberation still lie off in the future.

There is a second type of society in which liberation presents itself as emancipation from a post-democratic authoritarian state. The cases of Franco's Spain or Pinochet's Chile may serve as examples. The primary task of emancipation in these cases is the reconstitution of civil society. Catholicism may play a crucial role in this reconstitution, particularly in those cases, as in Spain, where the church played a hierocratic role as the official church, or in those cases as in Poland, where the church is a national church and Catholicism serves as a crystallization of the collective national identity.[74] It is not only that the churches may serve as a haven for public discourse, a discourse that is not permitted elsewhere, but the Church itself may become the official voice of the aspirations of a society without voice. In the case of Spain, for instance, where the Church had played a crucial role in the establishment and legitimation of the regime, the disengagement of the Church from the regime and the recurrent tensions between them served as precipitating factors in the regime's crisis of legitimation. From the mid-1950s on, *engagé* Catholics figured prominently in all groups of the democratic opposition, from the monarchists to the extreme Left. As the Council movement also began to take hold in Spain, the official pronouncements of the Catholic hierarchy grew increasingly critical of the regime. Finally, the Church publicly acknowledged its sinful role in the Spanish Civil War, deploring its failure to serve the task of national and social reconciliation. Throughout the democratic transition, the

as the most "vulgar" Marxism. See F. Belo, *Lecture matérialiste de l'Evangile de Marc* (Paris, 1974) and M. Clevenot, *Approaches Matérialistes de la Bible* (Paris, 1976).

72. Ernesto Cardenal, *La Santidad de la Revolución* (Salamanca, 1978), pp. 27, 31, 56, 57.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 35. I have raised these and other critical issues in my "Conversation with Otto Maduro," in *Telos* 58, (Winter 1983-84), pp. 185-195.

74. See José Casanova, "Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain's Transition to Democracy," in *Social Research* 50, Winter 1983; Hugo Villela, "The Church and the Process of Democratization in Latin America," in *Social Compass*, XXVI / 2-3, 1979; Andrew Arato, "Civil Society vs. State," in *Telos* 47, (Spring 1981).

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Church played a low key yet positive role. Most important was probably its decision not to establish an official "Catholic" party or to support directly any of the Christian-Democratic parties, thus avoiding the clerical-anticlerical polarization that had been a constant feature of modern Spanish politics. A genuine desire for religious peace; the realization that the Catholic community, the clergy included, had become politically pluralistic and would not support a monolithic Christian party; and the fear that such an officially sponsored party could become a minority party and, thus, undermine the Church's claim that Catholicism was Spain's national religion, all these factors contributed to the political neutrality of the church during the transition. Spanish politics became secularized in spite of the fact that, as Linz points out, "the association between religiosity and political choice is clearer than between subjective class identification and party preference."[75]

The Spanish transition may serve to illustrate the dilemmas of the Catholic Church in modernizing Catholic societies, particularly in situations of political democratization. From Poland to Chile, from Spain to the Philippines, the Church has played or is playing a key role of mediation between a reemerging civil society and the authoritarian state. By denouncing the violation of fundamental civil rights while propagating a discourse of reconciliation and peace, the Church has created for itself a new social space where the diverse social classes and interests converge and interact. But in this very success there lies the danger that the Church may hesitate to work towards the full reconstitution of civil society, knowing that it will eventually lose its special social space. Once civil society is reconstituted, the Church can no longer claim to represent the people or to be the voice of those who have no voice. The voice of the Church becomes then only one among the many voices of civil society, having to validate its claims through public rational discourse and to represent its interests through democratic procedural rules. Confronted with such a prospect, the Church may be tempted to choose the role of mediation that it can play in authoritarian situations. As the cases of Poland and Chile indicate, this role permits the Church to select the demands coming from civil society. In the case of Chile, the Church tends to screen out those demands for social justice that may bring destabilization of the social order.

75. Juan J. Linz, "Religion and Politics in Spain: From Conflict to Consensus above Cleavage," in *Social Compass* XXVII, 2-3, 1980, p. 270. The constructive attitude and the willingness to compromise shown by all parties in the constitutional debates were also manifest in the discussion of church-state relations. The Church accepted the separation of church and state, abandoning the traditional defense of its special rights, though it was able to introduce a special mention of the Catholic Church into the constitution. Generally, one can say that the Church played a positive role in the reconstitution of civil society and in the democratization of the Spanish state. Once democracy was consolidated, however, the Church became just another particular interest group, though a specially powerful one, lobbying for the defense of its corporatist interests. On those issues which is considers to be its special domain namely, education, public morality and family life (i.e., religious instruction, abortion and divorce) the Church has reasserted its traditional defensive position, even though so far it has abstained from attempting to mobilize the Catholic population against the socialist government. On the constitutional process, see Antonio Hernandez Gil, *El Cambio politico español y la Constitución* (Barcelona, 1982). For the "Catholic" position see, Oscar Alzaga, *La Constitución Española de 1978* (Madrid, 1978).

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In the case of Poland, the Church tends to screen out those demands for political liberties that may jeopardize the *libertas ecclesiae* gained by the Church.[76] The Church can play a truly emancipatory role only if it allows for and legitimates the full autonomy of civil society and that of all political actors, even if this entails the emancipation of these actors from the Church's tutelary role.

In advanced capitalist societies, the role that Catholicism could play in emancipatory praxis is again different. Though economic and political oppression, particularly among large marginal minorities, are still widespread in some of these societies, the primary task of emancipation takes a different form. Emancipation has to be postulated as the liberation of man from the dehumanization of economic and political structures, from the bureaucratization and colonization of the life-world, from the atomization and fragmentation of social life, from the egotism and solipsism of the narcissist self, from the fetishism of commodities and from the commodification of culture. The monopolization of political life by a state governed by increasingly privatized administrative bodies that can be penetrated by corporatist interests but are not answerable to public democratic processes; the atomization and fragmentation of a civil society that translates the individual's private search for freedom, self-determination and satisfaction of needs into an antagonistic and un-solidary system of impersonal relations regulated either by the invisible hand of economic laws or by the administrative fiat of publicly unaccountable corporations; the transvaluation of human values entailed in a cultural system that transforms men into commodities, which subjects life to meaningless work and to the aimless accumulation of wealth, which converts the producers into idolatrous worshipers of their products, which raises money into the measure of all things and into the universal medium of human communication and exchange, and which reduces nature, culture and others to objects of exploitation, consumption and domination; the anarchic state of nature of an international order in which might rules over right, in which a handful of privileged nations squander the resources of the planet while the rest are unable to satisfy elementary human needs, in which imperialist *raisons d'état* justify the denial of political, economic and cultural self-determination to captive and dependent nations, in which "mad" strategies and a senseless arms race are leading the whole world into nuclear Armageddon: those are the evils of this world and the enemies of the soul that confront the Christian message and test its secular relevance.

By preaching the sanctity of life, the dignity of the human person, the brotherhood and sisterhood of humankind, the sacramental nature of work, the spiritual life-giving value of traditions, symbols and rituals, the communal

76. As Villela has pointed out, "The Church chooses from the aggregate of demands coming from the popular sectors those that do not contradict its project. It attenuates the radical nature of other demands so as to adjust them to its goals of social pacification and reconciliation. . . . The Church is converted into a principal actor, appropriating through its mediation the suffering of the popular sectors and subordinating them to a role of secondary actors or simple beneficiaries." Villela, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-271.

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bonds of society, the ecclesial character of the state and the subordination of everything to the *summum bonum,* the Church could contribute to the transcendence of existing reality. Of course, Catholicism is not the only religion which can offer testimony of these values, but it is in a special position precisely because of its ambiguous relation to the modern world. The traditional Catholic critique of capitalism, statism, scientism, materialism, individualism and modern anomie are today more relevant than ever and can play a critical role in any process of individual and collective reflection on the modern world. But the Catholic critique can be a positive one only if it amounts to something more than just a traditionalist rejection of modernity. Only a transcending critique that affirms such modern values as economic development, democracy and the rule of law, rational-scientific knowledge, the pursuit of happiness in this world, the autonomy of the self and the pluralism of interests, needs and values, while questioning at the same time the particular, historical, bourgeois-capitalist institutionalization of these values, only such a critique can play a positive role in a reconstructed project of modernity. But given the hierarchic and authoritarian tendencies of the Catholic Church and the dogmatism of its doctrines, the Catholic critique can only be credible if the Church becomes truly a universal ecclesia and institutionalizes the proclaimed universal priesthood of all believers, male and female, so that all its members can participate equally in the hermeneutic task of interpreting, appropriating and reproducing Christian traditions, symbols and rituals. The plebiscitarian populism of the Pope cannot be a substitute for a true democratic participation in the life of the Church, nor can the proclamations of the hierarchy shun rational public deliberation. Least of all should the Church exploit the fear of death and the insecurity of the individual in the modern world, nor profit irresponsibly from the general crisis of modernity and from the disenchantment of modern man with the faith in progress, science and reason.

Much of recent sociological and theological discourse about the return of the sacred, the revival of God and the coming of a post-modern age is problematic in that it tends either towards a re-functionalization of religion as the solution to the legitimation crisis of modernity or towards a fundamentalist rejection of modernity in the name of higher values that are not subjected to rational critical discourse. Even more problematic is the fact that this discourse is coming from intellectuals who only recently were proclaiming "the end of ideology," celebrating the deep biblical character of the secular city or defending the critical relevance of political theology.[77] Bell is counting on the return of the sacred to overcome the cultural contradictions of capitalism that

77. Cf. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York, 1961) and "The Return of the Sacred?" *op.cit.;* Harvey Cox, *The Secular City* (New York, 1966) and *Religion in the Secular City. Toward a Postmodern Theology* (New York, 1984); Dorothee Sölle, *Political Theology* (Philadelphia, 1974) and " 'Thou Shalt Have No Other Jeans Before Me' (Levi's Advertisement, early 1970s). The Need for Liberation in a Consumerist Society," in Brian Mehan and L. Dale Richesin, eds., *The Challenge of Liberation Theology. A First World Response* (Maryknoll, 1981).

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derive from the structural disjunction of the realms.[78] Autonomous modernist culture, he argues, has ended in an orgiastic, nihilistic frenzy. Religion is now supposed to come to pick up the pieces. "Will there be a return of the sacred, the rise of new religious modes? Of that I have no doubt," Bell writes, thus climbing what he had previously called "the faith ladder," "which in its vision of the future cannot distinguish possibilities from probabilities and converts the latter into certainties."[79] The various sources of Bell's certainty are not very well grounded. One finds, first, the unsociological underlying notion that necessity is the mother of invention and that the meaninglessness of modern culture will necessarily call forth the return of the sacred. There is, second, the functionalist assumption that both religion and the distinction between things sacred and things profane are human universals.[80] Finally, Bell reverts to an a-historical, naturalistic and mythical *ricorso* theory of religion and culture which simply disregards the findings of Weber's theory of religious rationalization and denies the possibility of any meaningful conceptualization of cultural development.

It may be true that, as Bell points out, culture is a response to the recurrent existential questions that are rooted in the human predicament, in "the fact that man is 'thrown' into the world."[81] But from the fact that "the questions always recur" it does not follow that the same answers always recur, nor that any answer may be at any time plausible, nor that the sacred is, therefore, likely to return. The curious thing about Bell's prophecy is that it is not based on any analysis of empirical trends. He is aware, of course, of the multiplicity of new religious movements but discards them as cults, arguing that they are not authentic religions but only transitory fads arising out of the very failure of authentic religion. Bell is equally aware of the fact that religions are not created by what he calls "engineers of the soul,"[82] that, as Weber said, "the need of literary, academic or cafe-society intellectuals to include religious feelings in the inventory of their sources of impressions and sensations, and among their topics for discussion, has never yet given rise to a new religion. . . . No matter how much the appearance of a widespread religious interest may be simulated, no new religion has ever resulted from the needs of intellectuals or from their chatter."[83] Bell knows, from Weber's studies, that new religions arise from prophetic-charismatic movements that break through the bonds of established tradition. But there are some problems with such a prospect. Bell insinuates that such a prophetic challenge may no longer be viable in the modern world, since there is no tradition, nor anything "to shatter or to tear down."[84] Moreover, Bell himself seems to be uneasy about such a prophetic-charismatic challenge for he realizes that such a religion would not respect the

78. Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, 1978).
79. Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?" *op.cit.*, p. 442, and *The End of Ideology*, *op.cit.*, p. 397.
80. Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, *op.cit.*, pp. 154-171.
81. Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?" *op.cit.*, p. 428.
82. Bell, *Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, *op.cit.*, p. xxix.
83. Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston, 1963), p. 137.
84. Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?" *op.cit.*, p. 443.

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modern disjunction of structural realms. A prophetic-charismatic movement would not only revolutionize the religious-cultural realm but the economic and political realms as well. Yet, Bell wants to save modernity from meaninglessness, not to destroy it. His vision of the future religion appears to be a more manageable and familiar conception of the sacred, a sacralization of tradition and ancestral ties, not unlike the Chinese ancestor's cult or the Roman *lares* religion.

In any case, Bell's conception of the sacred does not have the character of a *mysterium tremendum* that Otto attributed to "the Holy."[85] Bell identifies the sacred with Benjamin's concept of "aura." But if art in the age of mechanical reproduction becomes "post-auratic," should we not expect the same of religion? Can modern or post-modern religion, in the age of administrative and technological manipulation of symbols, rituals and meanings, be anything but post-auratic, i.e., post-sacral? The experience of the sacred presupposes a collective sacred cosmos. But can such a cosmos be reconstructed once it has been broken? What Bell calls "some new efforts to regain a sense of the sacred"[86] is not yet an indication of its return. The same could be said concerning the attempts to sacralize tradition. Nostalgia for a lost tradition is not sufficient to bring about its revitalization. Moreover, once the return of the sacred or the sacralization of tradition is postulated in such functional-rational terms, as a solution to the exhaustion and meaninglessness of modernity, one has the right to ask some more concrete questions about this sacred religion. Commenting on the apparently eternal human need for utopia, Bell himself wrote earlier: "The ladder to the City of Heaven can no longer be a 'faith ladder,' but an empirical one: a utopia has to specify *where* one wants to go, *how* to get there, the costs of the enterprise, and some realization of, and justification for, the determination of *who* is to pay."[87] Should one not at least ask as much from Bell's descending ladder to the Sacred City?

This argument does not imply that a modern religion has to be or can ever be fully rational and fully transparent. Indeed, if it is true that meaning cannot be constructed administratively, perhaps it is also true that meaning cannot be created through rational discourse nor through rational communicative action. Perhaps not only religion but the structure of the life-world as well irremediably have a prerational foundation. In this sense, Bell is right in claiming that the Enlightenment's conception of religion was misleading. But this does not mean that modern religion, or at the very least its theology, should not be critical and self-reflective. Other main aspects of the Enlightenment critique of religion are still valid and only a religion that incorporates this critique as self-critique into its own self-reflection can be truly modern. Modernity and the Enlightenment are also traditions worth defending, though not dogmatically or uncritically. When theology in its urge to become a prayer becomes "impatient with abstract methodological canons"[88] and questions

85. Rudolf Otto, *Das Heilige* (Munich, 1963).
86. Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?" *op.cit.*, p. 448.
87. Bell, *The End of Ideology*, *op.cit.*, p. 400.
88. Sölle, "Thou Shalt Have No Other Jeans Before Me," *op.cit.*, p. 4.

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the relevance and usefulness of the distinction between theology and witness, between theoretical reflection and preaching, between theory and praxis, such a theology has already deserted the modern tradition of rational discourse, choosing instead the discourse of authenticity.

The new uncritical fascination which political theologians in advanced capitalist countries are showing for Third World liberation theologies does a disservice to these theologies and certainly transforms the original meaning of modern political theology. Sölle, for instance, writes approvingly that "liberation theologies emphasize praxis over theory, action over reflection, people's exegesis over academic exegesis, political struggle over solitary contemplation. They have also redefined the goals of theological education. It is considered better by many liberation theologians to become a militant organizer for the kingdom than a Harvard professor of theology."[89] Unfortunately, this is too reminiscent of Marxist-Leninist discourse. When Schubert Ogden, in the name of theoretical critical reflection, criticizes liberation theology for this tendency to obscure the distinction between theology and witness, Sölle retorts that "Ogden's thesis is indeed a frontal attack from the right on any form of liberation theology."[90] I don't know Ogden's political identification, but such a formulation smacks too much of witch-hunting. When Western theologians reject modern Protestant theology as "the product of white, middle-class male thinkers"[91] (and embrace uncritically Third World liberation theologies, adding that "theologians of the First World must acknowledge the privileged perspective of the oppressed")[92] they are not only rejecting liberal theology in the name of a vulgar-reductionist sociology of knowledge that is equally the product of white, middle-class male thinkers, but are actually deserting the modern tradition of the Enlightenment. Such theological discourse, moreover, is too reminiscent of the Narodnik-Maoist type of socialism adopted by Western leftists who saw in Third World liberation movements the historical subject of the Revolution.[93] Cox should not be so surprised to find "some unexpected structural similarities" between U.S. fundamentalism and Latin American *comunidades de base.*[94] After all, these similarities derive from their common, at times pre-modern, at times anti-modern, character. Interestingly enough, Cox's arguments in celebration of post-modernity are not very different nor more valid than those he used to embrace the Secular City. History may be a vehicle of grace, but to be able to discern always the work of God in the contradictory "signs of the times" demands, indeed, uncritical allegiance to and blind faith in the Lord of History.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
90. Ibid., p. 13.
91. Harvey Cox, "Symposium on Religion and Politics," *Telos* 58 (Winter 1983-84), p. 128.
92. Sölle, p. 15; Lee Cormie, "The Hermeneutical Privilege of the Oppressed: Liberation Theologians, Biblical Faith and Marxist Sociology of Knowledge," in *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,* 33 (1978).
93. For a critique, see George Lichtheim, *Imperialism* (New York, 1971).
94. Cox, "Symposium on Religion," p. 127; and *Religion in the Secular City, op.cit.* See also John H. Coleman's review of Cox's book in *The New York Times Book Review*, March 4, 1984.

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FROM RED TO GREEN

by Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller

The most important systematic analysis of social movements to date has been Touraine's *The Voice and the Eye.*[1] Here, one can almost paraphrase Marx's famous dictum: for the French sociologist, the history of all societies is a history of movements. In identifying movements with social classes, Touraine negotiates a radical turn from system theories to a strong version of action theory and breaks with the Procrustean framework of an Althusserian-Poulantzasian structuralism in which everything is accounted for once the economically based class equivalent has been found. For Touraine, movements emerge and diversify in the process of their challenging "historicity" — a key concept derived from Castoriadis' central category, the imaginary institution. However, Touraine's rupture with structuralism seems too Heraclitian. Everything flows and no relatively self-rigidifying elements remain. Labelling all social actions as movements and defining classes through action is undoubtedly a vestige of the 60s. This has already been effectively criticized by Cohen,[2] who concludes that Touraine is influenced by Marcuse in a problematic way. During a period of sharp conflicts, Marcuse and his followers located conflict at the center of their analysis. Yet, to regard collective actors as classes was an unacceptable extension of any coherent theory of class. An overly strong version of action theory that denies the relevance of all structural elements, that departs from a very vague concept of action identifying it with conflicts, and that in addition concludes in the identification of all collective and active social entities with movements, will ultimately fail.

The first characterstic of modern social movements is that they are *transfunctional.* Luhmann's distinction can be considered as an at least partially relevant explanatory principle. Accordingly, premodern societies were stratified, while modern society is functional (in that it is function within the division of labor that creates strata, rather than functions being allotted to particular pre-existing strata). Unlike typical forms of socio-political action, e.g., that of trade-unions, transfunctionality means that the specificity of modern social movements consists in their public disregard of social functions in recruitment and dynamics. They do not recruit their followers on the basis of particular functions while rejecting others on principle, nor are their issues related to these functions. This very fact establishes the movements "fluid" character. The modern social movement is consequently dynamic in that it has no predefined space, but flows over the whole "surface" of society in

1. *The Voice and the Eye* (An Analysis of Social Movements) (Cambridge, 1981).
2. For Cohen's critique see "Between Crisis Management and Social Movements: The Place of Institutional Reform," in *Telos*, no. 52 (Summer 1982), pp. 21-40.

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search of supporters and encounters unexpected ramifications of its concerns. Thus, it is transfunctionality that allows for the possibility of challenges.

The second distinctive feature is the *public character* of modern social movements. This means that movements should publicly state their objectives — even their strategy and tactics. In this sense, they are radically different from conspiratorial groups. Public statement of the entire structure of a social movement has become a norm, and it is on this basis that "manipulators" can be singled out and condemned. The public character of modern social movements further implies that they must seek all possible channels to publicize their issues. In this respect, their potential is much more restricted than that of political parties seeking parliamentary representation, or even of trade unions which, by means of strikes, can attract considerable attention to their demands. This explains the growing number of public demonstrations by modern social movements, and the close relation between movements and media. They need each other: movements make news; news make the movement's issues public.

A further distinctive feature of social movements is that, unlike political parties, they do not seek *to dominate their followers' entire personality*. One could object that this has only been the case with communist parties in their prime. However, even the most loosely organized parliamentary parties can make a similar claim — though in milder form. Consequently, unlike political parties, trade unions and all formalized associations, there are no formal requirements for admittance to movements. To actively accept the goals of the movement is identical with joining it. Further, whereas the movement works out its typical collective forms of behavior, they cannot be formalized and regulated by any statute. The absence of membership cards, admittance fees or regular membership dues is merely the symbol of a deeper fact: there is no binding discipline other than a temporary discipline that participants accept for the duration of an action. This does not mean that no norms whatsoever apply. On the contrary, solidarity or unselfish dedication of one's time and energies to the common cause are major moral imperatives. But belonging or non-belonging is a morally neutral matter.

The fourth distinctive feature of modern social movements is that *they are organized around one issue* or a few issues.[3] Two countervailing factors weaken this statement. In certain cases, e.g., the German Greens (composed of ecologists and anti-nuclear activists), modern social movements initially combine related but distinct tendencies. More importantly, complex single issues

3. Alun Chalfont, in an interesting criticism of the British anti-nuclear movement, makes the following objection to their characterization as single-issue actions: "There are, nowadays, few (if any) single-issue protest movements. The columns of unilateralist protesters carry banners which proclaim the virtues of every radical cause from Homosexual Rights to Anti-Vivisection. The peace women of Greenham Common, who so outraged the local inhabitants in 1982 with their eccentric standards of hygiene (and contempt for their vaunted environmental conservation), seem to be confused not only between unilateralism and the problem of Cruise missiles, but also between disarmament and women's liberation..." Alun Chalfont: "The Great Unilateralist Illusion", *Encounter*, April, 1983, p. 25. We do not find this objection convincing.

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regularly undergo a "nuclear fission" and several movements emerge from the original. However, there is always a limit. Modern social movements cannot claim any totality in social understanding. Whereas political parties without a comprehensive program are immediately found defective by their perceptive constituency, such a total view of society is counterproductive for movements, precisely because of their transfunctional character.

The fifth distinctive feature is that modern social movements are *primarily social* and *not directly political* in character. Their aim is the mobilization of civil society, not the seizure of power. As far as *nationalist* action is concerned, if it is similar to the Occitanirt campaign (Touraine's example), it is a social movement. If it is similar to the Sinn Fein/IRA action, it is a political organization seeking the seizure of power (in the sense of swapping national sovereignty).

The sixth distinctive feature is that modern social movements are *discontinuous*. They flare up, eventually lose momentum, and disappear entirely only if their single issue reaches a maximum attainable solution within a foreseeable future. The alternative trends are obvious. Either the objective is achieved, or new issues emerge from the initial one and the movements split and diverge. Or, within the same movement, new issues are raised, occasionally as a result of a reformulation of the initial goal. The fact that modern social movements have such a low level organizational framework further contributes to their discontinuous character. To keep political associations alive (above all parties) a self-reproducing ideology and an extremely high level of (bureaucratic) organization are needed, even when they are no longer politically active. Both these elements are absent from modern social movements.

The final distinctive feature of modern social movements is that they are *a crucial factor in the self-determination of civil society.* First, modern social movements are not launched by permanent institutions. Such institutions may *a posteriori* support a movement, and they generally do so. But if they launch these movements, the suspicion arises that they are merely "front" organizations and not genuine social movements. Secondly, the absence of regularly remunerated bureaucracies and of a binding discipline, limitation to a single-issue, structural discontinuity, and the prevalence of the "social" over the "directly political" rule out the possibility of a genuine high-level organization in social movements, especially the transformation of social movements into parties. But what if, despite everything, movements do grow into parties, as was the case with the German Greens? A social movement which shifts its natural space in the public sphere towards the parliamentary benches will sooner or later become either a disfunctional party or a defunct movement.

Are Social Movements Democratic?

This seems to be a bad question. Because of their loose organizational framework, lack of discipline and indoctrination, social movements appear to be a spontaneous entity, as opposed to parties, terrorist groups or paramilitary organizations. On the face of it, they exude democratic spirit. Further,

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their emergence in Europe (they have always been around in the U.S.) is clearly due to the general postwar consolidation of liberal systems in Western Europe — a region previously swarming with dictatorships. Yet, the question is justified. Three factors have to be taken into consideration: their democratic potential in relation to the state, political parties and the rest of society, their procedural democratism, and their "democratic spirit."

As far as the first factor is concerned, modern social movements are unambiguously democratic in relation to their environment. First, the transfunctionality and singlemindedness of social movements always raises new questions by thematizing new and previously inarticulate grievances. A typical example is the German Green movement. This movement broke through the impenetrable wall of political discourse in Germany, monopolized for decades by the Christian liberals and the Social Democrats. The new movement was instrumental in helping raise new issues which simply could not be previously publicized within the smoothly functioning selective mechanism of the "free" German media. Secondly, social movements develop new potentials for action, and not just in politics. Thus, the communal way of life, which has lost ground since but has not disappeared, emerged as a new mass option in the social movements of the 60s. Finally, each and every social movement entails an enormous critical potential. The social movements of the 60s presented a practical criticism of communist parties: those of the late 70s present, ironically, a criticism of social-democratic and Labor parties.

The situation becomes more complex with procedural democratism. Generally speaking, social movements are invariably split into militants and followers. This dichotomy is not a function of Michels' famous "iron law of oligarchy," nor is it a result of sinister manipulation. Since social movements do not claim the loyalty of the whole personality, many "common" participants of these movements may be as active politically in *other* respects as the "leaders" of movement. However, these militants are not elected, nor are they appointed by an elected body since it is impossible to follow formal procedures such as elections in the fluid medium of modern social movements. Therefore, these people steer movements in much more undemocratic ways than even in the most bureaucratic political parties. And this is not an indication of "immaturity" but a structural feature of such movements. As a result, they exhibit an ineliminable tension between their outward democratic potential and their internal dichotomy.

The third factor is democratic spirit. This refers to a crucial process: the *homogenization* of opinions and attitudes from the perspective of the single issue of the given movement. Since people enter movements with heterogeneous worldviews, interests and functions, homogenization is an indispensable task, but also an incomparably more difficult one than for a party, given the previously mentioned characteristics. It can only occur in two distinct milieus: either in a symbolic-iconographic or a critical-communicative culture. Although texts play a significant role in both, the first is homogenized by gestures, chants and icons (in the form of a pantomime theatre), the second by

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text and discussion (in the form of a psychodrama). This characterization is not meant as a dismissal of the culture of social movements. Intelligent people participate by the thousands even in symbolic-iconographic cultures since "theatre" describes a prevalent mode of behavior dictated by the need to attract public attention. Lacking better channels, in order to capture the media social movements have to "play their role" by chanting their slogans in the simplest and at the same time the most conspicuous way. They must imitate good advertisement techniques to make their demands public. These modes of behavior are formal requirements of homogenization.

Clearly, critical-communicative culture has a much greater inclination towards democratic homogenization than symbolic-iconographic culture. Of course, there are probably as many shrewd operators in the symbolic-iconographic culture than there are unthinking zealots in the critical-communicative one. The latter, however, has a potential that the former does not: roles are reversible. In simple terms this means that, at least in principle, during an assembly everyone has a chance to speak. Thus, while the roles of the speaker and the listener are constantly changing in an assembly, such is not the case at a rally. This state of affairs reduces, if not abolishes, the chances of dialogue, and thereby the democratic character of the movement.

All of this points to the fundamental antinomy of social movements. If they are based on small groups, the dialogic character and the democratic spirit can be upheld. In that case, however, the public and transfunctional character which makes limited action into a movement is endangered. If they focus on rallies, their character as movements is preserved, but the democratic spirit, already eroded by antidemocratic procedural features, will be destroyed. This antinomy can only be diminished not eliminated. The sad fact, however, is that emotional homogenization in the majority of present-day movements takes place in the form of a greater intolerance than in those of the 60s, in the shape of attitudes almost completely impervious to counterargument.

Freedom and Life in Modern Social Movements.

Freedom and life are the leading values of modern Western social movements. There have been other values, but they have been very limited in number and with only partial mobilizing power. Fraternity was one in the communal culture (though it was primarily a means to the more important problem of the good life). Equality was another, and appeared in certain fringe groups of those student movements influenced by the Cultural Revolution; in the civil rights movements (as political equality) and in the feminist movement (in the struggle for legal equality for women). Although methodologically straightforward, this situation presents more problems than solutions. Among today's thinkers, MacIntyre holds the most skeptical view about the chances of modern value discourse.[4] For MacIntyre, modern value discourses cannot be settled (his most challenging example is the debate about abortion) because of value pluralism and subjective choices. If this is true, the

4. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: An Essay in Moral Theory* (South Bend, Ind., 1981).

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value discussions raging with movements are essentially much ado about nothing. We hold a more optimistic view. All contemporary value positions are, in the final instance, related to the universal values of freedom and/or life. Freedom is already an empirical human universal; life is not — especially in some Third World countries. What is in question in the value debates, however, is neither freedom nor life as such, but their interpretations; the norms in which they are crystallized. Modern social movements do precisely that. Of course, it has taken a very long time for both values to become so central, and above all, *universal*. For centuries, freedom was only freedom *for* something, and it was only with the great *Declarations* of a victorious Enlightenment (in the American and the French) that it became a universal value. The journey of the value of life towards universality was even more tortuous. Hobbes was the first to argue that the guarantee of the individual citizen's life is the supreme duty of the sovereign. But when the Enlightenment, a pacifist culture, seemed to have achieved its goal (the elimination of the "unreasonable" virtue of the nobleman's valor), a new, unexpected and modernized upsurge of martial cultures, ranging from the phenomenon of Napoleon to WWII, once again relativized the universality of life as a value. This is still the case today and it is the context within which movements operate.

The good life is identical with the synthesis of freedom and life. Yet there is still a trend to absolutize freedom exclusively with a concomitant neglect of life. As it is, there is no morality *beyond* living human beings.

An emphasis on life at the expense of freedom, however, is equally self-defeating. Life as mere living, or survival without freedom, is not the good life. Furthermore, as catastrophes from Auschwitz to the GULAG to Cambodia indicate, the renunciation of freedom is no guarantee even of mere living. Finally, if the problem is approached exclusively from the perspetive of life and not from that of freedom (democratization of decisions concerning the fate of humanity in both systems), all that will be achieved is, at best, a supreme court order against a nuclear Holocaust.

This theoretical prolegomenon is essential because social movements in the 60s were overwhelmingly movements for freedom, whereas those in the 80s are movements for life. The central themes in the 60s were antiauthoritarianism and alienation, within a context where affluence and the good life were identified. Thus the movements' aversion was aimed not so much at "productivism" but at "consumerism". This revolt was many-faceted, but the value of freedom was central in almost all instances. It was with the civil rights movement, primarily in the U.S., where the single issue spoke for itself. All over the West, it was a sexual revolution which promoted sexual freedom for both sexes. This had emancipatory effects, especially for women and youth. It was the gay liberation movement that emancipated homosexuals of both sexes from their traditional stigma. It was the student movement that challenged authorities of all kinds. All these cases involved social movements focusing on freedom and having little time for life as a value in itself. Collective self-sacrifice was often applauded. The indifference towards quality and lon-

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gevity of life so blatantly expressed in the surge of the Leftist drug culture was indicative of the fact that the good life was conceived of as freedom and self-realization. The unproductive aspect of this trend was a frequent cult of *violence*, ranging from the turn of some militants towards terrorism to the nonarmed but excessively aggressive collective antiauthoritarianism of student groups. Of course, the political zenith of this period, the protest in which almost all movements participated, was the campaign against the Vietnam war, which for some simply meant humanitarian protest for life (and in that sense it was a prelude to the 80s). Yet, for the majority, it represented active support of the North-Vietnamese army and its Vietcong appendages.

After the mid-70s onwards, social movements underwent drastic change: they have increasingly become movements for life. This does not mean that the same movements have shifted emphasis from freedom to life. Undeniably, some movements can trace back at least part of their past to the 50s (e.g., the British peace movement), while many militants have swapped movements: with the decline of the student movement they have joined the ecologists. Yet, new movements have appeared with new single issues, new followers, and different cadres. There is only one movement which, despite various schisms, has preserved combination of freedom and life as the good life: the feminist movement.

The change of color, from red to green, is symbolic — especially in primarily symbolic-iconographic movements. Red was the symbol of blood, both in the sense of revolution and sacrifice, and it also represented violence. Green is now the symbol of life and nature. This bifurcation occasionally exemplifies the opposition of life and freedom. This position of the symbolic young man on an anti-draft demonstration with his slogan "Nothing is worth dying for" has more celebrated partisans.[5] If intelligent and honest people suggest such gloomy alternatives, there must be an underlying dilemma which accounts for the shift of focus in social movements. Put simply, the dilemma is the following. The nuclear deterrent is based on mutual fear and the threat of mutual destruction. This basis for survival works only up to a point. Even peace-loving and humanitarian communities would reject the option of surrender into slavery as long as at least part of the community can survive in freedom. But what if survival as such is not possible? Given that collective suicide is not a moral option, when this implication of deterrent becomes clear there will always be people who will choose capitulation instead of resistance for freedom.[6]

5. Cf. Rudolf Bahro, with his indifference to and even predilection for the Finlandization of Europe which is developing into a widely accepted "neutralist" -nationalist position on the German Left. See the debates concerning the West German Peace Movements from *Telos* n. 51 (Spring 1982) to *Telos*, n. 57 (Fall 1983). Cf. also the interview with Günther Grass in *Newsweek*, Sept. 5, 1983, p. 52. But even E.P. Thompson, who has not failed to see here a serious antinomy, suggested at least once — in the form of a question and without explicitly stating that the price to pay is the loss of freedom — that "occupation" rather than mass slaughter is the preferable outcome of a nuclear war, quoted in Chalfont, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

6. See our "On Being Anti-Nuclear in Soviet Societies", in *Telos*, n. 57, (Fall 1983), pp. 144-162.

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It is precisely on this ground that social movements have exchanged goals, from freedom to life, and have almost completed a full circle. The change is so synchronic that striking similarities in options have appeared between movements which otherwise oppose each other. Life is absolutized as much in the pro-Reagan "right to life" movements as in certain pro-Soviet anti-nuclear groups. Of course, exclusive emphasis on life eliminates the chance of attaining the good life. The absolutist stance of "right-to-life" militants on behalf of the foetus is just as impervious to arguments about the mother's general well-being and freedom as are fanatic health campaigners to people's rights to their passions and pleasures, or doctrinaire pacifists to claims for political freedom. The environmentalists constitute a special case since the obverse of their demands is not freedom but artificiality which erodes our natural environment and livelihood.

New social movements in the 80s operate in a space different from that of the 60s, with a different *modus operandi*, speaking a different language, generating a different imaginary. Since public space was organized by political parties and state bureaucracies, the movements of the 60s started from the social periphery. From there, most of these movements proceeded towards center stage not to seize power or replace existing political parties, but to create counter-institutions. (A minority, of course, deliberately remained on the periphery with their communes and collective dreams). In so doing, social movements generally bypassed the power centers in the state and in political parties. In contrast, from the beginning the new movements for life focus at the center of the public sphere. They do not see themselves as gate-crashers in need of a justification: they believe that they address issues of interest to everyone and are therefore entitled to act from the center rather than to create counterinstitutions. Nor are they antiauthoritarian. They recognize the authority of political bureaucracies and state agencies, and intend to use them to implement *their* objectives: the state is expected to defend the environment, abolish uranium mining, dismantle the nuclear deterrent, ban smoking and the use of dangerous chemicals, oversee the quality of health foods. There is also a change in language. The "red language" of the 60s was the idiom of de-alienation and antiauthoritarianism; the "green language" of the 80s talks about "pollution" and "contamination", the "natural" versus the "artificial". They have a radically different attitude to the media. While making headlines, the movements of the 60s were extremely hostile to the media: for them manipulation by means of television and the press was an article of faith. Since the movements of the 80s assume that their single-issue is everybody's concern, they see participating in the media program as an obvious step. Changes of the imaginary follow from the shift in languages. In the 60s, the embodiment of the negative was absolute alienation and total manipulation, i.e., 1984. Now it is Nuclear Doomsday. A complementary feature is the shift of criticism from consumerism to productivism.

With all this in mind, one can legitimately say that the absence of movements of self-management is a major shortcoming which cannot be accoun-

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ted for by the change in leading values. This white spot on the map of movements shows more dramatically than excessive emphasis on life to what extent freedom is being neglected by social movements.

Are Movements "Leftist" and "Rightist"?

At first sight, the answer seems clearly yes. On closer analysis, the issue becomes extremely complex.

Political ideologies and the ensuing affiliation of social movements with political parties cannot be regarded as indicative of a "leftist" or "rightist" character. Movements focus on social rather than political matters. Consequently, the presence of political ideologies is a contingency. Further, the presence of leftist ideologies in social movements is not necessary — not even in those whose image is otherwise leftist. Political incognito may even be indispensable for the transfunctional acceptance of and recruitment for certain social movements. Finally, the sympathy for or aversion to political parties often runs counter to the projected and widely accepted images of social movements. In Switzerland, conservationist or environmentalist movements were launched by conservatives. In France, the socialists are skeptical of national and international anti-nuclear movements, which they regard as a threat to the French national deterrent. While these political countercurrents are generated by a country's national peculiarities, they show that political ideologies cannot account for the leftist-rightist clarification of social movements.

Neither can the democratic or nondemocratic character of these movements be of help here. Since all modern social movements exercise an outward democratic influence while they are non-democratic in their internal practices, it is impossible to differentiate movements into "Leftists" and "Rightist' on the basis of this criterion.

Is Habermas' theory helpful in this context? Apparently so, despite his pessimistic estimate of these movements. If one accepts the central role of power and money, then it is possible to regard as progressive those movements which do not simply bypass the institutions, but promote institutional reforms and generate new norms of discursive rationality. It follows that regressive social movements are of an opposite nature. This distinction obviously offers a wide context within which movements can be understood. Further, it provides certain objective criteria for evaluation. Yet, it is full of insurmountable difficulties. While there are movements that in the post-WWII period have sought to promote institutional reform, several others have tried to bypass the systems during the 60s, or tried to influence them in the 80s, without any intention of changing them, but merely in order to use them. Nonetheless, both according to public opinion and to their own self-understanding, some of these movements (the student movements or the antinuclear movements) belonged to the Left, and their "theoretical dismissal" from it would destroy any possibility of making sense of the division "Leftist-Rightist" with regard to social movements.

All movements can be regarded as rightists, irrespective of overtly Rightist

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political sympathies in them, if, in their revolt against functional reason, they intend to return to premodern positions, which assault democratic logic by narrowing the universalization of freedom through fundamentalist qualifications. In this sense, "the right to life" is definitely a Rightist movement. All social movements which express needs pointing beyond functional reason, which aim, to use Touraine's expression, at postmodernity, and which do not express an overt hostility to, or rejection of, democratic logic, can be regarded as Leftist. This does not mean that there is no norm towards which the Left ought to move. This norm is provided by the historical contrast of the 60s and the 80s, and it can be formulated as follows: for a social movement to belong to the Left is not something given once and for all. It is a propensity that can be lost. The more a social movement combines the values of freedom and life (under the predominance of the former), the more marked is its Leftist character. The more emphatic their contrast, the weaker its leftist character. An absolutist contradiction of the two values is dangerous. The abolition of freedom through life has fundamentalist consequences, while the dismissal of life through freedom has suicidally heroic consequences. Both are detrimental to the Leftist character of movement.

It would be a misconception to see the contrast of the social movements of the 60s and the 80s as an attempt to glorify the former and condemn the latter. Our leading value is freedom: we regard the sense of life as more important than mere living. The movements of the 80s represent an important value, abstention from violence, much more than those of the 60s. More importantly, only a combination of freedom and life as values yields the good life, and there are potentials in this direction in all "progressive" movements.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY

by Heribert Adam

By the standard of popular approval, the South African state has no legitimacy, since only whites are enfranchised and blacks are being denationalized. This institutionalized politicization of ethnicity increasingly erodes the efficiency of private and state institutions alike. Enforced ethnic identities without representative leadership undermine proposed liberal arrangements of negotiated power-sharing as well as the government policy of cooptation. In the absence of political democracy, politicized labor relations substitute for restricted mobilization elsewhere.

There are three basic responses to this legitimation crisis of the South African state: 1) the radical left response of revolutionary reversal of power 2) the reformist business response of co-optation and 3) the technocratic government response of further political separation with increased economic collaboration. The following will analyze the major fallacies in all three reactions, along with the future of legitimacy in South Africa, by comparing the African state with Latin America authoritarianism and historical predecessors of ethnic autocracies.

I. Theoretical Clarifications

Legitimacy manifests itself in a widespread belief that a government exercises rightful power in its given domain. This popular consent can be empircally gauged by the degree of support such authority enjoys. Majority approval alone, however, does not necessarily constitute legitimacy. The system of political rule must also be considered morally appropriate, according to less measurable evaluative criteria. Popular despotisms, such as Nazi Germany, may have mustered the consent of their people, but clearly remained illegitimate morally. Without dwelling on the three Weberian sources of political authority (traditional, charismatic, rational-legal) it sufficies to stress that lack of legitimacy increases the costs of domination. A political system based on ideological compliance or shared beliefs remains far more efficient than coercive power based on sanctions or rewards.

Legitimation denotes the process that culminates in legitimacy, although both concepts are frequently used synonymously. *Delegitimation* occurs when crucial support-groups of a regime defect and change their approval into a search for political alternatives. Such a crisis of legitimacy results when a system fails to fulfill the expectations of new social groups or fails to govern effectively. A *legitimation crisis* exists when an old elite has exhausted its moral, political and intellectual capital. According to Jürgen Habermas,[1] a legitima-

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tion crisis is characterized by the inability of a system to ensure mass-loyalty, engender meaning, and integrate disparate interests. Other social scientists, S.M. Lipset[2] in particular, have singled out the effectiveness of regimes —their modernizing, economic performance rather than their extra-material, normative values — as decisive for maintaining authority.

If a state relies more on governmental effectiveness than on legitimating belief, relative stability can nevertheless prevail. Apathy, habit, cynicism, rewards, fear or mainly the sheer struggle for daily survival make many subordinates accept any efficient power. Habitual obedience to rule will hold unless there is delegitimation of the source of the authority. This presupposes a *politicization* of a public, through moral indignation[3] which erodes the traditional integration by deference. Legitimacy as a useful concept applies only to potentially politicizeable societies. Such politicization is less a matter of conscious effort by persons with higher consciousness, as many analysts in a voluntaristic Marxist tradition assume, but of structural conditions (work, education) and life experiences (socialization, religion). South Africa is the obvious example of a relatively efficient state with little legitimacy.

The South African state possesses legitimacy in the eyes of its white constituency. By the standards of popular approval however, the South African political institutions must be considered illegitimate. They fail to elicit a basic consensus on the part of the black citizenry. Instead of the depoliticized integration practiced in advanced liberal capitalism, South Africa politicizes its majority by denationalization. The state cannot even afford the enfranchisement for periodic plebiscites to which the idea of democracy has been reduced in the West. Morally too, the apartheid system could hardly fare worse as an officially declared crime by the U.N., the dismal democratic record of many of these judges notwithstanding.

In the euro-centric Weberian tradition, the literature on legitimacy derives from "steering problems" in political systems of advanced capitalism. If the domesticated resentment is being repoliticized, so Habermas especially argues, it may ultimately lead to a breakdown in social integration or a serious "system crisis". In the racial autocracy of South Africa, however, many of these assumptions do not apply, because political integration has not been achieved in the first place, and the state apparatus does not aim at ensuring administrative rationality but ethnic privilege. For the ethnic state, legitimacy concerns are reduced to self-preservation. What furthers the ethnic group in power is legitimate, what risks its hegemony may not be entertained.

This means the *politicization of ethnicity* as a normative political pattern. Ethnicity, culture and identity function primarily to lay claims, rather than as an intrinsic value in themselves. Ethnicity in the sense of who belongs and who is excluded is also permanently redefined according to tactical needs of the powerholders and their challengers. This manipulation of ethnicity adds

1. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimations Probleme im Spätkapitalismus* (Frankfurt, 1973).
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1959).
3. Barrington Moore, *Injustice. The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, N.Y., 1978).

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to the ideological instability.

With a minority ethnicity in power and the majority disenfranchised on this basis, illegitimacy becomes the norm, and the crisis is being institutionalized. However, this permanent emergency may not only constitute a liability but also an asset as long as it does not seriously threaten security. While a government in a divided society may rhetorically deplore the potential instability, it also benefits from the institutionalization of crisis: it keeps its constituency mobilized and provides the rationale for assuming wide discretionary power for maintaining law and order.[4] If the "total onslaught" were not real in some aspects, it would have had to be invented in South Africa.

However, in order to solicit compliance and insure in-group cohesion, the ethnic state must exercise power legally. Arbitrary terror would increase the costs of coercion and motivate more resistance. *Legality* thus becomes a substitute for legitimacy. The separation of legality from legitimacy makes it possible to rule illegitimately with the aid of the law. Divorced from substantive ideals with any universal content, normative regularity becomes a reified faith in procedures, so that, in the end, legitimacy interests can succeed only by extraprocedural means.

This "subversive" implication of the legitimation crisis is clearly recognized by the more sophisticated social engineers of the dominant group as well as those who do not confuse the moral with the legal. In the political debate, there are basically three distinct responses to this legitimation crisis of the South African state: the strategy of 1) the radical left, 2) the reformist, liberal opposition and 3) the Nationalist technocrats.

This analysis will focus on some major fallacies in all three responses. It will do so without making the impossible claim "to avoid commitment to any political viewpoint or ideology", as the editors of a new South African journal[5] pronounce. What the politically inactive but conscious social scientist nevertheless can attempt to achieve is a scrupulously realistic assessment of evidence beyond the propagandistic rhetoric of activists. He/she can hardly claim value-freedom, especially in a conflict in which an illusionary neutrality represents itself as a telling political position of moral indifference. In this sense, this essay represents an argumentative exploration of the socio-cultural dimension of political economy. While the focus thus lies on values rather than structural conditions, it hardly needs to be stressed that the political choices by which individuals and collectivities consciously and shape social events occur within many objective parameters beyond the control of the actors. Furthermore, this analysis attempts to avoid the pitfalls of either a personalized, running commentary on events or a dogmatic elaboration of preconceived categories with few links to a contradictory reality.

4. See I.L. Horowitz, "Political Legitimacy and the Institutionalization of Crisis," *Comparative Political Studies* (1968), pp. 45-69, who develops this theme in the couldron context of Latin America. The "permanency" of the Nationalist regime in South Africa since 1948 provides quite a different meaning to the concept. For a general overview of legitimation problems in different societies by eminent political scientists see Bogdan Denitch, ed., *Legitimation of Regimes*. Sage Studies in International Sociology 17 (Beverly Hills, 1979).

5. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 1:1 (1981).

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II. Comparing South Africa

Before dealing with these South African responses it may be useful to compare the South African state with other sovereign entities in order to better understand the chances and direction of South Africa's possible transformation. While most of the literature distinguishes between military or civilian governments, democracies and dictatorships, one party or multi-party states, four types of current regimes could be singled out more meaningfully in terms of how they maintain power: 1) traditional autocracies, 2) totalitarian/revolutionary regimes, 3) authoritarian/corporate states and 4) democratic welfare states.

1) In *traditional autocracies* a single person or family holds absolute power, with no provisions for accountability or legal limitations. The ruler amasses personal fortunes in the midst of extremes of poverty and wealth (Mobutu, Bokassa). A clique of sycophantic associates based on kinship ties or personal loyalties participates in expropriating general revenue. In exchange for arbitrary administrative favors, foreign companies add to the general corruption and graft of an official "kleptocracy".[6] Social scientists have used the Weberian concept of patrimonialism to describe many of the modern African autocracies.[7] In a patrimonial regime, the power of the ruler depends on his ability to secure the co-operation of the support staff in his administration. The ruler extends patronage and the rewards of office in exchange for loyalty and tribute. Since the state coffers constitute the only major source of wealth, the struggle for access among competing cliques is fierce. Attempted coups d'etat occur frequently. An adroit ruler will play factions off against each other and politics takes the form of elite rivalry. More inept despots revert to tyranny and establish an arbitrary government based on fear (Idi Amin), including genocide of suspected opponents, usually people of different ethnic origin. Gross violation of civil rights characterize all autocratic regimes, since the concept of legal protection exists in theory only and dissent is considered treason. Crucial for the stability of the regime are the attitudes of strategic officer cliques and whether the ruler succeeds in using the "military against itself." Most autocrats also possess private armies who have pledged their allegiance to the ruler personally rather than the state. When the autocrat loses office or dies, many institutions are therefore in danger of disintegrating since their rationale is tied to the deposed patriarch. Classical examples of auto-

6. Stanislav Andreski, *The African Predicament* (London, 1968), pp. 110-133.

7. Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire Building in the New States," *World Politics,* XX:2 (January 1968), pp. 194-206, and Victor T. LeVine, "African Patrimonial Regimes in Comparative Perspective," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 18:4 (December 1980), pp. 657-673. See also Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley, 1982). The authors distinguish between four ideal types: *princes,* who cultivate the loyalty of other oligarchs and clients and preside over their competition; *autocrats,* who paternalistically run the country as their estate; *prophets,* who attempt to inspire followers with doctrines and ideological blueprints; *tyrants,* who do not recognize any legal or moral constraints on the exercise of power. Ian Smiley, "Misunderstanding Africa," *The Atlantic* (September 1982), pp. 70-79, gives a perceptive journalistic illustration of the behavior of all four types and the hypocritical Western reaction to them.

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cracy outside Africa are the royal household of Saudi Arabia, the Samoza family dictatorship in Nicaragua or "Papa Doc" Duvalier's tyranny in Haiti. Needless to say, South Africa does not belong in this category. The South African state, despite frequently being labeled fascist, also cannot be lumped with a second type of contemporary regimes.

2) *Totalitarian/revolutionary regimes* are characterized by mobilization of the masses in the name of an ideology. In traditional autocracies the rulers hardly take account of politically uninvolved masses as long as they can exact taxes and services from them. Unlike the static autocracies, the revolutionary regimes politicize the people for a transformation or restoration of traditional institutions. Such regimes emerge at a higher stage of economic development and after a severe crisis of the previous rule. In terms of ideological orientation, three types of totalitarian mobilization may be distinguished: 1) fascism (Nazi-Germany), 2) Stalinism and its offshoots (Kim Il Sung) and 3) theocracies or messianic states (Iran of Khomeini, Lybia of Ghadaffi).

All three types use indiscriminate, arbitrary terror against ideologically defined outgroups and perceived foreign agents in and outside the polity. This scapegoating serves the function of uniting a heterogeneous populist movement and exhorting it to make sacrifices for economic and military goals. A regimented populace provides an audience for constant purges in the leadership which unmasks subversives and demands vigilance. The infallible supreme leader tolerates a personality cult or poses as indispensable guardian and interpreter of the sacred doctrine. His power is based on a symbiotic relationship of army and party. Both co-operate in parallel political structures in controlling the state with either one the senior protector of revolutionary heritage. Where socialist-revolutionary regimes have been established in Africa (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Congo-Brazaville, Guinea), their totalitarian tendencies were greatly ameliorated by lack of ideological cohesion and the immediate problems of underdevelopment. The leadership in totalitarian-revolutionary regimes is less prone to ostentatious consumption or the personal corruption of autocrats. Revolutionary leaders also rely more on collegial executives ("democratic centralism"), although there are no general institutional controls of the accession to and succession of the supreme posts. The leadership operates in a strictly hierarchical system, camouflaged with spurious elections or fabricated mass support. No public dissension is tolerated and political life is reduced to acclamation. The ruling elite faces the problem of how to keep the ideological zeal alive and prevent spiritual withdrawal and ideological apathy.

The Afrikaner ideology of Apartheid never aimed at mobilizing the majority black population and, on the contrary, arranged for its depolitization through Bantu education. Unlike other ideologies, Apartheid as an ideology never did achieve a hegemony because of the constant challenge by English liberalism in the country, embraced by many blacks and business alike. Afrikaner "civil religion"[8] gave racial segregation a strong ideological

8. T. Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom* (Berkeley, 1975).

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underpinning, but was primarily directed at remobilizing a defeated Afrikaner nationalism. It did not contain a convincing eschatology but merely a rationale for the exclusive use of the state to further sectional interests. Apartheid as a blueprint of expedience, in contrast to the sacred doctrine of revolutionaries, has now been largely discarded by the Afrikaner intelligentsia itself. Ideological confusion rather than religious intransigence reigns. Unlike Northern Ireland, the South African conflict is not perceived in absolutes of good and evil, but in terms of more or less privilege and security, to be open to compromise and bargaining, if need be. The pragmatic commitment to power maintenance by a threatened ethnic oligarchy puts South Africa in the category of authoritarian states.

3) The *authoritarian/corporate state* displays a limited pluralism, legitimated by the state. It lacks a clear ideology and justifies exclusion of the many from political participation on traditional or technocratic grounds. "At the same time, the authoritarian regime is not one of arbitrary power...neither tyranny nor despotism, and does not grant absolute power".[9] Corporatist authoritarianism became a standard concept in the analysis of Iberian and Latin American societies which did not fit the fascist one-party model. Corporatism corresponds to delayed capitalist development and dependency. In combination with international capital, paternalistic elites use the state machinery to modernize. State agencies and private interests interpenetrate. Social-security systems are established for the first time to forestall a growing class consciousness. The Latin American struggle for independence, for instance, eventually gave rise to populist mass movements in non-industrialized urban centers. Corporatism amounts to their forced demobilization. In the interests of middle classes, the military directed political participation into licensed channels which were not subversive for the system. Brazil, Argentina and Peru are the classical examples where lower class protest is neutralized by a mixture of right-wing repression and left-wing reform. In the tightly linked coalition of military technocratic and bureaucratic elites, the actual head of the government is chairman among equals. Officers and civilian technocrats and managers have become interchangeable. The "role expansion" of the military as economic modernizers makes the army dependent on recruitment from outside its ranks and prevents the military from ruling alone. Unlike the military in autocracies, the army in corporate states is not divorced from the community and represents a highy professional section of the executive-administrative center. In Africa, the Nigerian army resembles most closely the Latin American examples, with the additional task of preserving the unity of the country. In South Africa, too, the military has taken over the role of political warfare without having a formal institutionalized role in the civilian political center. It has not initiated society-wide reforms, except for increasingly integrating its own ranks where blacks now amount to 20%. However, political policing by the military can hardly guarantee industrial peace, so crucial in a modern economy where voluntary identification with

9. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York, 1967), p. 59.

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the system of production is the basis of its growth.

4) *Democratic-welfare states* in advanced industrial societies have so far succeeded better in securing mass loyalty and legitimacy. Material minimal security, universal citizenship and equal access to political participation guarantee, at least in theory, a model for the happiness of the greatest numbers. In reality, to be sure, democratic grass-root participation has given way to corporate and bureaucratic power in a spreading executive state. While the classical liberal model of constitutionalism undoubtedly needs revision in light of the various new problems, particularly in divided societies such as South Africa, important elements remain valid and exert great appeal. South Africa is a classical "bourgeois democracy" only for its white population, while the majority of blacks remain disenfranchised. The society followed neither the colonial model nor liberal capitalism but developed a unique form of oligarchic domination. Why?

Unlike the rest of Africa with weak native middle-classes that failed to carry out an autonomous capitalist development, South Africa has long experienced strong indigenous economic growth. For a variety of historical and geographical reasons, the country underwent an early capital accumulation. Unlike other colonial societies, these national interests ensured the reinvestment of accumulated capital in the local economy instead of its being drained to the metropole. Because of their permanent rather than temporary ties with the colonized land, the independent settlers, strengthened by a constant stream of skilled European immigrants, developed an elaborate infrastructure for South Africa's expansive extractive industry and commercial farming. After the forced isolation during World War II, this was supplemented by a rapidly growing manufacturing sector, aided by protectionist policies and an abundant cheap labor supply.

Moreover, this development to an industrial empire took place in conjunction with an early anti-colonial movement, that is, the bitter struggle between English capital and the indigenous Afrikaner farming group over state control. All these factors combined to create socio-economic conditions different from the traditional colonization by a merchant class acting under the umbrella and in the interest of metropolitan capital. South Africa's leading class long comprised indigenous entrepreneurs in their own right. It may be called "an outpost of monopoly capitalism" in the global economic system, as Marxist analysts suggest,[10] but it certainly constitutes a rather self-sufficient and increasingly invulnerable bridgehead for that matter. As the stronger, not the "weaker" partner in terms of subregional control, South African state interests can dictate the conditions for the operation of foreign capital. South Africa's intransigence on Namibia in the face of outside pressure further underscores this view.

In this respect, South Africa's position differs fundamentally with Israel with which it otherwise can be compared in many ways. Serving as a strategic-

10. Anne Seidman and Neva Makgetla Seidman, *Outposts of Monopoly Capitalism: Southern Africa in the Changing Global Economy* (London, 1980).

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political outpost of her U.S. sponsor, Israel is economically and politically dependent, while the Western influence on South Africa is increasingly limited. Both countries, however, have become, for different reasons, integral parts of the Western political system. Therefore, they can be expected to be defended at high costs if threatened to fall under Eastern bloc control.

In addition, the continued economic dependency on colonial trade links and a pre-independence infrastructure severely limits the leverage of socialist governments in Southern Africa. The entire subregion has developed historically as one system, feeding the center on the Rand with labor and providing outlets for exports, regardless of national boundaries. The co-operative economic policies of socialist Mozambique and Zimbabwe towards South Africa, the ideological hostility notwithstanding, have demonstrated how much the outer periphery is locked into an interdependent economy, in which white South Africa holds most of the cards. It is on this basis that Pretoria can pursue an internal geo-political fragmentation policy contrary to the rest of the continent. While in the rest of Africa the state elite struggles to maintain the post-colonial fragile unity, official South African policy aims at dismantling the unitary state into confederations under white economic hegemony.

III. Fallacies of the Left Perspective

The radical left perspective, if one may use this stereotype for want of a better label, comprises of course various positions: from academic Marxists of the mechanistic Althusser/Poulantzas version, orthodox neo-Stalinists, Trotzkyites of the old Unity Movement to sensible historians of the E.P. Thompson kind who are sensitive to the uniqueness of historical constellations as well as their ideological expressions; from non-socialist Black Consciousness advocates to unions that do not wish to be tainted by the controlling recognition of the system, and finally the ANC with its many multifaceted supporters in South Africa and abroad. What most groups in this camp share in common are two main fallacies which assume 1) the possibility of a revolutionary reversal of power in the foreseeable future, 2) the expectation that polarization and operating outside the system would facilitate this change.

1) The many reasons for the fallacy of revolutionary seizure in South Africa have been elaborated frequently[11] and need not be repeated here. No analogies with Vietnam, Iran or Zimbabwe can gloss over the unique South African constellation where an indigenous ruling group in a modern industrial state has acquired economic and military self-sufficiency that make it far more immune to outside pressure than colonial predecessors. By insisting on the colonial analogy or dependency theories for South Africa, the left deceives itself of the actual power relationships. As an integral part of the capitalist

11. Heribert Adam, "Three Perspectives on the Future of South Africa," *Internation Journal of Comparative Sociology*, XX:1/2 (1979), pp. 126-136. Heribert Adam, "Minority Monopoly in Transition: Recent Policy Shifts of the South African State," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 18:4 (1980), pp. 611-626.

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world economy, a South African breakaway can only be envisaged as a result of a collapse of the total system.

Equally unrealistic remains the expectation of effective sanctions by Western capitals, regardless of whether conservative or social-democratic administrations are in power. At the most, token gestures and moral posturing can be expected. The 1200 British companies, followed by 375 American and 350 West German firms, with a total foreign investment of R30,000 million in 1982, do constitute effective veto power for sanctions. At the bottom line, Western business will want to cultivate whomever — regardless of ideology or color — can best guarantee stability and access to high profit margins in the region. This may give the ANC in the end more leverage than acts of sabotage which run counter to such interests. Western flirtations[12] with potentially powerful alternatives to the status quo may also moderate or split a radical leadership, as happened in the case of the PLO.

That the ANC has regained impetus and renewed legitimacy as a symbol of hope and resistance constitutes one of the obvious tendencies after the decline of Black Consciousness in the aftermath of Soweto 1976. However, it is hardly justified to magnify the movement into the central motor of events as Marxist analyses conclude: "Just as the ANC is at the center of things, so the center of things is increasingly within the ANC".[13]

The appearance of ANC banners in the streets of Johannesburg after twenty years, or the increasing and sophisticated urban guerrilla incursions signal important changes in the mood and militancy. However, they hardly make a dent into a military-industrial complex that is far from being forced to compromise by such largely symbolic acts of resistance. Therefore, it seems naive of foreign academics to speculate "whether blacks have reached the point (as they did in Zimbabwe) where they and they alone determine the direction and pace of change".[14]

The South African state has simply not even begun to use its vast scope for reform and greater repression alike.

A decisive weakness for the potential growth of the present ANC remains its allignment with the orthodox South African Communist Party and thereby the Soviet Union. Without supporting South African propaganda that portrays a communist conspiracy behind all opposition, it is hard to believe the ANC disclaimer that "the Soviet Union has no influence on the ANC anymore than Canada has."[15]

As the major supplier of military hardware and training, Moscow expects

12. In this vein, a significant new twist was the first official meeting in 1981 in New York between the ANC and leading multinationals with South African interests, among them officers of the Bank of America, Citibank, Manufacturers Hanover, General Motors, Ford and General Electric.

13. John Saul and Stephen Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution* (New York, 1981), p. 146.

14. Patrick O'Meara, "South Africa: Mobilization, Revolt and Crisis," *Canadian Journal of African Studies,* 15:3 (1981), p. 570.

15. Oliver Tambo, *New York Times*, February 7, 1982.

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reciprocity. Any reading of the ANC journal *Sechaba* confirms that at least the ideological rhetoric toes the correct line without exception. The ANC support of Soviet imperialism in Afghanistan, the advocacy of a changing Soviet policy in Somalia or the praise for repressive Eastern European regimes, discredits the movement although this "external policy" may make little difference in South Africa at present. Clearly, exiled politicians operate under constraints, and they therefore seek support wherever and for whatever price it can be found. But as the ambivalent stance of Black Consciousness towards the ANC revealed, many politically aware blacks would not want to merley exchange ideological mentors, but to be their own. It is likely, therefore, that the ANC that will emerge once internal forces gain more prominence, will be considerably different from the present grouping. The growing support for the ANC as a symbol of the alternative to racism issues from a historical tradition of resistance, founded by the ANC, but hardly coincides with communist preferences since the overwhelming majority of South African ANC supporters at the same time opts for the free enterprise system, according to all surveys.

It was a central theme in Gramsci's work that as long as a revolutionary movement constitutes merely a centralized, secretive instrument for the seizure of power and does not at the same time reflect concretely the new democracy — a prefiguration and living anticipation of the better alternative, hic et nunc — it will be viewed with skepticism. It is bound to produce the previous bureaucratic and exploitative features under a different label, once power is seized, unless that event has been preceded by "social hegemony," a cultural dominance of more appealing values, policies and human relationships. Violence in the glorified "protracted war" cannot be the generator of new values but expresses only the "politics of despair."

(2) With respect to the fallacy of escalating confrontation as a viable strategy it has often been demonstrated that South Africa, because of its demographic make-up and resulting power distribution, represents a unique long-term stalemate. It constitutes, in van Zyl Slabbert's term, a "no-win situation" for either opponent. And even if one side were victorious in the end, the "victory" would be worthless because of the concomitant losses and destruction. This makes confrontation policies for both sides an irrational option.

The counsel for stronger bargaining positions within an antagonistic system is nevertheless increasingly rejected in favor of the rhetoric of violence and boycott. Mostly this results in a factual withdrawal from politics and the escapist cultivation of self-gratifying purity. The rhetoric of violence that has become so fashionable in South Africa does not mean that its advocates are also prepared for its sacrifices. Asserting liberation as a historical inevitability absolves from becoming involved in much needed improvements now. While people starve now, many choose to wait for the revolution, whose arrival, like Beckett's Godot, remains unpredictable. The underlying fallacy of this militant passivity is the traditional left belief that any reforms will only strengthen existing domination. Polarization is seen as the viable strategy to

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expose the weakness of oppression and to strengthen the commitment of progressive forces to overcome it. It may therefore be useful to marshall further arguments and comparative evidence of the concrete price such a leap of faith can exact.

Poland has again demonstrated how even a weak state can enforce its will against widespread popular opposition, as long as the ruling elite can rely on the loyalty of strategic police and army cadres. If the bankrupt Polish government can crush a mass movement with security personnel from the same class and ethnicity as the workers, how much easier is coercion for the present South African state that always can fall back on the unquestioned commitment of its ethnic forces. In fact, the South African security problem seems the very opposite: how to restrain an overzealous police and stubborn bureaucracy in light of the need for more political and sophisticated responses to challenges of state authority.

Once a civil war has escalated to a higher level of mutual violence, the few legal-moral restraints in committing atrocities break down easily. Self-styled vigilante groups will not recognize any legal conventions but operate to seek revenge and "teach lessons." If El Salvador, Lebanon or the Northern Irish case can be any guide, the formal authorities on both sides lose control over their extremist segments that fight in their name but according to their own sectarian priorities. Their first targets are usually not sought in the enemy camp but are defined as traitors to the cause in their own ranks. Prominent Afrikaners as well as several liberals have already received a taste of disenchanted fanaticism. While South Africa has been spared the death squads of the Latin American model so far, the extension of unrestrained killings of suspected dissidents remains a distinct possibility once the legitimacy of an authority has been eroded and the combatants perceive the mediators in between as the main stumbling block to a polarized commitment. At that stage, the ground may well be prepared for the takeover by an extreme dictatorship with widespread popular approval, culminating in the sentiment that Marx once described before Napoleon took power: "better an end with terror than terror without end."

However, compared with the potential of repression in modern, scientific barbarism, the bungling, paternalistic autocracy of Afrikaner nationalism will pale into mere authoritarian dilettantism. Particularly when an official war legitimizes extraordinary measures to be taken, there are few moral holds that bar large-scale atrocities or even genocide.[16] As the experiment of Stanley Milgram[17] has convincingly shown, habitual obedience to legitimate authority can overcome almost any moral scruples left. What guarantee would there be that a ruling group that views itself endangered in its very existence would behave more sanguinely than German predecessors who were not even threatened by minorities singled out for elimination? Who would come to the

16. See the illuminating study by Leo Kuper, *Genocide. Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1981), which analyzes potentially genocidal situations today and which describes the massacres in various political systems, adding up to more than 30 million people in this century.

17. Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (New York, 1974).

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rescue? The United States is apt to intervene in the "internal affairs" of seemingly hostile states but not friendly allies. Black Africa remains so beset by its internal economic and administrative decline that it would be incapable of offering material assistance. The Soviet Union practices gun-running hardly for reasons of moral justice and would benefit more from keeping the pot boiling than extinguishing the flames. The reality of it all is that black South Africans are essentially alone in wrestling their liberation from their white African counterparts.

IV. Fallacies of the Reformist Liberal Strategy

As among the radical left, the political spectrum of the reformist liberal Apartheid opposition ranges from the moralists of the old Liberal Party of Alan Paton, the Black Sash and various Church groups to some sections of the universities, the English press, the PFP, Inkatha, and what Poulantzas Marxists would call more farsighted fractions of disenchanted capital with an international orientation in the South African social formation. Without going into the nuances of the reformist differences, this analysis will focus mainly on the practice and theoretical assumptions of the important reformist business opposition.[18]

The overtures of the state to draw private enterprise into its network of a mobilized war economy have not led to an equivalent increase in business influence on the state bureaucracy. On the whole, the private sector has not yet seen fit to exact a price for its cooperation since it still relies heavily on coercive state measures for ensuring cheap labor. Nonetheless, much more so than in other Western societies, the economic and political elites in South Africa do not see eye to eye on several issues and their collaboration is still overshadowed by ethnic preferences and regional special interests.

A good example would be the Buthelezi Commission. A shrewd Marxist analysis, I would suspect, will soon explain the recommendations of the Buthelezi Commission as an attempt by regional capital (the Natal sugar industry and commercial farming) to exchange Afrikaner political hegemony for nominal, neo-colonial Zulu dominance, since this African bourgeoisie is more likely to successfully pacify dissatisfied masses than traditional apartheid policies that threaten political stability, undermine investment predictability (land consolidation) and general administrative rationality in the region. However, this new alliance between big capital and Inkatha is being rejected by the white petty-bourgeoisie and civil servants, represented by the NRP and NP, who rely on the occupational protection and security of Pretoria against state-sponsored black competition.[19]

18. For a more detailed assessment of political liberalism and its failure in South Africa, see Chapter 9, "The Failure of Political Liberalism," in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized. Can South Africa Change?* (New Haven, 1979).

19. Such seductively appealing Marxist explanations, of course, always impose outside theoretical conceptualizations on collective actors which rarely coincide with the self-perception and motivation of the actors themselves. It also does not explain why a supposedly collaborating central state continues to succeed in rejecting such powerful interests. Nonetheless, class analysis need not be the monopoly of Marxist writers.

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Given this state of affairs of a "divided bourgeoisie," the apartheid opposition within the system has relatively little actual influence, despite its economic clout and gradually increasing popularity among the white electorate. With the agenda for public discourse about real alternatives increasingly under the pressure of an intimidating, assertive patriotism, the liberal reformers tread a thin path indeed in holding an authoritarian state accountable. Even their legitimacy among the black population is increasingly in doubt. The paradoxical effect of leaving many opposition groups free of state harassment when this harassment has become the standard norm is to cast such suspicion of collaboration on the opposition that its functioning is effectively harnessed even though it remains formally free. Such is the forte of Inkatha and the PFP. However, a large part of the reformist ineffectualness derives also from the false assumptions of the reformers themselves.

The central liberal advice "to negotiate from a position of strength before it is too late" represents an unrecognized contradiction. If you are strong you do not need to negotiate. It is precisely because you have been weakened that you have to negotiate. Nationalist Afrikanerdom has not been forced to enter into any negotiations. Its policy of consultation merely masks the absence of genuine negotiations and testifies to the strength of the ruling group.

Many liberal reformers still consider apartheid as institutionalized irrationality or the pursuit of an ideological dream. But the Nationalist perseverance with grand apartheid, the relentless creation of more unrecognized mini-states, does not pursue an illusory mystique. It is wrong to view this homeland policy as a farcical self-delusion of its advocates. Regardless of its origin and motives, the policy has created institutional structures with all the accompanying vested interests that will be hard to reverse. A bureaucratic tribalism, once in place, can be made to serve different masters but will be difficult to abolish altogether. At the same time the white state has unburdened itself from costly policing and administrative duties in an impoverished hinterland. By all accounts, the new black masters in Transkei, Ciskei, or Vendaland have learned to emulate, even outperform, their creators quickly. In this respect apartheid is fairly astute and quite successful.

The creation of independent homelands has succeeded in a more far-reaching political-legal respect unrecognized by the left focus on the creation of cheap labor reservoirs or the moral-liberal emphasis on the neglect of humanity in its most severe degradation. By creating new citizenships, the white polity has disavowed any moral obligations towards these blacks. The previous legal bond, however unequal, made its subjects still part of a legitimate common concern of the state. The redefinition of citizens as foreigners, however, severs cognitive ties that make its victims disposable. Like the gradual exclusion of Jews from the civil service and public life in Nazi Germany, this "civil death" has to precede the abdication of any moral responsibility for the fate of fellow citizens. Not only have blacks been robbed of their historical birthright, their very presence in "white areas" has been redefined as being at the pleasure of their host. This happened paradoxically at a time when the

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"host" also acknowledged the permanency of the urban "guests." How can this contradiction be explained? It is because the previous illusion of urban blacks as sojourners had to be abandoned that the state felt an even greater need to abolish, according to internationally acceptable standards, any potential citizenship rights. Hence, it does matter whether the liberal "West" recognizes the creations of Pretoria. The flirtation with recognition of Bantustans in return for concessions on other fronts would deal a decisive blow to a democratic future of South Africa.

It is a fallacy of a more racially inclined capitalism both abroad and in South Africa in particular to assume that it can solve the racial problem by budgetary means. More township housing, better black educational facilities, even higher wages, as needed as they may be, do not pacify discontent in themselves. What matters is the meaning given to these initiatives by the recipients not by the donors. A government cannot manufacture meaning in order to engineer mass loyalty. Increasingly, any reform from above is suspected of manipulation unless clearly instituted under pressure from below. Since such "weakness" is the last thing an establishment wishes to admit, many of the well-intended paternalistic concessions have lost their impact even before they are implemented.

That a growing black middle class would join in the defense of white capitalism represents a related cherished fallacy. The historical evidence in South Africa itself contradicts this illusion where members of the black bourgeoisie were always in the forefront of resistance. Black managers or professionals would lose all credibility with their radicalized constituency if they would not embrace the common cause. They may ultimately long for a black capitalism, indeed, but this order too comes in various forms, dependent on who sets the terms. The irony of the present set-up lies in the glaring contradiction that the white company boards themselves do not take their stated policy of black advancement seriously. The few hundred blacks in senior management positions seldom have white subordinates reporting to them. If not employed for window dressing, black executives are hired to deal exclusively with an expanding black market or to act as brokers with the black staff in crisis situations. On top of this, the state does not allow black businessmen to establish shop in white areas and forces even the few Mercedes owners to live in the black townships without deeded property rights[20]

However, it is with regard to the black workers and their emerging unions that South African reformist business has on the whole displayed a remarkable shortsightedness, blatantly ignoring the experiences of Western countries. The much praised codetermination policy of West Germany or the Japanese model of split wages and profit-sharing schemes has yet to be seriously discussed in South Africa, where the historical Anglo experiences dominate the vision. Behind the debate about the Wiehan commission re-

20. A perceptive article by Denis Beckett, the editor of *Frontline,* from which this information is derived, reports that the township "roadblocks have done wonders. The people in flashy cars get the worst treatment of everyone. The police accuse them of having stolen the cars. They get searched and abused." *Frontline,* 2:1 (1981).

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commendations and particularly the demand for union registration and the role of industrial councils lie two models of labor relations which may be labelled the American and the British systems.

In the United States,[21] industrial conflict became privatized. Government remained on the sideline by channeling disputes into quasi-judicial bodies. Legislation merely established the machinery for determining bargaining units, unfair labor practices (the Wagner Act, 1936) and limited the use of injunctions against unions (Norris-La Guardia Act, 1932). Labor acts (Taft-Hartlen, 1947; Landrum-Griffin, 1959) mostly aimed at upholding rights rather than prescribing how disputes should be settled. Mediation remained voluntary. An essentially laissez-faire policy on labor relations left unions and employers on their own to come to terms with each other, notwithstanding a high level of strikes and lockouts. Strong but localized unions and decentralized bargaining corresponded with weak employer organizations.

The other model establishes an elaborate labor code with government heavily involved in enforcing libel and injunctions for wild-cat strikes, damage suits against non-complying unions that can be decertified. The machinery of mandatory conciliation, compulsory delay of work stoppages and government supervised strike votes works in practice only because of a widespread tradition of adhering to "the law." The system is respected by both antagonists, because both view it as the least costly and most appropriate way to settle disputes. It may even increase the number of conflicts to be arbitrated. But the process of regulated bargaining is accepted because it is perceived as legitimate by both employers and unions.

South Africa is in the process of adopting most aspects of the latter British system of a sophisticated labor code without having the political climate that can make it work smoothly. Distrust of governmental control and interference in union affairs creates a decisive credibility gap. One dimension of South Africa's "legitimation crisis" is characterized by her proclamation of industrial democracy without having established political democracy which preceded economic conflict regulation in all Western states.

By establishing equal political rights, the universal franchise paradoxically also depoliticized the Western population. It gave the masses the illusion of political participation without altering the basic power structure. In fact, the extension of citizenship rights in the bourgeois revolutions of Western societies stabilized existing domination by removing the sting of formal inequality and exclusion. It is this atmosphere of depoliticized consensus about the basic legitimacy of the state that is lacking in South Africa. In the absence of political democracy, economic democracy can only be the vehicle to gain entry into the political kingdom. In this process, stable labor relations are the first victim on a long list.

For example, the 1981 strikes over the use of pension contributions would have been unlikely to occur had black employees — through their authentic representatives — any say in how their pension funds were administered. The

21. See R. Evans, *Public Policy Toward Labor* (New York, 1965) on the evolution of American labor laws.

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traditional view of pension contributions — to be available as savings in times of unemployment — reflected the distrust of black workers in government-regulated insurance schemes. Already, the lack of portability of pension contributions restricts the mobility of workers by locking them into unsatisfactory employment unless they are prepared to forfeit the accumulated benefits.

As Lenin already argued in "What Is to Be Done?" trade unions stabilize capitalism. By participating in collective bargaining, unions absorb challenges to the political control of society by transforming the political conflict into an economic one as partners in market transactions. However, in South Africa, this "economism" is overshadowed by the unresolved political question. Therefore, trade unions play a different role in South Africa than Lenin envisaged. They cannot channel discontent as long as the economic bargaining is inevitably politicized by the exclusion of black workers from equal citizenship rights.

The growing identification of business with government will inevitably further politicize labor conflicts. Since business is perceived as a cunning ally of Pretoria and the government confirms this view by standing by as the ever-ready guardian with terrorism laws applied against union leaders and regular police interference in strikes, only a change at the political center will be seen as achieving improvements at the plant level. With more limited government intervention in labor disputes, archaic labor relations would have encouraged syndicalist, plant-based industrial conflicts, mainly about bread and butter issues such as occurred in the United States during the first half of this century. But given the overlapping private and public sphere and the absence of meaningful influence in either realm, black unions will have to stress the need for large, cohesive organization in order to maximize pressure. This motivation leads to an emphasis on unity and adherence to doctrine as the cohesive bond that overshadows occupational differences. It would seem to be on the labor front — through open and hidden industrial action as well as through consumer boycotts — that the South African state faces its most serious challenge and where ultimately the politicization of ethnicity shows its most severe effects.

V. Fallacies among Nationalist Technocrats

Hermann Giliomee has perceptively distinguished three distinct orientations among leading members of the ruling oligarchy: (1) the technocrats with an emphasis on stability and growth; (2) the survivalists with their main concern for security and (3) the ideologists with their priority on racial identity. Recent developments within Afrikanerdom increasingly favor power holders with the first two outlooks, particularly technocrats of rational conflict management.

While it is not worth arguing with racist ideologues, the Afrikaner technocrats represent a new and far more ominous form of pragmatic oligarchy. For them, apartheid has never been a sacred doctrine but a blueprint of expedience to be adjusted according to exigencies. While they have much in com-

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mon with the business reformers, Nationalist technocrats differ in their fundamentalist determination not to take any risks which would jeopardize the political hegemony of Afrikanerdom. They even appreciate the importance of legitimacy. In the words of the leading intellectual spokesman, Gerrit Viljoen, there exists "a growing realization that even well-meant reforms can only succeed if they meet with the required degree of acceptance and agreement on the part of the people concerned."[22] The author declares as an "explicit intention . . . to institutionalize multinationalism while at the same time deracializing South Africa as far as possible." The major fallacy of Nationalist technocrats lies in the contradiction between both these statements.

National identity cannot be decreed. Ethnicity cannot be imposed and at the same time accepted. A shared value consensus — an ingroup feeling *vis à vis* outsiders who do not properly belong to the national unit — persists in the self-perception of Afrikaners only, but not among blacks. The very imposition of separate nationalities on black linguistic units by Pretoria ensures that it is rejected in favor of a common citizenship. If attitude surveys among blacks had any consistent high degree of unanimity in the past decades,[23] it is the insistence that blacks want to be South Africans first and that they do not wish to be associated with plans to break up the country. No manipulated referenda in homelands under the control of opportunistic elites can disguise this outlook for long. In any case, urban blacks have made their choice, if ever they had any, abundantly clear. Stronger rivalries among black linguistic groups may well emerge once the white political monopoly has been broken, as can be expected in the competition for the control of scarce resources everywhere. But to institutionalize a dozen different black identities because it serves the divisive interests of the white minority is ironically the best way to prevent the so-called black "tribalism" from asserting itself.

A related fallacy concerns the institutions, such as the President Council, devised by the Nationalists, to conduct "representative intergroup deliberation and negotiation." As has often been pointed out, a body nominated by a dominant group cannot be representative of the subordinates, nor can it therefore conduct negotiations on behalf of them. A legitimate mandate is a precondition for bargaining. A second decisive principle stipulates that successful bargaining must take place in good faith. The institutions through which bargaining is carried out must be able to achieve results. Where sandbox institutions with mere consultative power are set up, the process of consultation and negotiation itself is being discredited. Even the search for a representative mandate for such institution proves counter-productive. This dialectic of politicization by illegitimate institutions — whether company unions or political bodies — emerged clearly in the large-scale boycott of the first elections for the South African Indian Council in November 1981. While the government could safely ignore the electoral participation of 10 percent, the revival of resistance after twenty years of enforced silence stands out as the

22. Gerrit Viljoen, "Constitutional Developments in the 80's," manuscript (1981).

23. Theo Hanf *et al., Südafrika. Freidlicher Wandel?* (Munich, 1978) and L. Schlemmer, "Provisional Results of Attitude Surveys for Buthelezi Commission," manuscript (1981).

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important effect of the politicizing exercise. If the socialist radicalization of black intellectuals in general continues at its present pace, the fashionable topics "South Africa and the West" may well be outdated and in need of supplementation by an analysis of "South Africa and the East." By all accounts, South Africa may indeed contain the seeds and economic-developmental preconditions for the first successful socialist society in Africa, albeit far different than all the repressive historical predecessors.

In such a situation, few prospects exist for a traditional consociational elite-cartel which is based on a de-ideologized integration by deference. Politicization contributes to the incompatibility of meaning. The grand elite coalition of the divided segments hinges on the acceptance of controversial alliances and disappointing compromises by the grass-roots following. In a traditional hierarchy, the leadership can rely on such unquestioned acceptance. The apolitical deference to higher wisdom tolerates disappointments more fatalistically. However, this tolerance threshold towards ambiguous maneuvering by group representatives stands much lower once those represented have become mobilized. Politicized resentment seldom favors the compromising moderates over group advocates who demand the unobtainable ultimate. When both competitors vie for support, it is usually not the moderate who will carry the day. More extreme demands for sacrifices and the promise of further struggle appeal to the disenchanted with psychological rewards of purity and self-esteem. The meager spoils of reformers seldom match the excitement of anticipating utopia. Besides, the South African government has constantly discredited moderate counter-elites by leaving them out in the cold.

Consociationalism developed successfully before industrialization in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria. It failed in Germany because industrialization had preceded national unification. This tearing away of people from their traditional subcultures into the mix of an industrial society changes life experiences and outlooks to such an extent that pre-industrial policy-making in consociational acquiescence can no longer be viable. Therefore, new legitimacies of democratic interest representation must be found to replace the past docility among non-elites. While a consociational arrangement of mutual group guarantees remains indeed the only rational option for both antagonists in a no-win situation, its chances of success are receding in South Africa the longer a genuine power-sharing compromise is delayed.

VI. Constitutional Engineering

On November 2, 1983, white voters in South Africa decided by a two-thirds majority in a nationwide referendum to approve a new South African constitution. The new political dispensation still excludes the 70 percent African population from participation in central political decision-making, but includes symbolically the 10 percent so-called Coloreds and 3 percent Indians in separate Parliaments. White control has been streamlined into a more technocratic, expanded executive state with greater powers for the ruling Nationalist Party and the office of the state president. The "Coloreds" and Indians now play the minor role of educating whites in non-racialism.

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Three racial parliaments constitute an extension of apartheid. There would be nothing wrong with ethnic representation if the group members were to identify with these labels. But in South Africa, ethnicity is imposed by the government, regardless of the feelings of people. For example, there are no voluntary "Coloreds," a mere legislated racial category of cultural Afrikaners. And yet these brown Afrikaners are not allowed to sit in the same parliament and vote on the same roll, because this would jeopardize Nationalist Party control and offend traditional sentiment. Therefore, the new constitution lacks legitimacy, the most vital precondition for making it work.

The majority of white South Africans, however, pride themselves on having voted for progressive constitutional change. In their perception, they have agreed, for the first time in history, to share power with people of color. The modest beginning is said to lead inevitably to more change later. A "step in the right direction" is better than the status quo, had the die-hard racists won.

Much of the support for the flawed constitution came, somewhat hesitantly, from traditional critics of apartheid policies, particularly in the English business sectors and parts of the English press.[24] Their reasons are an interesting case of self-delusion.

While hardly anyone praised the constitution as a likely recipe for future stability, it was supported as an apparent improvement on the status quo. Had the government been compelled to reconsider the issues by a loss of the referendum, it would have had to compromise to the right and not to the left.[25] F.W. de Klerk, the likely successor to a discredited reformer, P.W. Botha, would attempt to reunite Afrikanerdom. Foreign investors would view a no vote in the referendum, for whatever reason, as a refusal by white South Africa to change.[26] After all, the cautious move towards a more representative government represented progress, surely to be followed by later political inclusion of the black majority. These assumptions are clearly fallacious.

Could the Pretoria regime renege on its steps towards modernizing racial domination? Could it afford to go back into the laager in 1984? The answer depends largely on a proper understanding of the nature and functions of its constitution.

Constitutions generally recognize but do not create political rights. Effective constitutions mirror the socio-political conditions in a country, but are not responsible for them. Above all, constitutions reflect power relations. By regulating diverse interests into a mutually accepted social contract, a constitutional dispensation in itself does not determine the strengths of compet-

24. The influential Johannesburg *Sunday Times* and *Financial Mail*, for example, backed a yes vote while the Durban *Sunday Tribune* and the *Cape Times*, owned by the same group, advocated a rejection of the proposals. The Afrikaans press, as well as the government-controlled radio and TV, of course, were unequivocal in their stance. This despite the large ultra-right opposition in Afrikaner ranks, which make up to 40 percent of the total Afrikaner vote, particularly in the most populous Transvaal.

25. So Johan van der Vyver, leading human rights advocate and law professor at the liberal University of the Witwatersrand, in *Sunday Times*, October 16, 1983. Similarly, Alan Paton earlier, who retracted after severe criticism by his liberal friends.

26. So Gavin Relly, Chairman of Anglo-American, *Sunday Tribune*, October 9, 1983.

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ing groups. In light of this origin of constitutional change — the need to accommodate new social forces — a return to an old order is not in the cards. Nobody can say that the traditional apartheid order fits the requirements of a deracializing capitalism in an interdependent, advanced economy. The stretched manpower needs and the legitimation crisis of Pretoria are not to be solved by perpetuating the status quo.

The strength of the ultra-right in South Africa notwithstanding, a return to the status quo and simultaneous economic stability would simply be impossible. To be sure, the Conservative Party still speaks for a substantial white section. However, this represents a declining constituency and ideology in terms of social forces relevant in the future. The white, lower income groups and racist ideologues fear the competition of a rising black stratum and, therefore, need to rely on government protection. With this policy they are at odds with the powerful technocratic, free-market dynamics at work at present. Regardless of the outcome of the referendum, South Africa would have had to come to grips sooner or later with its economic advancement and political lag, even under an ultra-conservative regime.

The option of stalling reform, therefore, no longer exists. If it were tried, it would aggravate the inherent contradictions of the already outdated South African political order to such an extent that no sane government could keep itself in power and remain part of an international economy. Real isolation, not just rhetorical condemnation as at present, would be the consequence. The price of a stalled reform would be a declining domestic economy with much more serious instability. With the hopes for reform dashed, there would be an internal and external loss of confidence of such depth that the various latent cleavages would break open to an uncontrollable extent. Political optimism and belief in the evolutionary progressive development, however slow, forms an essential part of the psychological glue that holds the deeply divided society together.

If the illusion of genuine reform provides the necessary climate for business as usual, it must be reinforced by more legitimate political arrangements. "Power-sharing" and "more representative government" triggers such approval. "For the first time in South Africa's history, whites will share power with people of color," was the congratulation offered by the highest-circulation newspaper (*Sunday Times,* October 2, 1983). But by all standards of power-sharing, the newly included middle groups have no constitutional power to win any issue, either alone or in a coalition, against the will of the white group.

Do the three racial parliaments constitute a more representative government? The two additional houses have little legitimacy among their constitutents because they are based on racial membership. The key decision-making procedures are so firmly controlled by the white party in power that any "loyal opposition" is reduced to a democratic fig leaf rather than a potential alternative government. Authoritarian corporatism, not democratic openness, characterizes the new rules.

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The new politics will still be devised by non-African group representatives, albeit no longer whites only. Coloreds and Indians determining the political role of the majority population in cahoots with the ruling section can only aggravate intergroup tensions, particularly between the majority and the newly co-opted middle groups. As long as the co-optation policies are not backed up by the repeal of racial legislation, colored and Indian participants in the new deal cannot deliver and are widely discredited as collaborators. It is particularly the expanding colored and Indian middle class that is offended by the continuous racial classification. These professionals — lawyers, doctors and teachers with wage parity with their white colleagues — have now reached a measure of material equality that sharply contrasts with their second-class political status as members of imposed categories. No "Colored," for example, is a voluntary "Colored." This continuous status inconsistency has alienated the educated urban leadership from the political system. This resentment expresses itself both in apathy and militant repoliticization as a spillover from the white political debate. A newly founded "United Democratic Front" seeks to unite all apartheid foes outside the official political channels rather than work within the constitutional rules. Does the constitution allow for later African inclusion? The newly approved rules are predicated upon further African denationalization in "independent" homelands. Even if limited powers of self-government are granted to urban councils, Africans will not be involved in central decision-making. Therefore, the yes vote amounted to a vote for the continuation of the grand apartheid designs of African denationalization.[27]

It is true, though, that the reform process, once started, may develop its own dynamic. Although Botha has reiterated that there is no hidden agenda, he could hardly say otherwise in light of right-wing accusations of him as a sell-out. Regardless of intentions, there are always unintended consequences. The pressure for African inclusion may build up sooner than the regime realizes at present. Given a less ideologically oriented caucus, more pragmatic policy-makers will eventually be forced to recognize reality, particularly when interacting with a wider circle of interest groups and ideological outlooks in the new dispensation. Technocrats are not immune to learning lessons about the rising costs of maintaining privilege. However, what is at issue are not intentions or the good will of constitution makers. The tragedy lies in the fact that the new rules invite more conflict rather than minimize it. They waste precious time in letting excluded forces build up outside the political system rather than anticipate the pressure before the dam breaks, with dire consequences for all.

Whether any informed outside observer can believe in the viability of such questionable stabilization policies, as the chairman of Anglo-American argues, remains questionable indeed. His predecessor, Harry Oppenheimer, came to the opposite conclusion by announcing his intention to vote no. The split among big business about the scope and direction of political reform

27. A point stressed by John Dugard, *Sunday Times,* October 16, 1983.

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remains one of the intriguing aspects of the referendum.

It also showed the official opposition, the Progressive Federal Party, under its leader F. van Zyl-Slabbert, as more principled than its critics will give it credit. The party, often denounced as the political arm of English business, did not waver, despite assumed majority support among its supporters for the new deals and most leading English businessmen deserting their political home. On this issue, the PFP leadership indeed articulated the long-term interest of white security against the short-term views of their traditional supporters.[28] These were blinded by their newly found access to the corridors of political power.

It was Afrikanerdom, however, that has split most traumatically over the sham constitution, despite the Nationalist control being firmly consolidated. Power-sharing, the euphemism for the pragmatic adjustments, was interpreted by the Far Right as compromising Afrikaner sovereignty, the thin edge of the wedge with which big business would want to sneak in color-blind profit interests rather than guarantee traditional white protection. Ironically, this accusation is not without some truth.

The irony lies in the severe constraints which Afrikaner political culture imposes on any serious technocratic attempt at conflict management. The present regime indeed fears the Ultra-Right as a much more immediate threat to its power base than the left. Given its ethnically bound constituency, it cannot open itself sufficiently to the tainted liberal spectrum without disintegrating as an Afrikaner party. It cannot embrace genuine, real reforms without jeopardizing its basic Nationalist support structures. Given the cold war which the limited reforms caused in all Afrikaner institutions, Botha indeed probably "went as far as he could." Many English speakers, themselves as conservative and as solid beneficiaries of apartheid as the ruling section, wanted to give the government credit for its "courage" and not lose such a valuable ally. Herein lies the main explanation for the size of the yes vote in the referendum. However, accepting the ethnic limits of reform politics, the regime cannot go as far as necessary in order to thwart serious future conflict. Unless a new constitution is freely negotiated by representatives of all major interest groups rather than being imposed by one section, it aggravates confrontation by forcing the excluded group to seek redress by other means. In the meantime, compromise and moderation become discredited as "leading nowhere."

How aloof many white South Africans still are from such basic premises of conflict management is shown in the reasons of many "progressive" academics for their support of the new dispensation. They made the point that an

28. For a popularized survey of the arguments of all political parties, including the black groups, see: no author, *Yes, No. Your Guide to the New Constitution* (Lange-Lucus Publishing, Johannesburg, n.d.). The 100-page booklet ends with an excellent overview by Hermann Giliomee of the history and interests behind the various white fractions. In another article, "The English in Disarray," *Eastern Province Herald,* September 6, 1983, Giliomee describes the reluctance of the English-speaking establishment to make up its mind publicly. This initial confusion, however, has given way to numerous individual partisan announcements by leading English speakers, mostly in support of the constitution.

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all-inclusive democratic system "will only be achieved if the actual beginnings of mixed government show responsible leadership, an overriding willingness to cooperate and a deeply felt dedication to eradicate prejudice and fear."[29] These condescending preconditions imply that the newly included still have to prove their worthiness before they can expect further concessions. This insistence on proper behavior views political conflicts that a constitution is supposed to regulate, in terms of paternalistic rewards, contingent on the learning experiences of rulers. All-powerful as they may be, real power-sharing will not arrive in South Africa because the excluded have demonstrated non-threatening conduct. On the contrary, only realistic threats and pressures force enlightened rulers to compromise. The South African conflict is not about the eradication of prejudice and fear. These will always exist among mobilized competitors. How the conflicting claims and perceptions can be channeled into mutually acceptable bargaining procedures remains the fundamental issue of successful constitution making.

The new constitution, based on black exclusion rather than incorporation, will only lead to a further rejection of the rules of the game. By politicizing the majority population and feeding its resentment of racial privilege, the constitutional engineering of Pretoria ironically hastens the downfall of institutionalized racialism. When even avowed political moderates, such as Buthelezi's Inkatha, vehemently reject the new deal, the arrogant dismissal of such black opinion by government, business and many progressive apartheid critics, bodes ill for the proclaimed sophisticated techniques of evolutionary incorporation.

VII. The Future of Legitimacy

There has been much speculation about the abolition rather than extension of white democracy in order to suppress right and left opposition to unpopular reform from above. However, the de Gaulle of South Africa is neither in sight nor in demand. Much more likely than the total abolition of white democracy remains its further erosion. The extension of the executive state that emerged most clearly under the Botha administration can afford to keep the parliamentary facade while at the same time expanding rule by decree and discretionary interpretation of law by trusted bureaucrats. Together with sweeping powers of patronage appointments, lesser accountability and lesser public scrutiny in the name of non-cooperation with the enemy in its total onslaught, the state need not abandon its valuable white democracy altogether.

At present there are constraints and limits to the abandonment of legitimacy claims. South Africa cannot afford to abolish all safeguards of Western legalism in favor of Latin American or archipelago type repression. The South African state perceives the need to bring itself more in line with its Western allies as well as make it not totally unacceptable to all blacks alike. Above

29. So Marinus Wiechers, *Sunday Times,* October 9, 1983. Wiechers, a law professor at UNISA, was also a member of the Buthelezi Commission.

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all, the predominant sentiment among the white section requires that its rule must be able to be perceived as just and humane by the whites themselves. Here the still strong relics of the liberal and Calvinist traditions merge. They demand legitimation and accountability of powerholders in addition to technocratic efficiency. Too crude and ruthless a police action shocks dulled Christian sensibilities. More Bikos, Aggetts and deaths in police custody only confirm the propaganda of the enemy. They reduce South African to the level of Third World dictatorships while she prides herself on upholding the rule of the law where others sunk into nepotistic despotism.

If it ever were, it would open ideological cleavages and splits within the white camp that would weaken its fragile racial cohesion. It would further undermine white morale and the crucial self-perception of fighting for a just cause. The uncritical loyalty demanded from all South African patriots against "the total onslaught" would be exposed as a mere clinging to undeserved spoils. Few would want to risk lives without a glorifying ideology, reduced to untenable survival of privilege alone. Despite its existential appeals, mere survival ideology does not establish a just cause worth defending, but only represents the least common denominator of a divided ruling class in crisis. Economic growth constitutes little to die for either. The garish obscenity of Sun Cities in the midst of starvation only testifies to the moral decay of its defenders. How much more so does this hold true when the other side is primarily asserting a humiliated dignity and is motivated to rectify so gaudy an injustice as racial debasement and birthrights denied. This represents the core of the South African legitimation crisis for the white caste.

Analysts of German history have pointed to the rapid delegitimation of successive regimes, weakened by internal value dissension about their very aims and methods. Thus it has been said about the Wilhelminian polity that "neither hand grenades nor machine guns destroyed imperial Germany, but rather a lack of faith in its own right to exist."[30]

Where a polity lacks a just cause, where its *raison d'être* is reduced to mere survival, where contentless clinging to power substitutes for a society's substantive rationality, then the practice of more formal rationality dooms the pursuit of particularistic goals.

There are many indications that even as powerful an oligarchy as South Africa's ruling group has realized that it needs legitimacy. This confirms its strength. It is a weak regime that has to fall back on guns. Legitimacy, however, cannot be engineered on command from above. It is interactive with those below and it has to have a moral foundation. As is obvious, racism must be considered the height of immorality in a modern society. But Afrikaner cultural preservation in a land of 300 years residence does represent a widely accepted moral claim. Its legitimacy is contingent upon the recognition of equal aspirations on the part of the excluded. In short, there is only one condition attached to the legitimacy of survival politics: that Afrikaner ethnicity has become detached from political privilege maintenance.

30. Erich Eyck, *History of the Weimar Republic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), vol. 2, p. 173.

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PARTY IDEOLOGY AND PURGES IN ALBANIA

by Arshi Pipa

An aging Albanian Little Red Riding-Hood finds herself a lonely widow after having married and then divorced, one after another, the Yugoslax Wolf, the Soviet Bear and the Chinese Dragon. Each divorce entailed a thorough housecleaning, to make sure that the new partner, upon waking in the morning, would not risk stepping into the slippers of the preceding husband. Partial housecleanings have also occurred, involving removal of furniture and other belongings which, upon closer inspection, were identified as magic objects furtively introduced by the Western Ogre, lurking in the distance and waiting for his turn.

We can thus speak of purges related to four basic heresies: Titoism, Soviet social-imperialism, Maoism and Eurocommunism. The first three are explained as revisionistic variants of Marxism-Leninism in socialist countries mostly under the pressure of American imperialism. The same pressure on bourgeois European countries breeds Eurocommunism. Of the three revisionistic variants, Titoism stands in open collusion with capitalism, and therefore is the principal ideological enemy. And since Yugoslavia oppresses an Albanian population — in Kosova, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro — that amounts to more than two-thirds of the population in the mother country, Albanian Marxism-Leninism merges with Albanian nationalism to declare Yugoslavia Albania's archfiend.

After World War I, Albania was Yugoslavia's darling, the Communist Party of Albania (CPA) faithfully following the line of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), its midwife and tutor. Had it not been for the break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948, Albania would be the seventh republic of Federal Yugoslavia today. Yet the bitter enmity between the two countries goes back to the Balkan Wars, when Albania frustrated Serbia's attempts to annex part of it by achieving independence (1912), and then to the 1912 London Conference of Ambassadors, subsequently confirmed by the 1913 Florence Protocol, which assigned royalist Yugoslavia a part of the defunct Ottoman Empire that was overwhelmingly populated by Albanians. Communist Yugoslavia accepted this inheritance, and then proceeded to incorporate the whole of Albania. The attempt failed because a nationalist faction in the CPA led by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu managed to defeat the Titoite faction thanks to Stalin's denunciation of the CPY as anti-Soviet.

The ensuing sweeping purge was approved by the nationalistic population who was also pleased to see the Party's name changed into that of the Party of

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Labor of Albania (PLA). And since Stalin had practically saved the country's independence, the leadership's move to have Albania join the Soviet bloc met with relatively little resistance. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev tried to lure Yugoslavia back into the bloc. The Hoxha-Shehu duumvirate interpreted his move in the sense of a possible revival of the Titoite faction leading to their own liquidation. Another major purge began, involving pro-Soviet as well as pro-Yugoslav party members. The Soviet Union reacted by excommunicating the rebel and stopping financial and technical aid.

Then came the alliance with China, at a time when Mao was accusing the Soviet Union of having ceased to be a socialist country. Albania readily walked in Mao's footsteps and, mostly in exchange for economic assistance and technical expertise, espoused China's line, becoming its mouthpiece in the UN. But once admitted to that organization (1971), China lost interest in Albania, reconciled with revisionist Yugoslavia, and stepped into world politics with the ambition of a future third superpower. Its clash with the Soviet Union gradually brought China closer to the U.S. The ideological switch of the great ally could not fail to raise questions. Mao's theory of the three worlds, with Europe occupying a middle position between the two superpowers and the nations of the Third World was bound to make Eurocommunism appealing to the less doctrinaire party members. Albania's alliance with China began to look weird from a cultural and economic perspective and downright absurd from a military viewpoint. Soon pro-Western tendencies coalesced into a *modus vivendi et operandi* that ignored the austere prescriptions of the Hoxha-Shehu leadership. A third wave of purges started in the army and in economic and cultural sectors.

The break with China, accused like the Soviet Union of social-imperialism, left Albania the only Stalinist fortress on the planet. To justify that situation, Hoxha set out to demolish all kinds of revisionism in a series of books in which his own version of Stalinism is presented as the quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. He was in the process of writing his major literary work, *The Titoites*, when all of a sudden he found himself to be the target of a plot engineered by none else but his closest associate, Shehu. Hoxha was able to defeat his rival, who then committed suicide. The purge struck Shehu's family and his henchmen. In *The Titoites*, the First Secretary of the Party accuses his Prime Minister of having been an agent of the Yugoslavs as well as of the two superpowers, i.e., as the monstrous combination of the three evil beasts (the Dragon is missing) ready to pounce upon poor Little Red Riding-Hood, faithfully guarded by her Albanian champion.

The Yugoslav Tutelage (1941-48)

The Tirana Founding Conference (November 1941) succeeded in temporarily reconciling the ideological differences among three of the more important communist organizations: the Korçë Group, the Shkodër Group and the Youth Group. Hoxha, then a member of the Korçë Group operating in Tirana, was elected secretary of the Provisional Central Committee, composed of Hoxha, Qemal Stafa, Koçi Xoxe, Tuk Jakova, Kristo Themelko,

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Ramadan Çitaku and Gjin Marku.[1] Hoxha's election was the outcome of the stipulation that "none of the former main leaders (chairmen and deputy chairmen) of the groups would be elected to the leadership."[2] The leaders of the Youth Group, Anastas Lulo and Sadik Premte, were disappointed. Premte managed to get hold of the Vlorë Regional Committee in 1943. His rebellion was put down. Hoxha participated personally in the punitive expedition. A regional leader "was killed as a traitor,"[3] while another "accidentally fell victim of the plot they [the rebels] had concocted."[4] Premte escaped and later fled abroad. Lulo was arrested by partisans and executed.[5]

A second purge struck members of the leadership itself. Ymer Dishnica and Mustafa Gjinishi had been delegated by the Party to deal with the Nationalist Front (Balli Kombëtar) at the Mukje Conference (August 1943) in view of concerted action against the foreign occupiers. They signed the agreement for the formation of the Committee for the Salvation of Albania. The agreement was immediately rejected, under Yugoslav pressure, by the rest of the leadership as alien to the Party line, and Dishnica was expelled from the Politburo as an "opportunist" (Plenum of the Central Committee, May 1944). Opportunistic, i.e., inclined to collaboration with non-communist nationalist parties, was the whole Party line at the time, according to other Politburo members such as Sejfulla Malëshova and Nako Spiru. They tried to rehabilitate Dishnica after the country's liberation. He ended up in prison instead. As an intellectual with a French background, Dishnica was suspect to the then Stalinist Party leadership dominated by Koçi Xoxe, the leader of the Titoite faction, who was Organizational Secretary as well as Minister of the Interior and Chief of the Security apparatus. Hoxha concurred with Xoxe. They were only too glad to get rid of a brilliant poitician who could have eclipsed Hoxha and caused problems to Xoxe.

Gjinishi, a first-rate propagandist and organizer, was the person mainly responsible for the success of the Pezë Conference (September 1942) which saw the CPA emerge as a political-military force, able to conduct guerrilla warfare.

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1. Enver Hoxha, *Kur lindi Parti* (When the Party Was Born). Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the PLA [IMLSCC], (Tirana, 1981), p. 220.
2. *History of the Party of Labour of Albania*, [no author(s)] (IMLSCC: Tirana, 1981), p. 65.
3. Hoxha, *Kur lindi Partia, op. cit.*, p. 430.
4. Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works*, vol. 1 (IMLSCC: Tirana, 1974), p. 140.
5. This is how Ismail Kadare portrays the execution in his novel *Dimri i madh* (The Great Winter), (Tirana, 1981), 3rd ed., pp. 105-106: " 'Anastas Lulo, you have betrayed the International.' He stood before them pale, looking with empty eyes on now one now another. Partisan court martial. 'Don't hurry, my boys, wait a moment, you don't know what the International is. You are young. Don't rush, summon here a competent comrade. I want to discuss with him questions of principle. A comrade from the center, one who is conversant with theory.' They listened to him for a while. His imploring voice kept increasingly repeating resonant foreign words, which sounded more and more absurd in that scorched plain. 'This comrade here is conversant with theory,' the company commander finally interrupted him, pointing to a young man with blondish hair and a stubbed nose, a partisan from the village of Brataj. The partisan lowered his eyes. 'Coçol, explain to him the question from a theoretical viewpoint,' the company commander said. 'And you, Muqerem, assist him.' The man charged with treason opened wide his eyes, writhed his mouth. And instead of uttering resonant foreign words, he only said, 'no,' 'no.' They took him to a place some fifty steps away. And there they gunned him down."

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He was treacherously killed by a fellow Party leader while marching with a partisan division in Northern Albania, probably on orders from the Commander-in-Chief.[6] Hoxha accuses him of being an agent of the British Intelligence Service.[7] Gjinishi, who knew English, had had contacts with the British Military Liaison officers then operating in Albania.

Another victim of the above-mentioned partisan division at about the same time was Lazar Fundo, a veteran communist who had worked for the Comintern in Moscow. Repelled by Stalin's atrocities, he had left the Soviet Union and spent some time in Paris. Upon his return to Albania, he was interned in a fascist concentration camp (1939-43). When fascism collapsed, aware that the Party wanted to eliminate him as a traitor, Fundo joined an armed band in Kosova, led by Seid Kryeziu, an artistocratic social democrat whom Fundo had befriended while in Paris. Captured by the partisans together with his friend, the "Trotskyite" Fundo was shot "as an agent of the British and the feudals."[8] Kryeziu was saved by the British officers who insisted on his liberation.

The purges of the war period instituted a pattern. After the country's liberation, many communists who had led the anti-fascist resistance were demoted and even purged as suspects because of lack of enthusiasm for the Yugoslav line. A major purge was that of Sejfulla Malëshova. An old communist who had spent his exile years in Moscow working for the Comintern, Malëshova returned to Albania in the spring of 1943, joining the partisans. He was immediately coopted as candidate member of the Politburo, due to his reputation as an Albanian poet as well as a Marxist theoretician, indeed the only one of whom Albania could boast at the time. After liberation, Malëshova vied with Hoxha for primacy in the Party. But since his influence there was weak, he leaned for support towards pro-Western non-Party elements in the National Liberation Front, the cover organization for the CPA (he was Secretary General of that organization). According to Hoxha, Malëshova was purged as a "right-wing opportunist:" "a liberal parliamentary democrat...he was in fact opposed to the socialist revolution."[9] What he was really opposed to was a socialist revolution of the Stalinist kind, whose horrors he had experienced while in Moscow. His "pro-Western inclinations," with which the Yugoslavs found fault, lay less in his Italian background than in his refusal to ban from the schools authors such as the Franciscan father Gjergj Fishta, whose epic, *The Mountain Lute*, exalts the Albanians who fought against the Slavs. Malëshova's theses on the country's economy and culture (he was then Chairman of the Economic Planning Committee and Minister of Culture), at a time when writers were being jailed for expressing criticism,[10] and engineers

6. He was killed by Liri Gega. See Stavro Skendi, ed., *Albania* (Praeger: New York, 1956, 2nd ed.), p. 85.

7. Enver Hoxha, *The Titoites (IMLSCC: Tirana, 1982), p. 135.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 415.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

10. See Arshi Pipa, "Komunizmi dhe schkrimtarët shqiptarë" ("Communism and Albanian Writers"), in *Shqiptari i lirë(The Free Albanian)*, New York, Feb. 28, 1959 and March 31, 1959.

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hanged as saboteurs,[11] made Malëshova an easy target for his rivals. The main reason, however, for his purge was his nationalism which in those days was tantamount to anti-Yugoslavism. Hoxha's report to the Party's Fifth Plenum (February 1946) had Malëshova as its main target. With the concurrence of Xoxe, for whom Malëshova had utter contempt, Hoxha managed to liquidate a dangerous rival, his main one at the time, a person who would not bow to an upstart communist who, according to Malëshova, knew little more of Marxism than the jargon of tracts and the language of Stalin's *Short Course* of the History of the Communist Party.

The elimination of Nako Spiru was a much more complicated affair. A former student of Political Economy at the University of Turin, Spiru was, in his capacity as President of the Youth Organization, a member of the Politburo. Hoxha describes him as "intelligent, clear in the line, courageous and a good organizer,"[12] but also as "ambitious and inclined to intrigues."[13] Having been Hoxha's right-hand man during the war years, Spiru turned against him at the end of the war. The shift occurred at the Berat Plenum (November 1944), where Malëshova, Spiru and Xoxe, under the baton of the Yugoslav delegate Stojnić, submitted the Commander-in-Chief to a volley of damning criticism. Hoxha managed to survive, but his grip on the Party was gone. The victor was the proletarian Xoxe, who suddenly emerged as Albania's strong man, pushed or rather kicked ahead by the Yugoslavs (at a reception for the Albanian delegation in Belgrade in December 1946, Tito offered the seat at the head of the table to Xoxe, not to Hoxha). As President of the Special Court for the Trial of War Criminals and Enemies of the People (March-April 1945), Xoxe set the tune for the ensuing policy of repression against opponents and critics, inside and outside the Party.

A longtime communist and member of the Korçë Group, Xoxe was elected member of the Politburo while still in jail. After his release in April 1943, he was put in charge of the Party cadres. He accompanied Vukmanović-Tempo to Greece twice in 1943, and the two became friends. It was Tempo who, having clashed repeatedly with Hoxha, groomed Xoxe for the top seat. Colonel Stojnić set the stage, working behind the scenes, with Xoxe, Spiru and Malëshova, unhappy with Hoxha's monopolization of power. In *The Titoites*, Hoxha ridicules Xoxe, describing him as a half-literate tinsmith, "swarthy, short, with bulging eyes like those of a frog."[14]

Once Malëshowa was gone, a bitter rivalry developed between Xoxe and Spiru. This gave Hoxha an opportunity to arbitrate their disputes, thus helping him retain the reins of the government at a time when Party power was slipping from his hands. And since the stronger contender was Xoxe, Hoxha

11. The conspiracy of engineers, allegedly masterminded by H.T. Fultz, a member of the US Military Mission and former director of the American Vocational School in Tirana, is the subject of a prize-winning novel, *Këneta* (The Marsh) by Fatmir Gjata. See Arshi Pipa, *Albanian Literature: Social Perspectives* (Trofenik, Munich, 1978), pp. 175-78.

12. Hoxha, *The Titoites, op. cit.*, p. 159.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 449.

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made use of Spiru to check Xoxe's ascendancy. Eventually he won over Spiru to his side. This occurred when the latter began to have qualms about having signed the Economic Convention with Yugoslavia for the parification of currency, unification of prices, removal of custom barriers and creation of joint economic committees, which laid the ground for Albania's political union with Yugoslavia. Backing away from his former pro-Yugoslav stance, Spiru oriented himself towards the Soviet Union, asking for economic and technical assistance. The arrival of Soviet advisers infuriated the Yugoslavs, who felt betrayed by one whom they considered their man (Spiru had previously written a letter to Tito, asking him to use his authority for the removal of Hoxha). Not yet strong enough to attack Hoxha frontally, Xoxe demanded Spiru's head. He had Hoxha call a meeting of the Politburo restricted to only four members: Hoxha, Xoxe, his faithful Pandi Kristo, and Spiru. In that meeting, Xoxe accused Spiru of being an "agent of imperialism."[15] Spiru requested five days to prepare his reply. His request was rejected by the other three. The next day Spiru visited Hoxha, insisting that his request be granted and asking him to help. Hoxha's answer was negative: "The Bureau has decided it."[16] That same day Spiru committed suicide.

Hoxha had earlier joined forces with Xoxe to liquidate Malëshova, thus reassuring the Yugoslavs who disliked both Malëshova and himself. This time, the Yugoslav pressure growing on him, he sacrificed the very person whom he had been inciting to resist that pressure. And when pressure reached the point of explosion with the Yugoslav's insistent demand for the creation of a unified command of the army, Hoxha sold out Shehu, the only influential party leader who then stood firmly for him. In a telling passage in *The Titoites,* he admits his debt to Shehu for coming to his rescue: "Although I was Commander-in-Chief, I was virtually pushed to one side.... Among the first measures which I decided to take was the reorganization of the General Staff. When we discussed this question, Nako Spiru proposed insistently that Mehmet Shehu should be placed at the head of the General Staff because he was 'a born soldier, well trained, who had proved himself'.... Likewise, the fact that he was studying in the Military Academy in the Soviet Union added to my hope that Mehmet Shehu would strongly oppose the mish-mash the Yugoslavs were creating in our army."[17] Which indeed he did, thus angering "Xoxe and his clan," who began to attack him, pressuring Hoxha to dismiss him from his post. Shehu is quoted as having declared to Hoxha: "Comrade Commander... the Yugoslavs want to eliminate you.... I opposed them openly."[18]

Spiru committed suicide on November 20, 1947. At the end of December, Shehu was dismissed. In November of that year, Xoxe demanded that Hoxha write a leading article in a magazine founded by Xoxe "about the vital relations with the Yugoslav friends, about their aid and especially about the

15. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 430-31.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 435-36.

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contribution of Comrade Marshal Tito.... The Yugoslavs needed my article as a 'certificate of good behavior' for Yugoslavia and Tito."[19] Hoxha complied with Xoxe's demand: "In very general terms and with the odd 'fact' for the first years of the war, I pointed out the links of friendship between our parties and countries. However, even with this, the Yugoslavs and their agents were satisfied: the important thing of them was that the General Secretary of the CPA should write even one good phrase, even in completely general terms, about Tito's Yugoslavia, as a safe conduct pass for the annexation."[20] Hoxha had previously approved the Economic Convention signed by Spiru, who "did nothing in this direction without consulting me and receiving my approval." Now Hoxha wrote and signed with his own hand "a safe conduct pass for the annexation."

In the winter of 1947, Albania's annexation by Yugoslavia in the spring of 1948 was as probable as the succession of winter by spring. If it did not occur, this is because Stalin could not restrain his anger at Tito's growing acts of independence. Hoxha had been assiduously watching the darkening clouds that gradually obscured the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, patiently waiting for the "thunderbolt" to strike: "We had some signs and signals in this direction."[21] His strategy of temporization eventually bore fruit. Stalin's letter to the CPY (March 28, 1944) saved him. Understandable, therefore, is his worship of Stalin. On the occasion of Stalin's death, Hoxha signed an "oath" of allegiance to the Soviet dictator.[22] He has indeed honored his oath, made in the name of the Albanian people, as well as his pledge to Stalin during his last visit with him: "We shall certainly carry out your instructions, comrade Stalin."[23]

Xoxe was shot as a Titoite and a Troskyite in 1949, setting in motion the most wide-ranging purge in the history of the CPA-PLA. His closest collaborators in the Politburo, Pandi Kristo, Nesti Kerenxhi and Xhoxhi Blushi, as well as the regional Security chiefs and their most zealous dependents were given prison sentences. Kristo, a tinsmith from Korçë like his old friend Xoxe, was apparently spared because shooting him would have been too much of an honor for that "shitty rabbit"[24] who once, when confronted by Hoxha, "had collapsed like a heap of cow-dung in a rain storm."[25]

The anti-Titoite purge was not confined to pro-Yugoslav Party members. Pressing on Shehu to be more exacting against anti-Party and enemy elements, Hoxha engineered a radical housecleaning. The Party's Second National Conference (April 1950) announced the purge of Abedin Shehu, Minister of Industry, and Niazi Islami, Deputy Communications Minister.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 449.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 450.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
22. Enver Hoxha's *With Stalin* (IMLSCC: Tirana, 1979) includes a picture after p. 208, bearing the following wording: "Comrade Enver Hoxha signing the oath of the Albanian people on the occasion of the death of Joseph Stalin, March 10, 1953."
23. Hoxha, *With Stalin, op. cit.*, p. 216.
24. Hoxha, *The Titoites, op. cit.*, p. 482.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 556.

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They were accused of having criticized the Two-Year plan as "unrealistic."[26] Beqir Ndou, President of the National Council and a former member of the Regional National Liberation Council of Kosova and the Dukagjin Plain, was removed from his post. Two army chiefs were expelled for having undermined the Party's role in the direction of the army. They were Gjin Marku, a member of the 1941 Provisional CC, and Nexhip Vinçani, Vice-Chief of the General Staff. On the basis of official sources, it has been calculated that from 1948 to 1951, more than 25 percent of the Party membership was expelled,[27] including more than half of the Central Committee members and about a third of the deputies of the people's assembly.[28]

The Soviet Patronage (1949-61)

The slogan "Enver-Tito" was soon replaced by its counterpart, "Enver-Stalin." The explosion of a bomb in the Soviet Legation in Tirana (February 1951) prompted a wave of terrorism conducted personally by Shehu against former members of nationalist parties as well as against some more outspoken critics.[29] These were the days when a Party member advocating a modicum of moderation was suspected of being an anti-Party element. Such was the case of Tuk Jakova, Teodor Heba and Manol Konomi.

Jakova, a leader of the Shkodër Group and a founder of the Party (he was a carpenter by trade) had been, like Shehu, harassed by Xoxe and his men. After Xoxe's demise, he replaced his adversary as the Party's Organizational Secretary and was for a short period (June 1950 - February 1951) Vice-Premier and Minister of the Interior. Jakova disgraced himself by trying to win over to the Party adversary elements by conciliatory methods. He was accused of being sympathetic to reactionary individuals and groups and especially the Catholic clergy who had borne the brunt of the religious persecution (Jakova was a Catholic). His thesis that the class struggle was dying out in the country met with vigorous opposition from Hoxha and Shehu. He was dropped as Organizational Secretary and a Politburo member (Plenum of February 1951).[30] His associate Heba, Chief of the Directory of Cadres, was expelled from the Central Committee. So also Konomi, the Minister of Justice, was punished for having been lenient in administering justice to class enemies.

The improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations after Stalin's death set in motion a wave of opposition inside the Party, led by Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu. The proletarian Jakova reiterated his thesis of the extinction of the class struggle and demanded the rehabilitation of purged comrades. He was supported by Spahiu, a Politburo member and a high-ranking Party leader (he had been Public Prosecutor in the Special Court presided over by Xoxe, and later was Public Prosecutor in the trial that sentenced Xoxe to death). Spahiu

26. *History of the Party, op. cit.*, p. 263.
27. See Skendi, *Albania, op. cit.*, p. 86.
28. See Nicholas C. Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania* (John Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1968), p. 92.
29. Among the 28 victims executed without due process were a writer, Manush Peshkëpia, and a woman professor, Sabiha Kasimati.
30. *History of the Party, op. cit.*, p. 270.

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clashed vehemently with Hoxha at the Plenum of June 1955. The Plenum expelled Jakova from the Central Committee but Spahiu from both the Central Committee and the Party.

Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU rekindled the flames of the opposition. The dissidents came out into the open at the Party Conference for the City of Tirana (April 1956). They criticized the ruling élite for their autocratic methods, their contempt for the masses, and their failure to redress the economic situation, and they pressed hard for the rehabilitation of Xoxe, Jakova, Spahiu and other purged Party members. Intervening personally, Hoxha succeeded in quelling the rebellion. Twenty-seven Party members were arrested and tried. Two prominent Party members, Liri Gega, a member of the first Politburo, and General Dali Ndreu, her husband, were arrested while "attempting to cross the [Albanian-Yugoslav] border."[31] They were both shot — the three of them, to be precise, Liri being, according to Khrushchev,[32] pregnant. In May 1957, General Panajot Plaku, former Deputy Minister of Defense, defected to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev offered him political asylum.

Soviet-Albanian relations began to deteriorate after Stalin's death. The leadership's idolatry of the Soviet dictator had won him over to the cause of Albania's territorial integrity, which had been threatened by its neighbors. Forgetful of what he had once told Milovan Djilas, i.e., that Yugoslavia could "gobble up" Albania with his own blessing,[33] the Dictator found the Albanian virulent attacks against Titoism very much to his taste. And the Albanian leadership felt secure under his large wings. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin the next year added to the leadership's worries. The signing in 1957 of an agreement for the building of a Soviet naval base in the island of Sazan facing Vlorë reassured them momentarily. At about the same time they intensified their relations with China, which were resented by the Soviet leadership. An Albanian delegation visited China (June 1960) when the latter had made public its dispute with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev reacted by pointing to the Greek claims to Southern Albania. This infuriated Hoxha who denounced Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership at the November 1960 Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Khrushchev suspended a shipment of grain which was badly needed by the Albanian population and threatened to dismantle the Sazan base. Hoxha countered by threatening to destroy the vessels there. After embittered negotiations, an agreement was reached: the

31. *Dokumenta kryesore të PPSH*, 3 (*Main Documents of the PLA*, vol. 3) (Tirana, 1970), p. 449.

32. Khrushchev mentioned her case in his speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress (October 1961). See William Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 235.

33. In his *Conversations with Stalin* (Harcourt, Brace & World: New York, 1962), Milovan Djilas reports the following: ". . . Stalin said: 'We have no special interest in Albania. We agree to Yugoslavia's swallowing Albania! . . . .' At this he gathered together the fingers of his right hand and, bringing them to his mouth, he made a motion as if to swallow them" (p. 143). Later, he repeated the offer to Djilas. Yet, since the conversation took place on January 1948, i.e., not long before Stalin denounced Yugoslavia's leadership, it is possible that Stalin's offer was a provocation.

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greater part of the submarines were allowed to leave, while the rest, as well as part of the military equipment, were left to the Albanians.

The purging mechanism was again set to work. In 1960, a conspiracy was discovered. Its leaders were Moscow-trained Rear Admiral Teme Sejko and Tahir Demi, former delegate to the COMECON. Five of the plotters were executed (May 1961). The show trial revealed that they had been in touch with Greek and Yugoslav officials as well as with the American Sixth Fleet. In September 1960, Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko were expelled from the Party and probably arrested, accused of hatching another plot.

Belishova, Spiru's widow, became a member of the Politburo after her husband's rehabilitation. She was the number one woman in the Party hierarchy and led important diplomatic missions (including the above-mentioned delegation to China). Tashko, a Comintern man who had been commissioned to organize the Albanian Communist party, was discarded from the leadership when the Party was organized by the CPY. After the split with Yugoslavia, Tashko chaired the Party's Central Auditing Committee. Neither he nor Belishova made a secret of their loyalty to the Soviet Union. In 1961, Maqo Çomo, Belishova's second husband, was dismissed from his functions as Minister of Agriculture.

The Chinese Hegemony (1962-78)

Unlike the split with Yugoslavia which shook the CPA to its very foundations, the rift with the Soviet Union caused no serious perturbations, an indication that the Albanian Communists were not particularly attached to the homeland of socialism. Once the Belishova-Tashko group disappeared from the political scene, no spectacular purges occured for a period of eleven years. The Sino-Albanian alliance was unlikely to cause serious ideological ruffles, the Albanians being uninformed about the internal strife in the Communist Party of China and the Chinese uninterested in the PLA's ideological quarrels. The Hoxha-Shehu tandem maintained full control of the situation, despite the country's precarious economic condition following the Soviet Union's discontinuation of economic and technical aid. Beginning with the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-65), Albania adopted a policy of austerity, though assisted to some extent by China with credits and experts. Little improvement occurred during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1966-70), despite a Chines loan of some 200 million dollars,[34] as well as stern measures taken to reduce bureaucracy, lower the salaries of better paid workers, and employ women in productive work.

The stress exerted on the population by the "further revolutionization of the Party and the life of the country,"[35] was highlighted by the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), an imitation of some aspects of the Chinese Cultural

34. Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1974), p. 606.

35. The expression is part of the title of Chapter 7 in the *History of the Party*, which is divided in five subchapters. "Revolution," "revolutionization," "revolutionizing" and "revolutionary" appear 12 times in the titles of the subchapters.

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Revolution. Bureaucrats were a main target, ranks and insignia were abolished and commissars were reinstated in the army, and intellectuals were sent to work in the countryside for a period of time.

China's switch to a friendly policy towards the United States reproposed the question of doctrinal purity. The days of the revolution were long gone by, and a new generation had grown up, some of them with higher education obtained in more advance socialist countries. This younger generation would not profess the same loyalty to the ideals of the revolution as their elders (hence the emphasis on "revolutionization"). The Youth Organization began to express discontent. Unorthodox customs spread among youngsters. At the same time a taste for new ways of expression in literature and the arts developed, backed by the mass media. Hoxha had in the meantime cultivated a propensity for writing and his nostrils had become sensitive to literary rot.[36] In the 4th Plenum (June 1973), he took up the cudgel against "liberalism," which he describes as "an expression of ideological and political opportunism, renunciation of the consistent class struggle . . . and acceptance of peaceful coexistence with the enemy ideology." The Party's ax this time fell on Fadil Paçrami and Todi Lubonja.

A crony of Spiru, Paçrami had become editor-in-chief of the Party organ *Zëri i Popullit* (The People's Voice) when only in his twenties. He carried important functions in the Party and in the government. In his mature years he turned to writing plays. These were suddenly found polluted with liberalism. Lubonja, Director of the Albanian Radio-Television, seconded the contagion. The purge spread to the cadres of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The leadership of the Youth Organization was particularly affected and infected — "long hair, extravagant dress, screaming jungle music . . . ."[37] It was reshuffled. So was the direction of the League of Albanian Writers and Artists.

The cultural purge went on after the 4th Plenum. The 5th and 6th Plenums exuded the military purge. To call generals liberals won't do; another name had to be found which, due to the many stripes of their (former) insignia, had to be a string of names: "saboteurs," "counter-revolutionary revisionists," "plotters," "traitors." Such were found to be Beqir Balluku, Minister of Defense, Petrit Dume, Chief of General Staff, and Hito Çako, Chief of the Political Directory of the Army. They were charged with plotting to seize power through a military putsch. To that purpose, they had diffused in the army literature inspired by the Chou En-lai doctrine that "Albania could not be defended against external aggression, especially Soviet agression, except by applying the tactics of partisan guerrilla warfare."[38] This was not exactly what Hoxha had been repeatedly stressing, i.e., that "every citizen must be a soldier and every soldier a citizen."[39] According to this tenet, "the key ele-

36. The first two volumes of Hoxha's *Works* (in Albanian) were published in 1968. By 1971, eight volumes had appeared. Vol. 37 came out in 1983.

37. Enver Hoxha, *Selected Works*, vol. 4 (IMLSCC: Tirana, 1982), p. 819.

38. *History of the Party, op. cit.*, p. 504.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 467.

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ment in national defense and victory is man rather than weapons, the revolutionary consciousness of the 'citizen army' rather than military technology."[40] Apparently, Balluku and his staff wanted to build a modern army restricted in number but well-trained and disciplined and whose first loyalty was to the General Staff. The reinstatement of commissars in the army disrupted their plans. Their resistance to the Party's interference with their duties was interpreted as an attempt to set the Army against the Party. The issue at stake was who would command the army: the bygone generals, Hoxha and Shehu, or those actually in charge. A former metalworker from Tirana who had studied in the Voroshilov Military Academy and had served as minister of Defense from 1954 to 1974, Lieutenant General Balluku could become another Xoxe if a pro-Soviet or pro-Yugoslave tide should occur. He and his associates were found guilty of "distributing the documents and the materials of the party and the works of Comrade Enver Hoxha, sent to the Army, in very limited numbers."[41] The proletarian "arch-traitor" was punished "by the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat." His associates were also executed.

Did the Balluku group really conspire against the Hoxha-Shehu monopoly of power? A military putsch in a Stalinist regime is highly improbable. Their resistance seems to have been motivated by purely military defense concerns. The alliance with China was not a military one, like the alliances with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The Chinese leaders had more than once declared their readiness to come to Albania's rescue in case of aggression. Consequently, the Albanian military leaders had been expecting some form of military alliance. This seems to be the main reason for the recurrent visits to China by Balluku (1964, 1967 and 1972) and by Dume (1973). The Chinese kept supplying the Albanians with military equipment and experts. But that was all. After Albania's rift with the Soviet Union and especially after Albania's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact (1968), the country was left alone to defend itself. Unable to change the course of foreign policy, the military leaders must have tried, one thinks, to strengthen the power of the army. This was perceived as a threat to the powers that be. Hence their reaction, and their precaution as well. The 1976 Constitution of the Socialist People's Republic of Albania states that the First Secretary of the Party is also Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The cultural and military purges, cultural and military relating pretty much like thesis and antithesis, were to lead to the economic purge, their synthesis. This time the traitors were Abdyl Këllezi, Koço Theodosi and Kiço Ngjela, respectively, the Chairman of the Planning Commission, the Minister of Industry and Mining, and the Minister of Trade. Këllezi and Theodosi were Politburo members, Ngjela a member of the Central Committee. Their crimes? Sundry and divers: introduction of self-management and capitalistic methods, encouragement of bureaucratic and technocratic trends, waste in

40. Peter Prifti, *Socialist Albania since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments* (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 215.
41. *History of the Party, op. cit.*, p. 506.

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funds and materials, sabotage in industry and agriculture,[42] trade used as liaison with enemies. "This group, like the others, had been engaged in clandestine activity for years," one reads in the *History of the Party*, which further specifies: "Both the group of B. Balluku and the group of A. Këllezi and Co. relied on the aid of the Chinese leadership which incited the traitorous counter-revolutionary activity of these groups."[43]

"The smashing of the enemy group,"[44] took place in the 7th Plenum (May 1975). On July 3, 1975, Adil Carçani, then First Deputy Premier and now Premier of Albania, signed a five-year pact with China for a long-term credit without interest. The *History of the Party* does not mention the signing of the pact, which was, however, made public in the Party's organ. *Zëri i Popullit* (July 4, 1975).[45] At about the same time that an Albanian leader was conducting talks with Chinese leaders for economic aid to his country, the Albanian Plenum of the Central Committee was "smashing" the group of traitors who had tried to wreck the Albanian economy "rel[ying] on the aid of the Chinese leadership." The Albanians have a proverb that is a suitable comment to acts such as these: "I gave you bread, and you throw stones to me." It was the Chinese who in 1960, when the Soviets suspended their shipment of grain, fed the Albanian people with wheat purchased in France and paid for in hard currency.[46] And they continued their supplies of wheat until the Albanians, with help from Chinese experts and upon insistent Chinese advice, were able to produce enough grain to feed their country's population (1976), after making available for agriculture 200,000 hectares of drained land.[47]

According to articles in Party organs and reports of Party leaders, including Shehu's report on the Fifth 5-Year Plan,[48] the Fourth 5-Year (1966-70) Plan was a failure. The reasons for it were both internal and external, i.e., related to the leadership's unrelenting policy of centralization on the one hand and, on the other, to their increasing ideological alienation from China, resulting in decreasing Chinese economic aid. The quote from the *History of the Party* accuses both the military and the economy leaders for their "reliance" on Chinese aid. This means, as made clear by the literature of the period, that they suffered from lack of "self-reliance"; they were defeatists, not confident enough in the energies of the Albanian people to resist foreign military or economic aggression. Self-reliance motivates the break first with the Soviet Union and then with China. The concept has an illustrious parentage: Stalin's theory of socialism in one country, and Mussolini's thesis of autarchy. The economy planners, just like the military chiefs, rejected that concept, entailing isolationism. In 1968, the Party instructed its members to push for "working class control," a half-way decentralizing measure devised to increase productivity.

42. Pirro Dodbida, Minister of Agriculture and Politburo Candidate member, was fired in April 1976.
43. *History of the Party, op. cit.*, p. 506.
44. Part of the title of subchapter 5 in Chapter 8 in the *History of the Party*.
45. Prifti, *Socialist Albania, op. cit.*, p. 82, and note 65, p. 273.
46. Wolff, *The Balkans, op. cit.*, p. 607.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Mehmet Shehu, *Report on the Fifth 5-Year Plan* (Tirana, 1971), p. 147.

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It is possible that the economy planners implemented that instruction in the sense of Yugoslav self-management, as a cure for the economic asthemia resulting from rigid pyramidal centralization. No less damaging was the dwindling of the Chinese aid in response to Albanian criticism of China's new line. In these circumstances little could be done to restore the economy to health. Këllezi and his associates were scapegoats for the failure of a policy which they were to implement, without really believing in it.

Ideological-political Self-Isolation

The tripartite purge (1973-76) was comparable to the Titoite purge (1948-51) in its range and duration. It involved vital sectors of the Albanian government: industry and agriculture (Pirro Dodbida, Minister of Agriculture and candidate Politburo member, was fired in 1976), education and mass media (Thoma Deliana, Minister of Education and Culture, was dismissed in that same year), literature and the arts, and the armed forces. The purge witnessed the reappearance of a pro-Western trend among the intellectuals and the youth. The pendulum began to swing back, the eastward drive having exhausted its possibilities.

In 1976, a commercial agreement with Greece was signed. Trade relations with Yugoslavia, Italy and other European countries were intensified in the years following China's cut-off of credits and aid (July 1978). Yet Albania's total ideological and political isolation could not fail to worry those directly responsible for the country's defense and foreign policy. After Balluku's liquidation, the Ministry of Defense was assumed by Shehu who, in 1978, passed it over to his brother-in-law, Kadri Hazbiu, the executant of the tripartite purge in his capacity as Minister of Interior. Now that the internal enemies had been wiped out, Hoxha could devote himself to writing books in which he took care of the external enemies.[49]

One reads in the *History of the Party*: "The party combated any trace of the narrow concept of defense, which reduced it only to drilling and other military problems, a concept which had been cultivated by the traitors B. Balluku and company for their hostile aims. It became even more clear that the better the economic plans are fulfilled, the sounder the socialist order, the stronger the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Party-people unity and the better the people are prepared for the political, ideological, cultural, educational and technical aspect, the stronger the defence of the country . . . . The Homeland is defended with arms on the basis of the military art of people's war."[50]

In this text, a sound internal situation is said to rest with the dictatorship of the proletariat exercised against those who sabotage the fulfillment of eco-

49. Between 1978 and 1982, the following books authored by Hoxha appeared, all published by IMLSCC: *Yugoslav Self-Administration — A Capitalist Theory and Practice* (1978), *Imperialism and the Revolution* (1978), *With Stalin. Memoirs* (1979), *Reflexions on China*, 2 vols. (1979), *Eurocommunism is Anti-communism* (1980?); *The Khrushchevites. Memoirs* (1980) *Kur lindi Partia* (When the Party Was Born. Memoirs) (1981), *The Anglo-American Threat. Memoirs* (1982), *The Titoites. Historical Notes* (1982).

50. *History of the Party, op. cit.*, pp. 570-71.

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nomic plans, while the defense of the country from external enemies is assured by ideological cohesion and, to a minor degree, by "external support," i.e., "the international Marxist-Leninist Movement."[51] But what about external aggression? Here Hoxha's answer is the "people's war," fought according to military art learned in "free military schools, according to the teachings of the great Lenin."[52]

In his 1919 address to the peoples of the East, Lenin praises the "revolutionary enthusiasm . . . accompanied by a powerful inner cohesion" of the Red Army, which was organized and led to victory by Trotsky during the Civil War: "It will show them [the peoples of the East] that weak as they may be, and invincible as may seem the power of the European oppressors, who in the struggle employ all the marvels of technology and of military art — nevertheless a revolutionary war waged by oppressed peoples, if it really succeeds in arousing the millions of working and exploited people, harbours such potentialities, such miracles, that the emancipation of the peoples of the East is now quite practicable . . . ."[53] Hoxha's concept of defense is rooted in this theory, which was formulated when Kolchak was ruling over Siberia. Lenin's theory proved to be right during the Civil War, at a time when the fighting was done with guns. Will that theory be practicable in our atomic age? Elsewhere, Lenin rejects outdated forms of fighting: "Frequently the lackeys of the bourgeoisie reproached us for having launched a 'Red Guard' attack on capital.... The Red Guards fought in the noble and supreme historical cause of liberating the working and exploited people from the yoke of the exploiters.... Does that mean that a "Red Guard" attack on capital is *always* appropriate, under *all* circumstances...? We must know how to change our methods of fighting the enemy to suit changes in the situation... We shall not be so foolish, however, as to put 'Red Guard' methods in the forefront at a time when the period in which the Red Guard attacks were necessary has, in the main, drawn to a close (and to a victorious close)...."[54] This seems to have been Balluku's position. Hoxha takes him to task for his planned strategy of abandoning the coast as indefensible and retreating to the country's mountainous interior.[55] Yet, Balluku's strategy is supported by another Lenin text: "...We demand that everybody adopt a *serious* attitude towards defence of the country. And adopting a serious attitude towards defence of the country means thoroughly preparing for it, and strictly calculating the balance of forces. If our forces are obviously small, the best means of defence is *retreat into the interior of the*

51. *Ibid.* p. 570.

52. E. Hoxha, *Report Submitted to the 8th Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania*, November 1, 1981 (Tirana, 1981), p. 102.

53. "Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East" in Lenin, *Selected Works in One Volume* (International Publishers: New York, 1971), p. 508.

54. "The Immediate Task of the Soviet Government," *Pravda*, April 28, 1918, in Lenin, *Selected Works, op. cit.*, pp. 407-08.

55. "Beqir Balluku worked secretly in the direction that Chou En-lai proposed to him, that is for 'retreat to the mountains' and for alliance with Yugoslavia and Rumania." E. Hoxha, *Reflexions on China*, vol. 2 (1MLSCC, Tirana, 1979), p. 110.

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country . . ."[56]

Hoxha's thesis that the Homeland should be defended by the entire people, the People's Army being "only a part of the armed people,"[57] was presented at the 12th Plenum (July 1971). The Sixth Congress of the PLA sanctioned Hoxha's thesis while also stressing "the leadership of the Party in the Army." With the adoption of these theses, entailing the militarization of the whole population and the Party's full control of the Army, the defense of the country fell back on methods practiced during the October Revolution and the Civil War as well as by the Albanian Partisans during their own civil war. Nostalgia for the days when Hoxha was Commander-in-Chief of the National Liberation War? His reference to Lenin misses Lenin's point that methods must adjust to changed situations. The "free" military schools he propounds as the means for military education of the masses have more affinities with fascist paramilitary training (pictures of young male and female people brandishing guns adorn Albanian magazines just as anti-air raid bunkers decorate the Albanian landscape) than with Leninist war practices. A better reference is Campanella. Compare Hoxha's sentence, "The consolidation of the free military schools is making military training an *intrinsic* [my emphasis] part of the life and activity of every working [person],"[58] with the following excerpt from *The City of the Sun*: "In addition there are the athletes who provide military training for all the people . . . . Beginning at the age of twelve, youths are taught to strike, to overcome the enemy by craft; to use the sword, the spear, the bow; to ride, pursue, retreat, and maintain military formation. The women are also taught these skills . . . in case of an assault they can defend the walls . . . . Every two months there is a military review, and every day there are exercises either on horseback in the countryside or within the walls. There is also a daily lesson in the art of war."[59]

Reaction to Hoxha's primitive conception of defense by Balluku and his staff was bound to come. What was Shehu's position in this internecine fight? The fact that he, as Prime Minister, let his Minister of Defense go ahead with plans for resisting the interference of the Party in army affairs speaks for acquiescence. A professional soldier himself, Shehu could not possibly be happy with Hoxha's policy. Perhaps he came to look at his Minister of Defense as a person representing a potential rival to him as Prime Minister and a longtime personification of the Albanian government. His assumption of Balluku's duties after his demise corroborates the hypothesis. Yet, once becoming Minister of Defense, he must have begun questioning the wisdom of a policy which had isolated Albania from the rest of the world.

Chou En-lai had once advised the Albanian leaders to intensify relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania. Did Shehu follow this? Did he take steps for the

56. " 'Left-Wing' Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality," *Pravda*, May 9, 10 and 11, 1918, in Lenin, *Selected Works, op. cit.*, p. 438.

57. *History of the Party, op. cit.* p. 468.

58. Hoxha, *Report to the 8th Congress, op. cit.*, p. 101. In the text, "every working man," is an incorrect translation.

59. Tommaso Campanella, *The City of the Sun: a Poetic Dialogue.* Trans. D.J. Donno (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1981), p. 69.

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readmission of Albania into the Warsaw Pact? Hoxha's accusation of his being a triple agent, at the service of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and the United States, points in that direction. The day before he committed suicide, Shehu is reported to have received a Rumanian official. And after the liquidation of his associates in the cabinet, including his Minister of Foreign Affairs, rumors have circulated that the Prime Minister intended to "Rumanianize" Albania.

In *The Titoites*, Shehu is labelled a "superagent," having been recruited the U.S. Intelligence Agency while attending the American Vocational School in Tirana. He later studied at the Military Academy of Naples and became an army officer. He fought with the International Brigades in Spain as acting commandant of a battalion, and spent three years in a French concentration camp before returning to Albania in 1943. It was Shehu who organized and commanded the First Partisan Brigade, saved Hoxha and his staff from a German encirclement, and liberated Tirana from German troops. After the Liberation, he went to Moscow to study in the Voroshilov Academy. Hoxha called him back to resist the Yugoslav pressure and made him Chief of the Staff of the armed forces. We have seen how he stood up for Hoxha when the latter was threatened by Xoxe. It was Shehu who, together with Jakova, personally arrrested Xoxe in his office, and subsequently had him tried and shot. And when Hoxha clashed with Khrushchev, who, in a moment of anger, likened Hoxha to MacMillan, Shehu is reported to have said to the Soviet leader: "Take that word back and put it in your pocket!"[60]

How then did it come about that this man turned against his old ally and friend? According to the story as told in *The Titoites*, the tripartite plot was masterminded by Shehu who "pulled the strings behind the scenes." His plan to liquidate Hoxha years later was thus a sequence to the previous attempt. His scheme was germane to the plans of the tripartite traitors: he wanted to "liberalize" the Party, thus leading it to its own demise. To that effect, he had one of his sons get engaged to a girl of a bourgeois and enemy family. The Politburo foiled his stratagem by unanimously condemning the engagement. This sealed Shehu's fate who, in despair, took his life (18 December 1982). Investigation of his suicide revealed that Shehu intended to kill Hoxha, conspiring with his wife, Fiqret Shehu, Director of the V.I. Lenin Party School, and with his nephew, Feçor Shehu. Minister of the Interior. Also implicated in the conspiracy were Kadri Hazbiu, Minister of Defense, Nesti Nase, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Llambi Ziçishti, Minister of Public Health. Hazbiu, Feçor Shehu and Ziçishti are reported (no offical communiqué as yet) to have been put to death, and the other two sentenced to long prison terms. How many more have been purged is a matter of conjecture. The list may be long, considering that the purge involves personnel from four ministries and the Security apparatus, the latter the fief of the Shehu-Hazbiu clan for thirty-three

60. I have combined and slightly paraphrased Shehu's intervention in the Hoxha-Khrushchev confrontation. According to Enver Hoxha, *Albania Challenges Krushchev Revisionism* (Gamma Publishing Co.: New York, 1976, p. 177), both Mehmet Hoxha and Hysni Kapo replied to the Soviet leader: "Comrade Enver is no MacMillan, so take that back." The following, "Put it in your pocket," was pronounced by Mehmet Shehu alone.

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years.

Since ministers, army chiefs and important officials are Central Committee members as a rule, it can be stated that the Party apparatus has undergone a complete overhaul with the purge of the governmental sectors that had been spared from the tripartite purge. This must be the meaning of the rejuvenation of the Albanian leadership, a concept referred to frequently by Hoxha in recent years. As it appears now in retrospect, the dispute was about whether Albania could continue to be the prison-house of Stalinism, or open up to the world.

In the past Hoxha seems not to have been opposed to some kind of overture. In his *Reflexions on China*, excerpts from his political diary and covering almost the whole span of Sino-Albanian relations (1962-77), there is a note, "The Foreign Policy of China — A Policy of Self-Isolation." In that note he criticizes the Chinese trend of foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution: "Their general tactic is: 'Struggle with all, hostility with all.' Such a tactic is extremely sectarian and leads only to the course, 'either with me or against me;' 'if you do not think and act as I say or as I act, then you are against me!' "[61]

Prophetic words, they apply to Hoxha himself. But these were written in 1967, when Albania was flirting with the Chinese idea of cultural revolution. After the tripartite purge, Sino-Albanian relations went from bad to worse, and in 1978 China denounced the alliance. Hoxha responded with the publication of his *Imperialism and Revolution* (1978), the second part of which is a frontal attack against "Chinese social-imperialism." Subsequently, came his libels against Titoism, Khrushchevite social-imperialism and Eurocommunism, which forestalled eventual attempts to take Albania out of its isolation. Hoxha wanted Albania to remain the country whose brand of Stalinism was to be the model to be imitated by all other socialist countries, with him as the prophet of pure, atheistic, Hoxhan Marxism-Leninism.

Reflexions on China shows that Hoxha soon realized that Chinese Marxism-Leninism was quite different from his dogmatic Stalinism. In a note, "The Chinese Are Moving Towards Conciliation with the Khrushchevites" (July 2, 1962), Hoxha finds fault with China's readiness to publicize Krushchev's statement that "if China is attacked, then the Soviet Union will defend China."[62] Ironically enough, Hoxha later adopted Krushchev's formula, repeating that, if Yugoslavia is attacked, then Albania will defend Yugoslavia.

While publicly praising the great ally for its staunch defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism, Hoxha was rebuking its leadership for their "unprincipled line" in his own diary.[63] When Nixon visited China, Hoxha denounced "the scandalous and disgraceful propaganda and demagogy which Peking is making about the rabid fascist . . . Peking, which claims to be the world center of Marxism-Leninism."[64] That privilege belonged to Tirana alone. The con-

61. Enver Hoxha, *Reflexions on China, op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 369.
62. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 23.
63. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 97.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 690.

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viction that Hoxha had superseded Mao as the greatest living theoretician of Marxism-Leninism is already present in that text. In a later note one reads: "Nearly a month has passed since the day our article 'The Theory and Practice of the Revolution,' was published and its echo is still very powerful. Now not only it is being given by all the news agencies of the world and commented on by various circles, but it is being dealt with extensively by major world newspapers and the comments are in our favor [the author is using the *nos majestatis*]."[65]

Sober Party members could remember that Stalin signed a pact of non-aggression with Hitler in 1939 and, shortly afterwards, the Soviet Union fought against Nazi Germany as an ally of the United States and Great Britain. A pact or an alliance with ideological enemies in the national interest was a Maoist no less than a Stalinist "unprincipled" practice. Nor was Lenin principled when he compromised on a milder form of capitalism (the NEP). And was Albania's agreement with the fascist Greece of the Colonels a principled agreement? Hoxha knows well, without having to read Machiavelli, that politics has little to do with moral principles. Indeed, Hoxha could teach the Italian a lesson, something the history of the Albanian purges demonstrates *ad nauseam.*

As to the much maligned Chinese policy in Hoxha's *Reflexions on China*, the overwhelming majority of the Albanian leadership seems to have been content with it so long as Chinese credits replenished the Albanian treasury and Chinese wheat filled the Albanian barns. For if China did not feel like entering into a military alliance with Albania, at least it had no intention of gobbling it up, as Yugoslavia had tried to do, or of turning the country into a European Cuba, as the Soviet leaders had probably thought.

In light of what has been said, it would seem that the tripartite purge was engineered by Hoxha as a "revolutionizing" measure to cure Albanian Stalinism from the Chinese "opportunism" he himself had inoculated in the Party's body with his parody of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. He could try any experiment he wanted at the time, his personality cult having reached a degree comparable to that of his master. Unlike Stalin, however, he had no firm grasp on the government, which was in Shehu's hands. Hoxha's strategy was to start with a peripheral purge, aimed at ideological deviations, for which he was directly responsible as First Secretary of the Party. He tactfully refrained from attacking Shehu's government. And when the next year he assailed and demolished — in a two-stage operation — the military establishment, he had Shehu replace Balluku, thus giving the impression that he had nothing against his Premier. Once the army purge was accomplished, he turned his heavy battery against the government's economy sector, liquidating the chief planner, two ministers and (a year later) the Minister of Agriculture. This amounted to blaming on the Prime Minister the faults of his Cabinet members condemned as traitors. He thus undermined Shehu's influence in the Party and in the country, but prudently forbore demoting him, aware that

65. "The Echo of Our Article 'The Theory and Practice of Revolution'," in *Reflexions on China, op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 564.

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the Shehu-Hazbiu faction was firmly entrenched in the Ministry of the Interior and in the Security apparatus.

No reliable information from the impenetrable Stalinist fortress had leaked out to explain what really happened between the two leaders. Hoxha's account in *The Titoites* that the disagreement was caused by a wedding engagement is ludicrous. The engagement was only the match that ignited an antagonism begun with the tripartite purge and exacerbated by differences regarding Albania's attitude towards Yugoslavia — the barometer of Albanian politics.

Expectations that Yugoslavia would disintegrate after Tito's death were rife in many circles. In the Spring of 1981, student riots occurred in Prishtinë, capital of Kosova, and in other cities of the Autonomous Province. Albania protested against the brutal repression. Yugoslavia accused Albania of having incited the riots. Albania's position regarding the Kosova problem was specified in three successive articles published in the Party daily, *Zëri i popullit*:[66] Albania will continue to sustain the legitimate rights of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia, including Kosova's right to republic status, while abstaining from territorial claims. This is to say that Albania does not seek to annex Kosova, while wanting it to be made a republic. But what will Albania do if Kosova, having been granted republic status, request to join the mother country? And if the union occurs, can the country continue to be ruled as it now is? Concessions will have to be made to the Kosovars (that have resisted collectivization and they are also religious) thus bringing to an end the collectivistic and atheistic Albanian socialism. Would Hoxha accept sacrificing the purity of his ideology for the sake of national unity, the goal that has haunted Albanians ever since Kosova and other parts of Yugoslavia and Greece mostly inhabited by Albanians were left out of the Albania of the pre-independence Albanian patriots?

Questions such as these must certainly have been discussed and debated in the Party forums. We know Hoxha's answer. Shehu's position can be surmised, considering that he was a professional officer turned statesman, not a rigid ideologist like Hoxha. Of the two he was, no doubt, the more nationalistic, alien to Hoxha's doctrinary postures of internationalism. Hoxha accuses him of being a Yugoslav agent, in collusion with the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana through his nephew, Feçor Shehu, who transmitted to his uncle the following UDB ultimatum: " 'Enver Hoxha must be killed at all costs, even in the Politburo meeting, even if Shehu himself is killed'."[67] Hoxha then quotes a Yugoslav newspaper stating that a gunfight between the two sides erupted at the meeting, during which Shehu was killed. The two versions of his death are worth one another. The message they both convey is an attempt on Shehu's part to come to some sort of understanding with Yugoslavia, possibly playing the Kosova card. But a rapprochement with Yugoslavia is anathema to Hoxha, and that explains the rage of his language.

66. "Why Were Political Violence and Tanks Used Against the Albanians of Kosova," April 8, 1981; "Who Incites Hostility Amongst the Peoples of Yugoslavia," April 23, 1981; "The Status of a Republic for Kosova is a Just Demand," May 17, 1981.

67. Hoxha, *The Titoites, op. cit.*, p. 625.

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Purging the Purgers

The history of the CPY-PLA is to a great extent the history of its purges. Consideration of the phenomenon sheds light on the Party's nature and the ideology informing it, purges being always explained in ideological terms, even when they are outcomes of bare power struggles.

The Albanian purges have affected Party dissenters, individuals or groups and factions and, exceptionally (the Titoite case) the Party as a whole. In collective purges, the names of only representative figures have been made public, while the group or faction has been given a discrediting label such as "opportunist," "saboteur," "Titoite," "Trotskyite," "Krushchevite," "anti-Party," "enemy," "traitor," "agent of imperialism," "foreign agent," etc. The descriptions fit the recipients loosely, often being completely gratuitous and even Orwellian ("war is peace"). With few exceptions, such as the case of the Xoxe pro-Yugoslav faction, or the Belishova-Tashko pro-Soviet group, those who were purged were nationalistic communists just like Hoxha and Shehu but who, unlike them, resented foreign supervision, be it Yugoslav or Soviet. It is highly significant that during Albania's alliance with China, which did not interfere with PLA problems, no purges occurred for a period of eleven years.

Chronology shows that purges were diarrhetic during the Yugoslav tutelage. After the extensive Titoite housecleaning, there was a two-year pause (1952-54) before another wave of purges began, first against dissenting leaders (Jakova, Spahiu, Gega) and later, when Albanian-Soviet relations deteriorated, against pro-Soviet leaders (Belishova, Tashko). A shorter interval (1976-82) occurred after the sweeping tripartite purge (1973-76). The following table, in which only conspicuous Party leaders appear (almost all Central Committee and Politburo members), provides a general picture.

The table shows that the purges have been continuous from the foundation of the Party until the end of the Soviet Patronage period (with a two-year interval following Stalin's death) for a comprehensive period of twenty years. During this period of time, the greater part of the core leadership was destroyed, first by the Hoxha-Xoxe duumvirate and then by the Hoxha-Shehu tandem. The tripartite purge liquidated most of the rest. The purge of the Shehu faction has reduced the core leadership to Hoxha and his wife, Ramiz Alia, Adil Carçani and perhaps one or two others, some of the old guard members having died (Hysni Kapo, Gogo Nushi), others having retired or been demoted (Spiro Koleka, Haxhi Lleshi). The process can be described as progressive enucleation and deproletarization. Proportionately with other classes and social groups, it is the proletarian core that has been hardest hit: three of the Party founders and members of the seven-person Provisional Central Committee: Xoxe, Jakova, and Themelko as well as two Party builders, Kristo and Balluku. Such leadership enucleation and deproletarization is unique among European Marxist-Leninist parties.

Another distinctive feature of the Albanian purges is their fierceness. An example is the Titoite housecleaning, which involved the expulsion of a quarter of the Party membership and more than half of its leadership. Titoite purges

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PARTY PURGES IN ALBANIA

Period	Year	Individuals, groups and factions	Ideological trend
Yugoslav Tutelage (1941-48)	1943	Sadik Premte ** Anastas Lulo	unclear
	1943	Ymer Dishnica	pro-West
	1944	Mustafa Gjinishi	pro-West
	1946	Sejfulla Malëshova, Kadri Hoxha	pro-West
	1947	Nako Spiru	anti-Yugoslav
	1948		
Soviet Patronage (1949-60)	1949	Koçi Xoxe ** Pandi Kristo ** Nesti Kerenxhi ** Kristo Themelko	pro-Yugoslav
	1950	Abedin Shehu * Niazi Islami	pro-Yugoslav
	1950	Gjin Marku, Beqir Ndou	unclear
	1951	Tuk Jakova * Theodor Heba * Manol Konomi	independent
	1952	Nexhip Vinçani	unclear
	1953-54		
	1955	Tuk Jakova, Bedri Spahiu	independent
	1956	Tirana Section Group	mixed
	1956	Liri Gega * Dali Ndreu	pro-Soviet
	1957	Panajot Plaku	pro-Soviet
	1959	Teme Sejko * Tahir Demi	independent
	1960	Koço Tashko * Liri Belishova	pro-Soviet
	1961	Maqo Çomo	pro-Soviet
Chinese Hegemony (1961-78)	1962-71		
	1973	Fadil Paçrami * Todi Lubonja * Agim Mero	pro-West
	1974	Beqir Balluku ** Petrit Dume ** Hito Çako	independent
	1975	Abdyl Këllezi * Koço Theodosi * Kiço Ngjela	pro-West (pro-Yugoslav?)
	1976	Pirro Dodbiba, Thoma Deliana	unclear
Isolation (1978-)	1977-82		
	1982-83	Mehmet Shehu ** Fiqret Shehu ** Feçor Shehu ** Kadri Hazbiu ** Nesti Nase ** Llambi Ziçishti	pro-West (pro-Soviet?)
	1983	Haxhi Lleshi	independent

Note: The sign * signifies dissenting group, the sign ** means oppositional faction. Lleshi's position as President of the Republic was taken over, shortly after Shehu's suicide, by Ramiz Alia, a Hoxha devotee and his heir apparent. The replacement, which was barely mentioned in the press, seems to be a case of silent purging.

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occured in all other European socialist countries, but they were relatively mild. We shall briefly review the Balkan countries. The size of the Rumanian purge of 1950 (25 percent of the Party membership) comes close to the Albanian figure. Yet that purge, which occured after the unification of communists and social democrats, aimed at raising the number of workers at the expense of petty-bourgeois elements in the Party.[68] In 1952, under Soviet pressure, Lukács, Pauker and Georgescu fell from power. Two years later, Patracanu was executed (arrested in 1948, he was rehabilitated in 1968).[69] In Bulgaria, the hanging of Petkov in 1948 was not a Party purge, he being the leader of the Agrarian party. The same holds true for Lulchev, the socialist leader, jailed with his group of seven deputies.[70] Kostov, the major scapegoat for Bulgarian Titoism, was indeed executed while seven of his followers were given life sentences (1948-49). Yugov managed to survive by recanting — he occupied key positions in the government afterwards.[71] As to Yugoslavia, the Soviet excommunication strengthened the Party's cohesion instead of loosening it. The dissenters were Hebrang, who died in jail, and Arso Jovanović, who was shot while trying to escape to Rumania.[72]

A third characteristic of the Albanian purges is that all those directly responsible for the purges, i.e., the Ministers of the Interior: Lleshi (1944-46), Xoxe (1946-48), Kerenxhi (1949), Mehmet Shehu (1949-50), Jakova (1950-51), Mehmet Shehu (1951-54), Hazbiu (1954-78), Feçor Shehu (1978-1982), have all been purged, without exception. The purge of the purgers, an absolute rule in Albania, has manifested itself only sporadically in the other European socialist countries (Rajk in Hungary, Yugov in Bulgaria, Ranković in Yugoslavia). The pattern is, of course, the Soviet Union (Yagoda, Beria). But whereas only two USSR Security chiefs have been purged and executed ever since the October Revolution, in Albania all seven ministers of the Interior have been purged and four of them executed or induced to commit suicide. This is an absolute record, comparable to other such records identifying the uniqueness of socialist Albania, the first atheistic state in world history and the country where Marxism-Leninism is 100% pure.

The analysis leads to the conclusion that Albanian Party purges are an endemic phenomenon of ideological hemophilia which is cured by professional hemophilic purgers who end up being purged themselves. And how are we to describe the Party's ideology? We can say that it is Stalinism, Albanian style.

The CPA was born Stalinist because the CPY was Stalinist at the time, and it was under CPY tutelage that the CPA was founded and began to function. Of the various communist groups and circles existing then in Albania, Tito's emissaries, Miladin Popović and Dušan Mugoša, managed to bring together the Shkodër Group, the Korçë Group and the Youth Group, excluding

68. Wolf, *The Balkans, op. cit.*, p. 467.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 471.
70. *Ibid.*
71. *Ibid.*, p. 480-81.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 409 and 365-66.

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Trotskyites and other non-Stalinist elements. One such was, for instance, Zef Mala, leader of the Shkodër Group, a philosophy student and an orthodox Marxist who thought that proletarian revolution makes sense where a proletarian class exists (it did not in Albania, the proletarian Jakova thought). Among the thirteen representatives who founded the Party, only three had some knowledge of Marxism: Koço Tashko, Enver Hoxha and Qemal Stafa. Tashko, the Comintern representative, resented the presence of the Yugoslav comrades. These found Hoxha to be much more flexible as well as an able organizer. Stafa, a university student with a better theoretical preparation, was murdered by fascists in 1942. The rest were proletarian activists or youths who knew of Marxist theory little more than its elements. The one who was conversant with the theory and who had also experience its Stalinist practice, Malëshova, arrived too late to change the situation, then dominated by the Secretary General. The reader knows what happened during the war and after the Liberation. Instigated by his Yugoslav mentors, the proletarian Xoxe initiated the class struggle by jailing and hanging intellectuals and technicians who were to him class enemies and the natural allies of the bourgeoisie. This is how Albanian Stalinism began, led by a Stalinist Party under Stalinist Yugoslav control. In the virgin forest of Albanian socialism, Xoxe blazed a bloody trail which Shehu and Hazbiu later pursued to Hoxha's gratification. The ideology did not substantially change it only changed names. Albanian Stalinism resisted Khrushchev's pressure of de-Stalinization while gradually receiving a Maoist veneer. This crumbled away in time. *Reflexions on China* includes many a critical note on Mao's Cultural Revolution. Yet the author carefully avoids mentioning his own Cultural Revolution, thus silently denying its Maoist paternity.

The Internal Factor

In 1975, Hoxha was still signing hymns to Chairman Mao who had at the time lined up with the United States. His opportunism was, of course, dictated by economic reasons, which are likewise important for explaining Albania's boisterous affairs with her two former partners. But since the Albanian Party purges have been invariably contingent on the relations between the CPA-PLA and the Communist Parties of first Yugoslavia, then the Soviet Union and ultimately China, one would be led to infer that the main cause for the purges was ideological, prompted by the leadership's zeal to preserve the purity of Albanian Marxism-Leninism from alien influences.

Hoxha would, of course, accept this interpretation, tacitly assuming that leadership and his person are one and the same. His stress, however, is — we saw an example in his concept of national defense — on the internal rather than the external factor. The following excerpt is indicative on this point: "The Chinese comrades talk a great deal about the class struggle in the party, but in fact they are not purging the Party, which is the fortress of the revolution, from within, but are encircling it from the outside with people who are not organized in a party of the vanguard . . . . The working class and the

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peasantry do not appear anywhere in this experiment."[73]

In this text, "purging the party . . . from within" means waging class struggle in the form of dictatorship of the proletariat (the working class and the peasantry) against the part of the party which is affected by petty-bourgeois and bourgeois ideology and which therefore needs to be purged. We have seen where this leads: to the purging of the purgers and the dictatorship of the Purger.

The internal factor concept reappears in another text which deals with the founding of the Party: "We know that Marxism-Leninism always regards the internal cause, the internal factor, as the main determining factor in the birth and evolution of every phenomenon. The process and birth of a communist party can never be an exception to this law, hence, the process of the founding of the Communist Party cannot be an exception to it, either."[74]

Hoxha's concept of the internal factor is a time-honored one and goes back to Aristotle (his entelechy). The question of whether the external or the internal factor is determinant for the birth and evolution of a phenomenon boils down to the question of which comes first, the chicken or the egg. Aristotle was for the egg. But I doubt Marx shared that opinion, if for no other reason than because the poor devil could not afford to eat many chickens when he was writing *Capital*.

We won't argue the cogency of the impeccable syllogism with which Hoxha refutes the thesis that the CPA was founded by the Yugoslavs by saying that, since the Party was not founded by the Yugoslavs (and Russians and Chinese were then missing from the picture), the founders must have been the Albanian themselves. The question is where are these founders now? According to the *History of the Party*, there were fifteen founders,[75] two of them being Yugoslavs. Of the remaining thirteen, only four are mentioned: Enver Hoxha, Pilo Peristeri, Qemal Stafa and Vasil Shanto. The last two were killed by the fascists before the Liberation, while Peristeri, another tinsmith from Korçë, played no role in the top leadership. This leaves Hoxha a lonely star in what used to be a constellation. And if we add to the number of purged founders: Tashko, Xoxe, Lulo, Premte, Çitaku, Jakova, Themelko, the number of the purged builders: Dishnica, Gjinishi, Malëshova, Spiru, Kristo, Spahiu, Gega, Belishova, Balluku, Shehu, Hazbiu, one is left with the conclusion that Hoxha alone on the one scale of the balance weighs more than all the rest on the other.

Such being the case and taking the lead from Hoxha's doctrine that the main determinant is the internal factor, the inference to be made is that the main cause for the Party purges must be sought in Hoxha's entelechy, his *Wille zur Macht*. To realize this, one needs only read the *History of the Party*, the Albanian counterpart of Stalin's *Short Course* of the history of the Bolshevik Party. It begins with a description of the communist groups before the Party's founda-

73. "Notes on the Cultural Revolution in China. The Party is not Purged from Outside but from Within," *Reflexions on China, op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 366.

74. Hoxha, *The Titoites, op. cit.*, p. 35.

75. *History of the Party, op. cit.*, p. 64.

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tion. Hoxha is first mentioned (he joined the Korçë Group shortly before the Italian occupation of the country) towards the end of the first chapter, in a section exclusively devoted to him. From that point on, however, his name structures the text. It appears rather sparingly in the second and third chapters, which deal with the Party's activity during the period of the Yugoslav tutelage that saw Xoxe emerge as the real helmsman. But beginning with the fourth chapter, which focuses on the Party's struggle to industrialize the country, Hoxha's name and the Party become increasingly interchangeable terms. The History of the Party is indeed the record of his achievements, supported by citations from his reports and speeches. In vain one looks for his closest collaborators to be given some credit. They are never mentioned, except for one or two who are dead. Those who are named are invariably dissenters, branded as plotters and traitors. One expects that at least Shehu, his ally and Premier for twenty-seven years, would crop up somewhere. But not even he does. As everyone knows who is somewhat familiar with the Albanian Liberation War, it was Shehu who routed the nationalists, and it was he who, as commander of the First Army Corps, drove the Nazi troops from the capital. How does the *History of the Party* describe that battle? "The units of the National Liberation Army were now engaged in the final operations against the German troops in Albania and in Kosova. Of these operations the most important was that for the liberation of Tirana. The order of the Commander-in-Chief was to wipe out the enemy, to stop the plunder and destruction of the city by the Germans and to liberate Tirana at all costs. The operation was to be led by the Command of the First Army Corps."[76] The merit goes to the Commander-in-Chief who gave the order, not to the commander who fought and won the battle. Not only is Shehu's name omitted, but even his personality is denied, the word referring to him being "command," an abstract noun.

The Bible of Albanian Marxism-Leninism swarms with shams such as this. The impression one gets from reading Hoxha's works is the same: history is being continuously reinvented to please the one who detains its license. Things that never happened are presented as facts, while facts are concealed or disguised, mutilated or otherwise altered — wreckage of truth floating in a sea of falsehood. Looking for a modicum of honesty in works such as these is a desperate enterprise.

The purges are a major theme in the *History of the Party;* they constitute Hoxha's title of glory as the guardian and arbiter of the ideology of the Party. To that effect, the victims, ghostly apparitions wrested from the limbo of shame and misery where they have been hurled, are made to parade before the throne of the victor, their judge, hidden in his aureole. The *History of the Party* exalts him as such, approaching his books reverently like sacred scriptures. His name is pronounced in formulaic clauses such as "Comrade Enver Hoxha teaches" ("says," "explains"), "the teaching of Comrade Hoxha," preceding or following sentences in the form of maxims, often in association with the Central Committee as equiponderant with the latter. The following are all

76. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

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found in Chapter VIII, 6, pp. 522-25: "Special attention has been paid to providing the control group with ideological-political training and expertise. According to the instructions of the Central Committee and the teachings of Comrade Enver Hoxha, their training is ideological and political.... The cadre . . . first of all, must be educated in the school of the working class,' teaches Comrade Enver Hoxha. 'The cadres have their place, their role,' pointed out Comrade Enver Hoxha, 'however, they do not impose their law on the Party, but the Party and the class impose the law on them.' Comrade Enver Hoxha says, 'The Party must immediately and unhesitatingly bring down their high horse and break the noses and bones . . . ' of cadres with kulak, bureaucratic or liberal mentality . . . ."

The lawmaker's injunction to his subjects to blindly obey his law cannot be clearer. And if Hoxha has succeeded in reducing the Party to worshipping him as the Prophet of Marxism-Leninism, we can now explain the phenomenon of Party purges in conformity with his thesis of the predominance of the internal factor: the Party purges are a phenomenon of Hoxhan phagocytosis.

Those who were purged, in groups or individually, suffered their fate because they dared to disobey or scorn Hoxha's orders. Some of them, while having no qualms about expropriating the rich bourgeois and the big landowners, objected to jailing them and then harassing their families. Others who were in agreement with curbing the influence of organized religion would not condone the extermination of clerics, scoffing at the idea that Albania be made the first atheistic state in the world. No one would hesitate to distribute the confiscated land to poor peasants. But to persecute a peasant "with less than 3 hectares [about seven acres] of land, 1 head of cattle and less than 10 sheep,"[77] seemed preposterous. "In 1960 there were some 1,500 kulak households, or less than one percent of the overall number of the peasant households. The kulaks had lost their former economic base," they had "disappeared in general as a class."[78] According to Marxism, class is defined by its economic base. But if this was lost, as the text spells out, can their persecution, which raged until they were annihilated, be justified? They were annihilated as a class that has ceased to be a class. Is this Marxism?

It is, of course, Stalinism, precisely Hoxhan Stalinism. When Malëshova protested against the killing without due process of former army officers by Shehu's partisans in the first days of the liberated capital, Hoxha justifed the terroristic acts by saying: "When we appealed to them to go to the mountains and fight the occupiers together with us they didn't budge from their comfortable shelters. Now they are 'repenting' too late, and we have to settle accounts with the criminals."[79] Criminals because they did not join the partisans! Malëshova is quoted as having replied: "You have lost the heart of a communist who values another man's life and thinks deeply before he decides to wipe out someone who might be corrected and serve the country." A com-

77. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
78. *Ibid.*
79. Hoxha, *The Titoites, op. cit.*, p. 187.

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munist with a heart must have sounded ludicrous to Hoxha, which seems to be his reason for quoting Malëshova's reply.

Hoxhan Messianism

While Albanian Stalinism is not entirely a product of Hoxha, the ideology inspiring the PLA is completely his own. Party leaders and the intelligentsia only repeat or paraphrase what he says or writes. Albanian Marxism-Leninism remains earthbound because any attempt to lift it above that level would immediately be taxed with revisionism.

Hoxha's status as the official representative and monopolizer of the PLA ideology dates from the post-Stalin era, when he began to oppose Krushchev's process of de-Stalinization. He was able to capitalize on Stalin's cult to build up his own personality cult. At the time he joined Mao in challenging the de-Stalinization movement, Hoxha had achieved his objective of becoming the Albanian Stalin. Maoist ideas infiltrated his thoughts without indenting their Stalinist substratum. He merely parodied the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the ideological-political situation in Albania being very different from the situation in China. Mao launched the Red Guards movement because Party control was eluding him. This, however, was not the case with Hoxha, who dominated the Party. Behind his promotion of the Albanian Cultural Revolution lay his scheme to capitalize on Mao's doctrine, then popular with the extreme left. The sixties witnessed the flood of the student protest movement, which from the United States (the 1964-65 Berkeley Free Speech Movement) spread over many European countries (the French May of 1968). Mao's Red Guards were mostly pupils and students (hence the name of Cultural Revolution). Hoxha made good use of the student and, in general, intellectual discontent in his homeland in order to further his personality cult. This he did by encouraging attacks against the Party bureaucracy, thus casting himself in the role of the enlightened revolutionary leader. When Mao began to lose favor with the left because of his coming to terms with American imperialism, Hoxha saw his chance to promote himself to the longed for position of Commander-in-çhief of the forces of World Revolution, with Tirana as the Mecca of Marxism-Leninism. The cultural purge of 1973 cleared the ground of the weeds of liberalism grown during the diversified climate of the Cultural Revolution. And if the military purge had a Soviet pattern (Balluku's catastrophe parallels Zhukov's fall), it was meant to have ideological impact, just as the cultural and economic purge. One reads in the *History of the Party*: "The struggle against the enemy groups of conspirators and saboteurs, like the struggle against earlier traitors, was, *first of all* [my emphasis], an ideological struggle as the entire class struggle waged in the ranks of the Party is."[80] We already know from *Reflexions on China* that class struggle is carried not only outside but also inside the Party. This is to say that dissenters are class enemies. Class struggle inside a Party that has long eliminated enemy classes (Albania's position) is sheer gibberish. But read power struggle where class struggle stands, and the statement begins to make sense. Hoxha's doctrine has the

80. *History of the Party, op. cit.*, p. 530.

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magic power of turning any ideological dissenter into an agent of imperialism, or social-imperialism, or revisionism. Internalizing a cannibalistic process within the Party under the slogan of combating bourgeois survivals was common praxis in the Soviet Union as long as Stalin lived. Hoxha's merit is to "theorize" his master's practice by giving the Marxist concept of class an ideological rather than economic content. Hoxha's doctrine stands Marx on its head.

We understand why, in *Reflexions on China*, Hoxha criticizes Maoism as neglecting to practice class struggle within the Party and to purge it "from within." Another text in the *History of the Party* is a categorical rejection of Mao's doctrine of non-antagonistic contradicitons arising within the Party and which can be solved without resorting to violence: "The revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat; cannot fail to use violence against the enemies of the Party, the people and socialism. The contradictions between us and class enemies cannot be resolved in any other way. To try to resolve these contradictions as contradictions among the working masses, between the various aspects of the socialist order, are resolved, means to fall into idealism and class conciliations. The purging of enemy elements from the Party, its struggle to smash their anti-Party and anti-socialist activity, have further tempered the Party ideologically and politically as the vanguard of the working class and the leader of the people."[81] Mao's thesis of non-violent solution of Party conflicts is rejected in the name of Stalin terrorism. The passage summarizes Hoxha's theory of revolution, his legacy to world socialism.

One looks in vain in his books for an original thought that would qualify their author as a theoretician. Hoxha's ideas come from the Stalinist baggage (seldom directly from Lenin) and are interspersed with ideas current in the left literature of the time. The logic is loose, with frequent non sequiturs and even contradictions, the language coarse and vituperative at best, the style (Hoxha himself encourages comment on his style, he having authored a volume of literary criticism) a repetitious display of ideological platitudes interwoven with cheap journalistic clichés. Hoxha writes as he preaches, his "theoretical" books being germane to his prolix reports and how much more exciting speeches (he is a skilled speaker). Lacking sufficient intellectual vigor to devise theories, he enunciates theses that are antitheses as a rule, i.e., refutations of adversary theses. There is a method in this. He hits the adversary right on the head with sledge-hammer arguments, and without bothering to analyze the thesis, which he presents in a sketchy and usually distorted manner. Then he makes away with the thesis by producing one of his trump cards such as relentless class struggle, dictatorship of the proletariat, impossibility of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and the bourgeois order, proletarian internationalism, and the like. No attempt is made to supersede the antithesis into a synthesis. His definition of dialectic is sophomoric: "Marxist-Leninist dialectics teaches us that there is no limit to development, that nothing stops

81. *Ibid.*

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changing. In this process of unceasing developments towards the future, quantitative and qualitative changes occur." Heraclitus plus Engels, juxtaposed. And here is his refutation of Mao's theory of the three worlds, concerning the second world: "In the countries of the so-called second world there is a large and powerful proletariat, which is exploited to the bone, which is kept down by crushing laws, the army, the police, the trade unions, by all the weapons of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."[82] Here the trump card of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie concludes a sentence in which the police and the trade unions are put on the same level while the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie applies indifferently to all industrialized countries, to Japan as well as to Sweeden. Elsewhere we read that the Emperor Hirohito is a "fascist dictator" just as Mussolini and Hitler,[83] Santiago Carillo is "a bastard of revisionist bastardy,"[84] while "Aragon, André Wurmser not only changed their coats, but even sold their souls and their hides to revisionism."[85]

Hoxha's ideological daltonism, a consequence of his bone-dry dogmaticism, knows no degrees of transition, let alone shades, only black-and-white. Other examples: "The two imperialist superpowers represent *to the same degree* [my emphasis] the main enemy and danger of socialism."[86] "On the one side stands the capitalist-imperialist bourgeoisie, which is the most ferocious, deceitful and blood-thirsty class known to history. On the other side stands the proletariat, the class totally dispossessed of means of production, ruthlessly oppressed and exploited by the bourgeoisie, which [the referent must be the proletariat] is at the same time the most advanced class of the society which thinks, creates, works and produces...."[87] Marx thought that the proletarians will be able to perform these diverse activities when they cease to be proletarians in the society of the future which is communism. Thinking and creating presuppose leisure time and some comfort, which "oppressed and exploited" proletarians do not have. This other revolutionizing doctrine of Hoxha supersedes Marx pretty much as Muhammed superseded Jesus Christ. In his Stalinist ideology there is indeed a novel element, peculiar to him: messianism. But since this novelty may prove too much for the reader, I shall preface discussion by a digression.

In his book on Tito, Dedijer reports a conversation in 1946 between Stalin and the Yugoslav delegation headed by Kardelj. To Stalin's question about who and what kind of a communist leader was Hoxha, Kardelj answered that he was "good and honest on the whole, although he ha[d] certain characteristics of a petty bourgeois intellectual."[88] Such was also Stalin's opinion: "He is a petty bourgeois, inclined towards nationalism? Yes, we think so too."[89] In his

82. Enver Hoxha, *Imperialism and the Revolution* (IMLSCC: Tirana, 1978), p. 263.
83. *Ibid.,* p. 25.
84. Enver Hoxha, *Eurocommunism is Anti-communism* (IMLSCC: Tirana, 1980), p. 249.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
86. Hoxha, *Imperialism and the Revolution, op. cit.*, pp. 134-35.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
88. Quoted by Wolff, *The Balkans, op. cit.*, p. 277.
89. M. Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, p. 146. Stalin asked Djilas about Hoxha during their January 1948 conversation.

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article on " 'Left-wing' Childishness and Petty-Bourgeoise Mentality," Lenin describes the language of the ultras as "defence of petty-bourgeois sloppiness that is sometimes concealed by 'Left' slogans."[90]

Can this description also be applied to Hoxha? During the war-time period, Hoxha was Secretary General of the Party, Commander-in-Chief of the National Liberation Army and designated Premier of Albania. After Liberation, he was Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, besides being, of course, Secretary General of the Party. Such accumulation of power (would Hoxha call it democratic centralization?) is rather similar to accumulation of capital.

Consider his idea of a pure Marxism-Leninism. It contradicts his own definition of dialectics as Heraclitean becoming. Heraclitus illustrated his metaphysical concept by saying that one cannot wash one's hands twice in the same water. Indeed, if I wash my hands in a basin of fresh water, the water won't be the same after my act of washing because some of the dirt in my hands will have rendered the water less pure. Has any lasting religious or political movement remained as it started, pure? In his parable of the Grand Inquisitor, Dostoyevsky has depicted what would happen to Jesus, were he to come back in our times. And Marxism is of course different from what we read in Marx's works, if for no other reason than because Marx was one and Marxisms are many. Purity is a religious and, at best, a poetic concept which has absolutely no place in "dirty" politics. Those who associate purity with the latter are either hypocrites, or troubled souls longing for origins, for the otherworldly home. True, there are also those who believe in the Kingdom of God on earth and these are millenarians, waiting for the Messiah, or the Christ, or the Mahdi, to come back and deliver them from suffering. And I do not know whether Ayatollah Khomeini thinks of himself as a Mahdi. But a Sunni Mahdi, Muhammed Ahmed (1844-85), fought a war of liberation in Sudan, where he established a theocratic regime. He fought to purify Islam. Closer to our times, Hitler provoked a world war, seeking to purify the German race. It makes little difference whether Hitler believed in God or not, he certainly believed in the purity of the German race — and in the obscenity of the Jewish race, which he purged, very religiously indeed, through a modern equivalent to the pyre.

In one way or another, these people and others, too, who had a Savior's vocation, were convinced of being unique, chosen by God, or destiny, or also by themselves (again, it makes little practical difference) to lead a tribe or a nation, a sect or a religion, and at times the whole of humankind, to what they thought to be the terrestrial paradise.

Is there any doubt that Hoxha considers himself a unique genius, he who acts as though being the only one in the world to represent Marxism-Leninism in its immaculate purity? Uniqueness and solitude. "Mon Dieu, vous m'avez fait puissant et solitaire" (De Vigny): the great man's disgust of grandeur.

90. Lenin, *Selected Works, op. cit.*, p. 432.

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Has something similar happened to Hoxha? In the last several years he has devoted himself to writing, becoming remote, like Stalin in the last period of his life. Remoteness from the public adds a transcendent dimension to the personality cult. In *The Great Writer* (1977), a representative novel by the Albanian *poeta laureatus*, Ismail Kadare, Hoxha is portrayed as the Savior of the Albanian nation from Khrushchevite agression, towering Olympus-like above the other members of the Albanian delegation facing Khrushchev — something which is reminiscent, *mutatis mutandis,* of Virgil's apotheosis of Augustus in the *Aeneid*.

Hoxha saved Albania by daring to defy the Soviet colossus. Later he challenged Mao himself. A suitable analogy is David fighting Goliath. David felled the giant because he "trusted in the Lord without wavering" (Psalm 26:1). Hoxha humiliated Khrushchev supported by what angel, what faith? Compare Stalin's idea of socialism in one country with Hoxha's ideal of Albania as the chosen land of socialism. Both seem to derive from the Jewish belief in one and only one true God, which was adopted, with due modifications, by the other two monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam. In *The Holy Family*, Marx criticizes the "theological Critic" Bruno Bauer for his concept of atheism: "*atheism*, the last stage of *theism*, the negative recognition of God"[91] And in the *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx writes that "atheism, which is the denial of this unreality [of nature and man], no longer has any meaning, for atheism is a *negation of God*, through which negation it asserts the *existence of man*. But socialism as such no longer needs such mediation."[92] Yet Hoxha proclaimed Albania the first atheistic state in the world, thus outdoing even Stalin who prudently restrained himself from taking that step. Hoxha's promotion of his "negative" religion was actively seconded by Shehu. Is it only a coincidence that Hoxha (Albanian "hoxha" has the same sound and meaning as its English counterpart "hodja") is the son of a Mullah, and Shehu the son of a "sheh" (English "sheikh"), who was a religious leader belonging to an Islamic mystic sect? I shall end with an anecdote. At some time there were in the Central Committee, besides Hoxha and Shehu and their wives, people such as Mihal Prifti ("prift," an Orthodox priest), Manush Myftiu ("myfti," Moslem religious head of a district), and Haxhi Lleshi ("hadji" is one who has made a pilgrimage to Mecca). An Italian comrade who happened to be in Tirana was curious to know whether names such as these had a meaning. And when an Albanian comrade explained to him what they meant, he is reported to have exclaimed: "La santa famiglia!"

91. *Marx-Engels. Collected Works*, (International Publishers, New York, 1975), vol. 4, p. 110.
92. *Early Writings [of] Marx.* Trans. R. Livingstone and G. Benton (Penguin Books, 1977 repr.), p. 357.

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ON THE ALLEGED DEMISE OF VAGINAL SEXUALITY: A MOURNFUL ACCOUNT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM*

by Renata Schlesier

Is there vaginal orgasm or not? This question and the answers it has evoked have caused considerable confusion. The debate involves instincts and erogenic zones as well as the potential of female sexuality. At stake is not only the determination of the decisive erogenic zone in female sexuality but also, the extent to which female sexuality is susceptible to repression, the relation between social repression and the repression of sexuality, the specific understanding by women of their own needs and bodies, and particularly whether women must devolve a part of their body — the clitoris *or* the vagina — in order to be women.

Both sides in the debate understood a vaginal orgasm to be an orgasm limited exclusively to the vagina. Psychoanalysts treated this as dogma, and feminists opposed this with another dogma that violated reality as much as the one they opposed: the dogma of clitoral orgasm. The missionary zeal and the militant protest which exploded in the debate over the "vaginal orgasm" shared a common denominator: the mutilation of female sexuality.

The proponents of "vaginal orgasm" as the exclusive form of satisfaction denied the significance of the clitoris for female sexuality, and the proponents of "clitoral orgasm" believed the vagina to be as superfluous a sexual organ as the appendix is for digestion. Either the clitoris or the vagina? The choice became the slogan for a reduction of the instinctual force of female sexuality, not only by psychoanalysts but by feminists as well. Why is knowledge of female sexuality repressed in women? — The answer to the question seems easy only as long as one forgets or denies that even many women struggling for liberation include the crippling of their sexuality in their own programs.

In view of the clear-cut indictment against the vagina by feminists, one is forced to ask why women themselves repress their sexuality and construct ideologies that justify this repression passed as doctrines of liberation. Reflections on this can only be a mourning.

I

For some feminist ideologists and ideological critics, no part of the female body is as unpopular as the vagina, and no part is so embellished and elevated

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as the clitoris.[1] Yet, it is not enough to debunk this glorification of the clitoris as mystification and to reveal the defense of the vagina to be ideology. It would be superfluous to busy oneself with this "opposition" and "antithesis" of vagina and clitoris, if it did not contain a moment of truth. If there were no developmental stages within female sexuality, no incentives and premises implying the differentiation of vagina and clitoris, then no woman would seriously ponder whether she would prefer one or the other as the most important organ of satisfaction or, indeed, whether she is a "clitoral" or "vaginal" woman.[2] Vagina and clitoris do not just add up to the single female sexual organ. In addition to these two pleasure zones, there are others of hardly less significance, e.g. the breasts, the small and large pudenda, the anus and the uterus. Clearly, one cannot claim that the relation between vagina and clitoris remains invariable from the onset of sexual sensations. Rather, it is the clitoris in which sexual excitation centers during childhood, and, for many women, later as well, while the erogenic character of the vagina remains "undiscovered."[3] That is all present in Freudian psychoanalytic theory.[4] Why then is precisely this theory, which has investigated the differentiation of the vagina and the clitoris, the fragmentation of female sexuality and gender relations, been subjected to particularly vicious attacks by feminist sexual theory?[5]

Of course, one can find numerous instances within the Freudian theory of femininity which explain the feminist wrath regarding psychoanalysis.[6] The penis envy thesis,[7] for example, has become a kind of psychoanalytical skeleton key to "explain" not only all desires and inclinations, from the love of men or even the love of women, but also the wish for a child as well as the need for occupational activity and independence in women. The point is, to be sure,

1. Cf., A. Koedt, "The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm", in *Voices From Women's Liberation*, ed. by Leslie B. Tanner (New York, 1970), pp. 158-166. Alice Schwarzer, *Der "kleine Unterschied" und seine grossen Folgen* (Frankfurt/Main 1975), pp. 193 ff.

2. See: Carla Lonzi, *Die Lust Frau zu sein,* translated from the Italian (Berlin, 1975), pp. 35ff.

3. Sigmund Freud, "Femininity," in *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis,* trans. by James Strachey (New York, 1964), p. 104.

4. For the interrelations of the vagina's "non-discovery" in connection with the developmental history of feminine sexuality in Freud see: Renate Schlesier, *"Konstructionen der Weiblichkeit bei Signmund Freud: zum Problem von Entmythologisierung und Remythologisierung in der psychoanalytischen Theorie"*. Unpublished dissertation, Berlin 1979 (publication in progress). See especially p. 180 and, on the debate around this issue with the psychoanalytic movement, pp. 244ff.

5. Cf. Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York, 1974); Carol Hagemann-White "Frauenbewegung und Psychoanalyse," in *Psyche,* 8, No. 32 (August 1978), pp. 732-763.

6. Freud's theory of femininity differs from that of other psychoanalysts in essential respects. Cf. on this point Juliet Mitchell and Hagemann-White, *op.cit.*

7. For Freud the lack of a penis determines the "negative character" of the woman. See Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and trans. by James Strachey (London: 1953-1974), V. 21, p. 223. (Hereafter cited as SE.) For a critique of this concept see Luce Irigaray, *Speculum de l'autre Femme* (Paris, 1974), p. 60. On the other hand, in penis envy, and especially because of it, any femininity is denied that "at the same time should be defined by the renouncing of a libidinal drive goal like the 'acceptation of castration' ". Schlesier, *op. cit.*, p. 190. This is ignored when penis envy is regarded merely as a symbol of the repression of women. Cf. Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: 1964), pp. 95 ff. Kate Millett, *Sexual Politics* (New York, 1970).

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that the lack of a penis is invariably explained as failed masculinity, as an attempt to compensate for an inborn deficiency.

Another example is the designation of the clitoris as a "masculine" sexual organ of young girls — a "stunted penis"[8] that would no longer be allowed to have a function in the "mature" sexuality of the adult woman — otherwise she is said to be frigid. It is claimed that women are the castrated, sexless sex, because they have only a clitoris and a vagina, but no penis. The small size of the clitoris "could claim to be called 'inferior' without any ambiguity"[9] and the vagina is moreover declared to be only the "wound of castration."[10] Such interpretations correspond to the real experience that gender differences can scandalize children, and this does not necessarily change for adults. Freud is certainly to be reproached to the extent that he acts as an apologist for these interpretations, justifying the inhibitions, regressions and repressions on which they are based. Thus, psychoanalysis itself, despite its own claim to overcome repressions and ally itself with the developmental needs of human sexuality, is fundamentally deficient.

The list of passages in which psychoanalysis desexualizes femininity could be extended. Yet, despite the many insults and provocations to women that one can find in Freud's theory and in the theories of his many students, Juliet Mitchell was correct in her book, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*, when she claimed that: "If we are interested in understanding and challenging the oppression of women, we cannot afford to neglect it."[11]

Why is this so? Freud demonstrated that "femininity" is a construct based on repressions. The most important organ, the clitoris, and the first "sexual object," the mother, must be "repressed" by girls, in order to realize "female destinies."[12] Yet, this construct, as distored and one-sided as it is, is not utterly false. It points to real difficulties which do not appear in masculine sexual development. From Freud we can learn that any attempt to pronounce this construct completely erroneous, and therefore to wipe it away, is illusory. In fact, no real change is brought about if the "construct of femininity"[13] is replaced by an "alternative wish model" which needs only be chosen in order to avoid all difficulties and conflicts.

This does not mean that we must embrace the "castration model" of femininity as the central "reference-myth" of the Freudian concept of femininity.[14] Still: "The de-sexualization and mystification of the Freudian inter-

8. Cf. Freud, SE, vol. 10, p. 12, fn. 3.

9. Sigmund Freud, *Collected Papers*, eds. James Strachey and Ernest Jones (New York, 1959), vol. 5, p. 192. (Hereafter cited as CP.)

10. Cf. Freud, for example, "Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose," *Gesammelte Werke* (London, 1940-52), vol. 12, p. 110 (cited hereafter as GW.)

11. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. X, fn.

12. Freud, CF, vol. 5, p. 355.

13. Cf Schlesier, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-37 for a discussion of the concept of construction in connection with Freud's theory of femininity.

14. Or even elevate it into a symbolization of "renunciation ", e.g., renunciation of the mother, as proposed by Julia Kristeva. Cf. Kristeva, "Produktivität der Frau" interview by Elaine Boucquey (from the French), in *Alternative*, 108/9, No. 19 (June-August 1976), p. 172.

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pretation of femininity must be taken seriously. Freud did not invent the immanent negations, but brought to light their concrete consequences for female sexual development. In order to solve the problem of how a female child could become a woman without sexual difference becoming a problem, how a woman could attain satisfactory pleasure, and how she could excape sexual mutilation, crippling the research and heuristic constructions of Freudian psychoanalysis are irreplaceable."[15]

The fact that this has been blatantly denied for decades within feminist theory[16] has exacted a high price. For this is one of the reasons why many enlightened women still remain confused and ignorant concerning their own bodies, their own sexuality and their developmental possibilities. Freud's theory has been dismissed glibly as "hostile to women," but it is invariably distorted and falsified. Even legitimate criticism of psychoanalysis has thereby been discredited. It is easy to identify its inadequate empirical knowledge and capriciousness, yet this is not enough.[17] For this reason, such an attempt amounts only to demagoguery.

In addition, the alternatives to Freud are marked by idealism and wishful thinking.[18] A world purged of men or, at least, "ruled" by women, that is painted on the horizon as the long term goal with which male ideologists like Marcuse and Bornemann[19] try to flatter women, suggests that current problems are only momentary disturbances. Yet, no real change will be possible as long as these problems are minimized and suppressed. But, is the technocratic futurism or the structuralist model of an exchange of women, to which many feminists adhere, actually the "lesser evil," preferable to Freud?[20] Can we escape the prudishness that drove the first suffragettes to anti-alcoholism and anti-prostitution? Must sexuality remain suspect, or, as far as the vagina is concerned, must it again become taboo? Do we actually have to acquiesce in the masculine delusion of "freedom" as "loneliness"[21] and "mental growth" as "parting and separation, loneliness and mourning"?[22] Are there only external "influences" and prejudices" that subjugate us,[23] distorting our "true nature" understood as unchanging and complete? Is sexuality itself, perhaps because of psychoanalysis, given too much attention?[24] Are "spiri-

15. Schlesier, *op.cit.,* p. 37.

16. For example, see Simone de Beauvoir, Betty Friedan, Germaine Greer, Kate Millett and Shulamith Firestone.

17. See Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 348 ff.

18. Cf. Hagemann-White, *op. cit.*, p. 734.

19. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (New York, 1962).

20. For dominant positivist science *á la* Max Weber, see Millett, *op.cit.*; For technological futurism, see Shulamith Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex* (New York, 1970). For the structuralist thesis of exchange of women, see Kristeva, *op.cit.,* p. 167, or Irigaray, "Das Geschlecht, das nicht eins ist" (from the French), in her *Waren, Körper, Sprache: der ver-rückte Diskurs der Frauen* (Berlin 1976), pp. 14 f.

21. Cf. Friedan, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

22. A.H. Maslow, "Some Basic Propositions of Holistic-Dynamic Psychology", as quoted by Friedan, *ibid.*, p. 305.

23. Cf. K. Millett, p. 240 for example.

24. This approach is adopted by Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality* (New York, 1978).

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tual" matters more important and must they be strictly separated from sexuality?[25] Must we actually internalize male anxieties in preference to female "passion" so that they no longer need fear us? Does this only have to do with a "transvaluation of values"[26] in which the "valued" can otherwise remain as it is? If the history of human society is nothing but the history of our absolute and total repression, then have we been nothing but sacrifices consoling ourselves with the dream of a "matriarchal" epoch in which everything was "inverted"[27] and into which we ought to return?[28]

All that is just a mockery of history, a capitulation to the present and the offer of a hopeless utopia. This feminism amounts to proscriptions of thought and pleasure;[29] it demands a retreat to escapist movements which negate or idealize a dubious past, presented as all that is "still" left for women. On closer examination, the ideology advocated is hardly different from the one opposed. Many feminists seem content to merely endorse male myths which are nothing but rationalizations of the masculine fear of women: "Nothing happens in the vagina,"[30] the clitoris is ". . .almost identical to the penis,"[31] "Intercourse condemns the woman to passivity,"[32] and as a demand: "The liberation of women from the tyranny of reproduction."[33] The wretchedness of some feminist accounts of heterosexuality are frightening[34] and matched only by a feminist totalitarianism that is consciously deceptive.

II

The hopeless interlocking of ignorance and righteous indignation, of demagogy and futile attempts with respect to this issue of feminine "identity" becomes particularly clear at one point: Freud is held responsible[35] for the fact that women are saddled with a "new constraint formula," namely "vaginal orgasm." For Freud "would have it established as fact that the vagina is indeed capable of an orgasm."[36] Because the vaginal orgasm is, however, supposedly a "myth," this allegedly demonstrates that "Freud's ideas regarding

25. See Friedan, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

26. Cf. K. Millett, p. 473.

27. Cf. M. Vaerting, *Die weibliche Eigenart im Männerstaat und die männliche Eigenart im Frauenstaat* (Karlsruhe, 1921).

28. Or, if this is repudiated today by everyone as platitudes, then the "new femininity" ought to aid in the realization that the woman has previously only existed in the way men saw her and that femininity would be exclusively a masculine "imagination." Related to this cf. Silvia Bovenschen, *Die imaginierte Weiblichkeit: exemplarische Untersuchungen zu kulturgeschichtlichen und literarischen Präsentationsformen des Weiblichen* (Frankfurt/Main 1979).

29. Marina Moeller-Gambaroff has alluded to the regressivity and repressivity in the ideology of A. Schwarzer, for example. "*Emanzipation macht Angst*", in *Kursbuch* 47 (March 1977), pp. 22-24.

30. Schwarzer, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

31. Koedt, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

32. Schwarzer, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

33. Firestone, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

34. Cf. M. Moeller-Gambaroff, p. 22: "The portrait of heterosexuality that Alice Schwarzer sketches and that she can also demonstrate convincingly through her women's protocol is a picture of hopeless emptiness and brutality."

35. Cf. Marie-Louise Janssen-Jurreit, *Sexismus: über die Abtreibung der Frauenfrage* (München/Wien, 1976), p. 530.

36. Koedt, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

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the sexuality of women are simply false."[37]

One almost wishes that Freud had designated the *vagina* as the most important pleasure for female sexuality — something he nowhere does.[38] For then femininity would be less de-sexualized in his theory then is now the case, and his theory would not have given rise to so many de-sexualizations of women. In fact, some feminist insights concerning the vagina actually corroborate the view of women as the "receptacle" of men. This view, accepted long before Freud and never seriously examined by his theory, is carried along as a traditional element. The original point of the feminist rejection of Freud lies therefore in the assertion that only (perhaps exclusively) by use of the clitoris can the woman be saved from her fate, ostensibly linked to the vagina by nature, to be the sexual slave of men.

Preposterous pseudo-biologizations are used to prove this point. In order to denounce the "myth of the vaginal orgasm," the "anatomical" claim is made that the functions of the vagina are limited to: "1) menstruation, 2) receive penis, 3) hold semen and 4) birth passage."[39] This understanding of the vagina reveals a profound contempt for an organ considered superfluous and irksome and gives rise to an ideological process of self-mutilation: "If thine eye offendeth thee, then pluck it out," or at least repudiate it. In the feminist ideology of Anne Koedt or Alice Schwarzer, the image of the dead vagina resembles inorganic matter. The vagina itself is called "nothing," empty and hollow, even a "hole," at best a vessel in which something can come in and out: in no case a source of gratifications, but only suffering and pain, literally a "Pandora's box."[40]

Yet, this "myth of the vagina" does not lead to a victory over Freud. The reproaches directed at Freud and his putative overemphasis of the vagina in female pleasure attribute too much "positivity" to the Freudian interpretation of femininity. In fact, one searches in vain for a Freudian theory of female pleasure. For him there is no "female libido,"[41] and the vagina and the clitoris (all other female erotogenic zones are virtually non-existent in his thinking) are for him actually not female "genitalia." He understands the vagina as something lacking, as a "wound" that has been left by castration, while the clitoris is said to be not a feminine, but the "masculine" genital of the woman:

37. Firestone, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

38. Cf. section III below.

39. Koedt, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

40. Cf. Hesiod; "But then woman, raising the jar's great lid in her hands and scattering its contents, devised anguishing miseries for men. Only hope was left within, securely imprisoned." In "Works and Days" in *The Poems of Hesioid*, trans. by R.M. Frazer (University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), p. 99.

41. Cf. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, op. cit.*, p. 116. "There is only one libido, which serves both the masculine and the feminine sexual functions. To it itself we cannot assign any sex; if, following the conventional equation of activity and masculinity, we are inclined to describe it as masculine, we must not forget that it also covers trends with a passive aim. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition 'feminine libido' is without any justification. Furthermore, it is our impression that more constraint has been applied to the libido when it is pressed into the service of the feminine function, and that — to speak teleologically — Nature takes less careful account of its (that function's) demands than in the case of masculinity."

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" 'because something is lacking' describes the chief characteristic of the female genital."[42]

Undoubtedly, Freud's achievement is the expansion of the concept of sexuality into realms of life, especially early childhood and mental processes, whose connection with sexual drives had previously been denied. The price Freud paid in turn was the desexualization of women. Both the clitoris and the vagina are devalued because neither can compensate for the missing penis which is desired not as a stimulant of pleasure but as part of women's own body. While feminists legitimately criticize this totalizing of penis envy, it is clear that radical feminism and psychoanalysis share the same mutilation of female sexuality. In both instances the vagina is rejected as the woman's organ of pleasure. Freud, like the feminists, sees the vagina exclusively as the locus of male pleasure.

Feminists have not recognized this convergence, perhaps because they never read Freud throughly, but simply accepted rumors about his theory. Yet, an examination of his texts shows that he nowhere makes the "maturity of the woman" dependent on "vaginal orgasm."[43] On the contrary, the sexuality of the adult female is characterized evidently by its desexualized "decline,"[44] in contrast to the sexuality of males and of female and male children. Freud, who was unable to incorporate into his theory the discovery of hormones, and who must have learned little from women about their sexuality, maintains, for example, that during puberty only boys experience heightened instinctual drives, while the opposite is true for girls.[45] Only for menopause does Freud observe increased sexual needs.[46] Freud does not even ask whether this applies to menstruation, pregnancy and premenstrual periods.[47] Nor does he comment on the effects of birth and nursing.[48] The woman's pleasure capacities — and the possible differences between female and male pleasure — are not investigated. Pleasure is based on the construction of a male model; it is identified with an absence of tension and corresponds to the "discharge of seminal fluid"[49] by the male. Therefore, even male orgasm is not seen as a

42. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, trans. by James Strachey. (New York, 1965), p. 368.

43. Cf. Schwarzer, *op. cit.*, p. 193. Even Jacques Lacan, in his *Ecole freudienne*, had still not understood the fantastic claim that Freud made a "vaginal orgasm" into a criterion of the "success of the woman's sexual normality". Cf. Moustafa Safouan, *La sexualité feminine dans la doctrine freudienne* (Paris, 1976), p. 13. It is regrettable that even Margarete Mitscherlich-Nielsen in her exposition of Freudian femininity theory confirms this myth in *Psyche* 9, No. 29 (Sept. 1975), p. 772, and *Psyche* 8, No. 32 (August 1978), pp. 671, 673.

44. Cf. Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, trans. by James Strachey. (New York, 1962), p. 107.

45. Cf. Sigmund Freud, *Aus den Anfangen der Psychoanalyse 1887-1902. Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess*, (Frankfurt/Main 1962), p. 201.

46. Cf. Freud, GW, vol. 1, p. 327.

47. Related explorations are in Mary Jane Sherfey's *The Nature and Evaluation of Female Sexuality* (New York, 1972).

48. Indicated only in Freud's *"Ein Fall von hypnotischer Heilung"*(1892-93), GW, vol. 1, p. 11."...the first separation (matches) the greatest shock to which the female organism is exposed."

49. Freud, GW, vol. 1, p. 335. Cf. also William Gillespie, "Freuds Ansichten über die weibliche Sexualität," in *Psyche* 9, No. 29 (September 1975), p. 790.

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moment of pleasure. Pleasure is located solely in the post-coital reparation, i.e., the distinction between desire and disinterest shrinks into insignificance.

Freud himself remarked that this model does not explain the "conditions in children, females and in the eunuch."[50] Why pleasure is felt by women in the stimulation "of the skin of a woman's breast [. . .] by touch" and that this pleasure "can give rise to a need for greater pleasure,"[51] Freud could not explain. This was so uncanny that he declined to investigate it any further. This retreat is not incomprehensible, for an examination of this problem would have exploded the framework of his theory (and certainly not merely his theory of femininity).

The chief example for the Freudian minimization of feminine sexuality is not the clitoris, but definitely the vagina. What is its function in adult women according to Freud? The vagina is said to be the "shelter of the penis,"[52] the "cavity which receives the penis,"[53] and "a cavity in the body which excites the genital zone (of the male)."[54] These quotations make clear that the distinction between the vagina and the anus is not very important for Freud, for the same can be said about the intestinal outlet — indeed of a man's as well as a woman's. In fact, Freud does not leave this matter to indirect references: the vagina is said to be anatomically "leased . . . from the cloaca,"[55] and "derived" as an "erotogenic zone" from it.[56] Its erotogeneity is reduced to that of the intestinal outlet and characterized by passivity. Vaginal tension and discharge are discussed as analogous to the movement of stool and secretion.[57] But even that discussion, related to the vagina, turns out to be sparse, and Freud overlooks the role of the anal and vaginal sphincter muscle. In any case, the vagina for Freud bears greater comparison to the effects of the digestive function than the sexual one.

Actually, Freudian theory does not mention the concept of vaginal orgasm nor does it restrict adult female sexual satisfaction to the vagina.[58] The insistence on "vaginal orgasm," allegedly separate from the clitoral function, to which generations of women were constrained by psychoanalysis was thus unjustly ascribed to Freud.[59] Therefore, the feminist protest against this regimen was misdirected. To emphasize this does not imply an acceptance of

50. Cf. Freud, *op cit.*, p. 115.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
52. Freud, GW, vol. 13, p. 298.
53. Freud, SE, vol. 9, p. 218.
54. Freud, *Three Essays . . . , op cit.*, p. 124.
55. Cf. Lou Andreas-Salome, " 'Anal' und 'Sexual' ," in: *Imago*, vol. IV, no. 5, p. 259. Freud is quoted in *Three Essays . . . , op cit.*, p. 83.
56. Cf. Freud, SE, vol. 12, p. 326.
57. Cf. Freud, "Uber Treibumsetzungen, insbesondere der Analerotik," in GW, vol. 8, pp. 405ff.
58. This was recognized by Janine Chassequet-Smirgel within psychoanalytic theory but without any effect up till now. Cf. "*Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualität*," translated from the French (Frankfurt/Main, 1974), p. 19.
59. For a history of the discussion concerning "vaginal orgasm" cf. Daniel Brown, "Female Orgasm and Sexual Inadequacy," in *Human Sexual Response*, ed. by E. and R. Brecher (New York; 1966), pp. 125-175.

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Freud's desexualized interpretation of femininity. The point is, rather, that both the radical feminist and the Freudian conception of the vagina are defensive construct no less than the notion of a vaginal orgasm.[60]

III

What basis is there for the legend that Freud believed in a "vaginal orgasm," i.e., an orgasm in which the clitoris does not participate and on which the "maturity of the woman" depends? The passage in Freud's work which presumably supports this interpretation is in the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. The text reads at first like a metaphorical description of the investigative results of Masters and Johnson: "When at last the sexual act is permitted and the clitoris itself becomes excited, it still retains a function: the task, namely, of transmitting the excitation to the adjacent female parts, just as — to use a simile — pine shavings can be kindled in order to set a log of harder wood on fire."[61] The passage states further: "Before this transference can be effected, a certain interval of time must often elapse, during which the young woman is anaesthetic. This anaesthesia may become permanent if the clitoral zone refuses to abandon its excitability, an event for which the way is prepared precisely by an extreme activity of that zone in childhood. Anaesthesia in women, as is well known, is often only apparent and local. They are anesthetic at the vaginal orifice but are by no means incapable of excitement originating in the clitoris or even in other zones. Alongside these erotogenic determinants of anaesthesia must also be set the psychical determinants, which equally arise from repression." Gillespie has emphasized that "the unrealistic postulate of a vaginal orgasm" stems from this passage.[62]

Yet, is this "unrealistic postulate" actually found in Freud's writings? The expression "vaginal orgasm" is not there. In fact, it is doubtful whether here Freud is concerned at all with the matter of *orgasm*. Freud speaks only of an "excitation" process, hence of a phase which can, but not necessarily, lead to orgasm and what he elsewhere calls "forepleasure" — "in contrast to the 'end-pleasure' or pleasure of satisfaction derived from the sexual act."[63] The remarks here, however, are not about "end-pleasure" and less still about pleasure limited to the vagina.

The fore-pleasure and the associated combination of clitoris and vagina — if disturbances due to repression do not intervene — are described by Freud no differently than by Masters and Johnson. Freud characterizes the anaesthesia at the vaginal orifice as a disturbance and explains it as stemming from the infantile fixation on the clitoris as a center of excitation. It is symptomatic of the ideology of Freud's feminist critics that they do not accept the regressive nature of the fixation on the clitoris and consequently will not acknowledge the anaesthesia at the vaginal orifice as a disturbance.

The problem with the Freudian theses in the passage quoted lies in the fact

60. Sherfey, *op cit.*, pp. 54ff.
61. S. Freud, *Three Essays . . .*, pp. 123f.
62. Gillespie, *op. cit.*, p. 793
63. Freud, *Three Essays . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

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that Freud seems to dissolve the relation between the clitoris and the vagina in the course of the adult woman's sexual excitation into two developmental stages. It appears as though the "role" of the clitoris is to transmit excitation to the vagina (and other "adjacent female parts"), limited to the time of the first sexual intercourses, as if the clitoris accordingly would have to be "anaesthetic" in the normal course of events. Yet, this is by no means stated explicitly, just as the expression "vaginal orgasm" is not used.

A glance at Freud's other positions on the theory of female sexuality can be of help here. His opinion on these matters actually makes clear that Freud considered the *excitation of the clitoris* as normally limited to the female's childhood.[64] However, once clitoral sexual activity has been renounced, Freud can hardly see possibilities for the adult female to achieve any non-desexualized sexual activity. Of course, Freud's supposition of a fully anaesthetic clitoris is very improbable, barring the case of a real extirpation.

In short, the assumption of a "vaginal orgasm" can in no way be reconciled with Freud's interpretation of femininity. For female sexuality is, according to Freud, so strongly limited by overlapping processes of repression (for which there are no parallels in the male)[65] that it would appear doubtful that a woman could achieve more than an "excitation of the vaginal orifice." In other respects Freud appears to rely on a misconception in the sole passage in which he circumscribes female orgasm. The obsessive perception of throbbing and palpitations communicated by a female patient could be, according to Freud, only the "projection" of a "sensation of throbbing and palpitations in the clitoris," a "clitoral contraction." For this reason, according to Freud's conception, "a unification of the genitalia . . . would certainly not have happened"[66] in the experience pertaining to the prehistory of this obsession. One must pause here for a moment in order to clarify its far-ranging implications. Freud obviously deems it impossible for coition to cause a contraction of the clitoris, and he cannot comprehend, on the other hand, that in the case of clitoral masturbation, vaginal contractions are achieved in orgasm. This means that for Freud every female orgasm is an exclusively clitoral one. For Freud libido is masculine, and the female orgasm can be only an expression of her child-like, clitoral, i.e., "masculine" sexuality in his theory. Yet, female sexuality is considered mutilated and the vagina deemed irrelevant to the woman's sexual satisfaction.

Even more peculiar than this Freudian idea of "throbbing and palpitations," supposedly felt only in the clitoris, is the self-misunderstanding with which many women attempt to convince themselves, under the influence of feminist ideology, that vaginal contractions cannot have occurred since the

64. Cf. Freud, GW, vol. 15, p. 126. Yet, even there it states circumspectly: "With the changing to femininity the clitoris should relinquish its sensibility and therewith its significance to the vagina wholly or partly." Cf. also GW, vol. 14, pp. 520f.

65. Schlesier, *op. cit.*, pp. 31ff.

66. Cf. Freud, GW, vol. 10, p. 244. That is not the only example of noteworthy ideas in Freud on the nature of the women's sexual processes and the feminine sexual organ. According to him the clitoris is "related to urinary evacuation" — like the glans penis. S. Freud, *Three Essays . . ., op. cit.*, p. 83.

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vagina has "as many nerves as the large intestine, i.e., almost none."[67] This alone demonstrates the strength of the repression which, according to Freud, so strongly affect the sexuality of the female.

IV

The psychoanalytic reception of the Freudian interpretation of femininity and the role played by the vagina has not responded to the stigma of negativity that characterizes the "feminine" and "masculine" genitalia of women.[68] Freud's de-sexualization of the woman, the "defect of the genitals,"[69] has not been discussed. Regrettably, most psychoanalysts have responded extremely "unpsychoanalytically" to this interpretation, i.e., they refuse to treat the many intrinsic technical problems seriously. The incompleteness of the theory of femininity,[70] deplored by Freud himself, the unresolved character of many of the issues to which it spoke, are treated as Freud's subjective sin of omission, as lacunae in his theory intended to be filled out as soon as possible. Yet, the new concepts proposed hardly "completed" the Freudian theory and did not resolve its inherent problems. On the contrary, they concealed the ineradicable difficulties, or put dubious judgments and even biased interpretations in their place.[71]

This becomes clear especially in the treatment of the vagina and the female "orgasmic capacity"[72] by Freud's disciples and successors.[73] To begin with, the social-psychological and sociological approaches to Freudian theory have hardly been conducive to understanding or surpassing the Freudian interpretation of femininity. On the contrary, they have hindered efforts to develop a different and productive version and have led only to radical rejections, blind appropriations or mere relativizations.[74]

67. Schwarzer, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

68. Cf. the summaries of this discussion in both volumes of the journal *Psyche* dedicated to "*Psychoanalyse und weibliche(r) Sexualität*" (September 1975 and August 1978). Compare also the contributions by M. Mitscherlich-Nielsen, Zenia Odes Fliegel and Ellen Reinke-Köberer.

69. Freud, GW, vol. 15, p. 142.

70. Freud, GW, vol. 13, p. 401; GW, vol. 14, p. 241.

71. It is also true for the chief concepts of the feminist sexual theory that there where it is farthest removed from Freud, it joins hands with the psychoanalytic "revisionism" of the Freudian interpretation of femininity — critically or apologetically — and frequently without noticing it. Cf. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 339f.

72. "Orgasm capacity" is a horrible and reifying word like many others that were brought up in the debate on feminine sexuality. A debate led by the expression "penetration" as a synonym for the puritanically modest concept "intercourse" taken from the sphere of circulation or the medical term "Coitus," on the other hand, emphasizing quite realistically the contractual nature of the sexual union between the sexes; "penetration" — which does not signify so much the entering into something, but the entering through something, suggests exclusively power and brutality which had been inflicted on women as the helpless, powerless creatures predestined to be victims. Is it already time for a dictionary of feminist demagogy?

73. Cf. also Sandor Ferenczi, *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie* (Leipzig/Wien/Zürich, 1924), pp. 34ff. Cf. also Werner W. Kemper, "Neue Beiträge aus der Phylogenese zur Bio-psychologie der Frau," *Zeitschr. f. Psycho-som. Med.*, vol. 11 (February 1965), pp. 77-82.

74. On this, the works of Johann August Schülein, *Das Gesellschaftsbild der Freudschen Theorie* (Frankfurt/Main 1975), and Adrienne Windhoff-Heritier *Sind/Frauen so wie Freud sie sah? Bausteine zu einer neuen analytisch-sozialpsychologischen Theorie der weiblichen Psyche* (Reinbeck, 1976), have changed nothing. They attempt to elaborate what is "still important" in Freudian theory, and in so doing they have, for the most part, "scientifically misunderstood" him.

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This applies above all to attempts to criticize Freud's theory of femininity by reference to his "male chauvinism" which trivialize it as, for example, in the psychologizing account of Erich Fromm.[75] The authenticity and relevance of Freud's works, including his theory of femininity, are not obliterated by Fromm's diagnosis of character traits such as "mother-fixation," "patriarchical life style" and "sexual abstinence following the fathering of six children," as though it were a question of a person and the object of his work being one and the same thing. In that case, Freud's theory would have long ago landed on the rubbish heap of history and be of interest only to historians of science, or useful as a further example of the "patriarchical hatred of women. If it were solely dominated by the prejudices of the "Victorian era," as Betty Friedan has claimed,[76] outstripped meanwhile by scientific progress, more correct accounts of female sexual development would already have replaced it.

If, however, one compares Freud's statements to the theory of femininity of some of his male and female disciples, it becomes apparent that the psychoanalytic discussion of female sexuality[77] amounts to a still relevant dispute in which Freud in no way represented the most reactionary position. The conflict between Freud and a few female associates in the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute founded by Karl Abraham concerned the central problem of whether there is a so-called "naturalistic" femininity and therewith an inborn instinctual predisposition to the heterosexuality by women, as argued by Karen Horney as well as by Melanie Klein and Helene Deutsch, or whether, as Freud insisted, femininity is the result of a construction and hence "developed"[78] in a process, lengthy and abundant in complexities, in which the vagina, for example, must first be "discovered." While Freud emphasized the importance of instinctual conflicts not merely as defense processes but as the development of pre-instinctual processes, Horney wanted to treat them conclusively as only disturbances to be disposed of as quickly as possible.[79]

For Horney, the small girl is from the outset a "small woman" in whom heterosexual feelings govern the relation to the male (the father), the preference of vaginal pleasure and the wish for children.[80] As a sociological model, Horney crudely compares this biologization of "heterosexual attraction"[81]

75. Cf. Erich Fromm, *Sigmund Freud's Mission*, (New York, 1959). Herman Glaser's normative images do not go much further. Cf. his *Sigmund Freuds Zwanzigstes Jahrhundert* (München/Wien 1976).

76. Friedan, *op. cit.*, pp. 96ff. For a critique of it, see Mitchel, *op. cit.*, pp. 367ff.

77. Cf. Gillespie, *op. cit.*, pp. 795ff.; Z.O. Fliegel, "Die Debatte über die weibliche Sexualität," *op. cit.*, pp. 813ff.

78. Freud, CP, vol. 5, p. 355.

79. Karen Horney later founded the "neo-psychoanalysis" in which she does away almost completely with the reconstruction of the history of sickness.

80. Cf. Karen Horney, *Feminine Psychology*, ed. Harold Kelman (New YOrk, 1973). Karen Horney's merit within the development of psychoanalytic theory undoubtedly consists in the fact that she was one of the first, and very importantly, to have referred to the femininity wishes of men, male fears of women and the possibility of a premature discovery of the vagina in childhood. In her thoughts on these matters she underestimated, however, the importance of drive conflicts. Cf. also *Psychoanalysis and Women*, ed. Jean Baker Miller (New York, 1973), for agreement with the Horneyian position on the theory of femininity.

81. K. Horney, *Feminine Psychology, op. cit.*, p. 68.

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to the "purely masculine character of our culture" which makes it difficult for women to achieve "any sublimation that would really satisfy this nature,"[82] and to arrive at a positive evaluation of her "biological role."

Even Klein, like Horney, operates on the premise that, in the case of girls, the female instinctual predispositions are primary.[83] Klein admittedly did not consider the discovery of the vagina as natural as Horney did —like Deutsch she was convinced of the fact that vaginal instinctual wishes express themselves first of all in oral symptoms. Yet, she is "far removed from Freud's insight that the sexuality of the young girl is essentially masculine up to puberty and is related to the clitoris."[84]

Yet, both Klein and Horney disparage the vagina as the woman's pleasure organ, although for reasons different from Freud's. For Klein it is because of the fear of internal wounds, whose dominance is difficult to minimize; for Horney this happens on the strength of an earlier "disavowal of the vagina" which she wants to derive from the girl's adaptation to masculine values.

As reported by Deutsch, psychoanalytic practice found that disturbances of vaginal sensitivity, such as frigidity, are "emphatically not in direct ratio to the severity of the neurosis."[85] Her female patients were cases " . . . in which the most violent orgasm may result from hostile masculine identifications. The vagina behaves like an active organ, and the particularly brisk secretion is designed to imitate ejaculation." Frigid women, on the other hand, are said to be frequently the most warm-hearted and the most capable of endurance. "The women in question are psychically healthy, and their relation to the world and to their libidinal object is positive and friendly. If questioned about the nature of their experience in coitus, they give answers which show that the conception of orgasm as something to be experienced by themselves is fully foreign to them. During intercourse what they feel is a happy and tender sense that they are giving keen pleasure and, if they do not come from a social environment where they have acquired full sexual enlightenment, they are convinced that coitus as a sexual act is of importance only for the man. In it, as in other relations, the woman finds happiness in tender, maternal giving." After 1960, Deutsch characterized frigidity as typical for "the harmonious, warm, feminine woman without neurotic difficulties."[86] From this "health unto Death,"[87] that Deutsch apologetically describes and Adorno diagnosed as the "contemporary sickness," "consisting precisely in normality" it is a simple logical progression, but hardly a progressive one, to the feminist thesis

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 69f.

83. Melanie Klein, *"Frühstadien des Ödipuskonflikts," IZP* (1928), pp. 65-77. There she bases her conception of the priority of a "femininity phase" in the sexual development of boys and girls. Cf. also Melanie Klein, *Die Psychoanalyse des Kindes* (Wien, 1932), pp. 203-249.

84. Gillespie, *op. cit.*, p. 796.

85. Cf. Helen Deutsch, " 'Feminine' Masochism and its Relation to Frigidity," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, vol. V. XI (1930), pp. 57, 59.

86. Panel Report, Fall Meeting 1960: "Frigidity in Women," rep. by B.D. Moore, in *Journal of the American Psychiatric Association*, vol. IX, no. 3 (1961), p. 583.

87. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. by E.F.N. Jephcott (London, 1974), sec. 36, p. 58.

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that coitus would have to be disavowed to permit women no longer to "endure it patiently" when they no longer chose the self-sacrificing devotion to a man for their life task. It is obvious though, that in the evaluation of the "role" of the woman in coitus, radical feminists share the Deutsch's opinion. Feminist criticism was fully justified in exhorting women to refuse to act as the sexual slaves of men, and this critique has contributed to the fact that many no longer accept the ideal of a "clitoris-free" vaginal orgasm that some women in the past had supposedly realized and had to be imitated. We should not, however, limit ourselves to an unqualified refusal ending in the repression of our needs. For this reason women are now able to explore the pleasure possibilities of their vagina.

From the condensed summarization of Horney, Klein and Deutsch's conceptions of the vagina and its significance for female sexuality[88] it should be clear how little was contributed to a further undertanding of sexuality. It is nonetheless astonishing that even later psychoanalysis made no significant progress.[89] It is equally astonishing that psychoanalysis has hardly begun to explain this deficiency. At any rate, it is not enough, to blame "the social power structures and corresponding prejudices."[90] For the decisive achievement of psychoanalysis since its beginning consists precisely in transcending dominant prejudices.

With regard to the significance of the vagina and the clitoris for female sexuality, the works of Masters and Johnson removed the prevailing confusion regarding the physiological occurrence of orgasm in the woman.[91] Masters and Johnson show by a recording and measuring of the aroused physiological processes during coitus that the clitoris plays a definite role in the arousal of the woman's orgasm. Yet, the orgasm is shown to be not merely an exclusively clitoral process. On the contrary, the vagina, the musculature of the pelvis, the inner and outer pudenda, the breasts, the uterus and the interconnection of veins in the abdomen are all said to share intensively in the orgasm, regardless of the specific part of the female body that is stimulated prior to orgasm. The contractions characterizing orgasm are not solely confined to the clitoris but extend both to the vagina and the uterus.[92]

By now, psychoanalysis has begun to incorporate the findings of Masters and Johnson's investigations,[93] generally without the ideological distortion to which these findings have been subjected by many feminists.[94] Yet, the problem designated by Freud cannot be solved with the help of Masters and

88. Cf. also the synopses in Chasseguet-Smirgel, *op. cit.*, and by Karen Horney in Safouan, *op. cit.*

89 Cf. M. Mitscherlich-Nielsen, "Zur Psychoanalyse der Weiblichkeit" in *Psyche 8* (August 1978), p. 692; other attempts at a foundation for this are also in Z.O. Fliegel, *op. cit.*, and Ellen Reinke-Köberer, "Zur Diskussion der weiblichen Sexualität in der psychoanalystischen Bewegung" *Psyche* 8 (August 1978), pp. 695-731.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 670.

91. Cf. *Human Sexual Response* (Boston, 1966).

92. Cf. also Sherfey, *op.cit.*, pp. 146ff.

93. Cf. M. Mitscherlich-Nielsen, "Psychoanalyse und weibliche Sexualität," *Psyche* 9 (1975), p. 770.

94. For example, in Schwarzer, *op.cit.*, pp. 200f.

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Johnson's findings: how and when is the vagina "discovered" and what is its significance for feminine sexuality? Psychoanalysis has recognized that this question cannot be separated from instinctual conflicts which determine the sexual development of women and men and which are not reducible to conflicts between the child and the parents. We are nevertheless still far from a solution to related problems, which are by no means just theoretical.

V

Psychoanalysis has contributed decisively to the understanding of the *status quo* of human sexuality and the repressions impairing it. Allied with infantile sexuality, it has identified instinctual drives and the dynamic of their erogenous zones. Yet, it also became an accomplice, providing justification for infantile repression. Psychoanalysis overlooked what children of both sexes negated, in particular the vagina and its libidinal significance for adult women. The developmental need of human sexuality remains unexamined by Freud. Specifically, women's multifaceted pleasure zones and the possibilities of sexual satisfaction always remained a "dark continent"[95] in his theory. Therefore, the understanding of both the libidinal basis of female sexuality and gender relations is seriously impaired.

Freud's theory provides no argument for the libidinous basis of female heterosexuality. Because of the repression of the clitoris, the negation of the vagina and its significance for the sexual satisfaction of the woman, Freud could not treat heterosexuality as instinctual desire. No "female libido" drives the woman to the man as her sexual object. In Freud's account, it is easier to provide a libidinal foundation for female homosexuality, but it is subject to the verdict of inevitable regression into infantile auto-erotocism and fixation on the first sex-object of the small girl: the mother. The narcissism typical of Freud's version of the adult female closes the circle. It assures the satisfaction of the heterosexual desires of men at a cost: men offer to female narcissism the sacrifice of which women are incapable, the "sexual overestimation" of the object.[96] This narcissism, a "self-satisfaction and unsusceptibility" comparable to the narcissism of the child (and the narcissism of animals), appears, however, to describe only the foreplay, changing into its opposite in the course of the act. The woman who has "finally" become "susceptible" is said to be no longer self-satisfied. She demands the second important sacrifice, the penis, that she "arouses" only in order to introject and to "deprive" it "of strength." Freud supposes that this "deprivation of strength" justifies the masculine fear of the woman: the male, "dreads becoming infected with her femininity and then proving himself a weakling."[97] The feminine "defect" — the deprivation, the penislessness — in such Freudian constructs turns into an "infection" with which the male refuses to be "infected."

However, Freud noticed only masculine fears to become like women, i.e., "castrated." A male fear that women actively might perform castration never

95. Frued, GW, vol. 14, p. 241.
96. Frued, "Zur Einführung des Narzissmus," in SE, vol. 14, pp. 73ff.
97. Freud, "Taboo of Virginity," in CP, vol. 4, p. 224.

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occurred to him. In Freudian theory, the vagina has no threatening potential. Certainly in Freud the "horror"[98] aroused in men by the vagina occurs, but is not one of the "vagina dentata," but one of "castration wounds." This corresponds to Freud's defensive and negative treatment of myths which report castration and murder of men perpetrated by women.[99]

On the other hand, masculine reactions to "the female genitalia," such as homosexuality, fetishism or psychic impotence, manifest such a strong instinctual dynamic that it is questionable whether its origin is reducible to "being afraid of infection." In fact, Freud was of the opinion that in view of the fears and sexual inhibitions already aroused by the mere appearance of the woman, the escape into homosexuality, fetishism or psychological impotence possibly has a greater effect on the male than the "risk" of sexual relations. For the adult male is lucky, according to Freud, when the woman "submits to the man as an 'appendage' to the penis."[100] She is antagonistic toward him when she believes herself able to do without this "appendage" to the penis, i.e., the man. According to Freud both amount to the same thing for the woman; in both instances her concern would only be for the "possession" of the penis, and not for the sexual object that her drive might desire.

At any rate, for Freud, the female, hostile to the male, is already mutilated. In the case of the adult female the clitoris, unlike the penis, has no function in copulation or reproduction and should have been "extinguished" long ago. In the body of the grown female Freud discerns the traces of two penises: the clitoris (the "stunted penis") and the vagina (the "castration wounds" of an amputated penis). The vagina, according to Freud, does not inherits the instinctual desire formerly located in the clitoris, but "takes up the legacy of the womb."[101] Its "fire" glows, if at all, for the revenge of her gaping and empty shape, a revenge inflicted on the masculine "appendage" that she does not desire out of sexual motives. If her fire does not glow, then this revenge would certainly be realized, but with an admixture of self-punishment. If the woman is to avoid frigidity, then vaginal excitation (and as should be obvious, never satisfaction) could only occur due to motives lacking any libidinal foundation. Wherever the woman is "circumcised" — in the vagina, as some feminists want it, or the clitoris, as Freud wants it — in both instances it is the vagina which, by definition, cannot function as a zone of libidinal drives and means to satisfaction. Whether homosexual or heterosexual, the woman, lacking male genitalia, remains penis-fixated, and loses the possibility of non-narcissistic satisfaction.

Freud, however, ascribes immense significance to an "affection" which explodes the despair and negativity of the Freudian interpretation of femininity: hysteria. This is the center of the Freudian "puzzle" of the female and the "fragmentariness" of his own interpretation. In hysteria Freud found to his own surprise the character of "exaggerated sexual craving and excessive

98. Freud, "The Head of Medusa," in SE, vol. 18, p. 273.
99. Cf. Freud's "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse," GW, vol. 13, p. 152.
100. Freud, GW, vol. 10, p. 405.
101. Freud, GW, vol. 13, p. 298.

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aversion to sexuality."[102] From Freud's reconstructions of hysterical symptoms one can infer "that the female hysteric — *per negationem* — 'obstinately' persists in the relation and the 'simultaneity' of the clitoris and vagina. . . The 'bisexuality' of the female hysteric, emphasized by Freud and astonishing by him, would be explicable as an attempt to remain in the unredeemable possibilities of female sexuality."[103]

Actually, the *vagina* was, with the uterus, known to classical medicine as the "hysterical organ" *par excellence*. It responds with extreme sensitivity (in contrast to the clitoris) to "outrages" by men. Precisely this "sensitivity" of the vagina should be no reason for women just "to declare" it altogether "dead." Feminists legitimately encourage women to restore the most important organ of satisfaction in the female's childhood, the clitoris, to its rightful place and not disparage it as a supposedly "masculine" organ. It is, however, hardly sufficient to overcome the repressions of their infantile sexuality and become small girls again. If we want to be women and no longer acquiesce in our own mutilation, wherever it comes from and whatever affects it, then we must "awaken" the vagina "to life."

How could the denial of the vagina be so significant for anti-heterosexual feminist ideology? It is a matter of finding a "biological proof" for why men, and therefore heterosexuality, are unnecessary for female passion, as if female independence could only be preserved and female self-consciousness could only be possible if women at no point whatsoever were dependent on men. How do women accept the rationalizing negation of the vagina when so much ideological effort fails to notice the fact that most women begin, at some time or another in the course of their life, to sense passion in the vagina although the clitoris is not directly stimulated in the case of coitus and even when this passion occurs outside of a heterosexual union? The strong emotions involved in the denial of the vagina indicate that profound instinctual processes and conflicts are a state.

Is not the vagina the "wound" that bleeds a few days every month in every adult woman, and is not birth a bloody process? And for small girls is not the vagina of hardly any erogenic significance, if it is discovered at all?[104] Is the fear of internal wounds with which small girls regard the penis really so baseless?[105] And is the erotogeneity of the vagina not more susceptible to disturbance than the erotogeneity of the clitoris, evident in blockages such as vaginalism or in the "vaginal insensitivity"[106] that most women experience in the course of their lives?

The development of vaginal erogeneity is an instinctual quality that goes beyond the limits of childhood. A real advancement beyond childhood,

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102. Freud, *Three Essays . . . , op. cit.*, p. 56.
103. Schleisier, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
104. Cf. M. Mitscherlich-Nielsen, "Zur Psychoanalyse der Weiblichkeit," *Psyche* 8, no. 32 (August 1978), pp. 678f.
105. Melanie Klein, Karen Horney and Josine Müller already made a case for the importance of this anxiety of inner wounds in the 1920's and 30's.
106. Cf. Sherfey, *op. cit.*, pp. 184ff.

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however, would mean a condition between the sexes that is not determined by violence and fear. For this reason the development of vaginal pleasure is not a merely instinctual process, ultimately indistinguishable from infantile instincts. The different functions of the vagina are dependent on relations between the sexes, and its non-repressed development prohibits any further repression in sexual relations.

To say it once again clearly: the vagina represents a utopia of maturity. For auto-erotic and homosexual purposes it is of slight significance, although it must be recognized that today for many women auto-eroticism or homosexuality represents the sole possibility to become acquainted with the "potentiality" of their vagina. Unlike the penis, clitoris and anus, the vagina fulfills its various functions only in a relation between genders. Its "awakening to life" and its discovery as a locus of pleasure implies a clean break with mere pregenitality and childish drive fixations. If the vagina is surrendered as a locus of pleasure only for men, then it can be used as an anti-male ideology for the repression of women, including their own self-repression.

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Special Section:

INTRODUCTION TO GRAMSCI'S "NOTES ON LANGUAGE"

by Steven R. Mansfield

One reason that Gramsci's writings are becoming ever more studied in the English-speaking world is their non-reductive approach. Today, the fact that a general theory of language informs Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* is increasingly being recognized.[1] While some parts of the writings on language have been translated into English,[2] so far only the Italian editions have allowed an evaluation of the significance and role of linguistic issues in Gramsci. The following will seek to reconstruct the connections between the theory of language and the more familiar elements of Gramsci's thought.

In the translated *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* several passages suggest the centrality of linguistics in Gramsci's overall project. Take, for example, this commonly quoted passage (to which the last sentence is seldomly appended): "We have established that philosophy is a conception of the world and that philosophical activity is not to be conceived solely as the 'individual' elaboration of systematically coherent concepts, but also and above all as a cultural battle to transform the popular 'mentality' and to diffuse the philosophical innovations which will demonstrate themselves to be 'historically true' to the extent that they become concretely — i.e. historically and socially — universal. Given all this, the question of language in general (*linguagio*) and of languages in the technical sense (*lingue*) must be put in the forefront of our enquiry." (SPN, 348)[3] Or the following: "The experience on which his philosophy of praxis is based cannot be schematised; it is history in all its infinite variety and multiplicity, whose study can give rise to 'philology' as a method of scholarship for ascertaining particular facts and to philosophy understood as a general methodology of history." (SPN, 428) Following this methodological prescription is a strategic one: in order for the working classes to act in a historically effective manner it is necessary to establish a "living philology" — one based on conscious and critical knowledge of the "immediate particulars" of social relations. Only this will enable the masses and its leadership to be

1. For the most detailed discussion, see Leonardo Salamini, "Gramsci and Marxist Sociology of Language," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 32 (1981), pp. 27-44.

2. Three notes that appear in the 1971 *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* trans. and ed. Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart; New York: International Publishers, 1971) contain significant discussions on language. These are: " 'Language,' Languages and Common Sense," pp. 348-349; "Immanence and the Philosophy of Praxis," pp. 449-452; and "Questions of Nomenclature and Content," pp. 452-454. Subsequent references to this work will be given in parentheses in the text as SPN, followed by the page numbers. Also, translated material from *Quaderni del Carcere,* Edizione Critica dell'Istituto Gramsci, ed. V. Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi, 1975) is hereafter cited as QC, followed by the notebook and fragment.

3. Gramsci's use of *lingua* and *linguaggio* is reminiscent of de Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole*. *Langue* referred to the linguistic competence of the speaker, that is, the linguistic basis by which one speaks with and understands other members of the same linguistic community: the lexicon, the grammar, the phonology, etc. *Parole* referred to linguistic utterances, the actual data or phenomena of linguistics. While similar, however, Gramsci's distinction cannot be equated with de Saussure's. According to the editors of the *Selections from the Prison Notebooks, lingua* ("language(s) in the technical sense") has the sense of a particular system of verbal signs, a particular language, while *linguaggio* ("language in general") suggests the "faculty to transmit messages, verbal or otherwise, by means of a common code."

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unified into an active "collective," i.e., a historical agent. Thus, it is clear that Gramsci's thoughts on linguistics raise fundamental questions regarding his philosophy.[4]

After his imprisonment in late 1926 Gramsci began to devise a plan of study to help him combat his monotony and isolation. Since linguistic and literary issues were important to Gramsci earlier in his life, it is not surprising that they constitute a large part of that plan. In the famous letter of March 19, 1927 Gramsci writes to his sister-in-law that he, like many prisoners, is haunted by the idea of accomplishing "something *für ewig,*" i.e., something for ever and, by extension, disinterested. At this time the project *für ewig* is composed of four subjects, the second being: "A study of comparative linguistics! Nothing less! For what in the world could be more 'disinterested' and *für ewig* than that? It would, of course, only be a question of handling the methodological and purely theoretical side of the subject, which has never been dealt with from the modern point of view of the neo-linguistic school as against the neo-grammatical school."[5]

In view of the actual development of the *Prison Notebooks* the linguistic element is perhaps overly prominant in this plan of study. Of the 2350 pages in the 1975 Gerratana edition only about 50 pages deal directly with linguistic issues. But since many significant comments on language are intersperced throughout the notes and since Gramsci's last notebook deals entirely with language and grammar, the plan of study cannot be discounted. Throughout, the problem of language figures in the discussion of hegemonic relations between classes, the formation and role of intellectuals, the development of the national state, and the relations between state and civil society. Gramsci himself suggests this in his last notebook: "Every time that the question of language (*lingua*) surfaces, in one way or another, it means that another series of problems are going to be imposed: the formation and enlargement of the ruling class, the necessity to establish more secure and intimate relations between the ruling groups and the national-popular mass, i.e., to reorganize the cultural hegemony." (QC 29, 3)

Thus, Gramsci develops his historicist perspective through a critique of neo-grammarians, pragmatists, and Crocean idealists. The neo-grammarians considered languages "natural organisms," autonomous from conscious mediation, that develop according to objective phonetic and physiological laws. In this view, all sound changes are the result of a mechanical process that suffers no exceptions within the same dialect. Extra-linguistic factors have no affect on the "blind necessity" that governs phonetic and linguistic relations. For the neo-grammarians to admit an open texture to linguistics undermines the scientific status for their discipline. A number of Italian pragmatists viewed language as a process of convention and choice. But some conventions are more useful and internally consistent than others and thus language was often a "source of error," an obstacle to the elimination of illusory problems. Thus, Vailati and Pareto suggested creating artificial "pure" languages, free from metaphorical

4. There are several passages in which Gramsci refers to a Marxist "historical methodology," or to a "philology of history and politics as they are conceived by the philosophy of praxis." See, for example, SPN 407-408, 415, 427, and 436. For an analysis that recognizes Gramsci's conception of Marxism's fundamental innovations as providing the basis for a concrete, "living method of historical knowledge," and a "methodology of history," see Leonardo Paggi, "Gramsci's General Theory of Marxism," *Telos 33* (Fall 1977), pp. 27-70.

5. "*Lettere dal Carcere:* Gramsci's Letters from Prison," trans. Hamish Henderson, *New Edinburgh Review,* 24-25 (1974), pp. 8-9. Gramsci goes on to write that he was regarded by his teacher Matteo Bartoli, a historical linguist, to be "the archangel destined to rout the 'neo-grammatical' school for good and all." See, also, the concern for linguistic issues in the list of 16 principal arguments that Gramsci puts forward on February 8, 1929, as a plan for his studies (QC 1).

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meanings.[6] Croce and his followers (particularly Vossler and Bertoni) argued that linguistic change was the result of individual aesthetic developments. Croce contended that the expression of aesthetic intuition was the essence of language and that art and language were virtually identical. Moreover, communication relied on intuitive understanding so heavily that language could not be said to exist outside of the spiritual community which understands particular expressions in their poetic moment: "Languages have no reality beyond the propositions and complexes of propositions really written and pronounced by given people at definite periods; that is to say, they have no existence outside the works of art (whether little or great, oral or written, soon forgotten or long remembered, does not matter) in which they exist concretely."[7]

Against these three positions, Gramsci proposed a moderate conventionalism recognizing the subjective aspects of language and cognition (and, hence, their practical character) while rejecting the idea that the reality referred to is a function of the subjects' activity. Rather than focus on abstract epistemological questions concerning the links between reality, cognition, and the development of the meaning of words, Gramsci concentrated on understanding the relation between socio-historical process in general and language as a particular social process. Although it contained some advances in linguistics that profoundly influenced Gramsci, Croce's philosophy of language was ultimately inadequate. The essence of language is not be be found in the aesthetic creations of individuals but in a historical dimension bound to a determinate social content. In order to surmount the difficulties of Croce's positions one must study languages "not as art but as 'material' of art, as a social product, as a cultural expression of a certain people." (QC 6, 71) Moreover, "The whole of languge is a continuous process of metaphor, and the history of semantics is an aspect of the history of culture; language is at the same time a living thing and a museum of fossils of life and civilizations." (SPN, 450) For Gramsci, the social process involved in linguistic developments cannot be analyzed through a mechanical base/superstructure model that would reduce language to a passive reflection of class struggle or economics. Linguistic facts, like all historical facts, are real. Gramsci's distinction between *linguaggio* (language in general) and *lingua* (language in the technical sense, i.e., as a system of signs) assumes that an organic language has a specific materiality — its own technique and structure — which plays a part in historical development and is not simple evidence of such development.[8] But besides constituting a critique of vulgar materialism, this approach involves a rejection of an overly subjectivist view that would make language the sole reality, while at the same time agreeing that it is only through language that reality is knowable.

Linguistic innovation, Gramsci argues, does not occur because of parthenogenesis but requires some fecund element which can be found either internal or external to a given socio-cultural setting.[9] On the one hand, innovation takes place through external contacts between two societies. This innovation might be either "massive," as with the infusion of Latin into Gaulic that resulted from Roman domination, or "mole-

6. Among Italian pragmatists that Gramsci mentions in these notes are: Vailati, Pareto (significantly influenced by pragmatism), Prezzolini, Perrotto, and Pagliaro.

7. Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetics as Science of Expression and General Linguistics*, trans. Douglas Ainslie (New York: Noonday Press, 1956), p. 147.

8. Thus Gramsci writes: "Logically and also chronologically, we have: social structure — superstructure — material structure of the superstructure" (QC 4, 12); cf. SPN, 460-461.

9. For Gramsci the notion of language as a process of metaphor does not have the aesthetic implications that it does for idealists such as Croce and Vossler, "in *lingua* there is no parthenogenesis, i.e., *lingua* [which] produces another *lingua*" (QC 6, 71). Gramsci develops his views on the metaphorical process elsewhere: "Language is transformed with the transformation of the

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cular," through the loan of single words or forms as with Latin and German. On the other hand, innovation also occurs through internal stimuli resulting from the social, economic, and political interaction of different groups, i.e., either "massively" when a new class becomes dominant or "molecularly" when the jargon of small groups (e.g., the professions) is gradually diffused. Linguistic innovations (even "molecular" ones) cannot be the creations of individuals but belong to the historical progression of a social collective. It is only when individual changes come to be widely accepted that one can legitimately speak of historical innovations because innovations must be suited, necessary, or responsive to the complex socio-historical situation. By the same token, neither are all linguistic innovations directly related to developments in the infrastructure, but may happen either for "nonorganic" reasons with only a temporary and circumscribed existence or for "internal" reasons of the signification and grammatical systems that are only indirectly related to the social infrastructure. (QC 29, 2) The linguistic outcome of social interaction cannot be predicted, but depends on whether a class or class-fraction is able to articulate progressive solutions: "in any case, if the mediation is 'rational,' it will be organically linked to tradition." (QC 29, 3)

That innovations must be connected to tradition is particularly important to Gramsci's argument. Regardless of its origins, for an innovation to be "organic" it must express an autochthonal, national character and maintain a historical continuity of form.[10] But innovations are possible only because they suit historically-laid possibilities. Thus language is not merely a question of form, unconnected to content, as Croce would have it, nor is there any automatic identity between form and content. Changes in social life require changes in the ideological content of language even if the form may remain the same.[11] In a 1918 article against Esperanto as a solution to socialist internationalism, Gramsci says that while linguistic innovations are constituted by aesthetic choices, they are an "effect" and not a 'cause" since their diffusion ultimately rests on another basis: "language depends on the complex development of economic and social activity."[12] Even at this early stage Gramsci cannot accept Croce's extreme subjectivism in seeing language as an aesthetic and spiritual activity, apolitical in nature and unconnected to other social processes.[13]

In the prison writings Gramsci continues to display a moderate conventionalism.

whole of civilization, through the acquisition of culture by new classes and through the hegemony exercised by one national language over others, etc., and what it does is precisely to absorb in metaphorical form the words of previous civilizations and cultures" (SPN, 451-452).

10. See SPN, 453: "It must however be borne in mind that no new historical situation, however radical the change that has brought it about, completely transforms language, at least in its external formal aspect."

11. See SPN, 450-456.

12. "Contro un pregiudizio," *Avanti!*, January 24, 1918, as quoted by Franco Lo Piparo, *Lingua Intellettuali Egemonia in Gramsci* (Laterza, Rome and Bari, 1979), p. 53. Cf. Gramsci, "Universal Language and Esperanto," *Il Grido del Popolo,* February 16, 1918, republished in *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci,* ed. Pedro Cavalcanti and Paul Piccone (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1976), pp. 30-31: "the history of the fortunes and diffusion of a particular language depends entirely on the complex social life of the people who speak it. . . . The diffusion of a particular language is due to the productive activity, writings, mobility, and commerce of the men who speak the language."

13. Against such formalism Gramsci writes: "Every new social stratum which emerges in history and organizes for the right battle instills new trends and new usages in language, thus exploding the fixed patterns that the grammarians have set in order to facilitate teaching. In history and social life nothing is fixed, rigid and final. . . . New conditions of life create new and greater needs, new intellectual and moral curiosities sting the spirit and oblige it to renew itself and improve by altering linguistic forms of expression, incorporating foreign ones, reviving old forms by changing meaning and grammatical functions." "Universal Language and Esperanto," *ibid.,* p. 33.

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Linguistic constructions, like the terms "East" and "West," are conventional and thus "historico-cultural" products. The very real relation associated with the two terms cannot exist outside of human history and cognition for, "outside of real history every point on the earth is East and West at the same time." But the terms are not purely conventional projections, "these references are real; they correspond to real facts." These constructions are necessary to action in that they allow us "to objectivise reality, to understand the objectivity of the external world." (SPN, 447-48)

Recall Gramsci's famous argument that science is superstructural; i.e., that our knowledge of the world is subjective and it attains the status of objectivity (with material effects) by becoming systematic, historically operative, and eventually universal.[14] But even this active role for the subjective aspect does not push Gramsci into a position of extreme relativism or Crocean idealism, for we cannot thereby say that reality simply changes with changes in our conceptions. Accepting that knowledge is superstructural, "it is difficult not to think in terms of something real beyond this knowledge." (SPN, 368)

As part of his historicism, Gramsci attacks the formalism in Croce's definition of grammar. In his essay "This Round Table is Square," Croce suggests that while this proposition is technically grammatical, it is logically and aesthetically unacceptable. For Croce, language in its semantic aspects is aesthetic in nature but grammar and syntax are essentially static, technical systems. But Gramsci rejects the idea that grammar *qua* grammar is reducible to its technical elements and argues that even bad uses of grammar can be logically justified if some reasonable function is served; the latter being discoverable only if one takes grammar as something more than a technical system, i.e., as not so easily separable from the "historically determined" structure of meaning. For Gramsci, the historical and political aspects of language should be emphasized in understanding what constitutes grammatical error. Such errors must be accounted for "in terms of discipline to the historicity of language," i.e., they are errors because they fail to conform to the established norms of correctness. "Grammar is 'history' or 'historical document,' " Gramsci writes, "it is the 'photograph' or the fundamental traits of a photograph of a determinate phase of national (collective) language, historically shaped and in continuous development." (QC 29, 1)

Under Fascism in Italy, the Gentilian educational program (co-authored by Croce) excluded the teaching of grammar in schools. The Gentilians regarded the scholastic study of grammar as dispensable since the historically immanent grammar seemed to them to be the only one possible and could be learned simply by speaking. Teaching grammar was thus a useless formalism running counter to a laissez-faire philosophy. According to Gramsci, this position betrayed an unconscious, "old liberal" reactionary outlook that was unjustified and failed to take into account the normative elements of language. One of the results of the Gentilian program was that "the national popular masses are excluded from learning cultured language." (QC 29, 6) The popular masses cannot simply learn the cultured language by speaking it, since this manner of learning depends on transmission from the preceding generations and the public school provided the only regular setting where the masses could learn cultured language.

Here Gramsci distinguished between "immanent grammar" present in every language, and conceivable in its technical aspects, and "normative grammar." The unwritten and spontaneous normative grammar is transmitted from generation to

14. Antonio Gramsci, "Science and 'Scientific' Ideologies," trans. Maurice A. Finocchiaro, *Telos* 41 (Fall 1979), pp. 153-155; cf. SPN, 468.

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generation through the instruction of parents and later continues in conversation and mimesis; it is constituted by reciprocal control, teaching and "censorship" that manifests itself through a complex of action and reaction which "unites to determine a grammatical conformism." Equally important to the development of a "homogeneous skeleton for the national linguistic organism" is the written normative grammar since it necessitates conscious choices and involves a critique of the spontaneous and commonsense normative grammar. The written normative grammar "is always an act of cultural-national policy." (QC 29, 2) Consequently, the popular masses are largely bereft of any meaningful access to high culture when their exposure to the normative grammar of that culture becomes limited.

To counter the social polarization resulting from his program, Gramsci advocated a return to the humanist educational style before the Gentile reforms. This educational approach relied on the teaching of Latin and Greek as one of its essential components. The grammatical study of Latin and Greek and a concommitant comparison with modern Italian had fulfilled several pedagogical functions in secondary schools. Through an experience that was logical, artistic, and psychological in character, this study had inculcated mental discipline and certain personal habits. Also, it had helped to develop analytical skills since it involves "the distinction and identification of words and concepts; suggests the whole of formal logic, from the contradiction between opposites to the analysis of distincts; reveals the historical movement of the entire language, modified through time, developing and not static." (SPN, 38) The humanist curriculum had led to the acquisition of a "historicising understanding of the world and of life, which becomes a second — nearly spontaneous — nature," and to the development of the pupil's character and personality through "the absorption and assimilation of the whole cultural past of modern European civilization." Students learned Latin and Greek "in order to know at first hand the civilization of Greece and of Rome — a civilization that was a necessary precondition of our modern civilization: in other words, they learned them in order to be themselves and know themselves consciously." (SPN, 37)

Developing contacts with other cultures was intrinsically desirable to Gramsci. Without such contacts one's own conception of the world would be limited and provincial. This is especially the case if one speaks only a dialect or understands poorly the "standard" national language. For while a dialect often maintains an anachronistic relation to historically important currents of thought, an autochthonal national language, with its historic richness, can be translated into other national languages and can be a "world-wide means of expression." (SPN, 325)

With the example of the Gentilian program, it is easy to see that the "question of language" should be considered part of the political struggle. In an implicit critique of Croce's view of politics, Gramsci linked politics and the language question: "Language also means culture and philosophy (if only at the level of common sense) and therefore the fact of 'language' is in reality a multiplicity of facts more or less organically coherent and co-ordinated . . . From this one can deduce the importance of the 'cultural aspect,' even in practical (collective) activity. An historical act can only be performed by *'collective man,' and this presupposes the attainment of a 'cultural-social' unity* through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world, both general and particular, operating in transitory bursts (in emotional ways) or permanently (where the intellectual base is so well rooted, assimilated and experienced that it becomes passion). Since this is the way things happen, great importance is assumed by the general question of language, that is, the question of collectively attain-

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ing a singular culture 'climate.' " (SPN, 349) Here Gramsci emphasizes an integrative social goal and the collective nature of linguistic phenomena but he never loses sight of the political aspects of language and its connection with the hegemonic relations of class-based society.

The lack of a national Italian language began to be addressed in the 19th century when, as a result of lay intellectuals becoming detached from the Church, Italian finally triumphed over Latin as the cultured language and when, after the Risorgimento, Italian was adopted as the language of the new Italian state. But the primary use of dialects persisted and the advent of a unified culture was certainly not advanced by the Gentilian program.

The essential weakness of the Italian nation — its lack of both a "national-popular" culture and an internal political force that could rival the Church — goes back several hundred years to the inability of the bourgeoisie to fully integrate the economy, political power, and culture under its rule. Bourgeois intellectuals failed to translate the rising economic power of their class into a political hegemony over the Catholic Church and its traditional intellectuals. Instead, the traditional caste was eventually (in the age of decadence) able to absorb individual intellectuals as they "organically" emerged from the bourgeoisie. Intellectuals became once again cut off from the general populus and served only a cosmopolitan function. Italian (and Florentine dialect) became a second scholarly language. "In this sense," Gramsci writes, "a history of the Italian language does not yet exist: on the contrary the historical grammar is not yet that." (QC 29, 7)

Rather than accept the thesis of the mutual untranslatability of languages associated with extreme conventionalism and Crocean idealism, Gramsci argues that different languages, even philosophical and scientific languages, are reciprocally translatable. But only Marxism is capable of producing "organic and profound" translations. Other philosophical approaches produce only artificial and schematic translations. It is only because Marxism has profoundly and realistically theorized language as inseparable from other social features, and is itself consciously "adherent to reality," that it is thereby superior. No translation will ever be perfect in all its particulars, of course, but all national languages are translatable in their "essential foundation."

For Gramsci, the principle of reciprocal translatability, developed by Marx in *The Holy Family,*[15] constituted "the source of modern historicism" (SPN, 78) and must therefore be recognized as a core element of Gramsci's philosophy. But in addition to allowing translations between different languages, the principle of reciprocal translatability is also a cognitive method. Linked to an overarching general philosophy, it is closely connected to the dialectic and necessary to theorizing the organic unity of the constituents parts of the philosophy of praxis. The notion of translatability is essential, Gramsci says, to understanding the historical genesis of the philosophy of praxis as the "science of dialectics or the theory of knowledge, within which the general concepts of history, politics and economics are interwoven in an organic unity." (SPN, 431) On the basis of the principle's function as part of a theory of knowledge, each constituent element of the philosophy of praxis becomes "implicit in the others, and the three together form a homogeneous circle." (SPN, 403) Following Marx, Gramsci argues

15. Ch. IV, critical comment no. 3: "If Herr Edgar compares French *equality* with German 'self-consciousness' for an instant, he will see that the latter principle expresses *in German,* i.e., in abstract thought, what the former says *in French,* that is, in the language of politics and of thoughtful observation." Marx derived this notion of translatability from Hegel's discussion of the links between Jacobin language and classical German philosophy. See Gramsci's discussion of the history of this notion at QC 11, 49.

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that: "Translatability presupposes that a given phase of civilization has a 'fundamentally' identical cultural expression, even though the language (*linguaggio*) is historically different, determined by the particular tradition of any national culture and any philosophical system, from the predominance of an intellectual or practical activity." (QC 11, 47) Clearly, Gramsci's principle of translatability requires a materialist approach. Only this enables him to advocate a comparative linguistics: "Two fundamentally similar structures have 'equivalent' and reciprocally translatable superstructures, whatever may be their particular national language (*linguaggio*)." (QC 11, 49) Furthermore, this principle allows the direct comparison of one civilization with another even though they may be at different historical "phases" of development.[16]

The principle of translatability cannot be ahistorical or transhistorical. If this were so, it would lapse into metaphysical error or utopian idealism. Against Russell, Pareto, and Vailati, who attempted to create abstract, universal languages, Gramsci maintains that all artificial languages are arbitrary and utopian. (SPN, 447 & 451) Different national languages are reciprocally and directly translatable because they represent organic cultural expressions of social and political forces, that is, national languages are not totally autonomous as such. And because organicity, or lack of it, characterizes the outcomes of social conflict, the struggle on the terrain of language must not neglect the national setting and its historical links and culture.[17] Nevertheless, Gramsci's principle of translatability means that the lessons learned in one historical setting can be applied in another, provided the means for doing so are present.[18] He writes: "The historical grammar cannot be anything but 'comparative': an expression which, if thoroughly analyzed, indicates the intimate knowledge that the linguistic fact, like any other fact, cannot have strictly defined national borders, because history is always 'world history' and the particular histories live only in the framework of a world history." (QC 29, 2)

Finally, in the Italian situation there is the difficulty of translating the dialects into scholarly Italian and vice versa. In Gramsci's time most intellectuals, even intellectuals who claimed to represent the interests of the masses, had cut themselves off from the masses. This fact led, in several previous instances as well, to the serious consequence that when reactionary groups organized a *coup d'etat* there was no effective leadership for those who opposed them. Gramsci suggests that if this is to be avoided in the future, the world view of intellectuals who claim to represent the masses can be different only in a quantitative, not qualitative, degree: "A reciprocal 'reduction' so to speak, a passage from one to the other and vice versa, must be possible." (SPN, 199) A constant reciprocal translation between the immediate particulars experienced by the masses and the theoretical language of its conscious political leadership is therefore a necessity for a successful counter-hegemony against the immanent system of meaning. Here lies the importance of Gramsci's writings on language and his proposal for a "living philogy" that would unify theory and practice.

16. See QC 11, 47 and 48 and SPN, 11.

17. See SPN, 19-20 and 236-237.

18. Gramsci develops this point where, after describing how the framework of Russian history was laid by a passive assimilation of Norman, Greek, German and French influences, he says: "In the more recent historical period we find the opposite phenomenon. An *elite* consisting of some of the most active, energetic, enterprising and disciplined members of society emigrates abroad and assimilates the culture and historical experiences of the most advanced countries of the West, without however losing the most essential characteristics of its own nationality, that is to say, without breaking its sentimental and historical links with its own people. Having thus performed its intellectual apprenticeship it returns to its own country and compels the people to an enforced awakening, skipping historical stages in the process" (SPN, 19-20).

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NOTES ON LANGUAGE

by Antonio Gramsci[1]

NOTEBOOK 3 (XX)[2] 1930

§74. *Giulio Bertoni and linguistics.* In view of the attitudes expressed in his latest writing, a critique easily could be written that cuts the legs out from under Bertoni's linguistics.[3] It could be easily demonstrated that Bertoni has succeeded neither in providing a general reformulation of Bartoli's innovations in linguistics, nor has he understood these innovations along with their practical and theoretical import.

In an article published some years age[4] dealing with linguistic studies in Italy, Bertoni completely fails to distinguish Bartoli from the run of the mill linguists. Instead, by subtle ambiguities, he relegates him to a secondary position, unlike Casella[5] who emphasizes Bartoli originality. It should be pointed out how in his earlier article by Bertoni, Campus appears even superior to Bartoli, though his studies on the European Arian velars are no more than short essays in which Bartoli's general method is applied purely and simply on Bartoli's own suggestions. It is Bartoli who disinterestedly has given relevance to Campus and who has always tried to bring him to the fore. In this earlier article, where one almost has to count the words divided to each scholar, Bertoni, not without academic malice, has so contrived things as to shunt Bartoli aside. Bartoli's mistake was in having collaborated with Bertoni in compiling the *Manualetto*. It was a mistake as well as a scientific liability. Bartoli is appreciated for his concrete works. Having let Bertoni write the theoretical part induces students into error and

1. Selected and edited by Steven Mansfield. Translated by Steven Mansfield and Livio Alchini. Originally published in Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere,* Edizione Critica dell'Istituto Gramsci, ed. V. Gerratana (Turin, Einaudi, 1975). All matter within brackets in the text has been added by Gerratana. All matter within brackets in the footnotes has been added by the translators. Where a footnote is by Gramsci it is preceded by the initials: AG; and if in the same footnote, Gerratana provides further reference, then this is preceded by: VG. The footnotes have been renumbered to appear successive.

2. [The Roman numeration has no particular meaning. It was assigned by Tatiana Shucht (Gramsci's sister-in-law) when the notebooks came into her possession. The Arabic numeration represents the approximate chronological order of the composition of the notebooks as established by Gerratana and others.]

3. AG: In the *Manualetto di Linguistica* and in the pamphlet published by Petrini (see abstract published by "Nuova Italia" of August 1930). VG: The first work cited here by Gramsci (as "Manualetto di Linguistica") is the *Brevario di Neolinguistica* (Modena, 1925), written in collaboration with Giulio Bertoni (part I: *Principi Generali*) and Matteo G. Bartoli (part II: *Criteri Tecnici*); is among the books that Gramsci had in Rome before being arrested, but it does not seem like he was able to receive it in prison, despite repeated requests (cf. [*Lettere dal Carcere*, Einaudi, Turin, 1965, hereafter:] LC, 3, 134, 157). The other work by Giulio Bertoni, mentioned here by Gramsci as a booklet published by Petrini (i.e., among the "Critical notes collected by Domenico Petrini"), is the pamphlet *Linguaggio e Poesia,* Bibliotheca ed., Rieti 1930. The issue of "Nuova Italia" cited by Gramsci, 20 August 1930 (I:8) contains only, at p. 348, a bibliographic citation of Bertoni's pamphlet, but not passages from the text. A review of the same pamphlet, signed by Ferruccio Blasi, is in a following issue of "Nuova Italia," 20 October 1930 (I:10), pp. 428-429.

4. Cf. Giulio Bertoni, *Nuovi Orientamenti di Linguistica,* in "Leonardo," 20 February 1926 (II:2), pp. 31-34.

5. AG: In his recent article on "Marzocco" about *Miscellanea* Ascoli. VG: Cf. Mario Cassella, *L'eredità dell'Ascoli e l'Odierna Glottologia italiana*, in "Il Marzocco," 6 July 1930 (XXXV:27).

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leads them astray. In this case modesty and disinterestedness become a fault.

On the other hand, if Bertoni has not understood Bartoli, neither has he understood Croce's aesthetic, in the sense that he does not know how to derive canons for research from it. He also misunderstood Croce's construction of language (*linguaggio*) as a science.[6] He did nothing but paraphrase, exalt and lyricize impressions. We are presented with an inveterate positivist who swoons in the face of idealism because this is more fashionable and allows him to engage in rhetoric. Surprisingly, Croce has praised the *Manaletto*, without seeing and pointing out Bertoni's incongruities.[7] It seems to me that Croce wanted, more than anything else, to benevolently acknowledge that in this branch of studies, where positivism triumphs, new avenues could be opened in the idealistic direction. There is no relation of immediate dependence between Bartoli's method and Croceanism; the relation is with historicism in general, not with a particular form of historicism. While he has conceived it narrowly as a natural science, Bartoli's innovation has been to cast linguistics as a historical science, whose roots can be explored "in space and time" and not in the vocal apparatus understood physiologically.

Linguistics is not the only area in which Bertoni's legs could be cut out from under him. His status as a scholar has always been intellectually repugnant. There is something false and insincere in his work apart from prolixity and a lack of "perspective" in historical and literary values.

In "linguistics" Vossler is Crocean. Yet, what relation exists between Bartoli and Vossler and between Vossler and what is commonly called "linguistics"? Remember, with respect to this point, Croce's article, "This Round Table is Square,"[8] because it is from the critique that one can establish the exact concepts in the matter under consideration.

§76. *The question of language and the Italian intellectual classes.* This issue can develop the concept that Italy paradoxically represents a very young country and a very old one at the same time (like Lao-tse who was born at the age of 80).[9]

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6. [Gramsci refers to language in a particular or technical sense as *lingua* and to language in general, conceived as the faculty to transmit messages, as *linguaggio*. At some points herein this distinction is important, at others it is not overly crucial. But since there is no easy means in English to maintain the distinction, *lingua* and *linguaggio*, the original terms, have been left in brackets whenever they have been translated as "language."]

7. Most probably Gramsci refers to a review that appeared in "La Critica," 20 May 1926 (XXIV:3), pp. 181-182 (subsequently reprinted in Benedetto Croce, *Conversazioni Critiche*, series III, Laterza, Bari, 1932, pp. 99-101), where Croce defends the *Brevario di Neolinguistica* from the critique of K. Jaberg. Nevertheless, it has to be recalled that Croce subsequently raised objections and criticisms to Bertoni's positions, in a polemical debate of 1941-1942 (cf. *La Filosofia del Linguaggio e le sue Condizioni Presenti in Italia,* in Benedetto Croce, *Discorsi di Varia Filosofia*, vol. I, Laterza, Bari, 1959, pp. 235-250).

8. AG: In the *Problemi di Estetica.* VG: Cf. Benedetto Croce, *Problemi di Estetica e Contributi alla Storia della Estetica Italiana,* Laterza, Bari 1923, the Gramsci Foundation (FG), pp. 169-173. From a letter of Bordiga to Gramsci, this volume appears to be among the ones Gramsci had in Ustica and had afterwards — in 1927 — been sent to the Milan prison. The copy kept in FG is perhaps a duplicate.

9. The reference to the legend of Lao-tse, already mentioned in an article of 1916 (cf. [*Sotto la Mole (1916-1920),* Turin, Einaudi, 1960] hereafter: SM, 198) is connected to a recollection of Gramsci's university life; cf. the article "Cultura e lotta di classe," in *Il Grido del Popolo,* 25 May 1918 [republished as "Culture and class struggle," in *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci,* ed. Pedro Cavalcanti and Paul Piccone (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975), p. 111]: "This reminds us of an old university professor, who for forty years offered a course in theoretical philosophy about the 'Final Evolutionary Being.' Each year he would begin with a 'review' of the precursors of the system, and he would talk about Lao-tse, the child-man who was born at eighty, and Chinese

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The relations between intellectuals and the people, studied as an aspect of the written language (*lingua*) by intellectuals and use in their relations, can be studied as an aspect of the function played by Italian intellectuals in the Medieval cosmopolitan community. Inasmuch as the Papacy had its seat in Italy, the use of Latin as scholarly language (*lingua*) is linked to Catholic cosmopolitanism.

Literary Latin and vulgar Latin. From vulgar Latin, Neolatin dialects developed not only in Italy, but throughout the Romanized European area. Literary Latin is crystallized in the Latin of scholars, of intellectuals, and is the so-called Middle-Latin.[10] This written language cannot in any way be compared to a spoken, national, historically living language (*lingua*). It also must not be confused with a jargon or with an artificial language (*lingua*) like Esperanto.[11] In any case, there is a schism between people and intellectuals, people and culture. Religious books also are written in Middlelatin, and thus literary religious debates are not accessible to the people, even though religion is their prevalent cultural element. From religion, the people *see* the *rituals* and *hear* exhortative preachings, but they cannot follow the discussions and the ideological developments which are the monopoly of a caste.

Vulgar tongues are written when the people become important once again. The oath of Strasburg (after the battle of Fontaneto between the successors of Charlemagne) has endured because if soldiers had sworn in an unknown language (*lingua*) the oath would have been deprived of validity. In Italy, the first traces of a vulgar tongue are provided by oaths or testimonies from the people to establish the property of a convent's estate (Montecassino). In any case, it can be said that in Italy from 600 A.D., when it can be presumed that the people no longer understood the Latin of the scholars, to 1250, when the blooming of the vulgar tongue began, the people did not comprehend books and could not participate in the cultural world. The blooming of the Communes gives rise to vulgar tongues and the intellectual hegemony of Florence unites the vulgar tongue in creating an illustrious vulgar tongue. But what is this illustrious vulgar tongue? It is the Florentine as elaborated by the old traditional intellectuals! Florentine in *vocabulary* and *phonetics*, but Latin in *syntax*. However, the victory of the vulgar tongue over Latin was not easy. With the exception of poets and artists in general, Italian scholars used to write for a Christian Europe and not for Italy. They were a concentration of cosmopolitan and not national intellectuals. The fall of the Communes and the

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philosophy. And each year he would begin to talk about Lao-tse again, because new students would enroll and they too had to learn about Lao-tse from the mouth of the professor. And so the 'Final Evolutionary Being' became a legend, an evanescent chimera, and the only living reality, for the students of so many generations, was Lao-tse, the child-man, the babe born at eighty" ([*Scritti giovanili (1914-1918),* Einaudi, Turin, 1958] hereafter: SG, 240). Cf. also LC, 287 and 437. The hint of the article of 1918, "Cultura e lotta di classe," is to be found in Notebook 6 (VIII), §120.

10. AG: Cf. the article by Filippo Ermini in *Nuova Antologia* of 16 May 1928. VG: Cf. Filippo Ermini, "Il Mediolatino," in *Nuova Antologia,* 16 May 1928, pp. 228-236.

11. Gramsci had been concerned with Middle Latin during his linguistic studies of his Turinese period; cf. the letter of 17 November 1930: "ten years ago I wrote an essay on the question of language [*lingua*] according to Manzoni, and this required some research on the organization of Italian culture, since when the written language [*lingua*] (the so-called Middle Latin, i.e., Latin written from 400 A.D. to 1300) completely detached itself from the spoken language [*lingua*] of the people, which, once the Roman centralization was over, broke into innumerable dialects" (LC, 378). For Gramsci's polemic on Esperanto, cf. the article "La Lingua Unica e l'Esperanto," published in *Grido del Popolo,* 16 February 1918 (now in SG, 174-178) and the two preceding articles published in *Avanti!* (cf. Ambrosoli, "Nuovi Contributi agli *Scritti Giovanili* di Gramsci" in *Rivista Storica del Socialismo,* May-August 1960, pp. 545-550); cf. also "Una Lettera Inedita a Leo Galetto," in *L'Unità* (Roman edition) of 25 June 1967.

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advent of the principality, which created a governing caste detached from the people, crystallized this vulgar tongue in the same way that literary Latin had been crystallized. Italian is again a language (*lingua*) written but not spoken, of the scholars and not of the nation. There are in Italy two scholarly languages (*lingue*), Latin and Italian. The latter finally prevails with the triumph in the XIXth century, as lay intellectuals became detached from the ecclesiastics. Today, ecclesiastics continue to write books in Latin, but today the Vatican also makes an increasing use of Italian when dealing with Italian matters. It will end up using other lay languages in other countries in conformity with its present policy of nationalities. In any case, it must be emphasized that the crystallization of an illustrious vulgar tongue cannot be detached from the tradition of Middlelatin, and it represents an analogous phenomenon. After a short parenthesis of communal liberty in which there is a blooming of intellectuals emerging from the popular classes, or the bourgeoisie, there is a reabsorption of intellectual functions by the traditional caste, where the single elements are of popular origin but in whom the character of caste prevails over that of origin. It is not a whole stratum of the population which, by reaching power, creates its own intellectuals as happened in the fourteenth century, but it is a traditionally selected organism which assimilates single individuals into its hierarchy — a typical example of it is provided by the ecclesiastic organization

Other elements have to be taken into consideration in a full analysis. For many questions, the national rhetoric of the past century and the prejudices that it embodied have not even led to preliminary research. In the main, what were the exact areas of diffusion of Tuscan? In my opinion, in Venice, Italian was introduced on the Latin scheme as it already was elaborated by scholars and the original Florentine never entered. The living voice of Florentine merchants was never heard as it was, for example, in Rome and Naples. Thus, the language (*lingua*) of the government continued to be Venetian. This pattern was repeated in other centers like Genoa. In this sense, a history of the Italian language (*lingua*) does not yet exist: on the contrary, the historical grammar is not yet that. For the French language (*lingua*), this kind of treatise exists (that of Brunot — and of Littré — it seems to me is of the kind that I mean, but I do not recall). It seems that once language (*lingua*) is conceived as an element of culture and general history as well as a principal manifestation of the "nationality" and "popularity" of the intellectuals, then this study is not idle or purely academic.

Ermini's article[12] is interesting as an important source of information about the study of Middlelatin, which has assumed a misleading expression that seems quite improper and a possible source of mistakes among non-specialists. I believe that its meaning instead should be Medieval Latin. I will return to it for a first bibliography, as well as to other writings of Ermini, who is a Middlelatinist. He states that on the basis of his research, "we must substitute the theory of Latin unity and perpetual continuity of the classic tradition to the theory of the two separate worlds; that is, the view of a Latin which is in the hands of the scholars alone and on the way to being extinguished, and of a Neolatin, which is arising and coming to life." This can only signify that the new Neolatin culture strongly felt the influx of the previous culture, and not that there had been a "national-popular" unity of culture.

But perhaps, for Ermini, Middlelatin has precisely the literal meaning of the Latin that stood between the classic and the humanistic. It undoubtedly marks a return to the classic, while at the same time it has its own unmistakable characteristics. Ermini places the begining of Middlelatin towards the middle of the IVth century, when the

12. See note 10 above.

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alliance between classic culture (!) and Christian religion takes place, when "a noble pleiad of writers, emerging from schools of rhetoric and of poetics, deeply feel the desire to connect the new faith to the ancient beauty (!) and thus to give life to the first Christian poetry." (It seems fair to mark the beginning of Middlelatin at the first blooming of Christian Latin literature, but the manner of explaining its genesis seems vague and arbitrary to me.)[13] Thus, Middlelatin should be included between the middle of the IVth century and the end of the XIV th century, between the beginning of the Christian inspiration and the diffusion of humanism. These thousand years are subdivided by Ermini as follows: the *first age of the origins*, from the death of Constantine to the fall of the Western Empire (337-476); a *second age*, of Barbaric literature, from 476 to 799, i.e., up to the restoration of the Empire due to the work of Charlemagne, truly a time of transition in the continuous and progresive process of Latinizing the Barbarians (this phrase is an exaggeration, to be replaced by the notion of the formation of a stratum of Germanic intellectuals who write in Latin); a *third age*, of the Carolinian revival, from 799 to 888, to the death of *Charles the Great;* a *fourth age, of feudal literature,* from 888 to 1000, up to the pontificate of Sylvester II, when feudalism as a slow transformation of preexisting orders opens a new era; a *fifth age* of the scholastic literature, which runs up to the end of the XIIth century, when knowledge is concentrted in the great schools and philosophical method and thinking fertalize all sciences; and a *sixth age* of *erudite literature*, from the beginning of the XIIIth century to the end of the XIVth century, which already hints at decadence.

NOTEBOOK 6 (VIII) 1930-1932

§62. *The disciples of Padre Bresciani.* Somewhere De Sanctis writes that before writing an essay or lecturing on a *canto* of Dante, he used to read the *canto* many times aloud and learn it by heart. This is recalled in order to support the observation that the artistic element of a work, except on rare occasions (and it will be seen which ones), cannot be enjoyed at the first reading, often not even by leading specialists as De Sanctis. The first reading only allows an introduction to the writer's sentimental and cultural world, and even this is not always true, especially for non-contemporary writers whose cultural and sentimental world differ from the present one. A poem of a cannibal on the joy of a sumptuous banquet of human flesh can be conceived as beautiful, and it can demand a certain psychological separation from present-day culture in order to be artistically enjoyed without "extra-aesthetical" prejudices. But the work of art also contains other "historical" elements apart from the determinate cultural and sentimental world. This language (*linguaggio*), conceived not only as merely verbal expression that can be photographed in a certain time and place by the grammar, but as an ensemble of images and modes of expression which are not included in the grammar. These elements appear more clearly in the other arts. While the Japanese language (*lingua*) immediately appears different from the Italian, the language (*linguaggio*) of painting, music and figurative arts in general do not differ. Yet, these are also these differences of language (*linguaggio*). They become more visible the more one descends from the artistic manifestations of artists to the artistic manifestations of folklore in which the language (*linguaggio*) of these arts is reduced to more primordial and autochthonous element (remember the anecdote of the sketch artist who drew the profile of a negro while other negroes were mocking the portrait because the artist had reproduced "only half a

13. AG: Cf. the history of Latin literature by Marchesi on this point. VG: Cf. Concetto Marchesi, *Storia della Letteratura Latina,* 2 vols (Principato, Messina, 1925-1927). This work seems to have been known to Gramsci.

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face"). From the cultural and historical viewpoint, there is a great difference between the linguistic expression of the written and spoken word and linguistic expression in other arts. The "literary" language (*linguaggio*) is strictly linked to the life of the national multitudes. It develops slowly and only molecularly. If it can be said that every social group had its own "*lingua*," then it is necessary to notice (save rare exceptions) that there is a continuous correspondence and exchange between the popular language (*lingua*) and that of the cultured classes. The same does not occur for the language (*linguaggi*) of other arts. One can notice that actually two orders of phenomena occur: 1) in them the expressive elements of the past are always alive, at least in a quantity enormously greater than for literary language (*lingua*); 2) in them a cosmopolitan language (*lingua*) rapidly forms that absorbs the technical-expressive elements of all nations which from time to time produce great painters, writers, musicians, etc. Wagner alone has given more linguistic elements to music than all German literature during its whole history. This happens because people hardly participate in the production of these languages (*linguaggi*), which are distinctive of an international elite, but which can be understood rather rapidly (by them as a collectivity, not as individuals). All this indicates that the purely aesthetic "taste," if it can be called primary as form and activity of the spirit, is not such practically, i.e., in a chronological sense.

It has been said by someone (e.g., by Prezzolini, in the pamphlet *Mi pare . . .*) that the theater cannot be called art but rather mechanical amusement. This is because spectators cannot aesthetically enjoy the drama represented, but they are interested only in the plot, etc. (or something like this).[14] This observation is false in the sense that, in the theatrical representation, the artistic element is not given only by the drama in the literary sense. The creator is not only the writer. The author intervenes in the theatrical representation with the words and stage directions which limit the arbitrariness of the actor and of the director. The literary element provides occasion for new artistic creations in the representation which, from a complementary and critical-interpretive level, are actually becoming increasingly important: the interpretation of the individual author and the scenic complex created by the director. It is correct, however, that only repeated reading can allow one to enjoy the drama in the same way that the author has produced it. A work of art is much more "artistically" popular to the extent that its moral, cultural, sentimental content is consistent with morality, culture, national sentiments, and understood not as something static, but as an activity in continuous development. The immediate encounter between the reader and the writer takes plance when the unity of form and content in the reader has as its premise the unity of the poetic and sentimental world. Otherwise, the reader has to begin translating the "language" (*lingua*) of the content into his own. One can say that this situation is similar to one who has learned English in an accelerated Berlitz course and then reads Shakespeare. The toil of literal comprehension, obtained with the continuous assistance of a mediocre dictionary, reduces the reading to a pedantic scholastic exercise and nothing more.

§. *Linguistics.* Antonio Pagliaro, *Sommario di Linguistica Arioeuropea,* Fasc. I: *Cenni Storici e Quistioni Teoriche.*[15]

14. Cf. Prezzolini, *Mi pare . . .* [Delta, Florence, 1925], pp. 73-79 *Perché il Teatro Italiano non si Rinnova*).

15. AG: Libreria di Scienze e Lettere del dott. G. Bardi (Rome, 1930); (in the Pubblicazioni della Scuola di Filologia Classica dell'Università di Roma, Serie seconda: Sussidi e materiali, II, i"). On Pagliaro's book, cf. the review by Goffredo Coppola in *Pègaso* of November 1930, pp. 622-626.

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This book is indispensable for grouping progress in linguistics in recent times. Despite much having changed, a basis for linguistic studies has not been found. Croce's identification of art and language (*lingua*), has allowed a certain progress. It has allowed some problems to be solved, while declaring others non-existent or arbitrary; but linguists, who are essentially historians, face another problem: is the history of language (*lingue*) possible outside of the history of art and, furthermore, is the history of art possible?

But linguists study precisely language (*lingue*) not as art but as the "material" of art, as a social product or a cultural expression of a given population. These questions are not solved, or, if they are, it is only by returning to the old remodeled rhetoric.[16]

According to Perrotto[17] (as well as for Pagliaro?), the identification of art and language (*lingua*) has led to the problem of the origin of language (*linguaggio*) as insoluble or arbitrary inasmuch as that would amount to asking ourselves why man is man? This does not seem very precise to me. The problem cannot be solved because of a lack of documentation and thus it is arbitrary. Beyond a certain historical limit a hypothetical or conjectural social history can be written, but not a "historical" history. This identification also would allow one to determine what in the language (*lingua*) is error, i.e., not language (*lingua*). "Error is artificial creation, rationalistic, willed, which does not assert itself since it reveals nothing, and is peculiar to the individual outside his society."[18] Thus, it seems that language (*lingua*) equals history and language (*lingua*) does not equal arbitrariness. Artificial language (*lingue*) are like jargon. It is not true that they are absolutely not language (*lingue*) since they are somehow useful. They have a very limited socio-historical content as will dialect and national-leterary language (*lingua*). Yet, dialect also is art-language (*lingua*). But between the dialect and the national-literary language (*lingua*) something has changed: precisely the cultural, political-moral-sentimental ambience. The history of languages (*lingue*) is the history of linguistic innovations, but these innovations are not individual, as in art, but belong to an entire social community which has innovated its culture and historically has "progressed." Of course, they become individual as well, but not of the artist-individual, but of the *complete* determined historical-cultural element — the individual.

In language (*lingua*) there is no parthenogenesis in which a language (*lingua*) produces another language (*lingua*). Yet, there is innovation because of the interference of different cultures, which occurs in very different ways. These influences occur for entire masses of linguistic elements and also occur molecularly. Latin, for example, as "mass" has transformed the Celtic of the Gauls, but instead has "molecularly" influenced German, lending to its single words or forms, etc. The interference and the "molecular" influence can happen in the womb of a nation itself between different strata. A new class, which becomes the ruling one, innovates as a "mass." The jargon of crafts, on the other hand, or the jargon of particular professions, innovates "molecu-

16. AG: Cf. Bertoni. VG: [Cf. Notebook 3 (XX), §74, above].

17. Most likely here the name Perrotto is a slip instead of Coppola, author of the review Gramsci was discussing. In fact, Goffredo Coppola writes (*op.cit.*, p. 623): "Stating the identity between art and language [*lingua*] leads to very remarkable results. First of all the problem of the origin of language [*linguaggio*] which has been so laboriously investigated by philosophers, psychologists and linguists, appears to be insoluble, because sound itself is an element of intuition, or, to put it better, of the man who intuits. However, to ask ourselves what is the origin of language [*linguaggio*] as a faculty is like asking the question of why man has fantasy, thought, why man is man."

18. Cf. *ibid.*

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larly." The artistic judgment in these innovations has the character of "cultural taste," not of artistic taste, and these innovations occur for the same reason that one may prefer a blonde or a brunette. The aesthetic "ideals" change as they are linked to determinate cultures.

NOTEBOOK 10 (XXXIII) 1932-1935: *The Philosophy of Benedette Croce. Part II*

§6. Introduction to the study of philosophy.

IV. *Translatability of scientific languages* (linguaggi). The notes written under this rubric must be grouped precisely. Under the general heading of the relations of speculative philosophies and the philosophy of praxis, the philosophy of praxis explains their reduction to a political moment "politically." In reducing all speculative philosophies to "political" or a moment of historical-political life, the philosophy of praxis conceives the reality of the human relations of knowledge as an element of political "hegemony."

§20. *Points for the study of economics.* The Einaudi-Spirito polemic concerning the State[19] must be connected with the Einaudi-Benini polemic.[20] In the Einaudi-Spirito polemic, however, both are wrong. They refer to different things and use different languages (*linguaggi*). The Benini-Einaudi polemic illustrates the preceding one. In both polemics, Einaudi holds the same position as he took when arguing with Croce. He tries to limit every scientific function of the philosophy of praxis. The coherence of Einaudi's position is "intellectually" admirable. He understands that any theoretical concession to his adversary, even though only intellectual, can cause his whole construction to sink.

In his conception of the State, Einaudi thinks of *governmental* intervention in economic matters. It is the "juridical" regulator of the market which gives the determined market legal form so all economic agents can move in a "parity of juridical conditions." This governmental intervention also creates economic privileges and skews competition in favor of determinate groups. Spirito instead refers to a speculative conception of the State in which the individual is identified with the State. There is a third aspect of the question which is implied in both writers. By identifying the State with a social group, State intervention not only takes place in the manner suggested by Einaudi and desired by Spirito. It is also a preliminary condition or the same juridical-political expression by which the determinate good of labor is initially depreciated and placed in conditions of competitive inferiority, which pays for the entire system. This point is emphasized by Benini.[21] It is surely not a discovery, but Benini has reached it

19. This is in fact the polemic Einaudi-Benini-Spirito, already mentioned by Gramsci previously: cf. note 2 to Notebook 4 (XII), §42: Cf. Luigi Einaudi, "Se Esista, Storicamente, la Pretesa Ripugnanza degli Economisti verso il Concetto dello Stato Produttore (Lettera Aperta a R. Benini)," in *Nuovi Studi di Diritto, Economia e Politica,* September-October 1930 (III:5), pp. 302-314; this article by Einaudi is followed, in the same issue of the journal, with a reply by Rodolfo Benini, "Coesione e Solidarità, pp. 315-320 and with an article by Ugo Spirito, "La Storia della Economia e il Concetto di Stato," pp. 321-324. Cf. note 27, below.

20. AG: Cf. *Riforma Sociale* of September-October 1931. VG: Cf. Rodolfo Benini, "Su l'Incidenza dell'Interesse del Capitale," in *La Riforma Sociale,* September-October 1931 (XXXVIII:42, issue 5), pp. 449-457; in the same issue of the journal (pp. 458-464) follows Luigi Einaudi's reply, "Contro Osservazioni in Margine."

21. Cf. Benini, "Su l'Incidenza dell'Interesse del Capitale" [*ibid.*], pp. 449-450: "Strictly speaking, between the expectation of the worker, who is afraid of starving, and the expectation of the capitalist, who looks at future harvests and is in the meantime satiated by present ones, the gap is not negligible. . . . Therefore, he who is in the condition of having an inferior capacity to resist gives up the goods or his own work for a price which is inferior to the one he could have expected,

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in an interesting way. It is precisely the fact that Benini has reached it by starting from the principles of classical economy that irritates Einaudi.

In the letter published by *Nuovi Studi*, however, Einaudi had mentioned Giovanni Vailati's "marvelous capacity" for presenting an economic or even a philosophic theorem and its solution in the different scientific language (*linguaggi*) generated by the historical process of developing the sciences.[22] Thus, he implicitly admitted the reciprocal translatability of these languages (*linguaggi*). Benini has presented in the language (*linguaggio*) of liberal economics an economic fact already presented in the language (*linguaggio*) of the philosophy of praxis, although with all the necessary due limitations and cautions (the Benini episode should be connected to the Spirito episode at the Ferrara Symposium).[23] Remember, in this connection, the statement by Engels on the possibility of arriving, also by starting from the marginal utility theory of value, at the same consequences, though in a vulgar form, as those reached by critical economics.[24] Engel's statement must be analyzed in all its aspects. One of them is that if one wants to defend the critical conception of economics, then one must systematically insist on the fact that orthodox economics deals with the same problems in another language (*linguaggio*). By demonstrating the identity of problems being addressed, it can be shown that the critical solution is superior. In short, the texts shall always be "bilingual," the authentic text, and the "vulgar" translation of liberal economics, next to it, or between the lines.

NOTEBOOK 11 (XVIII) 1932-1933: *Introduction to philosophy.*

Part IV. *The logical instruments of thought.*

§45. *Philosophical and scientific Esperanto.* The tendency that is peculiar to all forms of thought (even of the historicist-idealist ones) to construe themselves as an Esperanto or Volapuek of philosophy and science derives from not understanding the historicity of languages (*linguaggi*) underlying philosophies, ideologies, and scientific opinions. One

had he been in such a condition to enable him to face the other in the contract. Then things take place *as though* a certain share of the goods or the work he provides had been given for *free* to the other, to the dominant. The lack of patrimony sums up in itself all the unfavorable conditions of the workers, as their being too numerous in relation to the proportion defined by the technical means of the moment, or their being in charge of many children, who constitute the future reserve of workmen. Moreover, with the diminishing patrimony education declines, the range of social relations narrows, etc., all causes of inferiority are to be paid for, and included in the humble cost of work."

22. A textual citation of this passage of Einaudi's letter is in [Notebook 11 (XVIII), §48, below].

23. The reference is to the report presented by Ugo Spirito at the II Convegno di Studi Sindicali e Corporativi, held in Ferrara in May 1932; the report had been published in the journal *Nuovi Studi*: "Individuo e Stato nella Concezione Corporativa," March-May 1932 (V:2), pp. 84-93.

24. Engels' statement in the preface to volume III of *Capital*: cf. Karl Marx, *Capital,* Book III [Progress, Moscow, 1959, p. 10]: "One need not strain his thinking powers to see that this explanation for the profits of capital, as advanced by 'vulgar economy,' amounts in practice to the same thing as the Marxian theory of surplus-value; that the workers are in just the same 'unfavorable condition' according to Lexis as according to Marx; that they are just as much the victims of swindle because every non-worker can sell commodities above price, while the worker cannot do so; and that it is just as easy to build up an at least equally plausible vulgar socialism on the basis of this theory as that built in England on the foundation of Jevons' and Menger's theory of use-value and marginal utility. I even suspect that if Mr. George Bernard Shaw had been familiar with this theory of profit, he would have likely fallen for it with both hands, discarding Jevons and Karl Menger, to build anew the Fabian church of the future upon this rock. — In reality, however, this theory is merely a paraphrase of the Marxian."

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can say that this tendency perpetuates the state of mind of primitive peoples towards other peoples in forms always different and more or less attenuated. All primitive people identify themselves with a word which means "man" and the others with words which mean "mutes" or "stammerers" (barbarians) because they do not know the language (*lingua*) of men. This linguistic quality results in the very beautiful paradox by which "cannibal," or eater of men, originally signifies — etymologically — "man par excellence" or "true man." For "Esperantists" in philosophy and science, everything not expressed in their language (*linguaggio*) is delirium, prejudice, superstition, etc. In a process comparable to a sectarian mentality, they reduce to a moral judgment or a psychiatric diagnosis what should be a mere historical judgment. Many traces of this tendency are found in the *Popular Manual*.[25] Philosophical Esperantism is rooted particularly in posivistic and naturalistic conceptions of science. "Sociology" is perhaps the major product of such a mentality along with tendencies toward abstract "classification," methodologism, and formal logic. Logic and general methodology are conceived as existing in themselves and for themselves, like mathematical formulas, abstract from concrete particular sciences. This notion parellels the idea that language (*lingua*) is supposed to exist in dictionaries and grammars or that the technique is supposed to exist outside of work and concrete activity. On the other hand, "anti-Esperantist" thought should not be considered as meaning skepticism, agnosticism or eclecticism. Every form of thought must "critically" consider itself as "exact" and "true" in combat with other forms of thought. Thus, the question is about the levels of "criticism" and of "historicism" which are contained in every form of thought. The philosophy of praxis, by reducing "speculation" to its proper limits, denying that "speculation," as understood by idealist historicists, is the essential character of philosophy, appears to be the historical methodology most consistent with reality and truth.

Part V. *Translatability of philosophical and scientific language* (linguaggi).

§46. In 1921, dealing with questions of organization, Ilich [Lenin] wrote more or less that we have not been able to "translate" our language (*lingua*) into European languages (*lingue*).[26]

25. [A reference to Bukharin's *Theory of Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology,* which was published in Moscow in 1921 and went through several subsequent editions. An English translation was published in New York by International Publishers in 1925, under the title: *Historical Materialism, A System of Sociology.*]

26. The date 1921 refers to the III Congress of the Communist International, where a resolution was passed dealing with organizational questions of the communist parties, which the following year — at the IV Congress of the International — was judged by Lenin "too Russian." Cf. Vladimir I. Lenin, *Opere Complete,* vol. 33, Italian translation (Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1967), pp. 395-396 [or cf. *Selected Works* in 3 volumes (Progress, Moscow, 1975), vol. 3, p. 670]: "At the Third Congress, in 1921, we adopted a resolution on the organizational structure of the Communist Parties and on the methods and content of their activities. The resolution is an excellent one, but it is almost entirely Russian, that is to say, everything in it is based on Russian conditions. This is its good point, but it is also its failing. It is a failing because I am sure that no foreigner can read it. I have read it again before saying this. In the first place, it is too long, containing fifty or more points. Foreigners are not usually able to read such things. Secondly, even if they read it, they will not understand it because it is too Russian. Not because it is written in Russian — it has been excellently translated into all languages — but because it is thoroughly imbued with the Russian spirit. And thirdly, if by way of exception some foreigner does understand it, he cannot carry it out. . . . I have the impression that we made a big mistake with this resolution, namely, that we blocked our own road to further success. As I have said already, the resolution is excellently drafted; I am prepared to subscribe to every one of its fifty or more points. But we have not learned how to present our Russian experience to foreigners. All that was said in the resolution has remained a dead letter. If we do not realise this we shall be unable to move ahead."

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§47. This is the problem: whether the reciprocal translatability of different scientific and philosophical languages (*linguaggi*) is a "critical" element proper to any conception of the world or is it only proper to the philosophy of praxis and only partially applicable for other philosophies. Translatability presupposes that a given phase of civilization has a "fundamentally" identical cultural expression. Even though the language (*linguaggio*) is historically different, it is determined by the particular tradition of any national culture and any philosophical system, and by the predominance of an intellectual or practical activity. So it has to be seen if translatability is possible between expressions of different phases of civilization. In so far as these phases are moments of development from one to the other, they integrate one another. If a given expression can be translated in terms of a prior phase of the same civilization, then a prior phase may be more comprehensible than the given language (*linguaggio*) etc. It seems that one can say precisely that only in the philosophy of praxis is the "translation" organic and profound; while, from other points of view, it is often a simple play of generic "schematicisms."

§48. *Giovanni Vailati and the translatability of scientific languages.* In the *Holy Family* it is claimed that Proudhon's French political language (*linguaggio*) corresponds to and can be translated into the language (*linguaggio*) of classical German philosophy.[27] This is very important in understanding some aspects of the philosophy of praxis, finding the solution to many apparent contradictions of historical development, and answering some superficial objections against this historiographic theory. It is also useful to combat some mechanistic abstractions.

It remains to be seen if this critical principle can be coupled or confused with analogous statements. In an open letter to Rudolfo Benini[28] Luigi Einaudi writes, in a footnote at p. 303: "If I possessed the marvelous faculty that the late lamented friend Vailati had in the highest degree, of translating any theory from the geometric language (*linguaggio*) into the algebraic one, from the hedonistic one into the one of Kantian morality, from purely nomative economic terminology into an applied prescriptive one, then I could try to retranslate the page by Spirito into your formalism, that is, into classical economics. It would be a fertile exercise, similar to those recounted by Loria, undertaken in his youth; of stating successively a given economical demonstration first in the language (*linguaggio*) of Adam Smith and then of Ricardo, and then of Marx, of Stuart-Mill and of Carines. Yet, these exercises, once made, have to be relegated to oblivion, as Loria used to do. They are useful to teach us humility when, for a moment, we deceive ourselves of having seen something new. If this novelty could have been expressed in their words, and thus incorporated in ancient thought, it means that something was already contained in that thought. But neither can nor must they impede every generation in using that language (*linguaggio*) which best adapts to its way of thinking and understanding the world. History is rewritten; why should we not rewrite economic science, first in terms of the cost of production, then of utility, of static equilibrium, and then of dynamic equilibrium?" Einaudi's methodological-critical suggestion is very circumscribed and refers to the particular languages (*linguaggi*) used by the personalities of science rather than to languages (*linguaggi*) of national culture. Einaudi rejoins the current represented by some Italian pragmatists, like Pareto or

27. Cf. Notebook 1 (XVI), §44 and note 31; Notebook 1 (SVI), §151; Notebook 3 (XX), §48; Notebook 4 (XIII), §3.

28. AG: In the pamphlet of September-October 1930 of *Nuovi Studi di Diritto, Economia e Politica.* Entitled: "If the Pretended Repugnance of Economists toward the Concept of the State as a Producer Historically Exists." VG: Cf. textual reference in [Notebook 10 (XXXIII), §20 above].

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Prezzolini. With his letter, he proposes quite limited critical and methodological ends. He wants to teach Ugo Spirito a small lesson, since for Spirito, very often, the novelty of ideas, methods, and formulation of problems, is purely and simply a verbal question of terminology or of a personal or group "jargon." However, one has to see if this is not the first level of the wider and more profound problem implicit in the statement of the *Holy Family*. As with two "scientists," whose formation was within the context of the same fundamental culture who might think they are supporting different "truths" only because they employ a different scientific language (*linguaggio*) (and we do not deny that between them there is a difference and that it should have its significance), so too might two national cultures, as expressions of fundamentally similar civilizations, consider themselves different, opposed, antagonistic, or one superior to the other. This development occurs because they employ languages (*linguaggi*) of a different tradition, which formed themselves on activities characteristic and particular to each of them: political-juridical language (*linguaggio*) in France, doctrinaire, philosophical-theoretical in Germany. For the historian, in reality, these civilizations are reciprocally translatable and reducible one to the other. This translatability is certainly not "perfect" in all its particulars, even in the important ones (but which language (*lingua*) is exactly translatable into another? which single word is exactly translatable into another language (*lingua?*), but it is translatable in its essential "foundation." It is also possible that one is really superior to the other, but nearly never in regard to what their representatives and their fanatic lackeys claim, and especially nearly never in their entirety. The real progress of civilization is the result of the collaboration of all people and national "impulses," although such impulses nearly always address determinate cultural activities or groups of problems.

The Gentilian philosophy is today the one which takes the most issue with "words," "terminology,' and "jargon." It considers as new "creations" those which are new, though not always very appropriate and adequate verbal expressions. Thus, Einaudi's note has exasperated Spirito who, however, is not able to respond conclusively.[29]

§49. The observation, contained in the *Holy Family*, that the French political language (*linguaggio*) is equivalent to the language (*linguaggio*) of classical German philosophy[30] has been "poetically" expressed by Carducci in the expression: "Immanuel Kant decapitated God — Maximillian Robespierre, the king." With respect to this Carduccian reconciliation between the practical politics of Robespierre and Kant's speculative thought, Croce records a series of very interesting philological "sources." Yet, they are for Croce of purely philological and cultural relevance, without any theoretical or "speculative" significance. Carducci borrowed the idea from Heinrich Heine.[31] But the reconciliation of Robespierre to Kant is not original in Heine. Croce, who has investiaged the origin of the reconciliation, writes that he found the first hint in a letter of July 21, 1795 by Hegel to Schelling,[32] that was later developed in the lectures Hegel gave on the history of philosophy and on the philosophy of history. In the first lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel says that "the philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Schelling contains in thought, the revolution," to which the spirit lately has advanced in Germany, in a great epoch, i.e., of universal history, to which "only two peoples have taken part, the Germans and the French, despite the fact that they are

29. AG: See the whole polemic in the cited review. VG: Cf. [note 18, above].
30. [See the references in note 26, above].
31. AG: Third book of *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland* of 1934.
32. AG: Contained in *Briefe von und an Hegel* (Leipzig, 1887), I, 14-16.

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opposites, but precisely because they are opposites." Hence, where the new principle in Germany "has made inroads as spirit and concept"; in France, it instead has displayed itself "in effective reality."[33] In the lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel explains that the principle of formal will and abstract freedom, according to "the simple unity of self-consciousness, the ego, is the absolutely independent freedom and the source of all universal determinations," remained with the Germans a *tranquil theory*, but the French wanted to carry it out practically."[34] This passage from Hegel, it seems, is precisely paraphrased by the *Holy Family*, where a statement of Proudhon is defended against those like Bauer,[35] or, if not defended, it is explained according to the hermeneutical canon. But Hegel's passage seems much more important as a "source" of the thought expressed in the *Theses on Feuerbach* that "philosophers have only explained the world and the point now is to change it."[36] That is, philosophy must become political to become true and continue as philosophy. The "tranquil theory" must be "carried out practically" and made "effectual reality." It also is a source of the statement by Engels that classical German philosophy has the German people as its legitimate heir and ultimately as an element for the theory of the unity of theory and practice.[37]

A. Ravá in his book *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia di Fichte*[38] draws Croce's attention to the fact that already in 1791 Begesen in a letter to Reinhold coupled the two revolutions. The writing of Fichte of 1792 on the French Revolution is animated by the affinity between philosophy and political events. In 1794, it was Schaumann in particular who developed the comparison, noticing that the French political revolution "makes us feel from the *outside* the need of a fundamental determination of human rights" while the German philosophical reform "shows from the *inside* the means and the way through which and on which this need can be satisfied." Moreover, the same comparison gave rise in 1797 to satirical writings against Kantian philosophy. Ravá concludes that the "comparison was in the air."

The comparison was repeated many times in the course of the nineteenth century (by Marx, for example in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*) and "enlarged" by Heine. In Italy, some years before Carducci, the same was found in a letter of Bertando Spaventa.[39] Croce concludes with some reservations about the comparison in that it is an "affirmation of a logical and historical relation." "Because if it is true in the domain of facts that the French Revolution corresponds fairly well to Kant as a natural law theorist, it is also true that that aspect of Kant belongs to the philosophy of the 18th century, which preceded and informed that political movement; whereas the Kant who ushers in the future, the Kant of the *synthetic a priori*, is the first ring of a new philosophy which goes beyond the philosophy embodied in the French Revolution."[40] One can

33. AG: Cf. *Vorles über die Gesch. d. Philos.*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1844), III, 485.

34. AG: *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1848), pp. 531-532. VG: The italics are Gramsci's.

35. [Cf. the discussion at the beginning of §48, above].

36. This is the XI thesis on Feuerbach; in Gramsci's translation of Notebook 7 (VII), p. 3: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point now is to change it." Notebooks, p. 2357.

37. Here, quoted by heart, is the famous Engelsian definition of the German labor movement as "heir of German classical philosophy": cf. Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, in Marx-Engels, *Selected Works* [in 3 vols. (Moscow, Progress, 1970), vol. 3, p. 376].

38. AG: Modena, Formiggini, 1909, pp. 6-8n.

39. AG: Titled "Paolottismo, Positivismo e Razionalismo," published in the *Rivista bolognese* of May 1868 and reprinted in the *Scritti Filosofici* , ed. Gentile, p. 301.

40. Valid until this point of [§49] is the observation of note 2 to Notebook 8 (XXVIII), §208:

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understand Croce's reservation, which is, however, improper and incoherent, since the same quotation by Croce from Hegel shows that it is not the particular comparison of Kant with Robespierre that is taken into consideration, but rather something more extensive and comprehensive — the French political movement in its entirety and of the German philosophical reform in its entirety. It is understandable that Croce favors "tranquil theories" and not "effective realities" or that a reform "in idea" and not the one in reality is fundamental for him. In that sense, German philosophy has influenced Italy during the Risorgimento with liberal "moderatism" (in the stricter sense of "national liberty"), even though in De Sanctis we can feel the impatience with this "intellectualistic" position, as it appears in his passage on the "Left" and from some writings, especially *Scienza e Vita*,[41] and his articles on realism, etc.

The whole question should be reviewed again by studying the references given by Croce and Ravá, and by seeking others, to frame them in terms of the question at hand, namely, two fundamentally similar structures can have "equivalent" and reciprocally translatable superstructures, whatever their particular national language (*linguaggio*). The contemporaries of the French Revolution were conscious of this fact and it is of the greatest interest.[42]

NOTEBOOK 23 (VI) 1934: *Literary criticism.*

§7. *Neolalism.* Neolalism is a pathological manifestation of individual language (*linguaggio*) (vocabulary). But we cannot employ the term in a more general sense to indicate a whole series of cultural, artistic and intellectual manifestations? What are all the literary and artistic schools and minor schools if not the manifestations of cultural neolalism? The most extensive and multiple manifestations of neolalism have taken place in periods of crisis. Every cultural expression, every intellectual and moral activity, has its own historically determined language (*lingua*). This language (*lingua*) also is called "technique" and "structure." If a scholar began to write in a personally arbitrary language (*linguaggio*) (i.e., became a "neolalic" in the pathological sense of the word) and was imitated by others (everyone with an arbitrary language [*linguaggio*]) we would speak of a Babel. The same impression does not hold for the (technical) language [*linguaggio*]: musical, pictorial, plastic, etc. (This point has to be thought out and thoroughly investigated.) From the viewpoint of the history of culture and cultural "creation," there is a difference between literary art and other forms of artistic expression (figurative, musical, orchestral, etc.), which should be defined and stated precisely in a theoretically justified and comprehensive fashion. (Such cultural creation is not to be confused with artistic creation, rather it is to be related to political activities, and precisely in this sense one can speak in terms of a "cultural policy.") "Verbal" expression has a strictly national-popular-cultural character. A poem by Goethe, in the original version, can be understood and completely re-experienced only by a German (or by one who has "Germanized" himself). Dante can be understood and re-experienced only by a cultured Italian, etc. However, a statue by Michelangelo, a musical piece by Verdi, a Russian ballet, a painting by Raphael, etc., can be understood quite immediately by every

Except for the final observation and the [. . .] comment mentioning Marx's *Holy Family* and the *Theses on Feuerbach,* the rest of the paragraph, with relevant bibliographic references, is retrieved from the text of Croce (*Conversazioni Critiche,* series II, *op.cit.,* pp. 292-294). The same themes are mentioned by Gramsci in the letter to Tania of 30 May 1932 (cf. LC, 629).

41. For De Sanctis' discourse, *La Scienza e la Vita,* cf. Notebook 7 (VII), §31, and Notebook 9 (XIV), §42.

42. AG: The notes of Croce on the Carduccian comparison between Robespierre and Kant are in the second series of *Conversazioni Critiche*, 292 ff.

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citizen of the world, even non-cosmopolitan persons, who have not gone beyond the limited province of their village. Still, the matter is not as simple as one may surmise by merely looking at the surface. The artistic emotion that a Japanese or a Laplander feels in front of a statue of Michelangelo or by listening to a melody of Verdi is surely an artistic emotion (the same Japanese or Laplander would remain insensitive and deaf when hearing a recitation of a poem of Dante, of Goethe, of Shelley, or he would admire the art of the orator as such); however, the artistic emotion of the Japanese or the Laplander will never have the same intensity and color of the emotion by an average Italian and even less than by a cultured Italian. What this means is that beside, or better, below, expressions of the cosmopolitan character of the musical or pictorial langauge (*linguaggio*), there is a more profound cultural substance that is more restricted or "national-popular." Yet, this also is not enough, because the degrees of this language (*linguaggio*) are different. There is a national-popular degree (and, often, before this, a folkloristic-dialectal-provincial degree), then the degree of a determinate "civilization," which can be empirically determined from the religious tradition (for example Christian, but distinct in Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, etc.), and, in the modern world, the degree of a determinate "political-cultural current." During WW I, for example, an English, French, or Russian orator could address an Italian audience through his incomprehensible language (*lingua*), about the devastations committed by the Germans in Belgium. If the audience had been sympathetic to the orator, and the audience had listened and "followed" the orator, we could say that they "understood" him. It is true that in public speaking the "word" is not the only element. There is gesture, tone of voice, etc. This musical element communicates the *leitmotiv* of the predominant sentiment, the main passion and orchestral element: the gesture which in a large sense conveys and articulates the emotional and sentimental tide.

For a cultural policy to be established, these observations are indispensable. Moreover, for a cultural policy of the popular masses, they are fundamental. Here also are to be found the reasons for the international "success" of modern cinematography and, before, of melodrama and of music in general.

§39. *Luigi Capuana.* Excerpt from an article by Luigi Tonelli, *Il Carattere e l'Opera di Luigi Capuana*[43]: "*Re Bracolone* (fairy tale novel: The XXth century is created magically in the interval of a few days in the fashion of 'once upon a time'; but, after having bitterly experienced it, the king destroys it, preferring to return to primitive times) interests us also from the ideological viewpoint. In a period of socialist internationalist infatuation (!) to passionately brand (!) the foolish sentimentalities of universal peace and of disarmament, and the no less foolish sentimentalities of economic equality and of community of property, and to express urgently the need to cut short the agitations which have already created a State within the State, an irresponsible government, and to affirm the necessity of a national conscience. "We lack national dignity; a noble pride must be created, carrying it up to excess. It is the only case in which excess does not hurt."[44] Tonelli is foolish, but Capuana with his phraseology typical of a small, provincial, Crispian newspaper, is nothing less. It also should be seen that the ideological value of his "Once upon a time," which exalted an anachronistic paternalism was everything but national, particularly in the Italy of that time.

Capuana's dialectal theater, and his opinions about the language (*lingua*) in the theater, should be compared with the question of language (*lingua*) in Italian litera-

43. AG: *Nuova Antologia*, 1 May 1928. VG: Cf. pp. 5-18.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

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ture.[45] Some plays by Capuana (like *Giacinto, Milia, Il cavalier Pedagona*) were originally written in Italian and then translated in dialect and they had success only in dialect. Tonelli, who understands nothing, writes that Capuana induced the dialectal form in theater "not only by the conviction that 'one has to go through the dialectal theaters if he really wants to reach the Italian national theater [. . .], but also and above all by the particular character of his dramatic actions, which are exquisitely (!) dialectal, and which find in dialect their most natural and sincere expression." But then what is the meaning of "exquisitely dialectal creations"? The fact is explained by the fact itself, namely, it is not explained. Furthermore, one must remember that Capuana wrote his correspondence in dialect to one of his "mistresses," a woman of the poeple.[46] He understood that Italian would not have allowed him to be understood precisely and "sympathetically" by many people. Their culture was not national, but regional, or national-Sicilian. Under such conditions, how one could pass from the dialectal theater to the national one is enigmatic and it only shows limited comprehension of national cultural problems.

In Pirandello's theater, it remains to be seen why certain plays are written in Italian and others in dialect. In Pirandello, the examination is even more interesting since Pirandello has acquired a cosmopolitan cultural physiognomy in another moment. He has become national and Italian in so far as he has completely deprovincialized and Europeanized himself. The language (*lingua*) has not yet acquired an "historicity" of mass, it has not yet become a national fact. *Liolá*, by Pirandello, in literary Italian, is worth very little, even though the *Fu Mattia Pascal*, from which *Liolá* is taken, can still be read with pleasure.[47] In the Italian text, the author does not succeed in entering the public imagination. When the characters want to be concretely Italian in front of an Italian audience, he does not have the perspectives of the historicity of the language (*lingua*). In Italy there are really many "popular" languages (*lingue*). They are the regional dialects which are usually spoken in intimate conversation to express sentiments and the most common and widespread affections. The literary language (*lingua*), for the most part, is still a cosmopolitan language (*lingua*), a kind of "Esperanto," that is limited to the expression of partial sentiments and notions, etc.

That the literary language (*lingua*) has a great richness of expressive means, is an equivocal and ambiguous statement. The "possible" richness of expression, as registered in the vocabulary or containe inert in the "authors," is confused with individual richness, which can be spent individually. Still, the latter is the only concrete and real richness upon which it is possible to measure the degree of national linguistic unity given in the living speech of the people or the degree of nationalism of the linguistic patrimony. Its importance is evident in the theatrical dialogue. From the stage, the dialogue has to stimulate living images with all their historical concreteness of expression. Instead, it suggests all too often bookish images or sentiments mutilated by the incomprehension of language (*lingua*) and its nuances. The words of familiar speech are reproduced by the listener as a recollection of words read in books and newspapers or searched for in the dictionary. It would be like hearing French spoken in a theater by

45. In the theatrical reviews published in *Avanti!* (1916-1920), Gramsci had occupied himself with Capuana's theater only on the occasion of the presentation of a minor unpublished play (*Quacauarà*); cf. [*Letteratura e Vita Nazionale,* (Turin, Einaudi, 1950), hereafter:] LVN, 238.

46. A letter by Luigi Capuana to his lover, written in dialect, had been published by Gino Rava in a literary magazine read by Gramsci; cf. G. Rava, "Una Lettere d'Amore Inedita di Luigi Capuana a Beppa," in *L'Italia Letteraria*, 28 July 1929.

47. In a critique in 1917 of Pirandello's *Liolà*, Gramsci had already insisted on emphasizing the relationship between *Liolà* and *Il fu Mattia Pascal* (cf. LVN, 283-284).

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someone who learned French from a book without a teacher. The word is ossified, with the articulation of nuances and the comprehension of its exact meaning which is given by the whole period. You get the impression of being clumsy, or that others are clumsy. One can observe how many errors of pronunciation the common man makes in spoken Italian, which means that some words have been read and not heard. Without being repeatedly heard or placed in the various perspectives (different periods) that would have illuminated the different facets of the polyhedron constituting word, mistakes of sytax become even more significant.

§40. *Bellonci e Crémieux.* The *Fiera Letteraria* of January 15, 1928, summarizes a silly and blundering article published by Bellonci in the *Giornale d'Italia.*[48] Crémieux in his *Panorama* writes that a modern language (*lingua*) is lacking in Italy, which is correct in a precise sense: 1) there is no concentration of a unitary cultured class, whose members "always" write and speak a "living" unitary language (*lingua*) that is spread equally through all social strata and regional groups of the country; 2) for this reason, there is a marked gap between the cultured class and the people. The language (*lingua*) of the people is still dialect, augmented by an Italianizing jargon, which in large part is the mechanical translated dialect. Furthermore, there is a strong influence of different dialects in the written language (*lingua*) because the so-called cultured class speaks the national language (*lingua*) only in certain circumstances. It speaks dialects in familiar speech, since the dialects are more alive as part of immediate reality. On the other hand, however, the reactions to the dialects causes the national language (*lingua*) at the same time to remain somewhat fossilized. When it wants to become familiar, it breaks into many dialectal reflexes. Apart from the tone of the discourse (the rhythm and music of the paragraph) which characterizes the regions, the lexicon, morphology, and especially the syntax are influenced. Manzoni rinsed his personal Lombardian lexicon in the Arno River, but not the morphology nor the syntax, which is more ingrained to the style, personal artistic form and national essence of the language (*lingua*). Something similar happens also in France between Paris and Provence, but to a more limited and nearly negligible extent. In contrasting A. Daudet and Zola, it has been found that Daudet has almost forgotten the etymological past tense, which he substitutes with the imperfect tense — something which occurs only incidentally in Zola.

Bellonci writes again of Crémieux's statement: "Up to the sixteenth century, the linguistic forms descend from above, from the seventeenth century on they ascend from below." This is absurd, resulting from superficiality and an absence of criticism as well as an inability to differentiate. Precisely because Florence, up to the sixteenth century, exercises a cultural hegemony connected to its financial and commercial hegemony (Pope Boniface VIII used to say that Florentines were the world's fifth element), there is a unitary linguistic development from below from the people to cultured individuals. This development was reinforced by the great Florentine and Tuscan writers. After the decadence of Florence, Italian became more and more the language (*lingua*) of a closed caste, without a living contact with historical speech. Is this not perhaps the question posed by Manzoni, to reconstitute a Florentine hegemony by means of the State, rebutted by Ascoli, who as more of a historicist, does not believe in cultural hegemonies by decree that are unsupported by a profound, necessary

48. Cf. the column "Rassegna della Stampa" ("Crémieux e Bellonci") in *La Fiera Letteraria*, 15 January 1928. Gramsci's observations, however, are also based on reading Benjamin Crémieux's book, *Panorama de la Littérature Italienne Contemporaine* (Kra, Paris, 1928) [. . .].

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national function?[49]

Bellonci's question: "Would Crémieux perhaps deny that a Greek language (*lingua*) exists (used to exist, he probably meant) because from it we have Doric, Ionic, Aeolian varieties?", is just comical. It shows that he has not understood Crémieux and understands nothing of these questions, rather he reasons in terms of bookish categories, like language (*lingua*), dialect, "variety," etc.

NOTEBOOK 29 (XXI) 1935: *Notes for an introduction to the study of grammar.*

§1. *Croce's essay: This Round Table is Square.*[50] The essay is wrong, even according to the viewpoint of Crocian philosophy. The use that Croce makes of the same proposition shows that it is "expressive" and thus justified. One can say the same of any "proposition," even it it is not "technically" grammatical, which can be expressive and justified in terms of its function, albeit negative (to show grammatical "error" one can employ a bad usage of grammar). Thus, the problem must be posed either in terms of "discipline to the historicity of language (*linguaggio*)" in the case of "bad usages of gram-

49. We should recall what Gramsci had written on this subject in an article published in *Il Grido del Popolo* of 16 February 1918: "Manzoni posed the query: how can the Italian language be created now that Italy is a nation? And he replied: all Italians must speak like the Tuscans; the State must recruit primary school teachers from Tuscany. Tuscan must be substituted for the numerous dialects spoken in the different regions. Thus, having made the Italian State, we will also make the Italian language. Manzoni obtained government support and he succeeded in getting the government to sponsor the publication of a *New Dictionary* which was to contain the true Italian language. But the *New Dictionary* remained half completed, and the teachers recruited were cultured people from all the regions of Italy. It so happened that a scholar of language of history, Graziadio Isaia Ascoli, wrote a mere thirty-page retort to Manzoni's hundreds of pages, demonstrating that not even a national language can be imposed artificially by the State; that the Italian language is developing by itself and will do so only to the extent that the new national coexistence stimulates expanded and continuing contacts between various parts of the nation; that the diffusion of a particular language is due to the productive activity, writings, mobility, and commerce of the men who speak the language. Between the 14th and 16th centuries in Tuscany, there were writers like Dante, Boccaccio, Petrarch, Machiavelli and Gucciardini, who spread the Tuscan language; there were bankers, artisans, and manufacturers who brought Tuscan products and the names of these products throughout all of Italy. Later, when the production of goods and books was restricted, so too was the productivity of the language limited. A few years ago Professor Alfredo Panzini published a dictionary of modern spoken Italian, which shows how many words of the Milanese dialect have reached as far as Sicily and Apulia. Milan sends newspapers, magazines, books, goods and salesmen throughout Italy and, at the same time, sends along with them some of the peculiar expressions of the Italian language spoken by its own inhabitants" (SG, 176) [republished in *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci, op.cit.* pp. 30-31].

The objections of Ascoli to Manzoni's formulation of the problem of the Italian language are contained in the "Proemio" to the *Archivio glottologico italiano* (1872), subsequently edited several times (for the most recent edition, cf. Ascoli, *Scritti sulla Questione della Lingua,* ed. Corrado Grassi, Einaudi, Turin, 1975). As a result of the outline of the program sketched at the beginning of the Notebooks, p. 5, note 12 (cf.: "Th question of language [*lingua*] according to Manzoni" (LC, 378); this statement should probably be placed in relation to Grasmci's own testimony in an article in *Avanti!* of 29 January 1918, where he said he was preparing his doctoral thesis on the history of language [*linguaggio*] (cf. L. Ambrosoli, "Nuovi Contributi agli 'Scritti Giovanili' di Gramsci," in *Rivista Storica del Socialismo,* May-August 1960, pp. 545-550; cf. in particular p. 549). Other comments on this subject, though they are not being directly developed, are in Notebook 3 ((XX), §63, and in Notebook 14 (I), §14.

50. A comment on Croce's essay (included in the volume *Problemi di Estetica e Contributi alla Storia dell'Estetica Italiana, op.cit.,* pp. 169-173) is already in Notebook 3 (XX), §74. In the letter to Tania of 12 December 1927, Gramsci said that he had already thought (even if the project had been temporarily set aside because of material difficulties) of writing "a dissertation on the topic with the title 'This round table is square' " (cf. LC, 157-158). The topic shows up again in the program outline (*Note e Appunti. Argomenti Principali*) with which Notebook I (XVI) begins.

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mar" (which are lacking in "mental discipline," neolalism, provincial particularism, jargon, etc.) or in other terms. In the case provided by the Crocian essay, the error is established by the fact that a given proposition may appear in the representation of a "fool" or an abnormal person and acquire absolute expressive value. How is it that one can represent someone who is not "logical" other than by making him say "illogical things"? etc. In reality, everything that is not "gramatically exact" can also be justified according to the aesthetic-logical viewpoint, etc. If one does not see it in the particular logic, etc., of the immediately mechanical expression, it can be an element of a wider and more comprehensive representation.

Croce wants to pose the question: "What is grammar?" Yet, he cannot find a solution in his essay. Grammar is "history" or "historical document." It is the "photograph," or the fundamental traits of a photograph of a determinate phase of a national (collective) language (*linguaggio*), historically shaped in continuous development. The practical question may be: what is the purpose of the photograph? Is it to provide the history of an aspect of the civilization or to modify it?

Croce's claim denies any value to a picture representing, among other things, a siren. That is, one should conclude that any proposition must correspond to the *true* or to the verisimilar, etc. (The proposition may be non-logical in itself, contradictory, but at the same time "coherent" in a wider framework.)

§2. *How many forms of grammar can exist?* Certainly quite a few. There is one "immanent" in language (*linguaggio*) itself, by which one speaks in conformity with grammar without knowing it, like Moliére's character who spoke prose without knowing it. This example should not be considered useless. Panzini[51] does not distinguish between this "grammar" and the "normative" written one, of which he speaks and that appears to him to be the only possible existing grammar. The preface to the first edition is full of amenities, however, which have their meaning to a writer (who is considered to be a specialist) of grammatical matters, like the statement that "we can write and speak even without grammar."[52] In reality, apart from the "immanent grammar" in every language (*linguaggio*), there is also, even if unwritten, one (or more) "normative" grammar(s). It is constituted by the reciprocal control, teaching, and "censorship," which manifest themselves with the questions: "What have you understood, or what do you want to say?", "Explain yourself better," etc. With caricature and hoax, this whole complex of actions and reactions combines in grammatical conformism to establish "norms" or judgments of correctness and incorrectness. This "spontaneous" manifestation of grammatical conformism, however, is necessarily unrelated, discontinuous, and limited to local social strata or local centers, etc. Because of the pressure of city ambience, a peasant who moves to town will end up conforming to the speech of the city. In the country, people tend to imitate the speech of the city, while the subaltern classes try to speak like dominant classes and the intellectuals, etc.

One could sketch a picture of the "normative grammar" which operates spontaneously in every society. This tends to unify itself both as a territory and a culture, in so far as there is a ruling group whose function is acknowledged and followed.

The number of "spontaneous or immanent grammars" is incalculable. Theoretically, we could say that everyone has his own grammar. In contrast to this actual, "disin-

51. AG: *Guida alla Grammatica Italiana* [cf. following footnote].

52. Cf. Alfredo Panzini, *Guida alla Grammatica Italiana con un Prontuario dell'Incertezze. Libretto utile per ogni Persona* (18 migliao, Bemporad, Florence, 1934) (FG), p. 5: "We feel cold and warm even without a thermometer; but it is a good thing to have at home; in the same way we can speak and write without grammar; but it is good that there is one."

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tegration," however, must one consider the unifying moments of greater or lesser power in both territorial area and "linguistic volume." The written "normative grammar" tends to embrace an entire national territory and its "linguistic volume" in order to create a unitary national linguistic conformism. Among other things, it sets individual expression at a higher level. It also creates a stronger, more homogeneous skeleton for the national linguistic organism of which every individual is the reflection and interpreter. (Taylor system and autodidatism.)

Historical grammars must be set apart from normative ones. Still, it is evident that a writer of normative grammar cannot ignore the history of the language (*lingua*) when he wants to propose an "exemplary phase" as the "only one" deserving to become, "organically" and "totally," the "common" language (*lingua*) of a nation, in struggle and competiton with other "phases," types or schemes which already exist. These factors are connected to traditional developments or to inorganic and incoherent attempts of the forces, as we have seen, which operate continually on "grammars" which are spontaneous and immanent in language (*linguaggio*). The historical grammar cannot be anything but "comparative." If thoroughly analyzed, this expression vindicates the intimate knowledge that the linguistic fact, like any other historical fact, cannot have strictly defined national borders. History is always "world history," and the particular histories live only in the framework of a world history. The nomative grammar has other aims, which influence it in innumerable ways, and are often difficult to control (who can contral the yield of linguistic innovations due to repatriated emigrants, travellers, readers of foreign papers and languages [*lingue*], translators, etc.'), even though one cannot imagine the national language (*lingua*) outside the framework of other languages (*lingue*).

The written normative grammar thus is always a "choice," about cultural direction. It is always an act of cultural-national policy. One can argue about the best way to present the "choice" and the "way" they might be willingly accepted. One could argue in favor of more appropriate means to achieve the goal, but there can be no doubt that there is a goal to reach, which requires suitable and consistent means that always has the character of a political act.

But what is the nature of this political act? And, if it should generate opposition of "principle," then can they create an actual collaboration or oppositions in the particulars, etc.? If one starts from the presupposition of centralizing the disseminated, inorganic and incoherent as it already exists in the diffuse state, it seems obvious that what is rational is not an opposition of principle, but on the contrary an actual collaboration and a willing acceptance of everything that can serve to create a common national language (*lingua*). Its non-existence determines resistance, especially in the popular masses, where local particularism and a limited, provincial psychology are more tenacious than what is commonly believed. In short, there is growing struggle against illiteracy, etc. The "actual" opposition already exists in the popular resistance against divesting such habits and particularistic psychologies. A stupid resistance can be determined by the fanatical supporters of international languages (*lingue*). It is clear that in this order of problems the question of the national struggle by a hegemonic culture against other nationalities or remnants of nationalities cannot be discussed.

Panzini does not consider this problem at all. Thus, his publications on grammar are uncertain, contradictory, and oscillating. For instance, he does not consider the problem of what today is the center of linguistic innovations radiating from below — Florence, Rome, Milan — which, by the way, is not of small practical importance. But, on the other hand, neither does he consider the existence of and what should be a cen-

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ter of spontaneous irradiation from above, i.e., in a relatively continuous, efficient, organic form, nor if it can be regulated and intensified.

§3. *Sources of irradiation of linguistic innovations in tradition and of a national linguistic conformism in the large national masses.* 1) The school; 2) the newspapers; 3) the folk and artistic writers; 4) the theater and the cinema; 5) the radio; 6) public meetings of any kind, including religious ones; 7) "conversational" relations between various more and less cultured strata of the population. (A topic, which has not received all the preeminence it deserves, is constituted by versified "words" which are learned by memory through songs, pieces of opera, etc. People do not care to memorize words, which are often strange, antiquated and baroque, but reduce them to a sort of nursery rhyme whose only purpose is to help in remembering the musical tune); 8) the local dialects, understood in various senses (from the most localized dialects to those which more or less widely embrace regional complexes: so Neapolitan for Southern Italy, Palermitan or Catanese for Sicily, etc.).

Since the process of formation, diffusion, and development in a unitary national language (*lingua*) happens through a variety of molecular processes, it is useful to be aware of the whole process, to actively intervene in it with the maximum result. This intervention need not be considered "decisive," nor should it be imagined that the proposed ends will be reached in all their particulars, such that a *determinate* unitary language (*lingua*) will be obtained. A *unitary* language (*lingua*) will be obtained if necessary, and if the organized intervention accelerates an already existing process. It is not possible to forecast or establish what this or that language (*lingua*) shall be. In any case, if the intervention is "rational," it will be linked organically to tradition, which is not a small thing in the management of culture.

Manzonians and "classicists." They had a type of language (*lingua*) that had to prevail. It is not fair to say that these discussions have been useless or that they have left no traces in modern culture, even though they are not very conspicuous. In reality, during the past century the unitary culture has been extended and with it also grew a unitary common language (*lingua*). But, the whole historical formation of the Italian nation was developed at too slow a pace. Every time that the question of language (*lingua*) surfaces, it means that another series of problems are going to be imposed in one way or another. These problems include the formation and enlargement of the ruling class as well as the necessity to establish more secure intimate relations between the ruling groups and the national-popular mass reorganizing cultural hegemony. Today, various phenomena have been observed that indicate a rebirth of these question: publications by Panzini, Tarabalza-Allodoli, Monelli, columns in newspapers, speeches by union leaders, etc.[53]

§4. *Different types of normative grammar.* For the schools. For the so-called cultured people. In reality, the difference is due to the different intellectual development of the reader or scholar. Thus, a different technique has to be employed for young people to learn or to intensify the organic knowledge of the national language (*lingua*). One cannot didactically abstract from a certain authoritative rigidity ("it has to be said this way"). Instead, there are "others" who need to be "persuaded" to freely accept a determinate solution as the best one (shown to be the best for pursuing the proposed and shared aim, when it is shared). It should not be forgotten in the traditional study of normative grammar that other elements of the didactic program have been grafted on to

53. For Panzini, cf. the preceding §2 and Notebook 5 (IX), §131. For Ciro Trabalza's and Ettore Allodoli's book, cf. instead the following §5.

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general teaching, like certain elements of formal logic. It can be argued if this graft is or is not opportune, if the study of formal logic is justified or not, but we need not ignore the question. It does seem justified and it should be accompanied with the study of grammar rather than with arithmetic, because of the similar nature. Moreover, formal logic, when taught together with grammar, is relatively enlivened and facilitated.

§5. *Historical grammar and normative grammar.* Assuming that normative grammar is a political act, we must inquire into its relation to historical grammar. Only by starting from this viewpoint it is possible to justify its existence "scientifically" and the enormously patient work that its apprehension requires. How much work is necessary to obtain, from hundreds of thousands of recruits drawn out of the most disparate origins and the most disparate mental backgrounds, a homogeneous army capable of moving and operating simultaneously with discipline in accord with how many "practical and theoretical lessons" of rules, etc.? Not having defined this relation explains many difficulties of normative grammars up to the one by Trabalza-Allodoli.[54] They are two distinct and partially different things, like history and politics, but they cannot be thought of independently, like politics from history. On the other hand, since the study of languages (*lingue*) as a cultural pehnomenon is born from political needs expressed more or less consciously and unconsciously, the needs of normative grammar have had an influence on historical grammar and its "legislative conceptions." This traditional element has, at least in the past century, reinforced the application of the naturalistic-positivistic method of studying the history of languages (*lingue*) conceived as a "science of language (*linguaggio*)." From the grammar of Trabalza and the destructive criticism of Schiaffini,[55] it is apparent how the renewal provided by Bartoli's doctrines[56] in the science of language (*linguaggio*) has not even been understood by the so-called "idealists." [The] tendency of "idealism" has found its most complete expression in Bertoni. It is a return to old rhetorical conceptions with words like "beautiful" and "ugly" seen in themselves and for themselves as conceptions repainted with a new pseudo-scientific language (*linguaggio*). In reality, he tries to find an extrinsic justification for normative grammar, after having "shown" its theoretical and practical "uselessness" as extrinsically as before.

Trabalza's essay on the *Storia della Grammatica*[57] may provide useful indications on the history of the problem about the interferences between historical grammar (or better, history of language [*linguaggio*]) and normative grammar.

§6. *Grammar and technique.* Is it possible to pose for "technique" in general the same question that one would ask for grammar? Is grammar just the technique of language (*lingua*)? In any case, is the thesis of idealists, especially Gentilians, on the uselessness of grammar and its exclusion from scholastic teaching, justified? If one speaks (one has to express himself with words) in a way historically determined for nations or linguistic areas, then can one avoid considering teaching in this "historically determined way"?

54. Cf. Ciro Trabalza and Ettore Allodoli, *La Grammatica degl'Italiani,* 4th ed. (Le Monnier, Florence, 1935) (FG).

55. AG: *Nuova Antologia*, 15 September 1934. VG: Cf. Alfredo Schiaffini's article, "La Grammatica degl'Italiani?" in *Nuova Antologia,* 16 September 1934, pp. 288-294. In the Gramsci Foundation there is a clipping of an article by Giovanni Papini, "La Grammatica degli Italiani," in *Corriera della Sera*, 15 June 1934, an apologetic review of the Trabalza-Allodoli book.

56. On the linguistic doctrines of Matteo Bartoli, in relation to the writings of Giulio Bertoni, cf. Notebook 3 (XX), §74, and notes [3, 4, 5, and 7 above].

57. This is Ciro Trabalza's book, *Storia della Grammatica Italiana* (Hoepli, Milan, 1908); mentioned in the preface to the Trabalza-Allodoli book and also in the reviews of it mentioned here.

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Admitting that the normative traditional grammar was insufficient, does one have a good reason for not teaching any "grammar" or for not caring to accelerate learning the distinct speech of a certain linguistic area? Does one then allow that the language (*lingua*) be learned in the living language (*linguaggio*) or other expressions of the same kind employed by Gentile or by Gentilians? This is, in substance, a form of "liberalism" of the strongest and most inconclusive kind. The difference between Croce and Gentile: as usual, Gentile bases himself on Croce, exaggerating some theoretical positions to the absurd. Croce argues that grammar does not belong to the spiritual theoretical activities that he has elaborated. Yet, he ends up by finding in "practice" a justification for many activities he theoretically denied. Initially, Gentile excludes even from practice what he denies theoretically, except later he finds a theoretical justification for the more obsolete and technically unjustified practical manifestations.

Must technique be learned "systematically"? The technique of Ford has been counterposed to the one of the village artisan. In may ways one learns "industrial technique" as does an artisan. During the same work in the factory, one learns by observing how others work (and then only partially with a greater waste of time and toil) or in vocational schools (where one learns systematically the whole job, even though some learned notions will be used only a few times in the workers' whole life and then maybe never). One also can learn with the combination of different systems, like the Taylor-Ford system which creates a new kind of qualification and jobs restricted to determinate factories, machines or aspects of the production process.

The normative grammar, which may be split from the living language (*linguaggio*) only by abstraction, tends to make people learn the whole organism of the determinate language (*lingua*), creating a spiritual behavior which enables them to orient themselves in the linguistic atmosphere (see note on the study of Latin in the classical schools).[58] If grammar is excluded from school, and it is not "written," it may not for the same reason be excluded from real "life," as it has been said in another note.[59] Only the unified and organized intervention is exluded in the learning of the language (*lingua*) and, in reality, the national popular masses are excluded from learning cultured language (*lingua*). In fact, the higher directive group that traditionally speaks the language (*lingua*), transmits from generation to generation, through a slow process beginning with the first faltering child under the guidance of parents, and continues in conversation (with its "one says so," "one has to say so," etc.) for the entire life. In reality, grammar is "always" studied by imitating admired models, etc. In Gentile's position there is more politics than what is believed and much unconscious reactionary fervor as has been noticed on other occasions. There is all the reactionary character of the old liberal conception, or a "laissez-faire, laissez-passer" which is not justified, as it was in Rousseau (and Gentile is more Rousseauian than he believes) from the opposition to the paralysis of the jesuitic school; but, it has become an abstract ideology, "ahistorical."

§7. *The so-called "question of language* (lingua)." It seems clear that Dante's *De Vulgari Eloquio* should be considered essentially as an act of national-cultural politics (in the sense that "national" had at that time and for Dante). When "the question of language (*lingua*)" becomes an aspect of the political struggle, it becomes interesting to study.[60]

58. Cf. Notebook 4 (XIII), §55.
59. Cf. the preceding §2.
60. A comment on Dante's illustrious vulgar tongue from this perspective is already in Notebook 6 (VIII), §78.

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It has been a reaction of intellectuals to the break up of that political unity which existed in Italy as an "equilibrium of the Italian states," and to the ruinous disintegration of those political and economic classes which had formed after eleventh century with the Communes. It represents for the most part the successful attempt to preserve and even to reinforce a unitary intellectual class, whose existence would have no small significance in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (in the Risorgimento). Dante's pamphlet also has great significance for the time in which it was written not only in fact, but also by elevating the fact to theory. The Italian intellectuals during the volatile formative period of the Communes "break" with Latin, and they justify the vulgar tongue, as opposed to the Latinizing "mandarinism," by exalting the vulgar tongue in a great artistic manifestation. Dante's innovative attempt has had a huge importance that is seen later by the return of Latin as the language (*lingua*) of cultured individuals. Here, one can raise the question of the dual nature of Humanism and the Renaissance, which were essentially reactionary from the national-popular viewpoint, while being progressive as an expression of Italian and European intellectual groups' cultural development.

§8. Concerning Bartoli, *Linguistic questions and national rights,* an address at the inauguration of the 1934 Turinese academic year, published in 1935 (see note in *Cultura* of April 1935). From the note, it seems that the address is quite debatable in several parts, for instance, the statement that "the dialectal Italy is one and indivisible."

PACIFISM AND ITS PROBLEMS*

by Paul Thibaud

"A conquerer is always a friend of peace. He would be happy to enter your State without opposition."

Clausewitz

Pacificism is not a conjunctural accident. It is not a sudden fever preceding the installation of the Persing and Cruise missiles in the NATO countries. The "double decision" of 1979 — to install missiles capable of crossing the continent[1] if the negotiations concerning the SS20's are not concluded in 4 years — has raised protests that go beyond simple anti-militarism: these protests have upset political life in at least two countries (West Germany and the Netherlands); they have spread to all of Western Europe; they have no equivalent in Eastern Europe (where a non-structured pacificist movement is weak and/or difficult to interpret) but they do have an equivalent in the U.S. in the Freeze and No-First-Strike pledge.

Western democracies are facing their first great debate concerning nuclear weapons. Implicit in this debate are questions of political and metapolitical values: of

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1. The Pershing II's can reach the Western border of the U.S.S.R. (Riga, Minsk and Odessa); the cruise missiles can reach as far as Batoum, Bolgograd, Gorki and Murmansk. At the moment, the SS20's "cover" Western Europe, including Ireland and Portugal.

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democratic citizenship, of mortality, and of our relation to that precariousness. To consider the reasons that we have, collectively, to live and to die is also to measure sharply the present historical situation. There is no more decisive evaluation.

Pacificism and Democracy

There is nothing surprising about pacifism. What is surprising is, on the contrary, that for 35 years, and with all the risks that they entail, nuclear weapons have so little shaken political life. One should be surprised that, since the Stockholm Appeal, the question of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons has generally been considered merely technical.

When General DeGaulle made known his projects for a *"force de frappe"* at the beginning of the 60's, his opponants objected to the cost and raised the issue of deterrence have been effective anesthesia: one could speak of a war which was so monstrous that it was impossible. The threat was so great that it worked, even if there was a minimal chance that it would be put into practice. This was the miracle of a real guaranty procured by an instrument nearly unreal!

In other countries, confidence in détente and "arms control" (the SALT I agreement in 1973, SALT II in 1979) maintained the idea that the atomic bomb could be domesticated. There was a moment — the moment when the electron which produced electricity was the villain — when the atomic bomb symbolized effectively the unity of humanity. Against it, because of it, humanity discovered the most incontestable of its common interests, survival. The disappointment is thus all the more violent when one realizes that the threat of destruction and of servitude continue to underlie the international "order."

Pierre Lellouche describes pacifism[2] as "the chronic illness of deterrence in Western democracies." One can say even more: with or without the atomic bomb, pacifism is natural to democracies. Democracies, in their optimism, organized supposedly civilizing colonial wars, in order to show the world-superiority of their principle. On the other hand, they are generally disinclined to believe themselves threatened and to prepare their defense. They make war all the more easily if they do not prepare it in advance, preferring to quickly change their values when the bell tolls.

Biographical evidence bears witness to this principle, that convinced democrats are not willing to *admit the existence* of the war that they are going to *make.* Thus, Jean Guéhenno was a pacifist before 1914, a good soldier from 1914 to 1918, and again a pacifist from the armistice until the dawn of WW II when he became a convinced partisan of resistence to Hitler from 1939 to 1945. At the twilight of his life he had, of course, become again a resolute pacifist. Already in 1910, Péguy remarked: our pacifists will make war, and they will make it quite well.

This reversal is not the result of individual failings; it expresses certain incompatibilities in our collective values. What is asked of citizens is to lend a hand in what was until the present considered the crime of kings. Universal suffrage and conscription make all of us participate in the despised privilege of princes and mercenaries! One can understand the rebellion. It is the source of anarcho-pacifism. It explains the dramatization of war in democracies: an apocalyptic time, when values are in abeyance and the rational course of history is interrupted.

A dramatization is a refusal to understand which must remain a scandal, one of those misfortunes of which one says that you have to have experienced it to believe it. This

2. Lellouche's essay is the Introduction to a collection titled *Pacifisme et Dissuasion*, published by the Institut Français de Relations Internationales (IFRI), edited by Lellouche and Nicole Gnesotto.

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dramatization can of course become positive, giving rise to a messianism. The combat waged by democracies, the one that conforms to their progressive rationalism, is the war to end war: they have several times waged the last! Péguy, again, repeated in 1914: I am going as a soldier of the Republic to fight the last war and to win general disarmament. Could he really believe that formulation, which is only inverted pacifism? In all events, the formula reflects the climate of Paris in August, 1914.

This refusal to conceive of war and the succeeding drunkenness of mobilization is followed by a disgust in having been had, brainwashed, and then by bitterness and finally a return to the beginning. Democracies have organized lovely mass mobilizations as long as they do it blindly, in a sort of transe.[3] On the other hand, democratic public opinion sees the admission of the possibility of war as if it were consenting to that war. A politician needs much courage not to give in, or to flatter, this common unconscious urge. This explains the spectacle of governments entering war backwards, like Daladier in 1939, swearing that they cannot help it, that they did not see it coming, that it just happened.[4]

These denials and superstitious phobias make it appear that merely considering its possibility will produce the event! A similar phenomenon appears when the reassuring masks of automatic deterrence and irreversible détente have fallen. Glucksmann's recent book[5] shows well that the framework of nuclear deterrence renders obsolete the attitudes of denial which permitted democrats to be pacifists between wars and good soldiers during them. Precisely because war will no doubt not take place, its possibility must be firmly accepted. The test, along the lines of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, will no doubt remain purely psychological — but that does not make it less difficult nor does it make giving in less dangerous.

As opposed to what is constantly repeated, nuclear weapons do not pose a radically new *moral* problem. The assertion that killing 50 million people in two hours or in five years makes no difference in principle is not new.[6] In both cases, the victims are mainly non-combattants. It is this, not the technology of the weapons, that poses the moral problem. The novelty at present is that because of the size, the suddenness and the unpredictability of the possible losses, a game of simulations and intimidations, of discourses between States, replaces or at least precedes action: this is deterrence.

But, as Glucksmann also points out, deterrence distorts the difference of war and peace. Peace can no longer be presented as an innocent order: violence and fear inhabit its boundaries. Conversely, in war itself, deterrence is also present: as long as the destruction of all humanity has not occurred, there is by definition a "worse" to be avoided, hence a moderation to be preserved. Absolute peace is not possible, and total war would put an end to humanity.

There is a kind of "conceptualization" (Glucksmann) of war which prohibits that kind of comprehensible and even reasonable duplicity which characterized demo-

3. England *after Munich* is a remarkable exception to this viewpoint. Cf. J.B. Duroselle's fascinating account of French foreign policy between 1932 and 1939 in *La Décadence* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1983).

4. Think, for example, of the extraordinary session of *Chambre des Députés* on September 1, 1939. Daladier's speech mentioned war three times, peace eleven times. He was given backing to "face up to the obligations posed by the international situation," with no mention of the word "war" in the enabling legislation. The result is that some seriously doubted whether this legislation permitted the government to declare war, which it did two days later. Cf. Duroselle, *op.cit.*, pp. 488-489.

5. André Glucksmann, *La Force du Vertige* (Paris: Grasset, 1983).

6. Jacques Julliard's discussion of Raymond Aron's *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations*, in *Esprit*, October 1962.

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cratic citizens in 1914. It was to a certain degree normal to refuse war *a priori* but to make it when it occurred. That is the clasical reaction in the face of misfortune: one rebels but one endures; one attempts to limit the fatality but, when it is there, one faces up to it. This permits the citizen to avoid two dangers: to give heart and soul to state power; or to opt for an irresponsible anarchism. This has been undermined by those contemporary ideologies which, as Jan Patocka notes,[7] create a permanent mobilization, hence war. To this is added progress in weaponry. Preparation for war becomes an increasingly determining element in defense policy.

In the last resort, deterrence is a constant preparation for what it is supposed to eliminate. The saying that one must prepare for war in order to have peace is well-know. It defines the statesman's attitude. Public opinion has difficulty accepting this attitude. Public opinion seeks to be reassured concerning the possible consequences of a game whose results it fears. This explains the continual recreation of the gap between the citizen and the politician. It suggests the reason that movements insisting on direct participatory democracy have a tendency toward pacifism. The nuclear question is a test of one's conception of politics.

This inevitable dissonance in a democracy deciding its defense policy can be cancelled by a national fanaticism, which offers a Beyond as compensation for individual death. It can be limited by the way in which political delegation of power takes place. It can be limited to a healthy skepticism or it can turn to panic. This is why today's pacifism cannot be explained by a single general cause. The particular conditions in certain countries that open the door to this tendency rooted deeply in the soil of democracy must be considered.

Deterrence and Détente

Pierre Hassner has shown[8] that the too strong belief in deterrence by a large part of public opinion explains why its breakdown has led to a reaction of fear. People believed that the bomb was not usable, and that it was thus stabilizing. They thought that Europe was lucky to be protected by the American nuclear umbrella, which made it a zone of calm between the great powers.

The idea of a Europe preserved by the equilibrium of terror was challanged very early. Already in 1957, Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* posed the question of the usability of such a fearful weapon. He asked himself whether "one would find an American president willing to 'exchange' 50 American cities for Western Europe."[9] By 1960, the Americans wanted to eliminate the paralysis resulting from a strategy of "all or nothing" by introducing the doctrine of a "graduated response" to each initiative of the adversary. The "all or nothing" strategy had to be given up and a panoply of "sanctions" prepared. Concerning Europe, the idea was that it was a part of the vital interests of the U.S., and that an attack on it would bring with it nuclear reply.

That doctrine was obviously contradictory: on the one hand, the decision to reply presupposes that the US makes its decision according to its interest in the issue; on the other hand, the US promises Europe a solidarity greater than its self-interest. If the employment of nuclear weapons means risking the destruction of the US, then their use to protect a third party is an "overly proportional" reply in terms of the doctrine of the "graduated response." This contradiction was recognized and stressed by

7. Cf. the postscript to his *Essais Hérétiques* (Paris: Verdier, 1982) and his "Wars of the 20th Century and the 20th Century as War," *Telos* 30 (Winter 1976-77), pp. 116-126.
8. In *Esprit*, July 1983.
9. Cited in Lucien Poirier, *Des Stratégies Nucléaires* (Paris: Hachette), p. 104.

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de Gaulle. The French government and its theorists (Gallois, Poirier, Aillert) sought to supplement to the American deterrence in the *force de frappe* and in the idea of "deterrence from the weak to the strong." In nuclear matters, only self-defense counts, and one is sufficiently defended if the risk to the eventual aggressor is greater than the interest he can have in attacking you. It is not necessary to be the strongest in this domain; even the weaker party can cause horrible damage — which explains the "equalizing power" of nuclear weapons.

After having been ridiculed, this doctrine surprisingly has been accepted by public opinion in a caricatured form: the so-called "sanctuarisation." The military doctrine which justifies the existence of the French *force de frappe* leaves aside the practical solidarity of France with its neighbors. It concerns only the integrity and freedom of France. The *force de frappe* is an ultimate measure; it cannot work in all circumstances, despite what is implied by the term "sanctuarisation." In all events, whether from lucidity or illusion, nuclear weapons have invaded French political culture. One might say that French citizens appreciate *a posteriori* what their political leaders anticipated in the domain of military strategy, and that on this terrain the regime had acquired a store of confidence from which the present government benefits. On the other hand, the very forms of the discussion concerning "sanctuarisation," naively adopting certain themes concerning the impossibility of war, have no doubt spread in France a kind of nuclear pacifism[10] or in all events a sort of tranquillity concerning defense problems, which makes a serious pacifist movement unlikely.

West Germany, on the contrary, for a long time believed in the Americans' unlimited commitment to its defense. This explains why, until recently, one heard sarcastic comments from partisans of the French notion of deterrence. "They reason as if West Germany had become the 51st state in the US," wrote General Gallois in 1977, deploring "the amount of outdated beliefs which our neighbors will have to give up in order to provide some sense to their defense."[11] The German position has become increasingly uncomfortable as the evolution of strategic materials and doctrines has broken the horrible and reassuring unity of mega-deterrence. The diversification of the forms of deterrence has made it clear that there are several types of countries in the Atlantic Alliance: one (the US) for whose defense any means is valid (or at least thinkable), and the others which will be defended as far as possible. When looked at geographically, the notion of "graduated response" has brought to light discriminations that were ignored or denied.

10. According to a recent study analyzed in *Pacifisme et Dissuasion, op.cit.*, pp. 225-226, the French are the people in Europe who feel the least threatened by nuclear weapons (18 percent as opposed to 32 percent in Germany and 49 percent in the Netherlands). When they are asked to explain international tensions, the French offer three non-military causes: the high rates of interest in the U.S. (45 percent), the action of the superpowers in the Third World (29 percent) and the insufficient unity of Europe (26 percent). The German attitude is radically different. They feel threatened first of all by the growth of the military potential of the Russians (55 percent) and the Americans (39 percent). Although the French say that they fear war as much as other people, one has the feeling that they say this in order to conjure away the threat. Their attitude toward the two great powers is surprisingly distant: 9 percent think that the U.S. plays a useful or fundamental role in the defense of Western interests. This contrasts greatly with Germany, where 68 percent appreciate positively the role of the Americans. Does the increase of the military power of the Russians and the Americans explain international tensions? No! The French do not believe it: 35 percent of them see this as important (as opposed to 94 percent of the Germans). This study gives the impression of a euphoric and even unconscious public opinion in France, one that in all events is not fearful. *Be Scared* is the title of a pacifist pamphlet in Germany. The French are not scared: how, then, can they be pacifists?

11. In *Le Renoncement* (Paris: Plon), pp. 215-216.

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This diversity among the partners has also brought to light an internal contradiction in the doctrine of deterrence: in order to deter, a threat must be at once horrible and plausible. But, on the one hand, these two ingredients are mutually exclusive (since a smaller and more precise weapon is more likely to be used because it is less threatening); and, on the other hand, plausibility is two-sided in its impact: if it impresses the enemy it simultaneously frightens those whom it is supposed to protect. For the latter, the "realism" of the threat is not an advantage; they fear that things will move from the plausible use to the actual use, and they would prefer a weapon whose use is less probable. This dilemma is also an ethical one. Mega-deterrence holds hostage tens or hundreds of millions of non-combattants — hence, its limit and its unbelievability in moral as well as practical terms. If it is replaced by the notion of "gradual deterrence" in order to avoid these extremes, then one must face the danger of real war.

This essential contradiction tends to make the debate brought about by the diversification of weapons even more difficult. It makes it clear that there are different positions within the Alliance. Hypotheses which increase the chances of a real and limited war frighten the Europeans; strategic deterrence, on the other hand, threatens first of all Americans. As long as there was only one form of deterrence, it was possible to live with the belief that if things went all the way at least we would all die together. That is no longer the case.

The two differences (concerning the level of protection and the risk taken) explain why the attempt to develop an "enlarged" or "total" or "supple" deterrence leads to a kind of decomposition. The result is a permanent transatlantic argument. According to the Americans, the Europeans dream only that, for their sake, Americans and Russians will exchange their megatons from one sanctuary to another, while the Germans accuse the Americans of preparing a war limited to Europe.

Whatever may be the subjective attitudes involved, the strategic doctrine of graduated response certainly presupposes a "decoupling" — a rupture, a hiatus — between the defense of Europe and that of the US. Concretely, this means that the USSR could fight a military engagement against West Europe without using "strategic" weapons and without first fearing for its own safety since the West would first use tactical nuclear arms whose range does not go further than Lwow, i.e., a very small part of the western Ukraine.[12] In the case where enlarged deterrence would work — that is, if the Americans threaten the USSR with their strategic weapons — the USSR could stop and negotiate on the basis of the advantages it had just acquired. In the contrary case, it would have called the bluff of "enlarged deterrence" and the American nuclear umbrella, and Western Europe, would fall.

To complete the conceptual defeat and to demonstrate that deterrence is hardly paradise, the strategic debates have shown that even at its central point deterrence is not so stable as was thought. Each partner must fear that the other will acquire a "first strike" capacity which will thus guarantee it against the "mutually assured destruction" that is the basis of the entire system. And, in order to avoid this threat, each tends to construct for itself the superiority that it fears the other will acquire.[13] This competition takes place in a fog of partial news, assertions and exaggeration. The debate in the U.S. concerning the MX missile illustrates the point: is the goal simply to guarantee the land-based American missiles against a Soviet first strike? Or is the goal to acquire a

12. Dieter Lutz's *La Guerre Mondiale malgrée Nous?* (Paris: Maspero, 1982) — which is supposedly the bible of German pacifists — publishes on p. 86 a very clear map showing the nuclear asymmetry in Europe even before the installation of the SS20's.

13. This question is well treated by General Poirier, in *op.cit.*, p. 191.

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first-strike capacity against the Soviet missiles? The result, in all events, is that the leader of each camp becomes suspect.

At present, it is clear that confidence in deterrence depended less than was thought on technical factors; it depended a great deal on the other great idea of the decade: détente. In other words, the dead ends and the growing uncertainty entailed in deterrence (especially because of miniaturization and mobility of weapons) were acceptable as long as one could hope that there would be a political, negotiated, consensual solution to the East-West confrontation: that is, Kissinger's politics, which presupposed implicitly that the U.S.S.R. would give up the idea of destroying the adversary and become a civilized power. In fact, more than the irrational confidence in the American guarantee that General Gallois ridiculed, it is the results and the hopes embodied in détente that have become, little by little, the cardinal reference point for West German foreign policy. And when détente began to falter, the crucial theme for many Germans became that of the particular "fragility" of their country, of its "vital interest" in the continuation of détente and the "political stability" of the continent, the preservation of a good microclimate in Europe.[14] This explains the sullen wish to neglect or hide the events of Afghanistan and Poland. In fact, from 1979, it became clear that while France had foreseen her own lines of defense, independently of the Atlantic Alliance, West Germany had more or less signed a kind of reassurance contract with the U.S.S.R.

From Strategic to Political Crisis

The crisis of détente which marks the passage from one decade to another (with the Iranian revolution, the non-ratification of SALT II, the Polish crisis, the invasion of Afghanistan, the NATO "double decision" and the election of Reagan) shows the decay of the strategic-political system of European deterrence. The pacifist movement that began suddenly at the end of 1979 translates a feeling of danger and doubts about the credibility of the American guarantee. In order to situate pacifism within the crisis of the formerly reassuring concepts (such as enlarged deterrence, graduated response, mutually assured destruction), one can follow the demonstration by which Dieter Lutz argues against the stationing of the Pershing II and cruise missiles.

Lutz does not deny that its medium-range missiles give the U.S.S.R. the power of destroying all the land-based nuclear defenses of Western Europe.[15] But this, he says, is of little importance, since there remain the NATO nuclear submarines (English and American) and those of France. He forgets that these are, at least for the moment, anti-city weapons that, if used, dangerously expose the countries that employ them. On the other hand, because they are protected by their mobility, and are more accurate, the Pershing II's stationed on European territory are a more credible threat against the Soviet weapons. Because he does not want to recognize the difference between weapons on European soil and those that are not, and because he believes that escalation will take place automatically, Lutz ends up finding not only bearable but equilibrated a situation where the U.S.S.R. has superiority in both classical and in so-called "theater" nuclear weapons at the very moment when strategic "parity" makes it impossible to compensate that regional inferiority by the intervention of the central actor.[16]

14. Cf. the contribution of Helga Haftendorn, professor at the Free University in Berlin, to the collection published by IFRI in 1980, *La Sérité de l'Europe dans les Années 80.*

15. He even asserts that this was already possible before the stationing of the SS20's. But he forgets to say that the task becomes all the easier with weapons whose explosive power is twenty times less than that of the SS4 and SS5, but whose accuracy is twenty or forty times greater. Then one can disarm Europe without massively destroying it.

16. Cf. Henry Kissinger, *Les Années Orageuses* (Paris: Fayard), p. 1224: "If the objective — or

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Lutz's criteria reflect his intention of reviving the formerly reassuring ideas of mutual deterrence by the Americans and the Russians that ensures universal stability. Dogmatic attachment to this model leads him to deny the facts when the Russians, by installing the SS20's, no longer conform to his model. This leads him to preach unilateralism. The only danger, according to him, is destabilization, i.e., anti-forces weapons. Happily, he continues, the goal of totally disarming the enemy is a utopia; he will always have enough arms for a second strike. Hence, deterrence works. The danger would come about only if, anticipating an attack from the other, one of the two partners said to itself: "the damage that he will do to me in replying to my attack even with a diminished arsenal still will be less than what I must fear from his immanent first strike . . . hence, let 'er rip." This is why it is paradoxically dangerous to possess anti-forces weapons (like the SS20 and the Pershing II), for they do not improve the security of their owner — since that security is guaranteed by the capacity for a second strike — but rather expose him to adventurist temptations. "Thus, giving up unilaterally these first-strike weapons makes the situation more stable, and the security of the party that gives them up is better assured than in the case where 'catch-up' is played" (Lutz, p. 230). This technical argument obviously adds to the classical moral argument on which the book concludes: "One must not take risks for war but for peace" (p. 234). This formulation, by the way, is as pious as it is false and even absurd: who takes risks for war? But this rhetorical flourish covers over or disqualifies the grounds that would justify risking war: freedom, for example.

Lutz's argument forgets first of all what General Poirier calls "the ambivalence of arms system" (*op. cit,* p. 270). If the Pershing II and cruise are offensive (first-strike) weapons, they are also (second-strike) defensive arms. They are more credible in this latter role because they are based in Europe and because of their accuracy. Not to take account of these factors is to forget the uncertainties of graduated response and — something rather paradoxical for a German pacifist — to think as if West Germany were the 51st American state. Lutz denies the specificity of Europe as a strategic space to which, however, the SS20's give a quite concrete meaning.

We see here the link of pacifism with the relapse of certain technicist and moralistic utopias from the McNamara era — utopias that Kissinger at times seemed to rehabilitate. The U.S. supposedly had discovered the utilization of nuclear reason that it was going to teach to the world and first of all to the U.S.S.R. This would result in a reign of peace. Because of its particular status, because of its need for guarantees, and its identification with American democracy, West Germany more than its neighbors adhered to the promises and the values of deterrence-détente. The crisis of this system, with its immense moral implications, thus affects it more profoundly.

The specificity of the German situation seems to be the depth of the crisis of its political institutions — a crisis of representation. From this viewpoint, the link of pacifism with the phenomenon of direct democracy is enlightening.[17] Parties, unions and parliament are all paying for the conformist unconsciousness which they had previously cultivated. Not only do Germans, more than other Europeans, face the uncertainty of the new nuclear situation, confronted by the idea of a war that can no longer be said to be unthinkable; they also realize that they have somehow lost the American guarantee without gaining autonomy, as the forced rearmament imposed from with-

even the tendency of the technology — is to be the mutual invulnerability of the strategic forces, our strategic power would not compensate for the superiority of the Russians in the sphere of classical forces nor in their capacity for regional intervention."

17. On this point, see the remarkable book by Joseph Rovan, *L'Allemagne du Changement* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1983).

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out demonstrates. The result is a classical panic situation: everyone blames the government, weakening it by criticizing its failures. No doubt this weakening comes from deeper sources, as witnessed by the different currents that for at least 15 years have passed through German youth and left a painful misunderstanding between generations (as if the German public space has no place for their confrontation). These deeper sources are evident also in the curious manner in which Schmidt and Brandt gave up political power (as if the smooth institutional functioning hid mysterious weaknesses, the gnawing effect of an inexplicable disappointment). The nuclear problem no doubt catalyzes these deeper tendencies, developing a movement that withdraws public respect from the government. The question is, how long can this go on?

Representative democracy depends on a responsible public opinion. It tends to organize that opinion around several possible choices. Mass movements of public opinion, like pacifism, tend rather to agglutinate repressed desires into an explicit political status. They have unexpected associative capacities, as if they were the spilling out of an historical unconsciousness that permits the transgression of all recognized limits. In Germany, the first element that appears during that emancipative therapy for an excessive statist super-ego is nationalism: a nationalism that is more utopian and messianic than aggressive [18] — an escapist nationalism.

Although the phenomenon is more evident in Germany than elsewhere, it is charac-

18. Cf. Sigrid Meuschel, "Neo-Nationalism and the Peace Movement," *Telos* 56 (Summer 1983).

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teristic of all pacifist movements. The popular movement in the U.S. for "no first use" of nuclear weapons is obviously a return to isolationism and the attempt to avoid too great an involvement in the defense of Europe. The IFRI's book on pacifism, as well as studies on Holland and Scandinavia, show a similar desire to leave Europe, to fall back on national values (moralism and commerce), to withdraw from history. The crisis of the Atlantic system seems to lead each nation to try to reidentify itself by returning to its own roots. Germany once again returns to its eternal malaise, seeking to refute the judgment of its former conquerors at the same time that it purifies itself from Hitlerism.[19] It attempts to play the innocent victim, oscillating between the sublimity of its ahistorical ecological dreams and the triviality of the economic opening to the East.[20]

Thus, however international its extension, this movement is by its very nature nationalist. It is a nationalist movement which is international. The flood of projects for nuclear-free zones, neutral and disarmed, in central Europe or at its periphery, express perfectly the desire to withdraw from an evil world governed by the great confrontation. A project of this type implies that others must take over the responsibility of assuring an international equilibrium from which, however, each expects to benefit. The moral coherence of this attitude is doubtful. The option for neutrality is, to a certain degree, to give up participation in the history of Europe. More specifically, it means remaining silent about totalitarianism, and thus giving up certain freedoms. That this implies a serious choice does not seem to have been recognized by the supporters of these positions.

Besides its nationalist component, the other moral structure seen in the new movement is religious. In effect, a certain aspect of European Christianity is apparent in this pacifism. It is a Christianity reduced to a moral quest: to be wholly on the side of the good, to be outside of sin — and to preach, mock, intimidate in order to better deny and repress a devouring guilt. This is the state of mind of perfectionists, the spirit of the sects. Is this the Christianity that developed from the paradoxical concept of original sin, the teaching that we always live with evil, that we cannot escape it nor act as if we were not responsible for it? What we are seeing, today, is a degraded and ideologized Christianity that attempts to justify sentimentally the quest for innocence that political doctrine promises to make operational.[21]

19. Glucksmann, *op.cit.*, says that the implicit slogan of the movement is: better red than Hitlerist. This is supposed to explain the tendency of the movement to identify itself with the principal enemy of Nazism.

20. French pacifism appears quite without an anchor in comparison with these movements, which find a common theme in their national heritage. This explains the inconsistency of its themes and its slogans. The CODENE does not distinguish the slogan "neither Pershing nor SS20" from the slogan "Nuclear Freeze." Others move from support for classical defense (which would imply a considerable increase of military spending) to a faith in non-violence. Still others propose negotiated disarmament at the same time that they praise unilateralism for supposedly making the domination of the U.S.S.R. over Eastern Europe more difficult. The only thing that ties together these incompatible proposals is the dizziness of "wishful thinking" and the vague feeling that "less is better." The result is that even if some of its meetings draw large crowds, it is difficult to find any coherent orientation in French pacifism.

21. If France is allergic to pacifism, it is no doubt *also* because it is the most laic country in Europe. The comparison of pacifism based in the liberal Protestant culture of Germany and the attitude of the American Catholic church is interesting. On the one hand, we see a Christianity reduced to the quest for the good and guilt. On the other, we see a strong theological and disciplinary structure. This is why Catholic pacifism in the U.S. can come froma bove. In the case of nuclear war, the classical theory of just war is not applicable (because of the massacre of noncombatants). Under these conditions, if it wants to propose a doctrine at all, the Catholic hierarchy is led necessarily to pacifism. The other solution for the Church would be to invoke a "situational ethics" that lets those responsible for the decision decide empirically (even if they

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What Is To Be Imagined?

One has the impression that the representatives of the silent majorities who govern the countries most affected by pacifism are waiting sanctimoniously or fearfully for the storm to end. This is not sufficient. If the present analysis is correct, pacifism may go through phases but it is hardly to be expected that it will disappear since it expresses the crisis of the ideology and the structures on which the Atlantic world is organized. It is necessary to rebuild those ideas and beliefs morally and politically, to reconstruct the political structures and redefine the relations of strategy and politics toward the U.S.S.R.

Concerning the moral sphere, Glucksmann's recent book is a strong and effective attack on the foundations of pacifism. He attempts to lay the groundwork of a law and a morality for the nuclear and totalitarian age. The unavoidable precariousness of the situation, the nuclear death on the horizon, must be confronted. Utopias of reconciliation or pacification are only means of evasion. This does not mean opting for suicide, as is repeatedly — and absurdly — claimed: it means living with the risk of death for ultimate values. "Does a civilization remain a civilization when it consciously risks its extinction in order to survive? . . . The answer, whatever the overly tranquil may believe, is yes." These are the concluding lines of Glucksmann's book.

To the question of whether one has the right to program the death of millions of children, Glucksmann replies that it is not programmed but that it is impossible to avoid. Neither the quest for the lesser evil nor a situational ethics can adopt limits. To do so would be to argue that life is worth more than anything else.

To refuse *a priori* the tragic possibility, as the German socialist leaders increasingly tend to do, is to open the path toward a non-politics. Citizenship is based on the acceptance of the crucifying possibility of death even though political practice works constantly to avoid this fate. In practice, Europe is not condemned to war or to agreement. Glucksmann returns to the 17th century jurists who considered international law (*le droit des gens*) in the context of the wars of religion, i.e., in the context of a violent heterogeneity of values. He recommends, following Grotius, a "law of peace and of war," which, thanks to the imagination inculcated by fear, is based on the threat, on the "socialization of fears" that knits relations "between independent powers that maintain their independence in their ultimate decisions" (p 256). Glucksmann believes that deterrence is possible and justified as a means "to force war to retreat" but not to eliminate it entirely. This understanding differs from those who praise détente or those who, like McNamara, build deterrence on the possibility of a total rationalization because it does not presuppose the existence of common values. It is an ethics and a technique to deal with danger. The law that it can create is thus not based on a universal principle or an ultimate peace that ought to be "constructed." It can claim only to eliminate war by means of an indefinitely prolonged reprieve.

Glucksmann's book is written with a kind of barely sarcastic lightness and without rhetorical flourish. Because it never strays from its central concern — evil and death — it is a pitiless machine shaking pious sentiments and moral assurances. By destroying false hopes, it has the paradoxical effect of giving a renewed taste for life. The question remains, however, whether a democratic politics can be based on such a negative posi-

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must of course bear a part of the inconsequence that follows). But this ethical course would mean that the bishops give up the magistery that they exercise in other domains, especially that of sexuality. This is why the had to take a position (see Robert F. Rizzo, in *Cross Currents*, Spring 1983, for an interesting discussion). It is significant that the traditional and the liberal branches of Christian humanism come to similar conclusions from different premises.

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tion, on the idea that a positive image of the future is not necessary, that what is crucial is to be rid of one's illusions.

A spiritual meditation such as Glucksmann's is not sufficient alone to face up to the nuclear dilemma. European defense structures capable of remedying the inevitable "decoupling" of the defense of Europe and America must be constructed.[22] The present pacifist wave is in large part the result of a failure of political imagination concerning this problem.

This is where a particular effort from the French is necessary. Their present tranquillity is in part due to unconsciousness[23] (what would become of us in a servile or Finlandized Europe?) and in part due to the awareness of their privileges (of which the German confusion and humiliation are the counterpart). The forms of a European defense can be diverse: specialization of national armies and strategic cooperation,[24] creation of a European political authority, putting nuclear arms at the disposal of every European government.[25] In all events, European defense can be achieved only if France gives up its privileges because this renunciation is a precondition for its neighbors' acceptance of an increase of their responsibilities. The key to unblocking the European situation is probably a declaration of principle concerning the equality of the rights of each state in defense matters. Only this will counter the compensatory nationalisms based on an inextricable complex of jealousies and precedences.[26]

It is obvious that the strategic failures of Kissinger's attempt to tame or civilize the Soviet Union and of Brzezinski's attempt to marginalize it and solve the world's problems without it[27] have left a void concerning Atlantic politics that Reagan's improvisations do not fill. There is no satisfactory concept of relations with the U.S.S.R. The talk of vigilance is hardly sufficient. Kissinger saw correctly that democratic governments must maintain continually "public confidence in their devotion to peace." They must do this by equilibrated proposals of disarmament and increased stability — in particular, to return to an idea dear to Kissinger, the decrease of the number of MIRV'd missiles. But beyond that, democracies must continually show that they maintain the ideal of a world governed not only by fear but also by positive principles. The example of Helsinki shows that they are not the losers in this game since the peace that Soviet propaganda trumpets is a peace without principles — a peace based on force alone.

This is the point where Glucksmann's stoicism finds its limit. At the same time that one must fight continually against illusions concerning totalitarianism, one must also affirm that it is not eternal and that it is always possible that a Soviet leader one day will no longer choose the path of the permanent smothering of freedoms and life but that

22. Cf. the recent articles of Pierre Cot (the Rocardian former minister of cooperation) in *Le Monde*, Sept. 28 and 29, 1983.

23. Cf. the articles by Nicole Gnessoto in *Pacifisme et Dissuasion, op.cit.,* and in *Esprit,* July 1983.

24. See the propositions presented by Pierre Lellouche in *La Sécurité de l'Europe dans les années 80,* published by the IFRI.

25. On this point, see the propositions of Colonel Manel, in *L'Europe sans Défense* (Paris: Berger Levrault), prefaced by Raymond Aron. A summary of these propositions appears in the journal *L'Europe en Formation* (April-June 1983).

26. An already old and horribly pretentious book, whose orientation is toward compensatory nationalism, presents some rather interesting analyses of this situation: André Brigot and Dominique David, *Le Désir d'Europe, l'introuvable Défense Commune*, published as a supplement to the journal *Stratégie* (2nd trimester, 1980).

27. See Stanley Hoffman's contribution to the collection published by IFRI, *La Défense de l'Europe dans les Années 80.*

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of giving material satisfaction to his people. One must always be ready to reply to such a possibility and to help it along as much as possible. This means that the dictatorship of globalizing concepts such as détente/cold war must be abandoned. Another sort of "uncoupling" must be practiced, the uncoupling of the communist states from their societies, and the uncoupling too of military relations — where vigilance must be total — and cultural and economic ones — where the West should be capable of more initiatives that demonstrate what it means by international relations.

This is the domain where unilateralism, which is absurd and dangerous militarily, can make sense. The West can make concessions in this arena in order to gain the means to weigh, however marginally, on the communist regimes and in order to demonstrate the values that it claims to uphold. This would be the best possible manner of replying to pacifism on its own terrain.

FRENCH SOCIALISM AND THE AGE OF TORMENT*

by Jacques Caroux

The end of the hope for a magic-socialist solution to the French crisis leads into the age of torment. This is an unexpected effect of the French socialists' coming to power. The international crisis which the socialist alternative previously conjured away magically takes on its full scope. Previous political certainties — those of the "first" and those of the "second" Left — are swept up in this typhon and cast about in a new space in which they have lost their anchor.

In its typical partisan style, the political Left is seeking a new identity without being really willing to shake off the scars of the past. The result is that it is falling behind the governing Left embodied by the pair Mitterrand-Delors who, since June 1982, are courageously and offensively responding to the new economic situation and the aggravation of international tensions. Their replies no longer correspond to the myths of yesteryear. Metterand's recent appearance on TV was clear: after having completed the ritual socialist speech to the Left orthodoxy within the nation he changed his tune and spoke of modernization to all of the French people. His line was basically that France must leave behind the socialist platform, which was elaborated before the crisis hit, and turn to an understanding of the crisis and the necessary mutations that will permit it to confront it. Modernization, mobilization, national solidarity and the independence of the country are the key slogans. They form a new political lexicon for the age of torment and of international competition.

Without the myths that were the source of its identity, the political Left is also discovering that "the social" on which it based its hopes and its very *raison d'être* has disappeared, as if it were allergic to the language and the forms of mobilization proposed to it. After the victory of May 10, 1981 the socialists were astonished by the social "passivity" and the multiplication of categorial or corporatist conflicts they encountered. The massive social movement that they hoped would support their reforms did

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not appear. This cannot be explained through the kind of Bismarkian logic applied by one of the leaders of the CERES faction who asserted that it proved that in France the political movement is ahead of the social movement. For some socialists, it is as if the social stage had suddenly and mysteriously been emptied of the actors who previously gave it its identity. In their place stand uneasy and amorphous masses, age groups, sexual, ethnic and professional clans who insist on the satisfaction of their subjective goals and interests.

Given this obvious cultural mutation and the obsolescence of traditional values that traditionally generated political action, the temptation is to fall back on the old values or to give in to bitter prophecies of decadence. Is this really the only option?

The Ideological Debris

This leads to a second radical criticism, one that hits directly: the critique of the "second Left." The ideological patrimony of the "first Left" was that form of socialism of which France, with Maurrassien accents, was the foundational humus. It used a progressivist eschatology in order to integrate class struggle with increased state intervention. This patrimony was already exhausted before the May 10th victory. The actual exercise of power emphasized the exhaustion (which is one of the explanations of the CERES leader Chevènement's leaving the government).

The second Left was developing an ideology to which the concept liberal-libertarian could be applied. The necessity of strengthening the ability to act on the international scene shows that this is inadequate. The main contribution of the second Left, as one of its leaders, Pierre Rosanvallon, has recently admitted,[1] was limited essentially to its critique of the traditional political culture (based on categories such as progress, the State, Revolution, the main conflict . . .). "The second Left," writes Rosanvallon, "has provided a critique of a certain number of crucial questions. It does not have clearly articulated projects or formulae ready to apply to the problem of the reforms needed in the State or the economy."

Like the new social movements of which it made itself the political voice, the second Left developed an immense corrosive capacity in the face of certain ideological and institutional structures without being able to constitute new forces of mobilization out of the ruins of the old world. This is why it is more correct to say that the second Left has not gone out of fashion. Rather, it has played out its role.

In fact, confronted with the finally admitted external threat, the liberal-libertarian "model" is inadequate. This is not because some of its leaders have gone off into politicians' strategic exercises which condemn them to silence [the reference is to Michel Rocard] but more simply because political models which are *exclusively* focused on internal social questions are incapable of confronting the primary task which is to keep society afloat in the context of an international crisis. As Rocard put it, "the new challanges brought by the world crisis — which is, in fact, an immense process of mutation — put into question the manner in which we produce and distribute goods; this will force social-democracy and socialism to bring new answers to this evolution."[2]

When the bell tolls, the crucial fact will be the ability to mobilize around these issues. This means entering another framework, one into which people of the post-war generation prefer not to think. It is a framework which poses the questions of the

1. P. Rosanvallon, "Que Faire de l'Etat?" in *Le Débat*, No. 26 (September 1983), p. 92.
2. In *Commentaire*, No. 19 (Fall 1982).

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independence and survival of society in a dangerous international context. It does not deny the importance of intellectual and political questions concerning internal politics in times of peace. If the cultural obsolescence of the first Left is now complete, the second Left's theories of self-institution of society are also put into perspective, relativised, by the new international context.

Those who had learned to dissociate intellectually the problems of the state as an actor on the international stage from those which concerns its relations to society are disarmed by their present interdependence. What is worse, the *exacerbation* of internal struggles — be they political or socio-professional — does not carry with it the promise of democratization; the new context means that these struggles bring the serious risk of a decline.

Concern with the crisis of the welfare state placed the nation state into a central position. Its new function is not to abolish class society, as in the old scheme. This time the CERES [faction of Chevènement] is right. The role of the state is to "assure the survival, the recovery and the greatness of France as a free and independent nation. This value, which had been one of the basis of French Left thought, is today at the heart of our action. It is more important than it was at the time of the *Résistance*. This value has a name: patriotism."[3]

Here we have it, the new and realistic slogan which will remain valid as long as Europe is not unified. Is this stress on patriotism to mean that the socialist struggle will no longer be based on the transhistorical and transnational basis of the class struggle? Is the socialist struggle no longer identified with the unity of all republicans against those who threaten the nation from within? Does the necessity of a national mobilization — which has the positive implications that pragmatism replaces dogma, conformism and ideological masks — really eliminate these two conflictual models which gave the Left its identity?[4]

If it is undeniable that political practice has changed its orientation and that the decisions of the present government cannot be analyzed in terms of those two old ideological references — something which members of the party and the government try to hide from themselves — then the theoretical conclusions have to be drawn. This will mean breaking with the Communist "ally" and increasing the Communists' ability to draw discontent to their side. It may also mean a rupture with some of the Socialist Party's own sectarians. These latter will preserve the two old poles of socialist identity by claiming that the external threat is really American-Japanese imperialism and international capital. This explains at least partially why those with the Socialist Party who do support the most delicate choices of the government have remained silent. This is why the "synthesis" that resulted from this Fall's Socialist Party Congress at Bourg-en-Bresse did not trace a new "line" but only a strategic objective, namely, the unanimous support of the government and the President of the Republic. Concerning the strategy to adopt *vis-á-vis* the Communist Party, Mitterand and Jospin may have been correct. This synthesis may permit the government to keep the Communist Party on its side and even to associate it with the most difficult of its decissions — so that it cannot skillfully gather in the fruits of a possible electoral defeat in 1986. The problem is that the strategy hinders the necessary theoretical and practical transformation of the Socialist Party itself.

3. Jacques Mandrin (pseudonym), *Le Socialisme et la France* (Paris: Le Sycomore, 1983), p. 245.

4. Cf. Gérard Grunberg, "Le Parti Socialiste et ses Représentations de l'Adversaire," in *Intervention,* No. 4 (1983), pp. 8-16.

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Can Socialism Become Secular?

The critical opening of the second Left, followed by the pragmatism of the government, have gone with and accelerated the process of laicisation of socialism that Patrick Viveret has analyzed. "French socialism is experiencing for the first time the laicisation of politics. The experience is positive. In Southern Europe, socialism and communism have lived the greater part of their history in a religious mode: their fundamental impetus was a utopian belief that became stronger the further into the future its realization appeared; their principle mode of action was to proselytize. The militant in this situation was at once a soldier and a priest."[5] The economic realism of the second Left and of the government destroys this attitude without replacing it by new horizons or motivations. Activists not accustomed to treat their political ideas as an instrument of social and geo-political analysis but as the source of faith and a tool in internal and external struggle are left in disarray, uncertain of their own identity and cut off from their social base.

If the secularization of socialism is in fact one of the conditions necessary for the creation on the left of a true democratic culture, the realists and pragmatists must open themselves to this process. The tightening that was imposed by the guardians of the sanctuary at Bourg-en-Bresse must be lifted. It is not a question of finding a new strategy to elect a new president [like Michel Rocard?], nor simply of supporting the action of the present government

The Necessary Mobilization

The goal of the leaders of the Socialist Party is to get their second wind, to remobilize their activists toward the upcoming legislative elections. This cannot take place within the party alone. It cannot neglect the goal of the government, which is to mobilize all of the French around specific priorities. This governmental task presupposes, as Lionel Jospin has insisted, that the socialist activists participate more fully in society and its transformation. How can this remobilization take place when it has broken with the tradition of religious-style socialism? Aside from the kind of progressive Christian-Marxist operation typified by *Témoinage Chrètien*, four directions have been proposed.

Two models can be called majoritary:

— *Hawkish dramatization* is certainly well adapted to the increased international tensions (interruption of negotiations concerning the Pershings, Chad, Lebanon . . .) and has the further advantage of public support.[6] Moreover, the institutional structure of the Fifth Republic permit the creation of a direct and intense relation between the President and the population. But, if it is adopted in place of any others, this solution is not without risks. When there are no "positive" motivations accompanying it, hawkish dramatization produces the kind of heroic mobilization that, if it does not threaten internal democracy, certainly does not contribute to its improvement. And, if this tactic can express the will to face up to the crisis, it can also become the basis of a protectionism, a neo-poujadism, or the nostalgic recreation of those days when the socialists could dream within the comfort of the hexagone, isolated from the external world.

— *Technicist pragmatism*, which is well adapted to the economic crisis, proposes to apply a realistic approach to the necessities of the moment: modernization or unemployment, competitivity or decreased standards of living. Experience is privileged over

5. Patrick Viveret, "Laïciser le Socialisme," in *Intervention,* Nos. 5-6 (1983), pp. 106-111.

6. For example, a recent poll of the IPSOS-*Le Point* group shows 84 percent of the French approving Mitterrand's trip to Beirut (after the bombing of the French troops the same day as that of the Americans).

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beliefs, facts above all. In Viveret's words, "The efficacy of this message explains the morose acceptance, in all Western countries, of different austerity measures. But this is a resigned acceptance which is most often preceded or accompanied by a tooth and nail defense of corporate privilege by all parties."[7] Because this approach eliminates all hopes without providing new horizons and new principles of solidarity, it fixates the most affected social categories into an age of destabilization, leaving the slightly better off in an age of blind recrimination. When it tries to mobilize, this stragegy finds only groups concerned to maintain their status whose narrow view of the collective social space goes so far as to treat excluded groups as scapegoats. This realism in spite of itself may work well on the level of the economy, but it hardly generates popular support, let alone enthusiasm.[8]

Two minoritary models can also be sketched:

— *A nostalgia for restoration* of old times is shared by the CERES faction and some members of the old guard of the Socialist Party. This approach has at least the advantage of preserving an historical identity even if the social basis which made it legitimate is no longer willing to accept it. The partisans of this strategy insist on all out political war against a social enemy who can only be described as proteiform: it sees everywhere the "expression of dominant ideas utilized by the Right," whether it be in individualism, corporatism or the turning inward away from the crisis. One reads, for example, in the CERES's *Le socialisme et la France*, that "The transcendence of corporatist behavior will be difficult. But one thing is certain, and that is that it will not take place at all unless we unify all those who order and can organize a social movement: the unions and the political organizations. It is impossible to struggle against the divisions of French society by superimposing over them other divisions, this time ideological or cultural ones." Robespierre, here we are! Maybe the excesses of such rhetoric will ignite the militant flames that were thought to be dead; but it is doubtful they will find a serious echo among the fearful "modernists" who make up the majority in French society. This attempt to weld together a national-productivism and a social-statism can lead only to a considerable restriction of the democratic public space. When it has been exported to dependent societies it has, at best, resulted in the constitution of modernizing but authoritarian states.

— *The attempt to create new democratic forms* is upheld by various groups within the Socialist Party and, silently, by certain realistic and pragmatic members of the government. It suggests that the legitimation crisis that is expressed by the irrelevance and meaninglessness of political speech and militant action can be transcended only by taking into account — without making normative judgment about them — the cultural transformations affecting French society. This would permit a reformulation of the democratic institutions that bind together politics (the government and the parties) and society, as well as the relations among the members of civil society. As Jean Puy has argued,[9] there will of course be a practical and a symbolic loss of bearings in this process, which is not to be instituted from above, in one simple act.

These four possibilities will interact to determine the forms that the next phase of the socialist experience in France will assume. The crisis cannot be avoided, but the cultural change should not be overlooked either. Neither can it be judged from the point of view of the past form of social organization. This does not mean accepting the new for its own sake. Nor does it make us censors or voyeurs, but actors.

7. *Op.cit.*, p. 100.

8. Only 32 percent of the French claim to have confidence in the economic policies of Jacques Delores, according to an IPSOS-*Le Journal du Dimanche* poll.

9. In "Quand le Pouvoir manque à la Société," in *Esprit* (December 1983).

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ON BUXTON: STRUCTURALIST LOGIC AND THE CONSPIRACY OF LATENT FUNCTIONS

by David F. Scudder

There is a dangerous tendency in left wing culture critique to create an increasingly dense web of latent capitalist functions that cut off every possibility of the development of transcendent identities, energies, and actions. The danger is two-fold: it prevents us from appreciating and acting upon liberating potentials when they present themselves; it creates a fatalistic mask of functional necessity whereby we cannot see failures as the truly tragic losses of opportunity they are. This is illustrated by Buxton's thesis that the rock music of the counterculture was "affirmative." and functioned to create an expanded consumerism. Such arguments assert that the capitalist commodity form penetrates into ever more indirect areas of life closing off their potential for liberation. Because it was popular and sold well, rock music is treated as little more than a latent capitalist conspiracy to ensnare us in the devilish business of consumption.

Buxton's rhetoric notwithstanding, rock stars are not "agents of consumer discipline," and they do not "anchor a chaotic aesthetico-ideological discourse and represent it in a 'humanized' form by investing the human body itself" (whatever that bit of impenetrable structuralist language may mean). Rock recordings do not "manage to achieve an *enhanced social usefulness* [surplus use value?] far exceeding the mere 'need' for recorded music," and they are not causes of "the modern self" being "increasingly defined in terms of life style" for which "failure to consume 'in style' becomes the basis for social rejection." Rock music, stars, and the record industry are not capitalist machinations to create a "consumer discipline" appropriate to capitalism's very real structural need for capital investment and accumulation. Buxton treats even the self-consciously revolutionary arguments of the counterculture, such as Leary's "Tune in, Turn on, and Drop out," as not merely wrong, and tragically so. For him, they were part of a conspiracy of latent functions to "aestheticize social life" and to increase "sensibility to color and design, both essential for a more discriminating consumer consciousness." Even blatant revolutionary statements in rock music apparently make for "efficient" consumption by helping to "define the norms and limits of the existing socio-historical consumer, and thus individual possibilities." Buxton's argument is a structuralist and functionalist nightmare of increasingly insidious latent functions and conspiracies that turns resistance into compliance and masks the actual tragico-comedy of the 1960s and 1970s.

The relationship between rock music as an aesthetic form, the counterculture, the capitalist recording industry, and comsumerism is *both* more simple and more complex than Buxton's functionalist structuralism can conceive. Marcuse's concept of "one dimensionality" is much closer to the mark. Rock music in the 1960s and early 1970s was an aesthetic expression of a spontaneous popular movement with an enormous potential for liberation. That the music was distributed by capitalist record companies is hardly surprising, but this surely does not eleminate its progressive features. Radical scholars buy books from capitalist publishers, and armed revolutionary

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movements buy weapons from capitalists. Could it plausibly be argued that the latent function of armed resistance is to increase the consumption of weapons and weapons sales, thereby stimulating consumer discipline and consciousness? The sole logic of capitalist companies is to make sales and profit. Market analysts and advertisers have little tolerance for "discriminating consumer consciousness."

The excessive functionalist structuralism is highlighted by a curious argument. Buxton implies that the domination of sheet music prior to the 1960s reinforced amateur performance while the rise of plastic recording led to the ascendance of the "star system" which "organizes consumption." Buxton's quest for insidious latent functions implies that capitalism stopped selling sheet music *in order to* destroy local and regional amateur performers and to create the conditions for an expanded consumerism. Such a functionalism creates a class subject and imbues it with insidious motives. This is just foolish. Sheet music declined for the same reason as any commodity; people stopped buying it. The stopped for easily understood reasons. Primarily, many amateur musicians interested in rock music could not read music; sheet music had not use value for them. I suspect that many amateur and quasi-professional folk musicians of the past, so dear to Buxton, also could not read music. Folk musicians do not go to music school; they learn to play by ear, and by association with friends. Even the Beatles when they first became popular were reported not to be able to read music, although they subsequently learned. Such musicians do not "write" music; they "make up" songs. In order to publish sheet music, competent musicians had to be hired to write arrangements. The sheet music published in the 1960s was simplified because amateur musicians could not follow the full score (the cord names were even printed over the simplified score and new musical directives were invented such as "with a rock beat"). Even for people who could read music, these simplified scores did not produce the desired complexity of sound.

Amateur performance, however, did not suffer. With a guitar in hand the amateur musician could, over a few days, learn by ear to play and improvise on recorded songs. It would have taken years of study to learn to play pieces of equal difficulty from a musical score. Buxton must have never witnessed young people together learning how to play their favorite songs for a record album. Live music remained important as a social occasion, but it was no longer necessary for hearing music. Consequently, rock fans are not polite audiences; they *listen* to the music at home and enjoy the *social* occasion of concerts mainly by making a lot of noise.

The consumerist consequences of counterculture rock music cannot be found either in structural deficiences of rock music or in a capitalist conspiracy of latent functions. Instead, they must be found in the history and defeat of "The movement" which gave rock music its temporary transcendent aesthetic quality. The aesthetic form cannot be divorced from the historical context ("conjuncture" for our structuralist friends) in which it had aesthetic meaning.

In its early phases the counterculture was an identity (life style if one adopts the language of pop psychology) based on the self-conscious rejection of consumerism (termed "materialism" by its members — an interesting derivation from religion) in all its forms. It eschewed expensive stylish clothes and affectations: its members preferred to shop at Army/Navy surplus stores; it avoided even haircuts and shaving, and it glorified the beat-up VW van that was pushed to rock concerts nearly as often as it was driven. The counterculture also valued spiritual and aesthetic experiences from which emerged its tragic love affair with drugs. The counterculture did invest some objects, such as denim jeans and that VW van, with an almost mystical symbolism that went far

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beyond functional utility. But this was a decidedly anti-consumerist symbolism. Levi jeans still cost half what traditional casual slacks sell for — designer jeans are a post-counterculture phenomenon. Tragically naive and misguided it was, but consumerist it was not. It was a challenge for market analysts and advertisers who had been selling expensive "Bass Weejun" penny loafers to the passive consumer youth of the post-Korean war period. By the late 1970s they had succeeded; longish haircuts at a "unisex" salon cost $12 to $20 as opposed to the $4 or $5 charged by traditional barbers, and bell-bottomed jeans are now bought at "boutiques" by people who eat croissants at three times the price of a mundane roll.

Within this context rock and roll, as the aesthetic and sometimes intellectual expression of a diffuse social movement, flourished. It extolled the values of "The movement." It stimulated discussion among counterculture members concerning its own themes, norms, and plans for action. Buxton asserts that rock music was merely a "symbolic radicalism" and that it "ignored an alternative organization of culture." Rock music or any music is an aesthetic form not an intellectual monograph. An aesthetic form can only present symbols.

The original rock stars of the counterculture (e.g., Morrison, Hendrix, Joplin, the Beatles, Ray Davies, the Jefferson Airplane, Frank Zappa, Dylan, the Greatful Dead) were not studio creatures; they grew spontaneously out of a local context after generating a genuine rapport with audiences. Not only did their appeal rest on values shared with their audiences; they considered themselves spokesmen for a movement of which they were a part. And for millions of people, naive though they were, these "rock stars" were genuine aesthetic if not intellectual leaders. John Lennon was naive and not an intellectual but he was more than merely an "agent of consumer discipline."

Buxton tries to distinguish between rock stars and 19th century opera celebrities who were not "stars": "The were rather *personalities* whose *celebrity* was rooted in local traditions" and their fame "depended on their talent being widely recognized in order to transcent local audiences." I doubt that Buxton ever heard of a free Jefferson Airplane concert in Golden Gate Park or a riotous Doors concert in a local nightclub in LA. How could he? These events occurred before their fame transcended local audiences. It is much easier to promote a good established product for a local market to an international market than it is to create a new product for an international market.

The fact that audience identification has been successfully created and marketed by the capitalist media — before, during, and after the counterculture — does not negate its genuineness. Rock music along with the other counterculture elements helped to create stable identities divorced from the affirmative and integrating institutions of bourgeois society. Such identities are necessary preliminaries for building more sharply defined political identities and organizations. The development of Mods, Hippies, Punks, etc. as spontaneously emergent identities that remain outside the integrating institutions of bourgeois society and actively resist incorporation should be encouraged and aided in building more sophisticated political identities. Once the association between rock music and the counterculture collapsed with the demise of the latter, however, the already historically established audience identity with rock stars was easily put to further profitable use by record companies.

After 1973, rock music, like the rest of the counterculture, became increasingly fragmented. The fact that rock musicians were foolish and naive, and never had a coherent analysis of society is a statement about the general intellectual climate of the movement not a criticism of rock music, rock musicians, or even the record industry. What passed for intellectual work during the period was no better. "Revolution for the

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Hell of it" and "Steal this Book" are no more enlightening than "Volunteers of America" or "They got the guns but we got the numbers." The fact that the counterculture was fragmented between individual life-style and political expressions is not the fault of rock music. Buxton's capitalist conspiratorial latent functions could be turned easily into an equally scathing but unnecessary critique of the theory and practice of "The movement" itself. But Buxton feels more secure in inventing a capitalist conspiracy of latent functions.

Of course, even the original rock stars would, in all probability, have reminded local or regional personalities without mass marketing, mass media, and the record companies. Mass media, according to its own specific logic of profit making, did spread rock music and countercultural values (along with conventional ones). Record companies did make rock musicians into national and international stars — for which many of them, unprepared emotionally and intellectually, paid dearly. But it does not take the subtle machinations of a conspiracy of latent functions to grasp the process. The image of a rock star, as opposed to anonymous rock music, on a television show, magazine cover, or record label means that people will watch *that* particular program, buy *that* particular magazine or record label. This is simple opportunistic profit logic, not consumer discipline and consciousness.

Once one company tapped a large market with a particular commodity, for whatever the reason, others realized that they might be able to *capitalize* on the same *formula*. It is at this point that the typical marketing strategy encouraging consumerism enters the scene and not before. If one company makes a surplus profit by taking a risk on a rock group like the Beatles, others will try to isolate what produced its high sales and profits — remember the "Monkees" television program. This isolation of the appealing but depoliticized content is a media *formula* that is used to recreate the market appeal of the original big seller. The same strategy can be seen in the endless remakes, e.g., Rocky I, II, III . . . It is even conceivable that any genuine original aesthetic quality may be lost due to an endless repetition of a marketing formula, e.g., MASH.

In explaining the escalation of record sales in the 1960s Buxton asserts that the extent to which rock music actually did espouse the values and ideology of the counterculture merely "enhanced" the "use value" of records, i.e., it increased demand. This is a back door admission that the genuine association between rock music and a major social movement accounted for the huge size of the market for rock music. When it comes to the decline of the individual star and record sales in the late 1970s Buxton examines every possible cause except the collapse of "The movement" that gave rock music its aesthetic character and appeal. In terms of the present analysis, it is not surprising that record companies search in vain through ever more foolish and outrageous gimmicks for the *formula* that will produce another "Beatlemania." But Buxton is content to mask this tragic contradictory relation between spontaneously emergent social movements and resistant identities with esthetic forms, failed opportunities, and the marketing logic of capitalist firms behind an historically ignorant fantasy of a capitalist conspiracy of latent functions. The Marxist focus on social contradictions is lost to a functionalism that sees even resistance as contributing to the omnipotent homeostatis of capitalism.

The consequences of a functionalist structuralism are most readily observable when Buxton turns his attention to its implications for a socialist cultural policy. His core argument is that "The aim of radical strategies must be to create alternative cultures on the *margin of the capitalist commodity circuit* and involve new forms of social solidarity both in the production and *reception* [like the good capital logician that he is, he cannot bring

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himself to use the term consumption] of cultural *items* [let alone products or commodities]." Buxton is aware that this high Marxist language "sounds utopian." But he never confronts the fact that it is not just unworkable, but self-defeating and foolish. What happens if the good Marxist happens to stumble on a marginal cultural "item" that actually does not touch the general aesthetic nerve of the working class? It moves out of the margin into the mainstream, and immediately capitalists become interested in marketing it. It therefore becomes consumerist and beyond the reach of good Marxists. Buxton's policy directive thus condemns the Left to a marginal status, damned if it does and damned if it does not.

EMIL OESTEREICHER (1936-1983) NOTES ON NEO-LIBERALISM*

by Fred Siegel

I spent last year teaching in Paris and when I came home for visits, Emil and I would play the analogy game between Western European and American political tendencies. Besides the obvious matches between Reagan, Thatcher and Chirac, we talked of the similarities between George Will and Ian Gilmore, the intellectual spokesman for the Tory Wets, both of whom drew on the same stock of quotes from Bolingbroke, Hume and Burke. But what of the American neo-liberals? Who were their counterparts? Despite some obvious similarities between the British Social Democrats and some of the French high-tech socialists, it was difficult to compare the neo-liberals to any other European formation.

Back in Paris, I was asked to explain American neo-liberalism to French audiences, already skeptical of someone who had tried to provide a rational explanation for choosing presidential nominees on the basis of the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. I usually began with this mock dictionary definition from *Business Week:* "Neo-lib-er-al. 1. A young Democratic politician who wants to stop relying on government to redistribute income and assure equality of opportunity. Instead, the neo-liberal focuses on market mechanisms, high technology, international competitiveness and economic growth to achieve these ends. 2. Any Democrat looking for an alternative to Reaganomics who thinks "post-Keynesian" sounds pretentious and "moderate" too Republican. (See also Atari Democrats, Re-industrializers, New Wave.)" — and, I might add, Micro-chip McGovernites.

Philosophically, neo-liberalism replaces the conception of liberalism as fairness, the liberalism of men as different as Humphrey and McGovern, with a liberalism distinguished by a commitment to balance. Hence, the oft-repeated call for "compassionate realism." In practice, balance meant the need to slow down the equity demands on the government in the name of promoting a renewal of the economic growth deemed necessary to underwrite those demands.

*This talk was given at a Memorial Seminar for Emil Oestereicher, organized by the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, March 2, 1984.

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The neo-liberals, I went on, are critical of Reaganism but their differences are muted by their insistence that they are as committed as the Republicans to cutting taxes on business, "reducing the role of government," building a stronger defense (and rejuvenating the private sector." Their mimicry is a tribute to the agenda-setting power of the neo-conservatives and Reaganites, with whom they share a distaste for Great Society liberalism. Or, as some have mockingly put it, "neo-liberalism is Reaganism with a human face."

The body of the talk later turned into an article for *Esprit*, discussing the neo-liberal support for a weak form of syndicalism or what is euphemistically called an "industrial policy." This was the part of the talk that most interested the French, but what struck Mike Harrington and other American friends in Paris was the discussion of the Republican social origins of neo-liberlalism.

Many of the neo-liberals, including two of their most prominent representatives, Sens. Tsongas and Bradley, are former Republicans; others, like Rep. Timothy Wirth, represent traditionally Republican districts and interests. Still others, such as Rep. Gephardt of Missouri, who has been close to David Stockman, and Gary Hart, who has borrowed a number of his ideas from Ford economics advisor William Simon, are on many issues indistinguishable from their old-line Republican colleagues. Hart's favorite aphorism, "To get the government off your back, get your hands out of the government's pocket," is worthy of Ronald Reagan. And, in a sense, Tsongas gave the game away when he admitted to a reporter that "The greatest danger to the Democrats is a rational Ronald Reagan, because if Reagan is capable of stripping away his ideology," "he could become the new FDR, because it would work, and there would be no reason to turn to the Democrats."

I concluded by suggesting that there was considerable truth to Teddy Kennedy's quip about the neo-liberals. Asked what he thought of their proposals, he responded: "We don't need two Republican parties."

When I returned home, I showed my article on neo-liberalism to Emil. He noted that while it described the social basis of neo-liberalism accurately, it failed to include the distinction I had made to him verbally between neo-liberal politicians and the increasingly prominent neo-liberal writers. The seminal neo-liberal organ is the little-known though highly influential *Washington Monthly,* which was founded in 1973 by Charles Peters, who still is its editor. But Peters has spawned a vast array of acolytes, some of whom are now editors at *Atlantic, Harpers, The New Republic* and *The Texas Monthly*. Both writers and politicians were critical of the bureaucratic state spawned by Roosevelt, but the writers were far more attracted to the homespun cultural themes of the New Deal. Charles Peters revels in describing how FDR called upon the nation to "roll up its sleeves" to do the WPA work of practical liberalism necessary to keep neighborhood and nation together.

Neo-liberalism, says Peters, "is first and foremost a movement of community. We believe in a society that shares its burdens and rewards." And while neo-liberal politicians like Gary Hart, jokingly described as the candidate from the Big Chill, represent the upwardly mobile suburban strivers, Peters explicitly rejects "the Me Decade" and the proliferation of special interest groups, which he claims are "its poly manifestation." What we saw as the answer to this problem "of special interest, of legal rights replacing fairness," says Peters, "was a politics of responsibility, of sharing, of *doing our part.*" Peters goes on to repeat the phrase, "We do our part. When I was a boy," he writes, "that was the slogan of the NRA and it stirred something in the average man never seen before or since in this country."

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Peters' heartfelt pronouncements, his concern with not just balance but fairness, did not fit into the framework of my *Esprit* article, but I was busy finishing a book on American politics since Pearl Harbor and did not think too much more about it, until I was sitting with Emil on what turned out to be the Tuesday before his death. After we roamed over a variety of topics, Emil told me he was particularly excited about an essay he had just written, which harshly criticized Mannheim. For early Mannheim, he noted, reading the essay aloud, "only the extraordinary, the superman, the man of charisma . . . the man of ultimate ethical convictions, can break through the iron cage of socio-historical determinism." Later, in *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim expanded the sacred circle to include members of "the free professions, certified civil servants, and the educated as potential candidates for transcendence."

As we finished going over his essay on Mannheim, he turned and asked if I saw the similarities between Mannheim's plans for what was called the Moot, which was to be an organization of committed intellectuals who were to meld Thomistic principles and modern social science into a new and more human social order, and the neo-liberals' call for a civic and moral revival. The connecting link between the two, he said, was C. Wright Mills.

Mills, as Irving Louis Horowitz points out in his recent biography, saw everything through the prism of the intellectual. Knowledge in his view was the exclusive possession of the initiated. His contempt for non-intellectuals was boundless. For Mills, it was Mannheim's "free-floating intellectual" who could save humanity from commercialized culture, the vulgarization of everyday life, the mechanized barbarism and incipient fascism he saw lurking within 20th-century capitalism. Only committed intellectuals armed with a "searing vision" of the social sciences could, thought Mills, restore America to its classically democratic past.

In "The Politics of Truth," Mills wrote that "the formula for a third party is to tell the truth to the right people with the right words at the right time. . . . The truth is what we know of the happiness of the world. . . . The right words are those which for such people will replace apathy with the energies for action." Mills' words recall for me one of Emil's favorite passages in the *German Ideology*, about how, "Once upon a time an honest fellow had the idea that men drowned in water because they were possessed with the idea of gravity." Mills attacked the old elites not as a populist but in the name of an alternate elite. The left wing of "the Best and the Brightest," the reform activists of the New Class, took Mills' message to heart. They drew strength both from his description of the barren middle-class world from which they hailed and his cure, rule by an enlightened vanguard. They were drawn to government activism in the hopes of carving out a sphere of life untainted by the marketplace and where the principles of equality and citizenship could reign.

The Great Society scored some notable successes: the diet, health, housing and general economic well-being of the bottom fifth were substantially improved by its programs. But the enterprise turned sour. Greed and self interest, it turned out, were as endemic to government as business. The social service enterprise produced ugly forms of snobbery and meritocratic self-aggrandizement. They have made it their job to sniff out conflicts of interest in places where other liberals were loath to look.

Part of what was so striking about Mills was his critique of the New Deal. The reform movement of the 1930s, he argued, had resolved itself into its antithesis. The New Deal's routinization of reform produced not radical change but a conservative, self-serving bureaucracy, as he saw it. For their part, the neo-liberals surveying the politics of the past two decades have decried the cycle of abuse-anger-laws bureaucracy and

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finally bureaucratic abuse. Where Mills placed his faith in free-floating intellectuals, the neo-liberals, almost all of whom are Harvard graduates, call for a new spirit of civic pride, disinterested service, and shared sacrifice, although given the neo-liberal economic perspective, it is doubtful as to just how equally those sacrifices would be shared. And as again with Mills, all this would be to restore the virtues of yesteryear. Like Mannheim, they believe, as Emil put it, that "the ruling classes could not resist (a) vision of a new world if it were presented by a united front of intellectuals." Self-consciously critical of the people who became Mills' vanguard, they have constituted themselves as an alternative vanguard, a "saving remnant" ready and willing, as Jim Sleeper has put it, to "regenerate an ethic of social responsibility by persuasion and bright ideas." They are one of a long line of contenders seeking to substitute their own virtues for those lacking in the society at large. Are they then the disease of which they proclaim themselves the cure? It is an ironic possibility that Emil would have appreciated.

JULIO CORTÁZAR (1914-1984)

by Juan E. Corradi

He was almost a year older than my father. Yet when I learned of his death on February 12 in Paris I did not have the sense of an orderly passing of generations. Julio Cortázar had the personal as well as the literary ability of remaining young. It was the combination of a nimble mind, the experimental quality of his narrative, and the uncanny resilience of his lean figure to the routine ravages of time (he looked a good 25 years younger than his age). He stood tall in a generation of splendid Latin American writers. As Carlos Fuentes has remarked, he is the first figure of what is known as the Latin American boom to go.

In the Argentina of the forties and fifties, while Perón held sway in politics, many young writers were busy imitating Borges' dreams. The result was a proliferation of labyrinths so boring that even the Minotaur deserted them. Borges had a different influence on Cortázar — an impact on the language. From the master Cortázar learned that Spanish improves through exiguity, not by accretion. A single well-chosen adjective is stronger than a string of metaphors. In 1951, when Cortázar left Peronist Argentina for a life-long sojourn in France,[1] he took that crystal gift along.

In Paris his writing blossomed, not in spite but because of the distance from his country. For Cortázar, life in Europe did not mean — as it meant to so many Latin Americans before and since — the initiation of a colonized mind into the mysteries of a metropolitan culture, nor was it a refugee's grim pilgrimage. On the main, it was a joyful occasion for the growth of the two C's that bulge in his initial: Creation and Commitment. He won for Argentine and Latin American letters what Hemingway, Scott Fitzgerald, and Gertrude Stein achieved in American writing: the possibility of pro-

1. He returned for visits many times, and did not consider himself in exile, not even in self-imposed exile, until after 1974, when terror descended like a frost on Argentina. He visited Buenos Aires again last year, after the elections.

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ducing an admirable national literature based on European experiences. He understandably disappointed those who expected to be entertained by native flavors and picturesque prospects. And he disturbed culture nationalists (right and left) back home. Cortázar's texts are Argentine, and deeper down, Latin American; yet they have roamed the world and found their readers, without protective labels.

In Cortázar's life, creation and commitment did not blend — they intertwined, and this was for the better. He was a good man of the Left. He believed in the fight against poverty, oppression, and foreign imposition in Latin America. He endorsed the ideals of the Cuban revolution and remained loyal to it through all the avatars. More recently, he became enthusiastic about the Nicaraguan revolution. If he nursed doubts about revolutionary regimes, he kept them to himself. He was a man to reprieve friends in private, and praise them openly.

Cortázar's revolutionary innocence was of a special kind — avuncular, good humored. Nothing could be farther from him than the suspicion that evil may come of a revolutionary process. He liked to adopt a revolution and then help it, honestly and generously. He graced it with his public endorsement and good words, his participation in symposia and juries. And he fought against privilege and right-wing repression with the same weapons. As a writer, however, he remained sovereign. Guevara, Castro, and Cardenal have entered his narrative, but they are caught in flights of literary fantasy that are unmistakably Cortázar's. I wonder how the writer would have felt if instead of bestowing what were — despite the devotion of much time and effort — visitor's gifts on revolution, he had brought his equipment and stayed in the grip of its practical dilemmas — either leading, or being herded with the herd.

Cortázar was a master of the short story — in the emphatic modern sense which the genre has acquired since Poe: an infallible machine that produces a maximum of literary effects with a minimum of means. His were short, precise, fantastic — what he liked to call "stories against the clock." If we recall, with Baudelaire, that the Parisian revolutionaries of 1848 *tiraient sur les quadrants*, we may find a link between writing and politics in Cortázar. In the old days, revolutions too were epiphanies — acts against the clock. Cortázar's narrative urges time on its way through spacial means: the braiding of inner, outer, and intersticial space, the bridges that span incongruous worlds, and the unexpected shifts in perspective turn his stories and novels into kaleidoscopes. Substitute a change of position for the slow passage of time, and in the space of one moment you pass over centuries, in imagination. Shake-ups were essential for Cortázar: the jolting of his narrative serves to throw into relief the charm of life transformed.

What linked Cortázar's art and politics was his sense of the responsibility for form — a sense that something always clamors for revision. Latin America became a continent imagined through a revolutionary poetics, through an agitational sense of life. Revolutionary situations are those in which new forms articulate old and new contents. Cortázar remained wedded to a Mayakovskyan project of poetic and social work. He drafted Jarry, Lautréamont and Artaud into the social shake-up of the Caribbean and the River Plate. He did not seem too concerned about the waning of epiphanies, the fatigues of institutionalization, the tyranny of new form. He was, above all, a pioneer of deconstruction. The same stem produced literary complexity and political simplicity. There are two series of preoccupations, and two series of writings, held together in Cortázar's mind but which, I suspect, are fated to fulfill Samson's prophecy on the sexes: "The two shall die, each in a place apart."[2]

2. Unlike other figures of the "boom," such as Paz and Fuentes, Cortázar did not write

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In 1963 Cortázar published, if not the first, one of the first great Latin American novels: *Hopscotch*. It was the second and the most successful of the four he penned. This novel is Latin American in that it basks in the air of a utopian search (always Eldorado!), but drastically original in its plurilinguism, reversibility, and self-reference. The deceptive object can be read from left to right, from beginning to end, like a conventional narrative, from "there" (life in Paris) to "here" (a mirrored life in Buenos Aires), skipping "dispensible" chapters. A manual of instructions, however, invites to violate those canons, to engage in another, combinatory, almost infinite reading, in which time, representation, and the subject disappear. *Hopscotch* was the perfect specimen of what Barthes would later call "the writerly text;" of what Nietszche, or Derrida, might have called a "hollowing game." It was a text "against the clock" of traditional narratives, an act about which one should say, in Cortázar's vein — 'he unwrote an antinovel.' In this respect, as Fuentes once remarked, *Hopscotch* is to Spanish prose what *Ulysses* is to English.

Cortázar's was a literature of the startling, which sought to enrich life by breaking with the pragmatism of reality — literature as a catastrophe of reason, as the possibility of different worlds, inside and outside the self. Many have observed that the fantastic genre is Latin America's own brand of realism — an observation especially apt for Argentinians, who have always oriented their mirrors to the world. With the acceleration of time, however, Latin American reality received a dosis of the fantastic in another ominous way. Political terror has produced situations worthy of the most extreme imagination. The catastrophes of history seem to outstrip fiction. Cortázar's last stories register this vengeance of the real on the literary text. In the story "Satarsa" (1983), the characters are engaged in an unusual trade: trapping live rats for shipment overseas. One night they plan to trap a large amount of enormous rodents so that, with the proceeds from the raid, they can escape the miserable life in the Argentine marshlands. But as they move their cargo in the dark, they are attacked, and hunted down, like rats, by what seem to be rat troops. Cortázar performs one of his famed passages between the Same and the Other, this time as an illustration of Hobbesian politics — *homo homini mus*. In another story, a girl lapses mysteriously into a coma. As her family gathers around her bed for weeks, they notice that she is having terrible dreams from which she cannot wake up. One day she starts coming to her senses, at the very moment that a military commando invades the family apartment to kidnap and to kill them all. The girl's nightmares are over; she can now face life.

Cortázar was confident that literature announced the triumph over the nightmare of history, over that bad caricature of fiction that are Latin and American hemispheric politics. He was highly conscious of the contrast between the great literature and its ramshackle context. "Why is it — he once asked — that we write so well and live so badly?" He never gave a satisfactory answer to the question, but he would have been willing to give up writing for less social pain. Luckily, he didn't. Instead, he dealt with the issue inside his fiction, exploring that the title of one of his books, translated into French, conveys so well: *façons de perdre* — manners of losing. He waited for the day, and looked for the ways, to break the spell.

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brilliant essays. His commentaries on social life and politics are scattered in the transcripts of interviews, in speeches, and papers for colloquia, most of which are noble but pious and flat. It was the price he was willing to pay for refusing what he called, in a speech on human rights delivered at the U.N. in November, "the fashionable skepticisms of our time."

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Eugene Lunn, *Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982, 330 pages.

Richard Wolin, *Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, 316 pages.

Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas Kellner (eds.), *Passion and Rebellion: The Expressionist Heritage*, South Hadley, Mass.: J. F. Bergin Publishers, 1983, 468 pages.

There is no serious work of which I am aware that does not consider the artistic and literary doctrine of "socialist realism" an intellectual disaster. When Zhdanov announced this doctrine as official Soviet policy at the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, his words put an end to a variety of artistic experiments which had taken place within the context of the Russian and European Left during the previous two decades. Suddenly socialist realism, or Zhdanovism, became the only "correct" Marxist approach to the question of what art in general, and literature in particular, should say, and how it should say it. Among other things, it was now claimed that the function of art was simply to "educate the masses" in order, thereby, to advance proletarian class consciousness; that the major purpose of any artistic work was to tell the "truth" about society so that it could be better acted upon; that the way the truth was told was by means of a "reflection theory" in which not merely the surface features of everyday life but also its underlying social and economic tendencies were accurately depicted; that irrelevant psychological issues beyond the normal range of human emotions not be dealt with since they obfuscate the central importance of class struggle; and that writers or artists be discouraged from making innovations of a merely technical or formal nature if this should mean that artistic works become too complex and therefore too difficult for the masses to understand. Even recourse to symbols and metaphors was questioned (including, in fact, Marx's reference to a spectre haunting Europe).[1] Literary devices such as these, it was claimed, invariably lead to an excessive subjectivism or mysticism which would only detract from the business of changing the world.

Some have argued that the doctrine of socialist realism came out of Soviet Marxism, and more specifically out of Stalinism. Others have pushed this point further by alleging that Zhdanovism has no roots in Marxism proper.[2] These claims are only partly true. A close reading of Marx himself does seem to show, first of all, that he did not adhere to anything like a utilitarian view of art, where every mode of expression had to serve the class struggle. On the contrary, there is plenty of room, as Marx saw it, for art to be playful and sensuous. Second, he did not stress only the matter of the *content* of a work of art, as socialist realism generally did, but also paid attention to matters of *form*. For Marx, form and content were not two separate issues, but rather each mediated the other within the same totality, which was the work of art itself. And third, it is clear especially from Marx's early writings that he did not support the kind of "copy theory" of art which socialist realism made so central to its doctrine. Nevertheless, there was not enough information in Marx's *oeuvre* (or at any rate, not enough was

1. Hermann Ermolaev, *Soviet Literary Theories, 1917-1939: The Genesis of Socialist Realism* (Berkeley, 1963), p. 187.

2. Maynard Solomon, *Marxism and Art* (New York, 1974), p. 235.

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known about his artistic views from the writings available before the 1930's) to prevent tendencies like socialist realism from emerging, and from appearing to have Marx's own stamp of approval. For example, the simplicities of Marx's frequently-cited *Preface to a Critique of Political Economy* (1859) were often used by Zhdanovists to justify the notion that literature is essentially a superstructural reflection of a material base, i.e., objective reality itself. Likewise, the emphasis on "typicality," or "typical characters in typical circumstances" (something found in Engels more than in Marx), was also easily picked up by the socialist realists who used these concepts to claim priority for the ideological content of literary works over the more "superficial" considerations of aesthetic form.

After Marx's death, the literary and artistic criticism of the Second International period, meager as it was, *did* lay the groundwork for a number of ideas which would later be better know under the label of socialist realism. From a modern perspective, it appears that even the best Marxist critics before World War I, including Mehring and Plekhanov, wrote highly mechanistic works of literary theory, thereby missing much of the subtlety that is in Marx's own writings. Later, in the 1920's, a rigid "proletarian" journal like *Linkskurve* also directly anticipated several key concepts which Zhdanov would soon designate as part of official literary Marxism.[3]

Hence, it seems certain that socialist realism did not simply spring full-blown from the Soviet experience after 1917, but had its roots in the pre-war traditions of European Marxism. In fact, if it were not for a number of extraordinary intrusions *into* Marxist theory from the outside — intrusions described especially well by Lunn — there might have been an unbroken line of development from the literary and artistic views of Second International Marxism in the 1890's to the policies of socialist realism proclaimed by Zhdanov in the 1930's. At least in terms of an immanent unfolding of ideas, there would have been little to check such a straight-line development. But this kind of simple unfolding is exactly what did *not* happen. The potential "socialist realism" tendencies within Marxism were tremendously disrupted between *circa* 1915 and 1935, and into this breach came an influx of entirely new ideas which had their origin beyind the closed world of Marxism. Many of these idea, in fact, came from various avant-garde movements which on the surface appeared incompatible with Marxist orthodoxy, among them Expressionism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Constructivism, and *Neue Sachlichkeit*. Though, from the viewpoint of the Communist Party militants, the perspectives associated with most of these movements were "bourgeois," they nevertheless made their influence felt in a number of ways on Marxist aesthetic theory. Thanks to this influx, the level of artistic discussion within Marxism in the 1920's and 1930's was raised to heights never attained before, nor perhaps sustained since.

One word that summarizes all these avant-garde movements (and other besides) is "modernism." At its broadest extent, modernism can be said to mean: 1) a rejection of traditional mimetic theories of art; 2) an emphasis on questions of form over content; 3) a concern with ambiguity, irony, and paradox since there is no fixed "truth" to be portrayed; 4) an interest in multi-perspectivity, and in making statements by means of inferences and "correspondences" rather than reason or logic; 5) an exaltation of simultaneity and juxtaposition in the present, and hence a "fetishization of immedi-

3. *Die Linkskurve* was a KPD journal whose first issue appeared in August 1929. It stood for the development of a radical proletarian culture, and consequently the journal fought against any "bourgeois" artistic or literary influences on the working class. See Andor Gábor, "Uber proletarisch-revolutionäre Literatur," *Die Linkskurve* (1929), 3-5.

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acy"; 6) a loss of interest in historical continuity and often a denial of the value of the past as such; 7) a willful focus on negation or distortion — or on being difficult and inaccessible; and 8) a strong penchant for aesthetic self-reflectiveness; the work of art, or so modernism claimed, is not a window on the world and does not "refer" to anything but is simply a reality in its own right. Of course, no literary or artistic movement perfectly embodied all of these characteristics, but the majority of the "modernist" movements (from Symbolism in the 1880's onward) confortably accepted most of these points most of the time.

When modernist aesthetic values began penetrating the intellectual world of Marxism after World War I, the stalwarts of orthodoxy were understandably disturbed. All of these new perspectives, partly because they emerged from a supposedly dying middle-class *Weltanschauung*, simply represented decadence or dilettantism. They appeared to contribute nothing toward increasing proletarian consciousness or advancing the class struggle; instead they positively hindered both. For Marxists of this stripe, only one goal mattered: making the revolution. Everything else, including art and literature, had to be evaluated according to whether it promoted or retarded this single end. Ranged against the theorists of orthodoxy, however, were other individuals who were more open-minded, though perhaps less strident in their politics. These people agreed on the importance of social revolution, but argued that this should not stop one from appreciating aesthetic and human concerns not directly tied to the question of revolution. For instance, beauty-in-itself and form-in-itself were worth considering for no other reason than that they helped perfect the aesthetic, sensitive side of a human being (in contrast to Lenin who feared that music might soften the individual, thereby weakening his revolutionary resolve). Marx himself seems to have taken this more generous position regarding art, but many of his followers in the 1920's and 1930's felt that if the door were flung open to the various strains of modernism, there would be no telling where it would end. Maybe the will to revolution itself would be effectively quashed as a result.

Before the door was in fact slammed shut by Zhdanov, the tension between these two points-of-view actually provided an extraordinarily creative atmosphere for the discussion of aesthetic issues from a left-wing perspective. All three books under review here reflect this tension and this creative climate in varying degrees.

Eugene Lunn's book is the most comprehensive of the three, and the one which speaks most directly to the problems just described. Lunn takes as his subject the confrontation between Marxism and modernism as reflected in the work of four individuals: Lukács, Brecht, Adorno, and Benjamin. Each of these thinkers reached intellectual maturity while still *outside* a Marxist framework and therefore without benefit of Marxist conceptions of art and literature. Each, with the exception of Lukács, was greatly affected by the modernist movements of Symbolism, Expressionism, Cubism, and Constructivism, though each assimilated these in different ways and with differing degrees of intensity. Finally, each then moved *into* the Marxist orbit after 1918, but in most cases each felt uncomfortable with the aesthetic ideas found there (e.g. reflection theory, *proletcult* literature, etc.). Their efforts to meld the best features of modernism with the "truths" of Marxism was a project which three of the four individuals took upon themselves (with Lukács, a most implacable enemy of the modernist avant-garde, being the lone exception).

What prevents Lunn's work from being just another re-hash of the thought of these four thinkers is his methodology. In a wholly convincing way, Lunn shows how the perspective of each of the individuals he treats was decisively shaped by his particular

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class background, by the urban setting which helped form him (Moscow, Berlin, Vienna, or Paris in the 1920's), and by the specific aesthetic or philosophical currents which he imbibed. He is also adept at demonstrating how, when one absorbs such currents, one also absorbs the social and cultural ideas directly "contained within the inner structure and meaning of these ideas" (p. 4). At the same time, Lunn avoids the all-too-familiar approach of simply discussing each of his four figures in successive biographical sketches; instead, he expertly constructs the major part of his book around two axes, the so-called Brecht-Lukács debate and the Adorno-Benjamin debate. Even here, however, Lunn manges to compare each member of these two dyads with each of the others, so that a subtle, many-sided discussion of contrasts and similarities results. This marks an improvement over earlier works which tended to highlight only the polarities within these debates, and not the richness and diversity of the interchanges which linked all four individuals to each other. Also, surprising juxtapositions sometimes result. Whereas it has been customary to think of Brecht and Lukács as holding diametrically opposed positions,[4] it is now clearer, thanks to Lunn's work, that when compared to Adorno or Benjamin both were actually much closer on a number of issues that one might not otherwise have noticed. (For example, both Lukács and Brecht were more comfortable than were the other two with Leninism, both equivocated about Stalinism and worked more or less within Comintern policy, both had similar concerns about the immediate political "effectiveness" of art and literature, etc.)

In the first part of Lunn's book, which focuses on the Brecht-Lukács debate, it becomes immediately obvious that of the four, Lukács was the least interested in modernism, even before his conversion to communism in 1918. From the beginning he had steeped himself in the humanist culture of the *Goethezeit*. Consequently, nearly all his artistic judgments came from the perspective of classical German philosophy (as well as the great novels of "critical realism" from Goethe to Balzac). But since most of the works which molded Lukács' outlook were written before 1850, everything after that date appeared to be a precipitous falling away from the ideal. It was no wonder, then, that movements such as Naturalism, Expressionism, Surrealism, and the like, all seemed to him decadent or disintegrative. Since they did not conform to the classical values of organic harmony, totality, and integration, they could only be viewed as signs of degeneration. Because Lukács rejected virtually the whole European avant-garde since Baudelaire, he felt more at home with Zhdanovism than any of the others. Like Zhdanov, he supported the notion that art ought to "reflect" reality (rather than deal merely with subjective impressions), that its job was to clarify underlying social tendencies, that good art necessarily emphasizes themes of continuity, evolution, and "progress," and that literary works were responsible for communicating by "signs" rather than by "symbols" (since symbols reflect only appearances and therefore convey messages of no substantial importance). Also like Zhdanov, Lukács argued that the best works of art needed to achieve *Volksthumlichkeit* ("closeness to the people"), though he failed to note how much the Nazis emphasized exactly the same concept in the 1930's. Naturally, from this point-of-view modernism was condemned as elitist and frivolous. Rather than encourage personal wholeness, or activate working class con-

4. See, for example, Werner Mittenzwei, "Marxismus und Realismus: Die Brecht-Lukács Debatte," *Das Argument*, 46 (March 1968), 12-43; and Klaus Völker, "Brecht und Lukács: Analyse einer Meinungsverschiedenheit," *Kursbuch* (1966), 80-101. Lunn generously admits (ftn. 5, p. 77) that he himself made the same mistake in an earlier article. See his "Marxism and Art in the Era of Stalin and Hitler: the Brecht-Lukács Debate," *New German Critique*, 3 (Fall 1974), 12-44.

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sciousness, it only accelerated the social fragmentation already underway — and worse, it paralyzed the *will* to do anything about it.

On the whole, Lukács comes off badly in Lunn's treatment. His accommodations to socialist realism are shown to be too great, and his inability to assimilate the most lively intellectual currents of his time is portrayed as too debilitating for him to produce the highest quality of work over a long period of time (though his insights and analytical power are certainly acknowledged). Brecht, on the other hand, is treated somewhat more favorably. Because — in contrast to Lukács — he basically accepted the modern world and did not want to flee from it into the past, Brecht developed a more creative, open-minded attitude toward contemporary reality. Also, unlike Lukács, he could envision the artistic possibilities of modern technology, if only "techniques" could be detached from the bourgeois social relations in which they were ensconsed and then "refunctioned" for socialist ends. In the place of German classical culture (which Brecht claimed had been appropriated and hopelessly diluted by the middle-class *Bildungsphilister*), Brecht stressed the importance of the very avant-garde outlook Lukács categorically rejected. For Brecht, everything valuable and useful for the modern artist or writer had come into existence *since* Baudelaire. The major influences on his work stemmed from Rimbaud and Wedekind, French Cubism and Russian Constructivism. This gave Brecht a quite different perspective. It made him more experimental and imaginative than Lukács, more able to see paradox and amibiguity in modern life. It also made him think that perhaps one could not perceive the totality anymore, since it had now become too multi-faceted, too full of contradictions which would not be resolved by any single individual or any single work of art. This is why Brecht stressed the importance of montage, juxtaposition, and imaginary constructions. These at least provided a variety of angles on the social totality which, if it were to be glimpsed at all, could only be seen through a "constructivist montage of shifting multiple viewpoints" (p. 116). As a result of this affirmation of the modernist outlook, Brecht is portrayed as not only more interesting than Lukács, but also more democratic and liberatarian. Moreover, it is obvious that Lunn strongly approves of his original contributions to Marxist aesthetics in the 1920's and 1930's (e.g., the V-effect, "production aesthetics," and the idea of an open-ended work of art which an audience "completes" by means of action).

The second half of the book deals with Adorno and Benjamin. As Lunn points out, both were shaped by modernism before they identified themselves — however loosely — with Marxism. Yet the modernism which left its stamp on each was different. Adorno was formed by Viennese Expressionism, especially musical Expressionism, which was much more disciplined and less apocalyptic than the German variety. He was also greatly influenced by Freud, which partly explains why the "crisis of subjectivity" moved to the center of Adorno's thought in a way it did not for the other three. (By contrast, he was hostile to Surrealism and, until late in life, to Symbolism as well, though both of these movements left their mark on Benjamin's development.) As Lunn shows very well, Adorno did accept tradition but only in order to implode historically given cultural forms from *within*. "This immanent perspective, wherein tradition lived on only through its historically necessary overcoming . . . was to form one of the abiding features of Adorno's historical method of social and aesthetic analysis" (p. 126). In other words, instead of simply abandoning tradition as Brecht largely did, Adorno played with its dialectical reversals. While Benjamin is pictured as the individual with whom Adorno was "in a debate" (though, in truth, the critique was practically all one way: from Adorno to Benjamin), a close reading of Lunn makes it clear that Adorno

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shared more with his younger friend than he perhaps realized. The *real* differences were the ones which separated Adorno from Brecht and Lukács. Unlike them, he did not claim to be involved in radical praxis; nor did he even attempt to reach a working-class audience by means of his writings (hence his lack of concreteness and the intentional "communicative indirectness" of his style). Likewise, there is little overt Marxism in Adorno except the dialectical method, which could just as well have been culled from Hegel. Any call for class struggle, or any hint that the proletariat is the subject-object identity of history, is entirely absent from his work. On the other hand, there is a strong emphasis on aesthetic subjectivity, an emphasis noticeably missing in both Brecht and Lukács. For Adorno, the main duty of the artist was to express himself in and through his aesthetic materials, not to construe his work as a contribution to some social or political collective. The more individualistic and unique an artwork, the more radical — and likewise, the more self-contained it happens to be, the less likely it was to be assimilated, negated, or commodified. As Lunn correctly notes, Adorno ultimately concluded that the most effective protest of avant-garde art lay in the critical and utopian power of its "forms," and not in the particularistic messages of its "content." Hence, precisely the modern artists Lukács most objected to because they appeared to be formalist technicians who lacked *Volksthumlichkeit* (Schoenberg, Picasso, Beckett, Joyce, Kafka, etc.) were the ones Adorno held up for emulation.

The last figure Lunn deals with is Benjamin. In many ways a prototypical modernist, Benjamin was shaped by two different avant-garde strains: one going back through Proust to Mallarmé and French Symbolist poetry, the other traceable to the influences of Surrealism and Brecht's epic theater. Adorno, with equally impeccable modernist credentials, was nevertheless critical of Benjamin in their by now famous exchange of letters in the mid-1930s.[5] On the one hand, Adorno took exception to Benjamin's Marxism. In his opinion, it was too materialistic and schematic, it overestimated the beneficial side of modern technology, and it exaggerated the ability of people to transform their lives in the face of an increasingly administered existence. On the other hand, Adorno also found fault with Benjamin's modernism. To him, it seemed too visually and spatially oriented (compared with the temporal, internalized reflection encouraged by music or reading), and these qualities made it appear not only superficial but also more easily cooptable by the advertising industry. Likewise, Adorno was certain that Benjamin's defense of the "loss of the aura" in art was badly misconceived, since in Adorno's view this loss did not amount to a positive development. The analogical-metaphorical method of writing with which Benjamin felt comfortable was also censured on the grounds that it hindered dialectical understanding. For Adorno, effective writing demanded that opposites be mediated so that each pole could be seen in terms of the other and criticized relationally. Benjamin, by contrast, preferred the unmediated juxtaposition of images or quotations which he thought forced disruptions, "epiphanies," or explosions of awareness in the minds of readers.

In their dispute, Adorno appears, on the face of it, to make the better case but I suspect that Lunn intends Benjamin to be the secret hero of the book. All in all, this is an excellent work — to my mind the best condensed treatment of the confrontation between Marxism and modernism that exists in any language. Besides following through superbly with the methodology he set for himself at the outset, Lunn also attempts to link the ideas of his subjects to particular aspects of their personalities. This turns out to be convincing on the whole; but more importantly, it also adds a personal touch to a

5. The key letters of this exchange have been translated and reproduced in Frederic Jameson (ed.), *Aesthetics and Politics* (London, 1979), pp. 100-141.

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discussion which would otherwise run the risk of remaining too abstract. Thus Lukács' espousal of "popular" art is explained in part as a compensation for his bad conscience regarding his *haute bourgeois* background. Brecht is shown as a child to have been frail and sickly, and perhaps to have had some questions about his masculinity; Lunn suggests that his aggressive affectation of vulgarity and "plebeian realism" (or even his advocacy of industrial productivity) may have been aimed at eliminating the traces of what seemed weak or sentimental in his character. Similarly, Benjamin's disinterst in subjectivity, and his cultivation of the opposite notion of "giving oneself up to objects," may be traceable to his own self-hate, including the discomfort he felt with his own body. These subtle connections between personality and world-view are interesting but extremely hard to prove. Without forcing his observations on the reader, Lunn does a good job of simply pointing them out and then wisely leaving it at that.

Whereas, in Lunn's book, Benjamin is only part of a larger story, in Richard Wolin's new study he advances to the center of discussion. *Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption* provides an excellent introduction to the many dimensions of Benjamin's thought. Beginning with the influences which shaped the young Benjamin, Wolin moves on to deal at length with the ideas contained in perhaps Benjamin's most difficult work, the *Trauerspiel* study. He then proceeds to elaborate upon Benjamin's theory of knowledge, the contours of his thought in the 1920's, the impact on him of Brecht's "crude thinking," the dispute with Adorno in the 1930's, the nature of his unfinished *Passagenarbeit*, and the final form given to his literary views and his "materialistic theory of experience." Wolin's approach throughout is chronological rather than topical (though he pauses to analyze carefully some of Benjamin's more important books and essays). To some this may seem a drawback, since it follows the conventional format of intellectual biography, even though Benjamin is a most unconventional subject. Nevertheless, this approach has the advantage of allowing Wolin to make one very important point: that the apparent contradictions between Benjamin's early "theological" phase and his later "materialistic" one are much exaggerated, and that at the end of his life he reconciled what differences there were in some of his best (though incomplete) works. Wolin appears to feel that Benjamin's earliest work (*Trauerspiel* and before) was brilliantly insightful, but too esoteric and messianic. The Marxist essays of his middle period — exactly the ones Adorno criticized most severely — suppressed the messianic element and were for that reason overly flat and mechanistic, even though they were less hermetic and more politically efficacious. Only in his last years, according to Wolin, did Benjamin begin to fuse successfully these two divergent tendencies; when this happened, the result was such fragmentary but richly textured pieces as "Some Motifs in Baudelaire" (1939), or "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1940).

If one sets the Benjamin portrayed by Lunn against the Benjamin pictured by Wolin, a number of things become clear. For one, the notion (in Lunn) that Benjamin got many of his central ideas from French Symbolism needs to be augmented by a stronger emphasis on the influence of the Jewish mystical tradition. Of course, no one has denied the importance of his influence (and Lunn himself does not deny it: he merely plays it down). But what Wolin helps elucidate is how close certain mystical strains are to the poetics of Symbolism — expecially the concept of a "lost paradisiacal language," or the notion that there is a "science of the combination of letters" which can lead one to the Absolute. In light of Wolin's book, it could be argued that Benjamin did not need Symbolism to formulate the major points of his early thought (as Lunn seems to imply); he could have done it on the basis of a close reading of a Kabbalist like

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Abraham Abulafia. (Abulafia's conviction that "language is not simply a utilitarian means of communicating something, but is of an inherently divine nature, and as such represents the most direct link that mankind can have with God"[p. 40] sounds almost exactly like Stéphane Mallarmé. But perhaps it was Abulafia rather than Mallarmé who provided the stimulus for Benjamin's most creative early work.[6])

Similarly, Wolin makes it clear — inadvertently, since at the time he wrote, Lunn's book had not yet appeared — that it is not always possible to place Benjamin at a far remove from Zhdanov, or to treat one as an enlightened modernist and the other as a vulgar socialist realist. When, in the mid-1920's, Benjamin adopted a fairly rigid Marxist stance, he sometimes wrote in a manner Zhdanov could hardly have faulted. For instance, in a 1927 essay (cited by Wolin, p. 144-45), Benjamin argued that in Russia it was appropriate that literature be stripped of its autonomous status — precisely the thing that, for Adorno, made literature a radical and critical enterprise! Instead of losing itself in psychological "refinements," literature should, according to Benjamin, be used as a pedagogical tool for the education of the masses and the building of socialism. Also, Wolin points out that there is an obvious immanentist side to Benjamin. His critical strategy did not rely exclusively on the use of paradox and juxtaposition which is what Lunn generally stresses. It likewise emphasized the need to draw out transcendental possibilities from the homogeneous continuities of historical reality *(Das Immergleiche)*. The "truth content" of historical events and cultural artifacts had to be rescued from their merely "material content," but this implied some kind of transformative criticism which salvages and "raises up" what is latent out of what is simply manifest. All of the importance Benjamin placed on remembrance and redemption assumed a vision of immanent transvaluation. Wolin tends to stress this important point more forcefully than Lunn.

Though other distinctions between Wolin and Lunn could be made, it would be a mistake to suppose that they offer conflicting views of Benjamin. Their differences emerge in matters of emphasis and in details of interpretation, but they are in agreement about Benjamin's overall stature and importance. By reading both works, one gets a more complete picture of Benjamin as a philosopher and aesthetician. If Lunn's discussion of Benjamin as a literary theorist can be said to surpass Terry Eagleton's recent work in many respects, then Wolin's study can be said, at the very least, to rank alongside Susan Buck-Morss's as the best treatment in English of Benjamin as one of the consequential thinkers of this century.[7]

Of all the modernist movements discussed by Marxist commentators, probably none has gotten more attention than German Expressionism. The so-called *Expressionismusdebatte* of the 1930's — which engaged the polemical abilities of, among others, Lukács, Bloch, Herwarth Walden, and Béla Belázs — raised important questions not only about the politics of the movement but about the nature, form, and

6. It has also been argued recently that many of Benjamin's ideas came from neither Symbolist aesthetics nor Jewish mysticism, but from the influence of Boehme, Romantic Neo-Platonism, and (most especially) the poetry of Hölderlin, which Benjamin immersed himself in around 1914-1915. See Michael W. Jennings, "Benjamin as a Reader of Hölderlin: The Origins of Benjamin's Theory of Literary Criticism," *The German Quarterly*, LVI, no. 4 (November, 1983), 544-62.

7. See Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York, 1978); and Terry Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin, or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism* (London, 1981).

8. Two important contributions to this debate — one by Lukács and another by Bloch — have been translated and reprinted in Fredric Jameson (ed.), *Aesthetics and Politics* (London, 1979), pp. 9-59. See also Lukács's "Expressionism: Its Significance and Decline," *Essays on Realism*, trans. David Fernbach (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 76-113.

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effectiveness of its critique of German culture and society.[8] Since then a number of studies of Expressionism have appeared, the best being Richard Hamann and Jost Hermand's *Expressionismus*, followed by another book with the same title by Silvio Vietta and Hans-Georg Kemper.[9] Now a new work entitled *Passion and Rebellion* is available in English. The editors of the volume, Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas Kellner, have assembled twenty-two articles dealing with all aspects of the movement, including its politics, its aesthetic credo, and its major contributions to literature, painting, theater, music, dance, and film.

Before commenting on the essays in this collection, it is important to ask first: What was so significant about Expressionism that makes it worth reconsidering today? It is obvious that the editors think of their volume as offering a much needed reevaluation. They want their readers to understand Expressionism as an important "socio-cultural movement," not simply as an artistic phenomenon, which is the way it has often been dealt with in the past. In their view, Expressionism raised extremely important questions about life in modern society. It was the rebellion of passionate subjectivity against various forms of manipulation and control. It was a protest against the reality of industrial capitalism. It was, finally, part of a larger movement in 20th century culture which provided critical insights into the contemporary bourgeois epoch, "an epoch which is not yet over." That the editors hope a reconsideration of Expressionism in our own *fin-de-siècle* might have political (or at least inspirational) consequences for present-day social movements is clear from their preface. There they write that the reassessment of Expressionism might help provide "images and ideas which can animate the desire for a transformation of reality." In the judgment of Bronner and Kellner, the Expressionist legacy still contains unredeemed emancipatory elements and utopian visions which can yet be called upon to "liberate creativity and life from repressive social and cultural constraints" (xi).

From such a favorable tone at the beginning of the book, one would expect a forceful defense of the movement. But this is not exactly forthcoming. The net effect of the collection of essays is to proclaim two, not three, cheers for Expressionism. This is as it should be, since the movement had both a positive and a negative side which must be taken into account if the Expressionist legacy is going to be accurately assessed. Hence, the affirmative spirit of the preface is counterbalanced by a larger number of critical comments from many of the contributors (including Bronner and Kellner in their own essays for the volume).

On the positive side, Expressionism is praised for its attack on conventional mores; its strong indictment of instrumental rationality and the mechanization and bureaucratization of modern life; its pacifism, internationalism, and anti-authoritarianism; its "core of genuine humanism" and longing for universal brotherhood; its stress on retooling "bourgeois ideologies of subjectivity"; its demand for instinctual liberation; its attempt to formulate a "socially relevant aesthetic"; and its eagerness to experiment artistically in order to unleash the creative power of the imagination in both the artist and in the audience. On the negative side, Expressionism is faulted for its frequent tendency to deal only with the private torment of the individual soul without providing any "objective" comprehension of social misery; its merely "romantic anti-capitalism" bereft of any real comprehension of capitalism as an economic system; its near total incapacity to envision concrete alternatives to the status quo because of a penchant for vague metapolitics; its inability to transcend notions of bourgeois individuality (except by carrying them to extremes), and hence also its failure to grasp the impor-

9. Richard Hamann and Jost Hermand, *Expressionismus* (Berlin, 1975); and Silvio Vietta and Hans-Georg Kemper, *Expressionismus* (Munich, 1975).

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tance of inter-subjectivity; its inherent elitism, which often assumed that the artist was by nature superior to "the masses"; its dubious emphasis on "intensity," "energy," "dynamism," and "revolutionary ecstacy" (all notions which could and did move Expressionists to the far Right as well as the far Left); and finally, its sometimes creative but sometimes irrational fascination with nihilism, violence, cruelty, and everything that suggested the primitive or the elemental.

It must be kept in mind that the outlook of Expressionism, like that of virtually every modernist movement, was initially non-Marxist (or pre-Marxist). If its vision or its social analysis now seems unsophisticated, it is because, for the typical Expressionist, feeling took precedence over reflection, and *Geist* was stressed over *Politik*. Not suprisingly, for those individuals who later entered the Marxist camp, such a simplisitc approach seemed highly questionable. Practically all the people discussed by Lunn, for example, were extremely critical of Expressionist assumptions. Lukács attacked it for its irrational and "mystical" tendencies, and for the way it allegedly dissolved real social relations into a "bathos of emotion." Brecht disapproved of its self-pitying attitudes, its sentimental idealism, and its excessive "O Mensch!" lyricism. And Benjamin took it to task for its exaggerated subjectivism, which prevented Expressionists from "giving themselves up to objects." Only Adorno — and, of course, Bloch — issued a strong defence of Expressionism as being, first of all, a significant protest against modern fragmentation, and secondly, a meaningful articulation of anguished subjectivity.

The contributors to *Passion and Rebellion* also acknowledge the limitations of Expressionism, but at the same time they succeed in taking a fresh look at many of its characteristics. This enables them to move beyond the Expressionist debates of the 1930's —where Expressionism was specifically evaluated within the context of the triumph of Nazism — and to re-assess the movement in light of both the political upheavals of the 1960's and the more sober political realities of the 1980's. The most valuable essays in the collection are those which operate within a broad theoretical framework, and which therefore permit the reader to view Expressionism through the lenses of some larger perspective. The pieces which fit this description best are Kellner's opening essay, "Expressionism and Rebellion," Arthur Mitzman's "Anarchism, Expressionism, and Psychoanalysis," and Barbara Wright's "Sublime Ambition: Art, Politics, and Ethical Idealism in the Cultural Journals of German Expressionism." Besides these, there are several more specialized essays which go a long way toward illuminating particular aspects of the Expressionist legacy. Among the best are Peter Jelavich's contribution on the origins of Expressionist drama, and Marian Kester's piece on the art of Kandinsky. The volume ends with an excellent essay by Bronner entitled "Expressionism and Marxism: Towards and Aesthetic of Emancipation." In addition to placing the whole Expressionist movement within a broad historical context, Bronner offers some interesting observations on what qualities a genuinely liberatory and revolutionary art might have to have in the present age in order to be "effective" (i.e., to both express the artist's radical perceptions and, at the same time, to stimulate a meaningful critical practice in others).

All three books under review are worth reading for anyone concerned with the relation between art and politics in the twentieth century. Each in its own way makes clear how much vitality there was in the various modernisms which flourished in the decades between 1900-1940. The "open" Marxism of a Benjamin or an Adorno could profit and grow from an encounter with the profusion of concepts and ideas which these modernisms made available; the closed Marxism of Zhdanovism could not.

David Gross

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Jean L. Cohen, *Class and Civil Society. The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory*, (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 264 pp.

Marxian class theory has been unable to account for the most significant historical developments of the 20th century. The rise of fascism not only belied the hopes put in the revolutionary proletariat, it also brought into the center of the political stage those social strata which the class theory had relegated to, at best, secondary supporting roles. The triumph of the Bolshevik revolution and the institutionalization and expansion of Soviet socialism has not only failed to issue into the anticipated free, classless society, but has led to the creation of a new system of stratification and domination which is simply unthinkable within the classical Marxian framework. Late or advanced capitalism continues advancing in spite of all its crises and contradictions. Actually it feeds on them. The intervention of the state in the economy and the integration of the workers movement through unionism and social democracy into the very system of crisis management has led to a reconstruction of the capitalist system along lines which are radically different from the classical liberal model. The relation between state and society has been radically altered and the structure and mechanisms of stratification have been complicated. Moreover, new social movements have emerged which can not be accounted for in terms of the theory of class struggle, thus putting into question the political relevance of a theory which seems unable to inform critically these movements or to articulate the radical needs of new social groups that cut across class lines. Different variants of "Western" or "Neo-Marxism" have attempted to revise particular aspects of the Marxian class theory in light of the changed historical circumstances, but these theories are doomed to failure in as much as they do not challenge the basic dogmatic assumptions of the old paradigm.

This is the point of departure of Jean Cohen's critical analysis of Marx's theory of class and civil society. *Class and Civil Society* begins with a critical overview of four basic types of Neo-Marxist new class theories: theories seeking a revolutionary subject other than the proletariat; "new working class" theories; structuralist class theories; and theories of the "new intellectual class." In each case, Cohen shows what has been revised and what remains of the original assumptions.

The work of Herbert Marcuse is taken as the paradigm of those theories seeking a substitute for the revolutionary proletariat. Marcuse's theory of "one-dimensionality" can be seen as a response to the "failure" of the proletariat. Once it became evident that the class which was the revolutionary class par excellence, "because it embodied the absolute negation of bourgeois society," had been integrated into the capitalist system politically as well as culturally, the search for substitutes began. Marcuse's turn to the "underclasses" marked a turn away from the critique of political economy and towards the philosophical presuppositions of Marx's theory. Marcuse's effort to derive "radical needs" from psychological and anthropological rather than economic factors was, as Cohen points out, a "significant new, non-Marxist element," but "Marcuse's ability to positively validate the needs of non-working class strata and to recognize their potential, is vitiated by the retention of the notion of a unified, revolutionary subject" (p. 5). Moreover, Marcuse's focus on the critique of alienated labor led him to conceive freedom in non-political terms, as the extension of free time made possible by automation, and to exclude any concern with political institutions. Indeed, all institutions of modern civil society are reduced to being nothing but "bourgeois" and "capitalist." It follows that total emancipation demands nothing short of the total abolition of civil society.

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The "new-working class theories" (Gorz, Mallet) can be seen in many respects as a response to Marcuse's theoretical impasse. The distinction between an "old" and a "new" working class allows their theory to "save" the workers from the thesis of embourgeoisification and one-dimensionalization. A new political economy of advanced capitalism, developed around the concepts of the scientization and professionalization of the labor process, discovers the emergence of new social strata, which are created by the very process of capitalist rationalization and to which a radical revolutionary potential is attributed. The reelaboration of the concept of radical needs and of the theory of alienation, begun by Marcuse, permits Gorz and Mallet to impute to the new working class radical qualitative needs for autonomy, participation and workers' control which are both generated and denied by the capitalist mode of production. But, as Cohen points out, "the theoretical strategy of locating radical needs within a particular group remains the same" (p. 7). The result is the totalization of disparate strata with particular interests into a single "class" with universalistic qualities and needs. The historical "praxis subject" is still rooted in the concept of unalienated labor, which Cohen interprets as "unreconstructed ouvrier-ism." Cohen finds it little surprising that, confronted with the internal inconsistencies of the theory, Gorz has recently bid his *Farewell to the Working Class* (1982)[1]

Marxist "structuralist" class analysis (Poulantzas, E.O. Wright) follows an altogether different strategy, this time trying to "save" the theory from unreliable subjectivity and class unconsciousness, as well as from the tests of empiricism and positivism. Objective factors, i.e., "structures," determine class positions. Thus, it becomes the task of those initiated into the science of structures to determine the exact boundaries between classes. Indeed, "the boundary problem" becomes the central issue in structuralist analysis. The exercise in pigeonholing could well be called the label theory of class. Of course, it is assumed that this structuralist classification is important because, in some unexplained way, 'classes are social forces and have real consequences'." The criteria used by Poulantzas, for instance, to classify the proletariat — "productive" (economic criterion), "non-supervisory" (political criterion), and "manual" (ideological criterion) labor — serve to distinguish the proletariat from the "new" middle strata which, irrespective of the fact that they may be productive wage workers, usually engage in supervisory, mental labor. Thus, "structurally," they belong to a "new petty bourgeoisie." But, as Cohen points out, Poulantzas's attempt "to defend the purity of the proletarian basis of Communist politics has the unfortunate result of reducing the working class to a minuscule proportion of the population" (p. 12).

By juggling with the old categories and by redefining the criteria — "control over labor power," "control over the physical means of production" and "control over investment resources" — Eric Olin Wright is able to increase once again the ranks of the proletariat. Moreover, the redefinition of the middle strata as "contradictory class positions" allows the discovery of new potential allies for the impending struggle between capital and labor. If only the workers and their potential allies had the scientific understanding provided by Marxist structuralism! Cohen argues that "such an approach is incapable of grasping what is new about the social strata and social movements proliferating in contemporary capitalist societies" (p. 14).

Finally, Cohen examines the theory of "the new intellectual class" in its Western (Gouldner) and Eastern (Konrad and Szelenyi) versions. This theory transfers the class referent of the historical materialist theory of revolution from the workers to the

1. See Johannes Berger and Norbert Kostede's review of Gorz' book in *Telos*, n. 51 (Spring 1982) pp. 230-234.

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intellectuals. The ideals of "intellectuals" — "critique, emancipation, participation, egalitarianism, social justice" — are subjected to an "unmasking" ideology critique that divests them of their universalistic aura and reduces them to what they truly are, i.e., the particular interests of the class on the road to class power. By maintaining that intellectuals are a "class" with specific interests, Gouldner wants to undermine the claims of intellectuals — "organic," "free-floating," etc. — to selflessly represent the interests of other strata, particularly the proletariat, or to stay above the fray. But, as Cohen points out, "it is difficult to see just what the class theory of intellectuals adds to the common analyses of the privilege and power of intellectual strata besides a deterministic evolutionism" (p. 16). It is the "use and abuse" of the Marxian revolutionary class model, in trying to analyze a new phenomenon of internal stratification within contemporary capitalism, that Cohen finds questionable. Szelenyi and Konrad's much more sophisticated version of the theory is criticized on similar grounds. Cohen argues that, notwithstanding the significance of the book as a critique of the political economy of state socialism, the analysis remains too loyal to the categories of historical materialism. The economistic model hinders the possibility of examining "the primacy of the political" or of considering "new" principles of stratification other than class.

It is necessary to become aware of the theoretical and political bankruptcy of the Marxian class theory, in its classical as well as its contemporary versions, to fully appreciate the significance of Cohen's *Class and Civil Society*. Cohen's analysis may generate a lot of resistance. Some may have given up the myth of the proletariat or the myth of the revolution, but to question the soundness and relevance of the theory of class itself is to question one of the central categories of Marxist analysis. In Cohen's own words, however, "unless the presuppositions of Marxism are reconstructed and immanently criticized, they are bound to constantly reemerge from the intellectual history of the past century to haunt those who seek to revise or transcend Marx in light of historical transformations" (p. 2).

Cohen's book offers both: a systematic reconstruction and an immanent critique of Marx's theory of class. Although Cohen insists that her book is not an exercise in Marxology, her systematic, thorough, at times painstaking reconstruction of the origins and the main turning points in the changing concept of class throughout Marx's work, not only amounts to one of the best and most systematic analysis of the Marxian theory of class, but it also throws new light into the whole of Marx's work in a way that is more enlightening than many of the recent exercises in Marxology. But Cohen also subjects the Marxian class theory to a "ruthless criticism," indeed, her critique is in many respects more "radical" than many a "bourgeois" critique for, ironically, supposedly anti-Marxist academic stratification theories end up, as Cohen herself points out, "affirming some of the worst Marxist assumptions" and "reproducing some of its worst dogmas" (p. 231). Cohen's critique is an immanent one in three ways. First, it is informed by the emancipatory intention of the original Marxian project. It is precisely the inadequacy of the theory to point towards viable emancipatory politics that demands the task of critique in order to rescue those original insights which are still valid for the project of developing a new critical theory of society. Second, the weapons of criticism are borrowed from the very theory being criticized. Cohen subjects the Marxian theory of class and civil society to the kind of ideology and defetishizing critiques to which Marx had first subjected Hegel's theory of civil society and classical political economy. Marxism as critique remains for Cohen "an unsurpassed model for critical thinking" (p. xiii). Finally, the critique is internal rather than external to the

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theory. It is not a question of subjecting the theory, in positivist fashion, to the falsifying test of empirical reality. This has been done by others. Cohen insists that it is not simply the structural changes in late capitalism that have rendered the class theory inadequate, nor is it merely a problem of "false consciousness." The class concept itself is the problem — especially the notion of a universal class. By reconstructing the stages of development of Marx's thought, Cohen is able to reveal the deep-seated antinomies of the class theory.

Chapter 1, "Civil Society and Its Discontents," constitutes the core of the book. Cohen's original interpretation of Marx starts with the assumption that the concept of civil society and its vicissitudes are the key to the whole of Marx's work. For Cohen, Marx's selective appropriation and critique of Hegel's theory of civil society, not only have "crucial bearing on the class theory, the theory of revolution and the various models of the communist future," but are also "crucial in Marxian methodology, for the object of investigation, the concept of ideology, and the method of analysis employed all shift according to *changes* in the interpretation of civil society" (p. 23). This perspective permits Cohen to place the usual periodizations of Marx's work in a new light. Her intention is not to offer a "symptomatic" reading to Marx's texts in order to "save" either parts or the whole theory as being truly "Marxist." Her reading tries to ascertain what is still "salvable" and "usable" for her project to develop a critical theory of "modern" civil society.

Cohen divides Marx's work into four periods: the critique of civil society prior to 1844; the first critique of political economy of 1844; the theory of historical materialism, 1845-57; the systemic theory of capitalist development in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital,* 1857-83. Both the continuity and discontinuity in Marx's work is explained by the fact that "each new period can be grasped as an attempt to develop solutions or alternatives to problems arising in previous formulations of the critique of civil society" (p. 24). Actually, Marx's entire work can now be grasped as a failed attempt to develop solutions or alternatives to the problems arising from Hegel's theory of civil society.

Marx takes from Hegel the notion that the differentiation of civil society and state is the hallmark of modernity. For Hegel, the emergence of a formally autonomous civil society was the basis for free, self-determining individuality, but also the basis for the disintegration of ethical communal life and its transformation into an impersonal system of atomized, privatized individuals confronting one another in the egoistic pursuit of their own self-interests. Hegels' attempt to find a system of mediations, the corporate organization of civil society and the estate form of representation, were his conscious response to this threat of disintegration. Marx criticized Hegel's institutional mediations as anachronistic and as contrary to the very principles of civil society discovered by Hegel. But, in the process, Marx also rejected all other possible institutional solutions to the problems of the modern order. Civil society is reduced to the system of needs, laying bare the type of "social relations" which is constitutive of modern civil society, i.e., class. Socioeconomic class relations emerge as the specifically "modern" principle of stratification. This discovery, however, led Marx to "radicalize the opposition between a totally fragmented civil society and the state (mediated only through class oppression)" (p. 28). Once all institutions of civil society are deemed unacceptable, the solution can lie only in some form of *reunification* of political and social life by abolishing both: a depoliticized, differentiated civil society and a state whose formal democracy and universalistic legal articulation only veils the particular interests of a particular class. Civil society means, therefore, the dual depoliticization of modern individuality. This is the Janus face of modernity. On the

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one hand, there is a "bourgeois society" made up of apolitical individuals united only through private needs, interests and mutual dependence mediated by the division of labor and the market. On the other hand, there is a state, whose monopolization of political life "signals both the loss of community and the denial of meaningful citizenship to the members of civil society" (p. 32). Cohen emphasizes the fact that Marx's critique is an "immanent" one, a type of critique which he later abandoned but Cohen wants to make central to her project of developing a new critical theory of contemporary civil society. Marx's analysis takes the form of a critique of "class" and "bureaucracy" as the institutional negations of the very universalistic principles which constitute the normative claims of civil society and the formally democratic state. Cohen argues that Marx's awareness of the "negative" side of civil society led him astray when he viewed the very separation of state and civil society as the ultimate "cause" of modern political alienation. This misconception would lead him, in turn, to the search for the universal within a particular agent which was itself the negation of the universalistic principles of modernity. For Cohen, this turn had ominous consequences. "Instead of seeking to articulte an institutional structure of civil society and the state that would be universal insofar as it allowed for the formulation of *all* interests and the participation of *all* pluralities in sociopolitical life challenging the state's monopoly of politics, he sought an embodiment of universality within a particular class" (pp. 28-29). The "proletariat" becomes that particular class which, by reason of being the radical negation of the society which negates it, carries within itself the abolition of that society through its self-abolition.

The positive contribution of Marx's critique is the crucial insight that "class" is the historically specific "modern" form of stratification distinguishable from all other premodern forms. Its negative corollary is the false implication, which Cohen attributes to "the unfortunate combination of Hegel's notion of the 'negation of the negation' with the concept of 'universal class,' (p. 61) that the abolition of the "class" structure of domination logically implies the abolition of all domination and the realization of "true human emancipation." The first theoretical flaw, which has burdened Marxian class analysis ever since, lies in the derivation of the universality and emancipatory role of the proletariat logically rather than sociologically. Moreover, even if the proletariat was to become through revolutionary praxis the "realization" of philosophy, nothing ensures that the revolution of that class would necessarily imply a positive revolution *for* the emancipation of humanity. This logical fallacy, Cohen argues, also had ominous consequences for the future model of society after the revolution. The programatic reunification of state and civil society switched back and forth between, a) the vision of a "stateless, direct democracy of freedom," which in its attempt to regain the communal basis of politics reverts to the premodern polis at the price of doing away with the political achievements of modernity (romantic, political Rousseauianism) and, b) the vision of "a centrally planned, rationally administered society," which reproduces and exacerbates the productivist and scientistic bias of capitalist rationalization (technocratic Saint-Simonianism). Cohen's analysis shows that the "class theory never transcended this archetypical antinomy of modern rationalization" (p. 38).

Marx's discovery of the proletariat as being both the problem and the solution to the antinomies of modern civil society, led him to change the focus of his analysis and the method of his critique. The Paris *Manuscripts* of 1844 mark not only Marx's first confrontation with political economy but also a new approach to the analysis of civil society and a change from "immanent" to "unmasking" and "transcendent" critique.

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The new focus on capitalism as being the systemic cause of class, inequality and domination brings some gains but also some losses into the analysis. The problem of stratification now moves to the center of analysis and civil society is seen in terms of its "anatomy," i.e., labor and class relations. This permits Marx to deepen the critique of civil society by uncovering the key to the structure of domination of modern society: "alienated labor." The wage-labor/property relation is unmasked as the true foundation of civil society and political economy and the "scientific" theory of this society is exposed as its ideology. But, in the process, Marx's original ambivalence towards civil society — an ambivalence derived from the recognition of the "negative" as well as the "positive" side of this society — disappears and civil society is reduced to capitalism *tout court*.

Having lost the ground for "immanent" critique, Marx now turns to philosophy in search of the philosophical presuppositions which may serve as the basis for a "transcendent" critique. The concept of "labor as objectification" and the category of "radical need" form the new philosophical presuppositions. A dualistic concept of labor unites the philosophical notion of "objectification" (species activity) with the historically specific form of wage labor. The first critique of civil society had located the "essence of man," praxis, in political action. The new concept of praxis locates the essence of man in "labor-as-objectification" — a concept linked to a speculative teleological philosophy of history. The philosophical elaboration of the concept of "need" permits Marx to develop a "transcendent" critique of capitalism, as the system unable to satisfy the needs it itself creates by imposing a social division of labor that reproduces poverty and alienation for the working class.

In her critical reconstruction of the philosophical pre-suppositions, Cohen builds on Agnes Heller's *Theory of Need in Marx*[2] and on Habermas' critique of Marx's restriction of the self-constitutive process of the species, "praxis," to the concept of labor, in order to show that "Marx never really succeeds in demonstrating that the experience of alienated labor leads to the self-constitution of a revolutionary class with radical needs and the potential to develop a new form of social individuality" (p. 74). Cohen shows that the antinomy in Marx's theory of the proletariat lies not only in the famous distinction between "class in itself" and "class-for-itself." It is the concept of "class" itself that is antinomic and the projection of radical needs onto the proletariat as a class that is problematic, for Marx's own theory of need implies that only individuals can have needs, while "a socio-economic class *qua class* can have only interests." (p. 75) Moreover, the assumption that a particular and collective subject must also be "universal," i.e., "represent" the universality of the species in its being in order to struggle for the realization of universalistic values is simply unfounded. Cohen attributes this "fallacy of representative logic" (p. 79) to a residual Hegelian panlogism which "subjugates the contingencies of historical praxis and the plurality of potential actors to the demands of reason" (p. 78).

Cohen interprets Marx's subsequent shift to historical materialism as an attempt to find a more secure grounding then the one provided by either the philosophy of praxis or the philosophy of labor. In Chapter 3, "Class and History: The Evolutionary Version of the Theory," Cohen offers a critical reconstruction of the "orthodox" model of the class theory which summarizes in a systematic form the well-known critiques of "economic determinist" and "scientistic" Marxism. Cohen uses Marxian categories from the critique of civil society and from the "mature" critique of political economy

2. See Jean Cohen's review of Agnes Heller's *Theory of Needs in Marx*, in *Telos*, n. 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 170-184.

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to criticize Marx's "disastrous" turn towards historical materialism. This turn is characterized, first of all, by a shift from philosophy to science which leads to the dehistoricization of Marxian categories.

Historical categories lose their historical specificity, are projected onto the past as well as onto the future, and become general categories applicable to all of history. Marxism becomes a "science" which has discovered the key to the "logic" and the "laws" of history. The concept of civil society is replaced by the concept of "mode of production" as the object analysis, thus generalizing the dialectic of forces/relations of production. The new synthesis of political economy with evolutionism "collapses" "history" with "economic development." The concept of class suffers a similar dehistoricization. It no longer refers to a stratification principle unique to capitalist society: it is now projected backward as the motor of history. History becomes the history of class struggles. All relations of domination are reduced to productions relations, expressed as class antagonisms, thus precluding an investigation of nonclass forms of domination and stratification. The concept of labor suffers a similar transformation. Reduced to the economic concept of production (labor in general), it now replaces the broader philosophical concept of objectification and the historically specific concept of wage labor. The economism and productivism of historical materialism entails "the universalization and naturalization" of specific capitalist features now projected onto all social formations. "To constitute history and society along the single parameter of 'mode of production' is to impose the political economic postulate of an autonomous economy, dubious even for the 19th century, onto the past, present and future" (p. 87). Marx falls prey to the very fetishization he would later criticize in political economy.

At another level, the positivist self-understanding of Marxism as "science" leads to a shift from critique to dogma. "Critique loses its primacy and ideology, its truth content" (p. 41). The conception of history reveals, however, a deep-seated antinomy between the "evolutionary" forces/relations model and the "revolutionary" theory of class struggle, an antinomy which is only apparently resolved by reducing the historical role of revolutionary classes to that of "representing" progress in the forces of production. Man loses it subjectivity and historical praxis becomes an illusion. Historical actors become, at best, the agents of an objective logic of history which operates behind the backs of individuals. Cohen points out that "the theory of historical materialism goes so far as to identify the self-activity of individuals and classes with the development of the productive forces themselves" (p. 90).

Cohen articulates clearly the consequences which the triumph of determinism had for the theory of revolution and for the model of the future society, and, one could add, for emancipatory politics as such. The same pattern of dehistoricization, faulty generalization, overdetermination and projection onto all of history is repeated with the concept of revolution. Meant to express radical ruptures, indeed, the radically new and the openness in history as well as the creativity and historicity of social action, this concept is trivialized, naturalized and reduced to a mimetic category. Cohen shows how the historical materialist theory of revolution, that was derived from an "absurd" class model of the French Revolution, is universalized into the definition of revolution *tout court* and imposed as a goal on the workers' movement. As to the future model of society, "the phantasm of the science of history that understands pre-history as composed of stepping-stones on a dialectical route to capitalism turns against Marx when he tries to scientifically ground a radically different future. Just as the symbolic wealth of precapitalist societies is utterly lost in the arrogance of a theory that sees everything

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in the image of its own time, so too the future alternative becomes an impoverished one when conceptualized in terms of the productive logic of capitalism." (p. 102) The theory which announced the end of pre-history and the beginning of true human history is unable to break with "the mirror of production" and can only anticipate "more of the same." This mimetic productivism, moreover, is further impoverished by the abolition of politics. Ironically, Marx's attempt to reunify civil society and state and thus, to recreate the conditions of possibility of a lost political praxis, leads to the dissolution of the rich opposition between state and civil society in statism. It is political interaction, not the state that withers away. As the administrative instance of society, the state now absorbs the logic of production of capitalist society. The introduction of the base/superstructure model dissolves political categories altogether by reducing the state, law, civil liberties and ideologies to mere epiphenomenal expressions of the mode of production.

Apologists often point to the rich, multifaceted and empirically informed class analysis of Marx's historical writings to argue that this caricature-like critique of economic reductionism and determinism is perhaps applicable to "vulgar Marxism," but not to Marx himself. But in a chapter dedicated to a critical analysis of "the historical writings," Cohen shows, that even if one was willing to put aside the paradigmatic texts of the theory of historical materialism, the fundamental antinomy of the class theory remains. "The class *theory* tends constantly to close off new paths and to prevent Marx from pursuing the insights his sociological class analysis provide" (p. 132). The antinomy between "an open-ended, nondogmatic critical sociology of class" and the "superimposition of the *interpretive schema* of the closed, totalizing and leveling logic of historical materialism" remains unresolved (p. 112).

In the last two chapters of the book, Cohen offers an insightful critical analysis of Marx's "mature" systemic writings, the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. Cohen argues that these texts, particularly the methodological introduction to the *Grundrisse* "break" with historical materialism, "insofar as the historical genesis and reproductive logic of a social system (capitalism) are now distinguished from one another." (p. 134). The dialectic is taken out of history and either replaced with a nonevolutionary analysis of precapitalist social formations or located within an analysis of the systemic and developmental dynamics of one social formation, capitalism, the only system "whose logic can be articulated in socio-economic categories because only such a system tends to subordinate and integrate social and political institutions to its own reproductive schema" (p. 134). The fundamental Marxian categories are rehistoricized. The concept of civil society, for instance, regains once again its historical specificity. Indeed, the separation of state and civil society serves as the basis for Marx's analysis of the mode of production as an autonomous "system" with its own internal dynamics, logic of development and crisis tendencies. The concepts of production, labor, alienation, forces and relations of production, and the concept of class itself, all of them undergo a similar rehistorization. The value theory becomes the center around which all the categories are reformulated and unfolded through the analysis of the value forms.

It is impossible to enter here into a detailed summary of Cohen's systematic analysis. It is necessary, however, to point to the conclusion of Cohen's critical reconstruction — a reconstruction which evaluates in its proper weight the merits of Marx's critique of political economy, but also shows the limits of the very project of a critique of political economy. The critique uncovers the logic of reproduction of the capitalist system; it can point to economic crisis tendencies and to the nonaccidental emergence of class relations of domination and conflict in capitalist societies, but no

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more. Marx's totalization of society from the perspective of one sphere, the mode of production, ultimately falls prey to the very fetishistic logic of political economy which he so lucidly criticized. With respect to the class theory, Marx's analysis simply "collapses" the two separate levels of wage labor and capital, on the one hand; and proletariat and capitalist classes, on the other. The systemic and sociological levels of analysis are not sufficiently differentiated. The result of this confusion for the Marxian political project is "the subversion of emancipation." Cohen rightly concludes that "the desire to immanently ground in a systemic logic revolutionary potentials of social action without interrogating the normative, political and cultural modes of integration of individuals into their society, necessarily culminated in a fetishistic class theory and a technocratic utopia for the future" (p. 193).

The only disappointing part of the book is the conclusion, not because it is not interesting in itself,[3] but only because it does not offer what the subtitle "Toward a Critical Stratification Theory," promises. To those interested in the Marxian emancipatory project, the unanswered question remains, "Where to go next?" Cohen calls for the development of a "new" critical theory *and* sociology of stratification, freed from the dogmatic assumptions of the Marxian class theory. Cohen avoids falling into the temptation of trying to reconstruct a "revised" class theory with those elements which are still "salvable." What is not so clear is the relevance which "class" as a category still has for the new theory of stratification or for an analysis of advanced capitalism. From her critique it follows that "class," as a historically specific form of socio-economic stratification, different from other non-class forms of stratification, should be reserved exclusively for the analysis of modern capitalist societies. But what is the significance of class under advanced capitalism? Is it just a form of stratification among others or is it still *the* central form of stratification? What is the relation, if any, between a critique of stratification, a critique of domination and emancipatory politics? It may be that these are empirical questions that demand a sociological answer, not a logical one. But if so, there should be a more explicit call for theoretically and critically informed sociological research. Therein lay the main fallacy of the class theory. Its main error consisted in having "collapsed" logically together five separate elements: 1) the discovery of the "proletariat," Hegel's "Pöbel," as a "class" of impoverished individuals, generated by the emergence of civil society, who claimed the rights of this society but could not be integrated into it; 2) the philosophical theory of labor as objectification, the essential anthropological category of the species; 3) the theory of radical needs, which emerge as a precondition for a radical revolution (these three elements were collapsed together in the *concept* of the proletariat, the bearer of these radical needs and the universal subject); 4) the sociological category of the working class; and, 5) the structural-systemic category of production, wage labor. Which of these categories or elements are still relevant and how are they related to one another? Cohen does not address this question directly, although some implicit answers could be derived from her analysis. Cohen's strategy is to examine contemporary "post-Marxist" theories to see if they can serve as models for a critical theory of contemporary societies. Of the three theorists she chooses to analyze, (Offe, Habermas and Touraine) only Offe addresses directly the problem of contemporary mechanisms and structures of stratification.

Cohen is probably right in focusing on the work of Offe as the best existing model of a theory of stratification that addresses the problem of the complex subsystems of

3. This is a revised version of her article "Between Crisis Management and Social Movement," originally published in *Telos*, n. 52 (September 1982), pp. 21-40.

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stratification which result from the changed relations between the political/administrative and the economic subsystems under advanced capitalism. The emergence of the interventionist state implies that the correspondence of the contradiction between wage labor and capital and the constitution of social classes is no longer valid. Thus, the need to identify the new "political mechanisms" of stratification. By incorporating into his analysis the role of the state "as a new source of stratification," Offe arrives at a three-tiered stratification system: 1) classes or interests generated along the horizontal axis of capitalist market/production relations; 2) new strata and interest groups generated in part by the administrative system, that cut across class lines; 3) marginal strata, interest groups and needs, generated by the selective process of state intervention, but excluded from articulation *vis-á-vis* the political/administrative system. What are the actual interrelations between these subsystems of stratification? Are there other forms of stratification which cannot be logically derived from the systemic theory? Are there other forms of organization and institutionalization of groups, interests and needs which escape the logic of the political/administrative system and may serve, therefore, as potential counterpowers to this system and, in the process, serve also to repoliticize civil society? Systems theory cannot answer these questions. Despite all its significant revisions, the theory is still caught in the kind of systemic pan-logism which Cohen criticizes. To avoid this danger, Cohen turns to a revised theory of praxis (Habermas, Castoriadis), to a revised theory of needs (Heller) and to a new theory of social movements (Touraine). The most significant aspect of this turn is that it opens up again the problems of civil society and of domination as distinct from stratification. Indeed, Cohen's strategy seems to be to go back to Marx's original point of departure, the problem of civil society, in an attempt to build a new critical theory of civil society which wants to avoid the errors of the Marxian theory and inform the organization and institutionalization of new emancipatory political praxis.[4] Those who argue that this project amounts to nothing more then a refurbished liberalism should first read Cohen's critique of the Marxian theory and then come up with a more viable alternative.

José Casanova

4. Jean Cohen, "Why More Political Theory?" in *Telos*, n. 40 (Summer 1979), pp. 70-94.

Samir Amin, *The Future of Maoism*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983 [1981]), 156 pages.

To Samir Amin, Stalinism, "a Soviet type developmental strategy" involves primitive accumulation of capital through the imposition of "a massive tribute on the peasantry" (p. 36) and a siphoning of a huge proportion of that weal "to the military," (p. 37) ending in a militarily expansionist police state with nothing in common with socialism. In contrast, Yugoslavia's Titoism is an ambiguous inheritance, consisting in a flexible polity which is not dominated by a Stalinist police state, a system which "may yet evolve in a progressive direction," although its supposedly excessive reliance on the market and foreign trade produces pronounced economic inequalities incompatible with socialism (p. 127).

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To Amin, only the Maoist strategy properly addresses most of the issues of socialist development. Maoism supposedly changed the terms of exchange of privilege agriculture (p. 51), appropriated voluntary labor reserves (p. 52), averaged out urban and rural income (p. 52), created equal commodity exchange between town and country (p. 53), expanded ancillary economic activities such as sidelines like hog raising (pp. 51, 53), increased "investments in and capital goods credits for the worst-off communes" (pp. 56-7). This, Amin claims, made China "undoubtedly the most egalitarian society in the world" (p. 59).

Even without economic data, these happy conclusion about equality should be dismissed out of hand. They ignore all we know about the inequality of political power and how, in Leninist Party systems, state power makes for an inordinately inegalitarian nation.

But economic data now available shows in addition that *none* of Amin's claims describes what actually transpired under Maoism. Amin seems at some level to know this. He is a serious researcher. He acknowledges that Maoist "hothouse measures" coerced labor, built paramilitary organizations and wasted productive efforts, breeding "administrative and bureaucratic militarization" (p. 69) which "were pushed to an extreme" during "the Cultural Revolution (as in Kampuchea when Pol Pot held sway)" (p. 70). In addition, Amin acknowledges that "Many communes (to which perhaps as many as 100 million [150 million — EF] peasants belong) still find it difficult to meet their member's subsistence needs" (p. 54). Amin further acknowledges that Maoist periods were "marked . . . by a decline in growth rates" (p. 66) and that one Maoist "failure," an "inability to master demographics" actually "canceled out" agrarian accomplishments (p. 59). Grain production per capita actually declined. Amin also accepts new data showing that the scissors gap had not been closed and that prices in practice still at Mao's death favored industry over agriculture. Amin offers no statistics to persuade us that the tribute Chinese peasants paid to subsidize industrialization was not as massive as in Stalinism.

Amin offers one rejoinder — with no proof. He asserts that industrial profits were recycled to finance agricultural development projects (p. 58). Actually, Chinese budget figures show that, except for the post Great Leap 1960's period of anti-Maoist policies when investment in agriculture reached 17%, Maoist budgets kept such investment around 6% — low even for what Amin considers the dependent capitalist periphery of the Third World — leaving poor districts and rural counties to self-finance rural development. The poor were thus starved of funds and Maoist self-reliance further polarized historically inherited regional income inequalities as those that had wealth could accumulate and invest, while the have-nots could not.

Actually, matters are even worse than this. In fact, Maoists suppressed family sidelines such as hog-breeding as remnants of capitalism, thus reducing rural incomes, especially for the poorest peasants who lacked good land and immediate markets. Maoism was a disastrous strategy for the rural poor.

One "positive" thing that Maoism did do was impose large labor corvées. It was no voluntary, as Amin wrongly claims. Still, that piece of appropriation of labor value, while at times murderously inappropriate — as in the Great Leap when it brought millions of premature deaths and a precipitous plummetting of production (p. 47 has the numbers but Amin is silent on their meaning) — by 1978 had also created enriched, levelled, and irrigated soil in large areas of rural China, providing a basis for post 1978 agricultural development which simply did not exist in 1952. It is at least debatable whether that achievement — or any other — cancels out the sum of cruel

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failures which Amin does not total up.

Amin's one economic suggestion — in agreement with Joan Robinson — is that China now should enact a progressive tax to transfer wealth from richer to poorer regions (p. 56). Post-Mao China has done precisely that. But that requires a new bureaucracy and an economy where money has meaning, a society of mobility of economic factors, of markets, material incentives, profitability, etc., at least a market socialism. It is a highly differentiated society, very different from Amin's and Maoism's ideal of solidaristic egalitarianism. Still, China's rural misery has, as a result, been rapidly reduced in that recently differentiated, more Titoist order.

Amin's handling of statistics obscures the Maoist disaster tha previously befell rural China. That false advance of 1958, the first year of the Great Leap, caused three bad years, which were reversed by anti-Mao policies that by 1964-5 restored the rural economy to 1957 levels. That growth was interrupted by the Maoist Cultural Revolution, but resumed again in 1969 as Prime Minister Zhou Enlai wrested the policy initiative away from the Maoist ideologist, Chen Boda.

In Amins's rendition of these periods and facts, "the rhythm of growth in grain production sagged between 1958 and 1968," yet "income inequality tended to increase following agrarian reform until 1957, after which time the peasantry's standard of living steadily imporoved . . . (p. 62); but if "production sagged," living standards could not improve. Writing as if Mao in September 1959 had not defeated Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai's opposition to the Great Leap, as if Mao had not ordered a renewal of the Leap policies whose disasters had let crops rot while people went hungry, Amin wrongly claims that "beginning in 1959 excesses in rural policy were corrected," (p. 70) and then he misleadingly concludes, "the Great Leap Forward was apparently not a catastrophe: the most difficult period (1960-1961) coincided with the Soviet Union's withdrawal of technicians and materials . . . " (p. 64). What that "coincidence" has to do with plummetting food production since 1959, with the skyrocketting death rate in 1959, 1960, and 1961, and with the refusal, until 1961, of China's rulers to enter the world grain market to buy food for China's starving people (at least 14 million innocent victims of Maoist policies), Amin does not say.

What he does say, again erroneously, is that the post 1969 anti-Maoist policies — which continue until this day — did not result in any significant growth in agricultural production" (p. 66). Yet earlier, on a page where he was not noting that these were anti-Maoist policies, Amin called the agricultural growth "remarkable (p. 47), and noted that only after 1969 did growth "fully translate into higher levels of popular consumption," textiles, thermos bottles, radios and televisions, rather than "an increase in basic investment and in military expenditures" (pp. 47, 79). In fact, when these post 1969 anti-Maoist policies were intensified after 1977, the urban/rural income gap was cut 25% and value added in the countryside between 1978 and 1982 equalled the entire quarter century that preceded it, the 25 years beginning in 1952 with the move to nationalize commerce and collectivize agriculture. Amin is simply wrong when he claims that China's growth through 1977 was attained without compromising "the material welfare of its working population" (p. 80). In fact, living per urban worker declined by one-third between 1952 and 1977.

At issue here are not the well-meaning hypotheses of the brilliant Amin but the dangerous policy prescriptions of Maoism. As everyone understands the murderous destructiveness of Stalinist collectivization in the USSR, so it is important to understand the failure of Maoism in rural China in the hope that poor rural people elsewhere not be forced again to suffer such misery. Profoundly concerned with the plight of

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those poor, Amin tells us he is looking to Maoism for a path to successful rural development, "especially compared to the Soviet debacle of the 1930's." People who care about helping the Third World rural poor, however, must also insist on a successful path, especially compared to the Maoist debacle of 1952 to 1977.

Amin has studied China too closely not to half see that Maoism, as Stalinism, is a disaster for the rural poor. But he has too long been committed to self-reliant de-linkage from world capitalism as part of a commitment to authentic growth through solidaristic egalitarianism to draw the conclusion forced on him by the data, by Maoist China's experience. Within Leninism, only a democratized, market socialism is defensible as the least bad socialist alternative for the poor of the rural third world. What has to be avoided, Amin now argues, is "wholesale integration into the international capitalist division of labor . . ." (pp. 33, 41). But how much involvement with the world market is "wholesale," especially when, according to Amin, only Yugoslavia, of all Leninist Party states, has successfully moved from extensive to intensive accumulation with rapid growth (p. 79)? Maoism's "opposition to the market (i.e., value, the commodity, and commodity-exchange relations)," Amin now finds, "precludes the progressive mastery of the economy by the popular masses" (p. 71). To avoid Stalinism, commodity production is required (p. 116). Amin concludes that only by dismantling Stalinist centralized planning, rethinking Leninism's "one sidedly negative appraisal of bourgeois democracy," (p. 75) [because "The dogma of a single and monolithic party is . . . antithetical to socialist democracy," (p. 121)] and reversing Maoism's "abolition of market relations" (p. 72) can democracy and planning on behalf of the poor become possible. But what is health in Leninism-Stalinism-Maoism when Amin acknowledges that to achieve humane and democratic ends, the system must be cleansed by removing the poisonous essence of Leninism, of Stalinism and of Maoism? Given Amin's continued insistence "that there is not a third way," (p. 96) given his praise of North Korea for "autocentric," (p. 84) "efficient," "benign" (p. 85) growth with a democratic potential rooted in a mass party and elected enterprise committees (p. 118), combined with his approval of "the Albanian model" (both equated with the supposed "basically correct general line" of Maoism) (p. 123), one has to conclude that Amin has not absorbed what he acknowledges of Leninist, Maoist and Stalinist disasters, and that he has not yet given any real meaning to his proclaimed commitment to "fully democratic practices" (p. 91), to "real democracy" (p. 97), to the notion that democratic politics — or its lack — shapes the economic system (p. 98, 130). It is too bad, since Amin acknowledges that "So-called Soviet democracy . . . the absence of even bourgeois democracy, signals that the Soviet state is oppressive and exploitive," (p. 99) as proved in 1956 in Hungary and later in Poland (p. 121), and that bourgeois "Democracy . . . represents a decisively progressive step in the evolution of human society" (p. 98).

Amind concludes that "the Maoist strategy is still the only answer to the problems posed by the socialist transition" (p. 146). He cannot, however, even pose the right questions. Since Maoism, in fact, exacts a tribute from the peasantry, produces malnutrition and famine, uses Stalinist-Leninist political means of coercion, militarizes the society, and increases the economic gap and the social tension between town and country, how well then does Maoism work? Unfortunately, Samir Amin throws no light on that crucial question, because he cannot accept as real the painful historical experience of Maoism, which is virtually the opposite of what is predicted by Mao's (and Amin's) misleading theories — theories that are especially dangerous to the rural poor.

Edward Friedman

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Joseph W. Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich*, Princeton University Press, 320 pp.

"Who are you? Tu quis es?" The interrogator was the German philosopher and pedagogue Eduard Spranger. The subject was Carl Schmitt. The place: Berlin. The time: summer of 1945.

The question was "precipitous," as Schmitt acknowledged in *Ex Captivitate Salus,* the book he completed following his release from Nuremberg in 1947.[1] "Who are you?" Who, but one of the most highly acclaimed and esteemed jurists and political thinkers of the Weimar Republic, whose writings captured the attention of Georg Lukács, Karl Korsch, Felix Gilbert, Leo Strauss, Ferdinand Toennies, and whose concepts significantly influenced Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, Karl Mannheim and many other intellectuals and writers on the Left and the Right? Who, but one of the signal defenders of the Weimar Republic against its enemies on the Left and the Right who following the advent of Hitler attempted to become the self-styled "crown jurist" of the Third Reich? Although none of Schmitt's publications or activities consituted punishable crimes as defined by the statutes of the Nuremberg Trials, the controversy surrounding him has not diminished. Jürgen Habermas has called him a "natural son" of Max Weber, firing the debate concerning not only Schmitt's politics, but Weber's as well.[2] Karl Dietrich Bracher characterizes him as "conscienceless." William Ebenstein writes that "his brilliance [is] only surpassed by his lack of character." Other critics, among them Walter Lewald, Jürgen Fijalkowski and Erich Kaufmann, describe him variously as a nihilist, an opportunist, a prophet of the totalitarian state, even "the intellectual prophet of National Socialism par excellence." But there are those, and their number is growing, who, like Leo Strauss, Julian Freund, Gerard Radnitzsky, Helmut Rumpf, Raymond Aron, Bernard Willms and Piet Tommissen see Schmitt as the heir of a political tradition that began with Thomas Hobbes. The "political realism" of Hans J. Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger is indebted to Schmitt's concepts.[3] Extraordinary interest in Schmitt has recently emerged in Japan, where many of his major writings have appeared in new translations,[4] and in Italy, where the Left has taken the lead in discussions and a conference organized by the Venice Section of the "Instituto Gramsci" has been published

1. Carl Schmitt, *Ex Captivitate Salus: Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47*, (Greven Verlag, Cologne: 1950), p. 9.

2. Jürgen Habermas, "Diskussion ueber 'Wertfreiheit und Objektivitaet'," *Max Weber und die Soziologie heute*, Verhandlungen des 15. Deutschen Soziologentages, Im Auftrage der Deutschen Gesellschaft fuer Soziologie, Herausgegeben von Prof. Otto Stammer, (J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck] Tübingen: 1965), p. 81.

3. Morgenthau's complex personal attitude towards Schmitt is revealed in "Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932," *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau*, ed. by Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers, (Washington D.C.: 1977), pp. 15-16. Morgenthau's doctoral dissertation was written in response to Schmitt's 1927 treatise on "The Concept of the Political." Cf. Morgenthau's critique of Schmitt's friend-enemy criterion in *La Notion de "politique" et la Theorie des difference internationaux*, (Paris: 1933), pp. 35-37, 44-64. Schmitt's influence is implicit in all the editions of Morgenthau's magnum opus, *Politics Among Nations*. In his review of the first volume of Kissinger's memoirs (*White House Years*), "The Case of Dr. Kissinger," *The New York Review of Books*, December 6, 1979, pp. 22 ff., Stanley Hoffmann drew attention to the influence of Schmitt's friend-enemy criterion on Kissinger's notion of constant and inevitable struggle.

4. A collection of George Schwab's writings on Schmitt was published by Misuzu Shobo, Tokyo: 1980.

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together with a translation of Schmitt's book, *The Concept of the Political.*[5] Carl Schmitt is, as the German historian Heinrich Muth has noted, "one of the few really significant political theorists of our century, but without doubt the most controversial."

In the concluding pages of *Leviathan,* Thomas Hobbes wrote that his work had been "occasioned by the disorders of the present time." The same is true of Carl Schmitt. Born during the Second or Wilhelmine Reich, his work was occasioned by WWI, the collapse of the German monarchy and the 1918 revolution, the threat of civil war and revolution during the Weimar Republic, the Nazi dictatorship, WWII, the division of Germany and the world in what has been called "the century of total war."

He endured it all and celebrated his 95th birthday on July 11, 1983 in a suburb of Plettenberg, the small town in the Sauerland where he was born and where he retired after Nuremberg. He refused to submit to "denazification" because in his case he considered the process meaningless. As one newspaper later reported: "He could neither be nazified nor denazified." Schmitt compared his fate to that of Hobbes, who endured ostracism despite his significant intellectual contributions. His residence was dubbed by others San Casciano, where Machiavelli lived in exile following his public disgrace and imprisonment and where he wrote the works that would make his name immortal. When Schmitt began publishing again under his own name,[6] the reaction was immediate and hostile, accompanied by a pattern of dissociation already established in the 1940s. Scholars like Carl J. Friedrich, who in 1930 characterized Schmitt as "one of the most acute constitutional theorists" and stated that the 1928 edition of Schmitt's book on dictatorship constituted "an epoch-making discussion to which the writer is indebted for important suggestions," in 1941 dismissed the same book as a "partisan tract." Franz Neumann, having written to Schmitt in 1932 that he shared Schmitt's concern that parties hostile to Weimar would succeed in tearing it apart, in 1942 distorted many of Schmitt's key concepts and wrote that Schmitt's friend-enemy distinction was a "doctrine of brute force in its most striking form." In Theodor Adorno's 1955 edition of the works of Walter Benjamin he studiously omitted those footnotes in which Benjamin acknowledged the importance of Schmitt's ideas. In 1959 Arnold Brecht, a former colleague of Schmitt's, published a massive volume, *Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century Thought,* in which he devoted most attention to the contributions made by Germans, but mentioned Schmitt's name and works not at all. Nevertheless, by the late 1960s continuing interest in Schmitt in West Germany led to new editions of several of his Weimar writings, which in turn led to an upsurge in interest on the part of scholars and writers throughout Europe and beyond.

Since WWII more than twenty books and hundreds of articles have been published on Schmitt; his works have been translated into nine languages.[7] But the name and works of Schmitt are still relatively unknown in the English-speaking world.[8] This is

5. Carlo Schmitt, *La Politica oltre lo Stato,* ed. by Giuseppe Duso, (Arsenale Cooperativa Editrice, Venice: 1981), "Cultura Territorio" no. 13.

6. Among Schmitt's most significant postwar writings are *Der Nomos der Erde im Voelkerrecht des jus publicum Europaeum,* (Dunker & Humblot, Berlin: 1950/74); and *Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politishen,* (Dunker & Humblot, Berlin: 1963/1975).

7. Piet Tommissen, "Carl Schmitt-Bibliographie," *Festschrift für Carl Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag,* ed. by Hans Barion et al., (Berlin: 1959), pp. 273-330; "Ergaenzungsliste zur Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie vom Jahre 1959," *Epirrhosis: Festgabe fuer Carl Schmitt,* ed. by Hans Barion et al., 2 vols., (Berlin: 1968), pp. 739-778; "Zweite Fortsetzungsliste der C.S. Bibliographie vom Jahre 1959," *Revue européenne des sciences sociales et Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto,* Tome XVI, no. 44 (July 1978), pp. 187-238.

8. Joseph W. Bendersky, "Carl Schmitt Confronts the English-Speaking World," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory,* vol. 2, no. 3, Fall: 1978.

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largely to be explained by the animosity on the part of those of Schmitt's former students, friends and colleagues who, because of the Third Reich, emigrated to England and for the most part to the United States, some of whom endeavored to prevent works by and about Schmitt being published. Notable in this regard is Otto Kirchheimer, who during the Weimar Republic received his Ph. D. under Schmitt and integrated many of his mentor's ideas into his writings. Kirchheimer succeeded Franz Neumann in the graduate school of political science at Columbia University, where in 1962 he engineered the rejection of George Schwab's Ph. D. dissertation on Schmitt.[9] Only after Kirchheimer's death in 1967 was Schwab able to obtain his degree, and then only by writing on another subject. His ground-breaking manuscript on Schmitt, which found no American publisher, appeared in English in Germany in 1970 under the title *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936*. The burgeoning of Schmitt studies in the United States today is no doubt due primarily to Schwab, who virtually alone has pioneered the effort.[10] The first English translation of Schmitt's seminal work, *The Concept of the Political*, was published together with Leo Strauss' cogent comments in 1976.[11] The first American colloquium on "Carl Schmitt: The Modern Equivalent of Hobbes," took place at the American Political Science Association's Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. in 1980.[12] Translations of *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, The Condition of Contemporary Parliamentarianism in the History of Ideas* and other of Schmitt's works are in progress under the auspices of the MIT Press' "Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought."

Wilfred von Bredow recently commented that Schmitt's work is too intelligently written and too important to be left in the hands of apologists and detractors. Joseph W. Bendersky is neither. His engrossing book, the first to be published on Schmitt in the English-speaking world, succeeds in providing a detached evaluation. Owing to the fact that the controversy surrounding Schmitt is directly related to his political involvements, Bendersky has made this the focal point of his investigation. Seeing a significant interrelation between Schmitt's ideas and the changing political circumstances, he provides a detailed account of Schmitt's public life. Although the title of his book might mistakenly imply that Schmitt was a theorist for the Third Reich, Bendersky clearly demonstrates that Schmitt neither prepared the way for the Nazis, shared their ideological beliefs, nor provided the legal foundation for their regime. His book contributes to an appreciation of Schmitt's place in twentieth century political thought.

Schmitt's formative influences were Catholicism, neo-Kantianism, WWI, the German Revolution, and the creation of the Weimar Republic. His Catholicism goes far to explain his aversion to materialism and what Bendersky terms his "pessimistic" view

9. George Schwab, "Carl Schmitt: Through a Glass Darkly," Foreward to the Japanese edition of Schwab's writings on Schmitt, op. cit. A truncated English version appears under the title "Schmitt Scholarship, *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, vol. 4, no. 2, Spring/Summer: 1980, pp. 149-155.

10. Schwab, "Carl Schmitt: Political Opportunist?" *Intellect Magazine*, February 1975, pp. 334-337. Cf. the debate on some of Schmitt's concepts in the Schwab-edited *Newsletter* of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, issues August/Oct. 1980, August 1982 and October 1982.

11. Translation, Introduction, and Notes by George Schwab, Rutgers University Press.

12. Among the participants were Schwab and Bendersky. The Proceedings, ed. by Frank Grande, are scheduled to be published under the same title by the Walter Bagehot Research Council on National Sovereignty.

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of human nature. Equally important was his "youthful identity as part of a minority caught in a confessional struggle," since until today Schmitt refers to the significance of the "civil war" between Catholicism and Protestantism for an understanding of twentieth century political theory. When the tension was finally resolved between the special political role Schmitt reserved for the Catholic Church as the representative of humanity and guardian of universal precepts and what Bendersky characterizes as his "Hobbesian thought, a growing political realism, with emphasis on power, conflict, and the concrete situation," his political theory was much the more profound for it.

As is well-known, neo-Kantianism challenged the prevailing positivism and materialism of the nineteenth century and by the early twentieth century it was defying the absolute power of the state by subjecting it to law. But with national survival at stake in WWI, the state assumed ever greater significance in Schmitt's writings, leading away from neo-Kantianism. To facilitate the war effort, martial law was declared with the outbreak of hostilities and Schmitt, having been assigned to the state-of-war section involved in administrating martial law at the General Staff Headquarters in Munich, had first-hand knowledge of the increased exercise of state power. The practical and legal problems of that experience left an indelible mark on him; he began to subscribe to the Hobbesian concept that law is the creation of the sovereign authority, i.e., *auctoritas, non veritas facit legem.* He would no longer emphasize moral purpose, but rather the concrete danger, or what he would later term the "concrete situation" as dictating the actions of the state. Obedience to the legally constituted authority became a fundamental maxim of his political and legal outlook.

Once the Weimar Constitution had been ratified by the popularly elected National Assembly and a new legally constituted authority had replaced the monarchy, Schmitt had no difficulty reconciling himself to the fact: "By accepting the Weimar constitution the German nation does not want to disavow its identity with that of the constitution of 1871; it wants to renew its Reich . . . but not establish a new Reich. Just because it is democratic, the new constitution does not establish a new German state. It only signifies that a people, which until now believed [in] . . . monarchical principles . . . [has decided to] continue its existence on the basis of a constitution which it has granted itself." This fundamental understanding of the relationship between the German state and the Weimar constitution underlay Schmitt's attitude both toward Weimar and its enemies — an attitude shared on the whole by those prominent conservatives like Max Weber and Friedrich Meinecke, who accepted the Republic out of good sense rather than sentiment. Schmitt thus understood the defense of the Weimar constitution to be the defense of the state.

Within a matter of months after the new constitution had been ratified, the government was being challenged by extremists on the Left and the Right. Following the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 and attendant attempts at torpedoing the constitution, which revealed that ideological and class differences had not been resolved and that civil war and revolution were menacing, Schmitt addressed himself to the concrete danger facing the republic and in 1921 published a historical and theoretical study of dictatorship in which he distinguished between "sovereign" and "commissarial" forms. The first differs from both an absolute monarchy and a sovereign aristocracy in that it is transitional, since it utilizes a crisis to eliminate the existing order and establish a new constitutional order. The second or "commissarial" dictatorship is limited in that it exists only for the purpose of eliminating the crisis and only so long as the crisis exists. In other words, a commissarial dictatorship can temporarily suspend certain

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laws or parts of the constitution in order to meet a present danger, but it cannot change existing laws or make new laws. It exists only to uphold the constitution. Schmitt saw Article 48 of the Weimar constitution as the instrument on which the state could rely to take all necessary measures to preserve the existing order. But he also foresaw the possibility and warned against the danger that a commissarial dictatorship under Article 48 could be transformed into a sovereign dictatorship that would destroy the Weimar constitution and hence the Weimar state.

In this period of mounting instability, culminating in the "crisis year" of 1923, which saw the French occupation of the Ruhr, the climax of runaway inflation, the Nazi Beerhall Putsch, and the aborted Communist "German October," Schmitt responded with an enormous intellectual output dealing with the problems of the Republic — most notably *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* in March 1922; *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* and *The Condition of Contemporary Parliamentarianism in the History of Ideas* the following year.

In its structure and succinctness, *Political Theology* was not only quintessentially Schmittian; it foreshadowed the concise and coherent political philosophy Schmitt would later articulate in *The Concept of the Political.* The first half, summed up in its lapidary opening statement, "Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception," presumed the relevance of the second half, summed up in its similar opening statement, "All pregnant concepts of political theory (*Staatslehre*) are secularized theological concepts." By addressing the "concrete situation" before revealing its theoretical foundation, Schmitt demonstrated the significance of his frequent use of such phrases as "philosophy of real life," "adequate expression of reality," and "concrete juridical questions." In writing that "nothing is more modern than the struggle against the political," he had in mind Hans Kelsen's thesis that the legal system is nothing more nor less than the basic underlying norms found in the constitution. He argued that such preoccupation with "scholarly objectivity" neglected the realities of social and political change and failed to address the concrete question of the exception, which by definition precludes the possibility of binding it to a norm. As he put it: "There is no norm which would be applicable to chaos." The crucial question for Schmitt was "Who decides?" on the state of exception.

The Concept of the Political was published first an an article in 1927 and later as a book. Rejecting any idea of universal morality and law, Schmitt recognized that there are only " . . concrete human groupings which fight with other concrete human groupings in the name of justice, humanity, order and peace" and that the question is who decides what these concepts mean in a concrete situation. The contrast with the argument in his book on political Catholicism was striking, since there he had maintained that the Catholic Church had historically proven sufficiently flexible to make necessary adjustments and alliances without compromising its intrinsic principles. The concrete situation in the late 1920s revealved that the Catholic Church in Germany was becoming more like a special interest group than a universal institution and that its parochial *Weltanschauung* was as much a factor in limiting political harmony as were the ideological positions of the socialists and nationalists and indeed the political parties, which were reducing politics to a means of satisfying narrow economic and class interests.

The opening statement of *The Concept of the Political* said it all: "The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political." Since only the state is capable of protecting its citizens from internal and external enemies, it is the institution which must either rise to meet its obligations of assuring order, peace and stability or be prepared to for-

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feit its sovereignty. Since in extreme situations only the state is capable of making the crucial political distinction, the state is the decisive political entity. Simply stated, Schmitt's seminal concept is that "the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy." It is more a criterion than a definition, corresponding to such other antitheses as good and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, etc. It denotes the utmost degree of union and separation, association and dissociation, existing theoretically and practically without necessarily and simultaneously drawing other distinctions. Thus the political enemy is not necessarily morally evil; he is merely "the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in extreme cases conflicts with him are possible . . . " Not to be confused with moral or economic concepts or private feelings, the political enemy is solely the public enemy, that is *hostis*, not *inimicus*.[13]

By 1928, when Schmitt left the University of Bonn to accept the Hugo Preuss chair at the Graduate School of Business Administration in Berlin, he had become part of that small vanguard of professors like Weber, Toennies, and Max Scheler, who pioneered the development of German political science. In the process he had not substituted propaganda for scholarship, nor had he become a political activist. Neglected by Rightists and conservative revolutionary organizations, he had frequently been invited to deliver lectures at the republican *Hochschule für Politik*, opened in Berlin in 1920 for the purpose of educating Germans in political affairs. Now, as Weimar was entering its final phase in which he would actively enter the political fray, Schmitt published his classic legal study, *Constitutional Theory,* in which he systematically considered issues raised earlier in his critique of contemporary parliamentarianism.

Schmitt's book on contemporary parliamentarianism had joined the debate on liberal politics and raised issues that even today engage the political Left. He argued that no political system could rest solely upon either sheer force or the technical procedures of government: "To the political belongs the idea, because there is no politics without authority and no authority without an ethos of belief." Modern parliamentarianism had strayed so far from its original moral and intellectual foundations that it was becoming "an empty apparatus" that would be defenseless against ideologically motivated movements such as Bolshevism and Fascism.

In a letter to his friend, Moritz Julius Bonn, Schmitt confessed that he had "an almost continual fear [of the manner in which] the German Right and Left pursue their politics" and Bendersky aptly comments: "The history of the Weimar Republic showed that his fears were well-founded." But in spite of his fears, Schmitt did not favor the elimination of parliamentary government. Although he found it neither more nor less than "useful," it was clearly the "lesser evil" as compared with "Bolshevism and dictatorship" and "untried methods of government." In *Constitutional Theory* he asserted that a constitution originates not from legal norms but from a poltiical decision on the part of those who hold the "constitutional granting power." Once the German people had made "a political decision for a constitutional democracy," the Weimar constitution as a whole, i.e., the spirit of the political and legal order, was "inviolable."

The distinctive element in Schmitt's exposition was that the constitution must be interpreted on the basis of its spirit, rather than on the wording or details of specific

13. At this time Schmitt still conceived of the adversary in the traditional context of the *jus publicum Europaeum*, not yet cognizant of the distinction elaborated by George Schwab, "Enemy oder Foe: Der Konflikt der modernen Politik," *Epirrhosis: Festgabe für Carl Schmitt*, Hrsg. von Hans Barion et al., (Berlin: 1968), pp. 665-682.

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articles, and that the inviolability of the spirit of the constitution placed limitations on revisions. He warned moreover that in certain political circumstances a literal adherence to specific constitutional articles might paralyze the entire governing process and thereby endanger the constitution and/or the security of the state. It would be inconsistent and unrealistic to, on the one hand, assert the inviolability of the constitution or express loyalty to the Republic and, on the other, to ignore the political dangers to the existing order. Thus, in March 1929 Schmitt developed his concept of the president as "the defender of the constitution," building upon arguments he had made as early as 1924 at the First Conference of the Association of German Constitutional Lawyers in Jena. To the dismay of the majority of legal experts present, he had contended that the president must be allowed the widest possible latitude for action in line with the dictates of the concrete situation. Speaking concretely, he favored a "commissarial dictatorship" in accordance with Article 48, whereby the president could, if necessity dictated, temporarily suspend most of the provisions of the constitution in order to maintain stability and security. At that time his position was defended by Preuss, the father of the Weimar constitution. In the late twenties, when the Weimar parliament was becoming more an arena for dividing the nation into a plurality of social groups than an institution where compromise and political unity could be achieved, and when every incumbent or majority coalition declared its own acts legal and designated any criticism of its own position illegal, Schmitt again looked to that "neutral force" standing above pluralistic party interests and representing the whole German people.

In Berlin, the center of German politics, Schmitt made the transition from cloistered academician to constitutional advisor to the government by establishing personal relations with many prominent personalities, among them Johannes Popitz, a state secretary in the Finance Ministry, Chancellor Heinrich Bruening, and most significantly Hindenburg's confidant Kurt von Schleicher. With the embattled Republic once again facing a major crisis, both Schmitt and Schleicher feared that fratricidal politics could bring Germany to the brink of civil war or open the way to power to the extremists. As Bendersky writes: "They saw the German state as the only bulwark against such a catastrophe. It was on this point that the ideas of Schmitt and the policies of Schleicher converged, closing the gap between the realm of theory and the realities of political life." Pursuing some of his own ideas on how to strengthen the existing order against the onslaught of the Nazis and the Communists, Schmitt published in 1932 yet another major work, *Legality and Legitimacy*, which would be his swansong for the Republic.

Reiterating his thesis that a constitution could never provide the legal means for its own destruction, Schmitt identified the greatest danger to be a "value-neutral" and "purely functional" interpretation, which would allow its destruction through legal means. It was in this context that he developed his concept of the "equal chance," then very unpopular with the liberal democratic establishment but recognized as basic to any liberal constitutional order in post-WWII Europe. Schmitt's essential point was that the Republic should only extend an "equal chance" to compete for political power to those political parties committed to upholding the constitution, i.e., the "equal chance" should be denied to all anti-constitutional parties which, once in power, would legally close the legal door behind them, denying an "equal chance" to other political parties to compete for political power. Were an anti-constitutional party to gain power it would suddenly find itself in possession of what Schmitt called the "political premiums" that accompany the legal possession of power and use them to

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abrogate the constitution: "The majority is then suddenly no longer a party, it is the state itself." Finally, he warned that unless those in authority recognized the logic of the situation and blocked the constitutional road to power of the Nazis and the Communists, "reality will avenge itself."

Owing to the Nazi assumption of power shortly thereafter, Schmitt's arguments were all the more remarkable. But he was fighting a losing battle. Just as Hindenburg was uncertain of Chancellor Schleicher's motives, Schmitt was misinterpreted by almost everyone else. The Leftist journal, *Weltbuehne*, charged that he had become the apologetic "crown jurist" of the government, and this judgment was shared alike by Catholics, liberals and socialists. Bendersky has it right: "The defenders of the Republic were so concerned with a constitutional violation that they were blinded to the dangerous alternative so clear to the Chancellor and Schmitt." A case in point was the Catholic Center Party, whose Prelate Kass wrote to Schleicher on January 26, 1933 warning against Schmitt's alleged constitutional relativism. Below the front-page article in *Germania* announcing Schleicher's resignation on January 30 was the letter headlined: "Kass Warns of Illegality." While Hitler was being sworn in as Chancellor, Schmitt wrote a reply: "One would find in none of my publications and in no authentic verbal remark even one phrase which could justify such degrading of my constitutional interpretations. My constitutional expositions are entirely concerned with the attempt to convey recognition of the meaning and consequences of the German constitution, without regard to changing party interests, and to oppose degrading it to a tactical instrument and tool. I do not relativize constitutional law, but struggle against the misuse of the concept of legality and a value- and reality-neutral functionalism." Bendersky adds: "Contrary to the claim of Schmitt's post-WWII critics, that statement was not an apology, but a succinct elucidation of his basic approach to constitutional law." The Nazis had acquired power not through the use of Article 48, but precisely because it had not been used against them.

As he was wont to do, Schmitt responded to the passage of the Enabling Act of March 24, 1933 with an article assessing its implications. He saw clearly that it represented more than a major constitutional amendment and more than a temporary provision similar to that of the Enabling Act of 1923. It represented a revolutionary change in the nature of the constitution itself, as decisive a transformation as that of the 1918 Revolution. What he had feared all through the Weimar Republic had now come to pass. An anti-constitutional party had seized upon the amendment process to undermine the constitution. In a later publication, he described the Enabling Act as the "Provisional constitution of the German Revolution," i.e., the genesis of a new political and legal order. Schmitt expected Hitler to use his legal mandate and dictatorial powers to institute far-reaching changes in the political and legal system, but he was still hoping that Hindenburg could serve as a counterweight to the Nazis. Because the constitution had not been officially abrogated, and the institutions of the parliament, the president, etc., were immune from decrees under the Enabling Act, he continued to argue that parts of the Weimar constitution were still valid. He made a special point of emphasizing that the president retained his constitutional authority, including his right to dismiss the Chancellor, his emergency powers under Article 48, and his supreme command of the army.

But when all was said and done, Schmitt was forced to recognize that National Socialism had become the dominant force in German politics. It was on the basis of this new political reality that he joined the Nazi Party on May 1, 1933 and set out to become the "crown jurist" of the Third Reich by attempting to create a constitutional

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structure within the framework of a traditional authoritarian state in which the Führer and the Party would be bound by certain "institutional guarantees." The means to this end spelled collaboration, which became ever more degrading as the end appeared more desperate. Attempting to make his ideas more palatable to the Nazis, Schmitt adopted their jargon, paid lip-service to their ideology, defended the "legality" of Hitler's purge of the SA in 1934, and even included anti-Semitic statements in his writings. Nevertheless, as Bendersky points out, "Such changes in Schmitt's attitude and writings were not due to any recently acquired sympathy for National Socialism, but resulted from his recognition of the increasing domination the NSDAP exercised over German society." He "never succumbed to a belief in the biological racism of National Socialist ideology. He always considered such ideas absurd..."

Although none of Schmitt's writings were ever commissioned or condoned by the Nazis, they did not hesitate to adopt and adapt his ideas to suit their own purposes. Even before Hitler became chancellor, Nazi apologists had appropriated Schmitt's friend-enemy criterion, indicating, as Bendersky comments, that "Schmitt had obviously lost control over his own ideas." Nevertheless, neither then nor later did the Nazis acknowledge Schmitt to be one of their own. He was suspect from the very beginning and by 1936 his past had caught up with him. Spurred on by genuine Nazi ideologists and German emigres, both of whom considered him an opportunist, the SS Security Service initiated an extensive investigation, which established Schmitt's defense of Weimar, opposition to National Socialism and friendship with Jews. When these findings were published by the SS in December 1936, he was warned in no uncertain terms to stop posing as a Nazi theorist.

Thereafter, Schmitt's options appeared to be either emigration abroad or the so-called "inner-emigration," which meant avoiding public political involvements and retreating into scholarly pursuits. He chose the latter because emigre publications were deliberately providing the SS with grist for their mill. Until the end of WWII he continued to occupy the chair in public law at the University of Berlin he had accepted in the summer of 1933. But he could not fail to respond to the concrete reality of a totalitarian party which conceived the state as a means for the realization of National Socialist ideology. Early in 1937 he published "The State as Mechanism according to Hobbes and Descartes" and in 1938 *The Leviathan in Thomas Hobbes' Theory of the State,* in both of which he demonstrated the incompatibility of Hobbes' ideas with any type of totalitarian order. Bendersky writes: "Unmistakably, Schmitt had Nazi totalitarianism in mind when...he began to work on Hobbes. However, Schmitt never entertained the thought of resistance to the Nazis. Like Hobbes, he believed that resistance to the power of the state would be a fruitless absurdity, since the state monopolized power and had the means to destroy any resistance...Thus, Schmitt found himself in the precarious position of an individual who is uncertain if his existence is secured by the state, yet to whom resistance appears hopeless."

His precarious position notwithstanding, Schmitt now began to focus attention on questions pertaining to international law and relations. Following Hitler's diplomatic successes in the Anschluss with Austria and in regaining the Sudetenland, which established German hegemony in Central Europe, Schmitt found support for his conviction that the traditional state system was undergoing a fundamental transformation. In a lecture before the Institute of Politics and International Law at the University of Kiel early in 1939 he introduced a new concept of extraterritorial order (*Grossraumordnung*), which he carefully distinguished both from the Haushofer school of geopolitics (which had succumbed to Nazi ideology), and from the demographic

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theory of *Lebensraum* favored by Hitler. His model was the Monroe Doctrine and its concept of nonintervention in the Western hemisphere. As he saw it, the new *Grossraum* in Central and Eastern Europe, dominated by the German Reich and its political idea, would stand between the Western nations and their political idea of liberal democracy and the Bolshevist East and its idea of world revolution.

After the Nazis were in control of most of Europe, Schmitt expanded his concept accordingly; but Bendersky points out that he analyzed changes only after they had taken place, i.e., "Schmitt did not advocate war or the Nazi conquest of Europe"; he "did not provide the theoretical foundations for Nazi foreign policy." In fact, real Nazi ideologists attacked Schmitt's concept; but commentators in England and elsewhere presented Schmitt as the theorist behind Hitler's expansionary politics. He had lost control of his ideas inside and now outside Germany, and this situation is still true today. Bendersky's book goes far toward returning control of these ideas, if not to their author, at least to the scholar.

In conversation with his friend Ernst Juenger in 1941, Schmitt compared his predicament during the Third Reich to that of Benito Cereno, the protagonist of Herman Melville's novel about the Spanish captain of a slave ship, who, following a mutiny, retains only the appearance of control, thereby confusing the captain of an American vessel with whom his ship later came in contact. Bendersky comments: "the significant difference between Schmitt and Benito Cereno was that the former never attempted to escape and never considered any action which might undermine Nazi rule. Until the very end, Schmitt behaved like a true Hobbesian, obeying in return for protection." An immanent critique of Bendersky's book might well focus on the cursory references to Schmitt's "Hobbesian thought" at the outset, his "tremendous respect for Hobbes" evident in his 1938 book, and his "Hobbesian behavior" throughout and in conclusion. Although Bendersky considers these references meaningful, he fails to explain their significance. Beyond the oft-repeated correlation between protection and obedience, we never learn to what extent Schmitt's thought is Hobbesian and to what extent it is Schmittian.

The upshot is a certain ambiguity with respect to Schmitt's task and particularly with respect to his behavior. At the beginning of his chapter on Schmitt as "crown jurist" of the Third Reich, Bendersky writes: "Succumbing to fear and quickly forgetting his own advice, Schmitt subsequently based many of his political decisions on personal considerations, and suffered the consequences for the rest of his life. Always a cautious realist, Schmitt's keen instincts for self-preservation took control...". Further on, we read: "Fear, ambition, and vanity each played a role in determining the way Schmitt reacted to the changing circumstances...," and finally: "Opportunism had certainly been a major factor in Schmitt's National Socialist career but equally important was his belief that he could, as the Nazi *Kronjurist*, establish a constitutional framework for the Third Reich." Since Schmitt's ideas and actions during the Weimar Republic argued against his collaboration with the Nazis, this is the only sense that Bendersky makes out of the most critical decision of Schmitt's life. But one could as well argue that Schmitt, being a declared enemy of the Nazis and early critic of their racial theories, risked all — his reputation and his life — in an attempt to salvage the German state in the early years of the Third Reich and that such an intention was equally as "Hobbesian" as his sense of self-preservation when the effort failed. Whatever the truth of the matter, the apparent discrepancy between the Schmitt of the Weimar Republic and the Schmitt of the Third Reich cannot be adequately explained by Bendersky's oft-repeated references to the protection and obedience formula.

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Reflecting in the fall of 1946 on the "family" of thinkers to which he belongs, Schmitt significantly omitted mention of Machiavelli, whose political ideas were developed before the 16th and 17th centuries, i.e., before the creation of the *jus publicum Europaeum* and the modern state.[14] He mentioned Francisco de Vitoria, Alberticus Gentile, and Hugo Grotius: "I know them, their work, their lives and their fates, as well as the history of their fame until today. I love them. They belong altogether in our camp. But they do not belong to my study."[15] To his study belong two others, who "founded international law on the basis of constitutional law" — Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes: "These two names stemming from the time of the confessional civil wars, became for me like the names of living and contemporary men, like the names of brothers with whom I have grown up in one family over the centuries. The invisible hand that directs our reach for books has for thirty years guided me again and again to that exact spot on the shelf...The thoughts and formulations of these two are always with me...They have kept my mind alert and forward-looking...Through them I have found actual answers to the questions of international law and constitutional law in my time..."

Both Schmitt's "brothers" bore the characteristic stamp of having confronted civil war; but in all other respects they could not have been more dissimilar. After drawing attention to some of these distinctions, Schmitt says of Bodin: "With unsurpassed success he expounded the decisive concept of the *jus publicum Europaeum*, of the internal and external nature of the sovereign state. He is one of the accoucheurs of the modern state. Nevertheless, he had not yet apprehended the modern Leviathan, which appeared in four forms, the quadripartite combination of God and Animal and Man and Machine. His despair was not yet great enough."[16] After another hundred years of theological disputes and civil wars, Hobbes' despair was much the greater and it was he who conceived the modern Leviathan: "As a private person he remained aware of the foundation of all law, and for him this was a reciprocal relation between protection and obedience...He went to the heart of the matter, where he could deal with how to bring an end to civil war and where he found an effective safeguard. He did not concern himself with taking on the potentates and dogmatists of his time. Thus he secured his observation posts and constructed an edifice of the clearest intellectual consistency. With fear and foresight, he lived more than ninety years and led the life of an independent mind."

After the "despair" of another three hundred years, Schmitt, like Hobbes, followed a similar logic in a different situation. Bendersky draws attention to the importance Schmitt attaches to the "concrete situation," but his own situational treatment of Schmitt's public life fails to come to grips with the complexity of Schmitt's concept. On the one hand, he all but disregards Schmitt's view of his times, and on the other, he hesitates to place Schmitt in the context of his times. In fairness to Bendersky, one might presume that he did not choose to repeat the work of Leo Strauss, Helmut Rumpf, George Schwab and others, but the question remains unanswered.

In the *Festschrift* for Ernst Juenger, Schmitt wrote: "Historical thinking is that of unique situations and therefore unique truths. From a rational point of view, all historical parallels serve only the most rigorous realization of this uniqueness."[17] The historical

14. Schmitt recognized that no political writer or theoretician of the state has had a success equal to Machiavelli. Nevertheless, "he was neither a great statesman nor a great theoretician." Cf. Carl Schmitt, "Machiavelli. Zum 22 Juni 1927," *Koelnische Volkszeitung*, June 21, 1927.

15. Schmitt, *Ex Captivitate Salus,* op. cit., p. 63.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 65 f.

17. Schmitt, "Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West:

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parallels between Hobbes and Schmitt should serve also only the most rigorous realization of Schmitt's uniqueness, for Hobbes is the theorist of the modern Leviathan at its beginning and Schmitt at its end. Nevertheless, when Schmitt recently proclaimed: "I am no Hobbes, but like Hobbes I am 'a sole retriever of an ancient prudence'," he was making a distinction without a difference, since Schmitt lauds Hobbes as "the real teacher of a great political experience; alone, like every pioneer; misunderstood, like one whose political ideas are unrealized among his own people; unrewarded, like one who opens the door through which another can march on; and yet, in the undying community of great men who know their times 'a sole retriever of an ancient prudence'."[18]

G.L. Ulmen

Bemerkungen zu Ernst Juengers Schrift: 'Der Gordische Knoten'," *Freundschaftliche Begegnungen: Festschrift fuer Ernst Juenger zum 60. Geburtstag*, (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt/Main: 1955), p. 147.

18. Schmitt, *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols*, (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg: 1938), p. 132. Cf. Bernard Willms, "Politik und Theologie: das Carl Schmitt Problem," *Der Weg des Leviathan*, Beiheft 3, *Der Staat*, 1979, pp. 114-129; and Udo Bermbach/Kaus-M. Kodalle (Hrsg.), *Furcht und Freiheit: Der Leviathan-Diskussion 300 Jahre nach Thomas Hobbes*, (West-deutscher Verlag, Opladen: 1982), pp. 79, 96, 103, 116, 183, 188, and 238.

Paul Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980; Paperbound edition, 1983).

In the late 1960s political and theoretical conflict on the left between Marxism and anarchism, one of the recurrent features of socialist history was rekindled when vehemently "anti-authoritarian" currents spread throughout the international student movement. But whereas anarchist sentiments helped to fuel the "events of 1968," various Marxist critiques of anarchism were rehearsed in their aftermath to help explain the weaknesses of the rebellion. Paul Thomas' superb *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (1980), which was begun in this post-1968 climate of reassessment, is a far richer and many-sided study, however, than the usually ephemeral products which emerged from the years 1968-73. This is the first and only full-length study of Marx's long-running battle with his anarchist competitors on the left, providing us with the most penetrating examination available of the theoretical sources of their various disputes. But the book contains more than comparative analysis. Through the prism of Marx's bitter struggles with the anarchists, the author ably illuminates the much-debated question of Marx's own political theory.

Thomas analyzes in detail each of the disputes Marx had with major anarchist thinkers — Stirner, Proudhon and Bakunin — after having developed the overall framework in terms of which Marx approached the question of political action, the state and proletarian emancipation. A major premise is that the conflicts between Marx and the anarchists should not be construed to be merely about tactics, on the assumption that they both allegedly shared the long-range stateless goal, since both sides quite rightly refused to so separate ends and means and treated the question of tactics as "embody-

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ing a real futurity" (p. 342), as deeply structuring the revolutionary society toward which they were aiming. That Thomas is able to demonstrate this so persuasively, is able, that is, to show the depth of the division between the two positions, results from the meticulous care with which he reconstructs each side in the debate. Thomas presents the disputes from multiple angles, in terms, for example, of divergent intellectual sources of Marxism and anarchism; the precise arguments against the anarchists which Marx developed in key texts, such as *The German Ideology* and *The Poverty of Philosophy*; and the particular textual, historical, and institutional settings which did so much to define the contours of debate. The disciplinary focus of the book, an historically sensitive political theory, is one of its undoubted strengths: by treating each of the conflicts within their social, intellectual and institutional context (e.g., Proudhon in relation to mid-nineteenth century French social conditions, the battle with Bakunin in terms of the history of the First International, etc.), Thomas avoids the more abstract and ahistorical kind of exercises in political theory; at the same time, the theoretical sophistication and rigor of Thomas' analysis outdistances the earlier narrative historical accounts which are flat and superficial by comparison.

Whereas anarchist anti-politics derive from the contractarian liberalism of the eighteen century Enlightenment, Thomas argues, Marx's attempt to recast political action as a primary mode of human self-emancipation is developed from Hegel's epistemological and social theory. The exposition of the latter argument, which takes up the first third of the book, is one of the finest discussions I have seen of the Hegel-Marx nexus and serves vitally to underpin much of the later analysis of Marx's conflicts with the anarchists. (The other thesis, the indebtedness of the anarchists to eighteenth-century classical liberalism, is somewhat less successful, though it too provides a host of new insights into old questions.) Thomas convincingly demonstrates that while abandoning Hegel's political solution (the bureaucratic state) to the dissociative, atomized and dehumanizing tendencies which the philosopher found in civil society, Marx draws heavily on Hegel's diagnosis when developing his own politics. Here Thomas shows more fully than anyone before that for Marx alienation involves much more than the denial of creative labor; it is a basic feature of the poverty of politics in a market society governed by possessive economic individualism and marked by the virtual absence of both active political citizenship and community. Instead of focusing on reductive and crude "ruling class" theory, which is usually seen as the major touchstone of Marx's analysis of politics, Thomas persuasively argues that there is another, more promising theme running through Marx's political writings — a searching critique of the "alienated politics" of bourgeois civil society and the need for its political (as well as economic, social, cultural, etc.) overcoming. To eschew and condemn working class *political* organizing, which the anarchists do in the name of blanket indictments of all forms of authority, was, according to Marx, to undercut the very struggle which enabled a future self-governing socialist society to develop itself.

From this vantage point, Thomas shows in a new way the continuity of Marx's political thought from his early critique of Bruno Bauer's idolatry of the state ("On the Jewish Question") through the analyses of contemporary history ("The Class Struggles in France," "The Eighteenth Brumaire," "The Civil War in France") to the late "Critique of the Gotha Programme." Along the way Thomas attempts, among other things, to counter the frequently-heard charge that Marx was naive about and theoretically unequipped to deal with the problem of bureaucratic arrogations of power by arguing that this was, in fact, part of the very problem of "alienated politics" which Marx cogently explored, and which it was the capacity of communal political activity to overcome.

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The Paris Commune of 1870 provided the prototype for the kind of political action Marx had in mind, one in which "alienated social capacities" — the ability for communal self-governing — were recaptured (p. 96). By sidestepping the inadequacies of the "ruling class" argument, which tends to reduce political power to the question of the ownership of the means of economic production, and focusing upon the issue of "alienated politics," Thomas marshalls a more effective current in Marx's thought for the response to Weberian and liberal critiques of Marxist politics. The problems of capitalism, so Thomas' argument suggests, are not reducible in Marx's thought to private property whose elimination will presumably inaugurate the transcendance of the centralized state; they include alienation of collective human political needs and capacities. That anarchists would only perpetuate and strengthen this de-politicization of civil society, and alienation of an oppressive state from its "subjects," through their campaigns against all political activity as serving to strengthen the state, helps to explain the intensity and stridency of Marx's attacks upon them.

After setting these "foundations" Thomas proceeds to analyze each of the major Marx-anarchist confrontations. In the highly original chapter on Stirner, Thomas details Marx's generally well known criticisms of the anarchist individualist who, on philosophically idealist grounds, had attacked all collectivities as "illusory" and oppressive. Where we might expect Thomas to merely emphasize Marx's collectivism and historical materialism against Stirner's abstract and unhistorical "egoism," we learn much more, however: that the *The German Ideology*, a pivotal text which is rarely read in its entirety, was deeply influenced by Marx's desire to show why and how only communist, and not capitalist, society allows the full flowering of a many-sided individual personality; and that it was Stirner's attack on communism as subordinating individuality, as well as his unhistorical neglect of the impact of the capitalist division of labor, which helped form much of the argument presented in this basic Marxian text. If we study the alienated politics and economic division of labor under capitalism, so Marx wrote, we find that capitalist individualism subordinates persons to exchangeable "roles" in the production process and shortcircuits their potential development as self-activating individuals. Unlike Stirner, Marx drew on Hegel in seeing individuality not as a static given to be found after stripping away layers of consciousness and social role, but as an expansive quality made over time by activating social beings.

In a searching reconstruction of Proudhon's thought Thomas suggests that the French anarchist's anti-politics — which proved to be so influential in the French socialist tradition — was sustained by a moralizing view of labor as inherently ennobling and regenerative, in contrast to power, which he saw as corrupting. Proudhon's mutualist economics, Marx argued in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, were an attempt to purify capitalism, not overthrow it; to reinstate an imagined pre-industrial world where independent and roughly equal procedures fairly exchange their labor values. The attempt to develop an economy of direct contract between persons, excluding the state, reveals Proudhon's dependence on classical liberalism. On the other hand, his failure to distinguish between different forms of central authority — especially between bourgeois parliamentary and absolutist autocratic rule — since all were seen as equally regimenting and oppressive, allowed Proudhon to justify collaborative ventures with Napoleon III. Thomas shows that Marx, who consistently favored working-class political participation in bourgeois liberal efforts to overthrow autocratic rule, regarded Proudhon's utopian economics as a mirror inversion of Bauer's and later LaSalle's *étatisme*, for they were two sides of the same coin: instead of abolishing

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alienated politics each of them maximized it. In contrast to an *ouvriériste* autonomy from the state, with merely contractual relations perpetuating the fragmented atomization of bourgeois society, Marx insisted on the necessity for working-class education in political self-governing within the liberal polity.

In the long last chapter on Marx and Bakunin (which is somewhat too detailed and a bit repetitive) Thomas shows how the intensity of the struggle between the two socialists rested on fundamentally different views of what shape the International should take. Combining historical and institutional analysis with a focus on the doctrinal differences and mutual personal suspicions held by the two combatants, Thomas stresses that Marx saw the International as useful only if it aided in the growth of working class consciousness for which political organizing was indispensable. If, however, Bakunin's combination of conspiratorial tactics and celebrations of indiscriminate violence were to predominate, as they appeared to be doing by 1871 especially in the southern European sections of the International, then Marx would just as soon see the organization disappear. Both disputants firmly held that socialist society would be profoundly effected by the forms of prior working-class action. Marx's increasingly doctrinaire attempts to outmaneuver Bakunin, however, which were motivated by his concern to resist the dire consequences for a future society of the Russian's tactics in the present, gave credence to Bakunin's repeated charges that Marx was authoritarian. Marx's actions proved to have still more harmful results: in one of his few major criticisms of the thinker, Thomas argues that later socialist Internationals would be influenced by Marx's attempt, under pressure from the expanding Bakunist menace, to make the first one ideologically monolithic.

Karl Marx and the Anarchists is clearly, even eloquently, written and is based on voluminous research in primary and secondary sources. I have been able merely to suggest some of the richness of the work, for it contains illuminating insights and observations on almost every one of its densely constructed 353 pages of text. There are, of course, various aspects of the arguments with which different readers might want to disagree. I myself have two criticisms. First, the contrast drawn between Marx's derivation from Hegel and the anarchist inheritance from eighteenth century liberalism is not entirely successful. Whereas the discussion of Marx's reworking of Hegel's analysis of civil society is masterfully done, important in itself and for the light it throws on Marx's political responses to the anarchists, it takes attention away from his French Enlightenment stress upon the positive potentials of scientific and technological advance. Had Thomas concentrated more on the variance between anarchist and Marxist theories of history, then the later ingredient in Marx's thought would have loomed larger in contrast to the *romantic* voluntarism, anti-industrialism and anti-urbanism which Thomas does not emphasize in the anarchist tradition, even though he is well aware of their presence. Relating anarchist theory to classical liberal economics does provide some insights, especially on Proudhon, but apart from his suspicions of the state, it runs into difficulties when addressing Bakunin's thought — his collectivism, for example — and minimizes the importance of romantic organic motifs in the nineteenth century anarchists' distrust of proletariat, city, industry and technocracy. Marxism and anarchism include different mixtures of both Enlightenment and romantic thought.

Thomas's concentration on the question of how Marx's responses to the anti-political anarchists helps reveal his own politics — a *Fragestellung* which perhaps explains the author's treatment of intellectual lineage — leads to what may be another limitation. While showing that Marx was more aware of the dangers of alienated

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bureaucratic power (and was concerned to overcome it through working class self-activation) than he is usually credited with, Thomas does not systematically consider the potential dangers in Marx's reliance on the centralizing state as the vehicle for the inauguration of socialism. Thomas is, of course, quite familiar with this common anarchist, Weberian and liberal objection, and in the introduction he even writes: "... both capitalism and communism, the anarchists prophetically indicated even in the nineteenth century, would come to depend upon the progressive (if 'progressive' is the right word) incursion of bureaucracy into hitherto uncharted areas of human experience. Marx, himself, of course, was no lover of bureaucracy — as we shall see — particularly when it proceeded from the autocratic state; but nineteenth century anarchists, and their successors, have indicated that even deep insights into the nature of social evils like bureaucracy do not of themselves produce effective solutions to them" (p. 3). This pivotal issue — which goes beyond the question of Marx's emancipatory political *intentions* — is not sufficiently pursued in the book. Whereas the stress on Marx's understanding of alienated politics and its political overcoming reveals his sensitivity to the problem of bureaucratic domination and leads to a possible solution for it — far more than the "ruling class" theory would allow — it does not entirely meet the objections raised by anarchists and others. Although Thomas is usually quite fair in presenting the thought of each of the three anarchist thinkers he treats, his interest is in Marx's responses. Such a framing of the problem, with all its strengths, does not, however, permit a sufficiently mutual critique to develop (even if we grant that Marx was a far greater thinker than his adversaries.)

But these two limitations are minor in comparison with the book's virtues. For *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* is a stimulating, original and important contribution to the vast literature on Marx.

Eugene Lunn

Paul Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists,* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 416 pp.

In his recent book, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists*, Paul Thomas develops a new interpretation of Marx's theory of politics by ostensibly contrasting Marx's views with those of his anarchist contemporaries and opponents, Stirner, Proudhon and Bakunin. Thomas' critique of anarchism succeeds only by seriously misrepresenting it. Thomas fallaciously ascribes many of Stirner's, Proudhon's and Bakunin's various inconsistencies, contradictions and eccentricities to anarchism as a whole, giving the impression that anarchism is nothing but "Proudhonized, Stirnerian Bakuninism." Although it is unlikely that Thomas will ever be regarded as a major interpreter of Marx, there is a danger that he will be regarded as a major Marxist critic of anarchism. It is the purpose of this review to dispell such misconceptions.

According to Thomas, anarchists believe that the state is the source of all evil and that its removal will "suffice to restore man [sic] to his true nature." Besides repeating the perennial half-truth that anarchists have an excessively naive view of human nature, Thomas portrays anarchists as advocating a purely political revolution. But anarchists have always criticized such a narrow conception of revolution, insisting

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(although not always consistently) that real human liberation requires the elimination of all forms of hierarchy, exploitation and domination, not just the elimination of the state, as well as the creation of egalitarian, co-operative and libertarian communities and social relationships. As Kropotkin put it, "to overturn a government is everything for a bourgeois revolutionary. For us, it is only the beginning of the social revolution."[1]

Thomas also claims that anarchists fail to distinguish between different kinds of states, seeing nothing particularly progressive about liberal democratic ones. Here, Thomas has conflated a number of distinct issues. First, although anarchists regard all states as equally *illegitimate*, it does not follow that they regard all states as equally *evil*. It is not at all inconsistent for an anarchist to hold that the Soviet Union under Stalin was a far more barbaric and morally objectionable regime than, say, France today under Mitterrand, while also holding that no state has legitimate authority, for the uses to which illegitimate authority can be put can be more or less evil.

Generally, what distinguishes one state from another is its form of government. But, as Bakunin wrote, although "the most imperfect republic is a thousand times better than the most enlightened monarchy...we must recognize and proclaim that whatever the form of government may be, so long as human society continues to be divided into different classes...there will always be a class-restricted government and the inevitable exploitation of the majorities by the minorities."[2] He further argued that statist societies are necessarily class-dominated societies, for "the State has always been the patrimony of some privileged class: a priestly class, an aristocratic class, a bourgeois class. And finally, when all the other classes have exhausted themselves, the State then becomes the patrimony of the bureaucrtic class and then falls — or, if you will, rises — to the position of a machine."[3]

Implicit in Bakunin's remarks is an important distinction between state and government — a distinction later pursued by Kropotkin, who emphasized that while anarchists desire the immediate abolition of the state, they regard decentralized, participatory democracy and workers' self-management as positive steps toward human liberation, although these are clearly "forms of government."[4] In practice, this translates into an anarchist insistence on control from the "bottom upward" (an idea which Marx ridiculed), with decision making at the base and, at higher levels of organization, recallable delegates with no independent authority or decision-making powers. In contrast, in *The Civil War in France*, perhaps Marx's most libertarian work, Marx praises the Commune's concentration of administrative and decision-making power in a single body of elected delegates. As Bookchin notes, by doing so Marx "identified the process of policy-making, a function that rightly should belong to the people in assembly, with the technical execution of these policies, a function that could be left to strictly administrative bodies subject to rotation, recall, limitations of tenure, and,

1. Peter Kropotkin, *Quotations From the Anarchists*, ed. Paul Berman (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 102.

2. Michael Bakunin, *Bakunin On Anarchism*, ed. Sam Dolgoff (Montreal: Black Rose, 1980), p. 144.

3. *Ibid*, pp. 330, 318.

4. See especially Kropotkin's essay "Must We Occupy Ourselves With an Examination of the Ideal of a Future System," "The State — Its Historic Role," *Selected Writings on Anarchism and Revolution*, ed. Martin Miller (Boston: MIT, 1970), and "Modern Science and Anarchism," *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, ed. Roger Baldwin (New York: Dover, 1970). See also the important discussion in John P. Clark, "What Is Anarchism," *Nomos XIX: Anarchism*, ed. Pennock and Chapman (New York: N.Y.U.P., 1978), pp. 8-10.

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whenever possible, selected by sortition."[5]

Thomas asserts that anarchist revolutionary strategy consists in "following the instincts of the masses." This is an especially strange claim coming from someone who insists that anarchists believe in revolution as an "act of will," not of necessity, or for that matter, instinct.[6]

But even Bakunin, who did tend to overemphasize the role of rebellious instincts, realized that "if instinct alone had been sufficient for the liberation of peoples, they would have long since freed themselves."[7] According to Bakunin, what is needed is propaganda, education, and a network of libertarian organizations, from co-ops to trade unions, through which people will "learn theory . . . through practice," creating "not only the ideas, but also the facts of the future itself."[8] This belies Thomas' further claim that anarchism is a Manichean doctrine which totally divorces means from ends, seeing the future utopia rising "like a phoenix" from the "root and branch extermination" of society. Supposedly, anarchists take on faith that "hate will turn into love, chaos into harmony, violence into peace, desperation into hope and optimism."

Like all good Marxists, Thomas thrives on contradiction, admitting later that anarchists do not "divorce revolutionary means from revolutionary ends," and that they see certain pre-revolutionary institutions — the International for instance — as the "presentiment" of future society. To further impress us with his "dialectical" reasoning Thomas assures us that anarchists see "a conflict between state and society," that they want to abolish the state so that society may flourish freely. Yet he later claims that anarchists fail to distinguish "between state and civil society" and consequently want to destroy both of them!

From this inauspicious beginning Thomas' book quickly lapses into a series of *ad hominem* attacks on the founding fathers of anarchism. Thomas' underlying premise that the thought of Stirner, Proudhon and Bakunin is somehow representative of anarchist thought as a whole is surely false. Neither Stirner's ruthless egoism, nor Proudhon's sexism, anti-semitism, collaborationism and half-baked economic theories, nor Bakunin's anti-semitism, vanguardism and conspiratorialism form part of a consistent anarchist theory and practice.

In his section on Max Stirner, Thomas never clearly distinguishes Stirner's asocial egoism from the social anarchism of Proudhon, Bakunin and later anarchist theorists. At one point in the book he even compares Stirner to Bakunin, showing he understands them as well as Marx did. Thomas claims that Stirner regarded the state as an "illusion" when in fact Stirner saw the state as a very real and powerful institution legitimized and protected by illusions. Unless these illusions are destroyed, any revolution will only result in a change of rulers, for people carrying a "gendarme" in their breasts, as Stirner put it, will soon replace their former rulers with new ones because of their continued psychological need for authority. It is this idea which lies at the basis of Stirner's distinction between revolution and insurrection, which Thomas dismisses as "incoherent." By revolution Stirner meant the violent and sudden replacement of one set of rulers and institutions by another; by insurrection he meant individual liberation on both a material and psychological level from all authority and

5. Murray Bookchin, *Toward An Ecological Society* (Montreal: Black Rose, 1980), p. 216.

6. Thomas' contention that anarchism is a voluntarist doctrine based ultimately on the notion of free will is belied by the fact that many of the "classical" anarchist theorists — notably Godwin, Bakunin, Kropotkin and Reclus — were determinists.

7. Bakunin, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

8. *Ibid*, p. 255.

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coercive institutions. Thomas also misinterprets Stirner's contention that all people (not just laborers) are psychological egoists. Stirner did not mean to imply that all people are *conscious* egoists, nor that everyone's egoistic desires are currently being satisfied. Rather, his point was that people, being psychological egoists already, should become conscious, frank egoists, and that existing institutions and practices, such as the state, property, religion and morality, which prevent the full satisfaction of egoistic desires should be destroyed.

What Thomas inadvertantly emphasizes in his discussion of Stirner is the complete lack of an adequate Marxist psychology (his few references to Marcuse are derogatory). And while he stresses the theoretical importance of Marx's encounter with Stirner, there is one significant aspect of Stirner's influence on Marx which he neglects. This is the effect Stirner's anti-humanist arguments had in helping turn Marx away "from a passionately moral commitment to communism as a humanistic creed...to a sociological affirmation of communism as the historical outcome of objective economic forces."[9] The results of Marx's intellectual struggle with Stirner are then more ambivalent than Thomas is prepared to admit.

Thomas' treatment of Proudhon descends to the level of invective. He impugns the integrity of the iconoclastic Frenchman, insinuating that he was a crypto-fascist suffering from scatological obsessions and a nostalgic yearning for an "arcadian" past. Thomas even suggests that Proudhon's influence over the French working class was in large part due to their shared prejudices and bigotry. Much of his section on Proudhon is devoted to the proposition that Proudhon was neither a good Marxist economist nor a good Hegelian dialectician, as if Proudhon's flawed economic theories and shaky metaphysics were an essential part of anarchist theory.

Thomas misunderstands Proudhon's notion of contract, claiming it is derived from Adam Smith and bourgeois legal notions, when in fact it owes more to Rousseau. Proudhon differed from Rousseau, however, by insisting that the social contract should be "more than a fiction," and explicit agreement between free and equal individuals "which has actually been proposed, discussed, voted upon, and adopted, and which can properly be amended at the contracting parties' will."[10] Proudhon, far from being a closet authoritarian, advocated a society of voluntary associations freely federated with one another with no authority above them. Thomas does not even discuss this theory of federalism — Proudhon's most lasting and important contribution to anarchist theory.

Thomas further argues that Proudhon accepted the claim of classical political economy that in capitalist society workers are "free agents" whose social relations are characterized by the "face to face bargain between equal contracting partners." Moreover, Thomas claims, far from finding modern factory work with its concomitant division of labor alienating or degrading, Proudhon saw it as "ennobling and regenerative." Then why was Proudhon so intent on "destroying bourgeois society," as Thomas insist? In fact, Proudhon no more believed his vision of society of free and equal individuals had been achieved than he believed it could be achieved within the existing capitalist system and nation-state. As for alienation and the division of labor, Proudhon criticized the latter for "becoming always more minute" so that "the workman has been given over to a more and more degrading subjection to machinery."[11]

9. R.W.K. Paterson, *The Nihilistic Egoist — Max Stirner* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1971), p. 117.
10. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *The Principle of Federation* (Toronto: U. of T., 1979), pp. 38-39.
11. Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Freedom, 1923), p. 48.

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Modern factory work, he wrote, by replacing "manual skill" with "the perfection of the apparatus," inverts "the roles of man and material...the spirit is not in the worker, it has passed into the machine; what ought to be the worth of the worker has become for him a brutalization."[12] For Proudhon then, not only is property "theft," but capitalism is a form of slavery, for it prevents the worker from realizing himself through his own self-chosen creative labor.

Underlying Thomas' remarks is his view of Proudhon as a reactionary counter-revolutionary opposed to "*any* properly revolutionary movement" who wanted to return to the "austere" and "static" utopia of the "pre-industrial workshop." But not only did Proudhon consider himself a revolutionary, he actively participated in the 1848 revolution in France. In his *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century* he argued for the necessity and the inevitability of social revolution. With his theory of mutualism he attempted to provide the workers with a positive revolutionary doctrine which was both socialist and decentralist, as opposed to Jacobinism, which was neither, and Marxism, which was only the former.[13] While one can find fault with much of Proudhon's revolutionary theory, goals and strategy, to portray him as a counter-revolutionary is untenable.

Thomas' claim that Proudhon advocated a return to the "pre-industrial workshop" is inconsistent with his own interpretation. Proudhon looked forward to a society which would "have as much as possible produced and consumed by the greatest number of men," which is hardly compatible with the "pre-industrial workshop." He thought that "small industry is as stupid as petty culture." He disparaged "philanthropic conservatives" who "look back in anguish to the days when industry was simple and spinning was done in the home," and who "want to go back to the feudal-farming period," to "the days of the communal bakehouse."

In his discussion of Proudhon's actions during and shortly after the 1848 revolution Thomas distorts the facts. He portrays Proudhon as a friend of the right because, as a member of the National Assembly, he voted against the constitution of the Second Republic and later he briefly advocated collaboration with Louis Bonaparte. In reality, Proudhon never entered into any alliance with the right while he was a member of the National Assembly, voting against the constitution simply because "it was a constitution," as he himself explained at the time. Proudhon did not believe that any assembly of representatives had any right to commit an entire population and its posterity to a set of principles which they themselves had not agreed to and which could easily become anachronistic. As an anarchist, Proudhon opposed any sort of enforced legal system, including political constitutions. He believed that society was too complex for general laws to deal fairly with social conflicts, even if the laws were not bound to class interests.[14]

Thomas fails to mention that Proudhon, almost alone in the National Assembly, defended the workers who fought on the June barricades. In the same speech, Proudhon advocated the "liquidation of the old society" with or without the cooperation of the bourgeoisie, prompting his conservative opponents in the Assembly to cry out, "It

12. Proudhon, as quoted in Robert L. Hoffman, *Revolutionary Justice* (Chicago: U. of Il., 1972), p. 303.

13. At the time Marx wrote that "it is the task of the really revolutionary party to carry through the strictest centralization of power in the hands of the state authority." Karl Marx, *Selected Writings*, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: O.U.P., 1977), p. 284.

14. This argument against legal government, besides being a defining characteristic of anarchist thought, is perhaps the most original anarchist contribution to social theory. See Alan Ritter, *Anarchism* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1980), pp. 17-39.

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is the social war!"[15]

Thomas attempts to portray Proudhon's brief advocacy of collaboration with Louis Bonaparte in 1851 as a natural outgrowth of his political views and treats this as evidence of the authoritarianism implicit in both Proudhon's thought and anarchism as a whole. His claim is that while anarchists usually advocate political abstentionism, they are willing to suspend it occasionally to ally with right-wing forces in order to crush the democratic left.

In the case of Proudhon, he could hardly suspend his political abstentionism in 1851 when it was a policy he was not to consistently advocate until 1857. How being elected to the National Assembly is a form of political abstentionism is incomprehensible. Thomas also fails to mention that in the 1848 fall elections Proudhon supported the leftist presidential candidate, Raspail, and in January 1849, he *denounced* Louis Bonaparte as a reactionary conspiring to enslave the people — for which he was rewarded with three years of imprisonment. While in prison he risked further imprisonment by predicting and decrying Bonaparte's *coup d'etat*. Proudhon's brief advocacy of collaboration with Bonaparte was completely at odds with both his anarchist political views and all his previous actions. Thomas misrepresents Proudhon's reasons for advocating collaboration with the Bonaparte regime. He was not trying to destroy "bourgeois society and liberal democracy" by allying with the right; rather, his collaboration was an opportunistic attempt to win reforms for the working class by appealing to the vanity of a petty dictator.

Thomas' contention that the anarchist movement has had a tendency to ally with the right to crush liberal and democratic forces is not borne by the facts. During the Franco-Prussian War, while Marx was ready to welcome a Prussian victory, Bakunin, in his famous *Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis*, openly called for social revolution.[16] Those anarchists and libertarian socialists who participated in the Paris Commune — Varlin, Reclus and Michel, for example — fought on the barricades against the Versailles government, and the anarchist movement as a whole revered the Commune. In the First International, it was Marx, not the anarchists, who allied with the authoritarian Jacobin Blanquists against the anti-authoritarian opposition. In Russia, the anarchists were the intransigent opponents of the Czarist autocracy, supporting and participating in the revolutionary soviets in 1905 and 1917. After the revolution, some anarchists did collaborate — but with the Bolsheviks, not with right-wing groups (and they paid dearly for it, imprisoned, exiled and "liquidated" by their erstwhile Marxist allies). During WWI, while the great majority of anarchists firmly opposed the war, those who did not, such as Kropotkin and Jean Grave, supported the so-called "liberal democracies," England and France. Gustav Landauer, the great anarchist philosopher, joined the revolutionary government of Kurt Eisner in Bavaria in 1918, to be murdered later by troops loyal to the Marxist Social Democratic government. The Italian anarchists tried to prevent the fascist rise to power through mass strikes which the Marxist Socialist Party failed to support. The anarchists in Spain were the first to

15. George Woodcock, *Anarchism* (New York: N.A.L., 1974), p. 128.

16. "The French need to be overcome. If the Prussians are victorious, the centralization of State power will be useful to the centralization of the German working class. Moreover, German ascendency will transfer the centre of gravity of the European workers' movement from France to Germany, and it is sufficient to compare the movement in both countries, from 1866 up till now, to see that the German working class is superior to the French . . . On a world scale, the ascendency of the German proletariat over the French proletariat will at the same time constitute the ascendency of our theory over Proudhon's." Marx, as quoted in Bakunin, *Selected Writings*, ed. Arthur Lehning (New York: Grove, 1974), p. 284.

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resist the fascist coup, only to be betrayed by the Stalinist Marxists. Some anarchists in Spain collaborated with the Republican government, but none with Franco. Thomas' contention that anarchists are the secret friends of the right recalls the Stalinist charge that the Spanish anarchists were a fascist "fifth column" and is without historical foundation.

Of all the anarchists, Bakunin is vilified the most. Thomas portrays him as a terrorist fanatic more concerned with "the spread of Bakuninism" than with human liberation. By "Bakuninism," however, Thomas does not mean a coherent revolutionary doctrine, for Bakunin "did not think before he acted, nor did he want anybody else to do so." According to Thomas, Bakunin was opposed to rational thought in principle. To treat Bakunin as a serious thinker then is to commit an "egregious" error. Bakunin's dire and prescient predictions of Marxist authoritarianism, which Noam Chomsky has described as perhaps "among the most remarkable within the social sciences,"[17] are accordingly dismissed as "willful exaggerations, or even fantasies." Fantasies which, unlike Marx's "scientific" predictions, coincidentally came true. In an ironic twist, Thomas actually argues that Bakunin was responsible for Marx's authoritarianism, which was just an illjudged response to Bakunin's devious attempts to take over the International. In his commentary, we find such gems as the observation that Kropotkin was an "anti-Bakuninist" and the claim that anarchists oppose "the reassertion of conscious social control by men [sic], associated with one another, over their own lives, creations and relationships."

Bakunin was not opposed to "*theory itself,*" as Thomas claims, but to the coercive imposition of social theory on society. Neither was Bakunin opposed to science and rational thinking. Quoting Bakunin's remark that "what I preach is a revolt of life against science," Thomas conveniently omits Bakunin's important qualification: "or rather against the *government of science*, not to destroy science — that would be high treason to humanity — but to remand it to its place,"[18] Bakunin realized that claims to intellectual authority are frequently translated into claims to political authority, as social theory from Plato to Lenin attests. Bakunin's solution was not to destroy science, but to make it accessible to all people through "general instruction . . . in order that the masses, ceasing to be flocks led and shorn by privileged priests, may take into their own hands the direction of their destinies."[19]

Thomas dismisses Bakunin's critique of bureaucracy as a fantasy because the proletariat of Bakunin's time "was not even united, let alone characterized by 'oligarchic' or, worse still, 'technobureaucratic' tendencies." But for Bakunin it is the *state*, not the proletariat, that is inherently bureaucratic, which is why he denounced the idea of a socialist "People's State" as a dangerous fraud. However, Bakunin's own experiences in the Swiss labor movement had convinced him that bureaucratic tendencies existed even in the proletariat, especially among higher paid workers, and he sought to combat such tendencies by insisting on control by the rank and file rather than by elected committees and union bureaucrats. Furthermore, Bakunin did not pretend to be describing the socialist movement of his time when he warned of the dangers of the "Red Bureaucracy," rather, he was *predicting* that if the socialist movement utilized hierarchical and authoritarian forms of organization, including the state, in its struggle for human emancipation, the result would be a new class system, with the capitalist class replaced by a bureaucratic class primarily composed of intellectuals and professionals

17. Noam Chomsky, *Towards A New Cold War* (New York: Pantheon 1982), p. 61.
18. Bakunin, *God and the State* (New York: Dover, 1970), p. 59.
19. *Ibid*, p. 63.

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(not *workers*, as Thomas seems to think) charged with the so-called "administration of things." Bakunin's argument is that the authority relations typical of statist forms of organization will survive the abolition of capitalism unless they are deliberately destroyed and replaced by libertarian social relations and organizations. By depriving most people of effective control over their lives, hierarchical organizations encourage apathy and diminish people's capacity for autonomous action. Those who enjoy power and its attendant privileges will never relinquish them voluntarily, despite their original good intentions, for "men do not make positions; positions, contrariwise, make men."[20] In this regard it is Marx, not Bakunin, who relies on "the caprice of an individual" to counter-act "the logic of the situation, a logic that never errs."[21]

The reasons Thomas gives for Bakunin's turning "away from the proletariat and 'its' scientific socialism" are the very reasons why Bakunin embraced the proletariat to begin with — because, in Bakunin's words, it is "socialist without knowing it; it is basically and instinctively and by the very force of its position more seriously and more really socialist then all the bourgeois and scientific socialists put together." Significantly, Bakunin adds (again Thomas omits this passage) that "what the workers lack is not a sense of reality or socialist aspirations, but only socialist thought" and class consciousness, which they will acquire through propaganda, education and "*practical action*."[22]

Thomas reduces Bakunin's contribution to anarcho-syndicalism to "a belief in violence as the redemptive agency," and further claims that Bakunin wanted to turn the International into an "underground terrorist organization." By so seriously misrepresenting Bakunin's views on the International, Thomas obscures the true nature of the dispute between Bakunin and Marx.

Bakunin argued that the International should be based "only on the economic struggle of the workers against capitalism."[23] Consequently, he advocated that it should be primarily composed of autonomous trade unions federated with each other for mutual support and solidarity. The purpose of the International was both to overthrow capitalism and to provide the basis for "a new social order resting on emancipated labor . . . the free federation of workers' associations."[24] Is this a terrorist conspiracy? Neither is it "anarchy" in the pejorative sense of the word. In fact, in his writings on the International, Bakunin laid the theoretical foundations for anarcho-syndicalism by emphasizing economic struggle over political struggle, the need for direct action and general strikes, and the necessity of free federation, decentralization and autonomy for the trade union sections before, during and after the social revolution.

Thomas concludes his section on Bakunin with an uncritical gloss of Marx's *Conspectus* of Bakunin's *Statism and Anarchy*. In this *Conspectus*, Marx derides Bakunin's idea of organizing society from the "bottom upward," insisting that all organization is necessarily hierarchical, even in post-revolutionary society. Marx makes clear that political forms are merely the excrescence of "the economic base." He emphasizes the coercive nature of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, of which the International is the presentiment, a dictatorship which will miraculously disappear as capitalism is gradually abolished, and denies that it will necessarily be composed of workers.

20. Bakunin, *Bakunin on Anarchism*, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
21. *Ibid*, p. 198. For a more extended discussion of these issues see John P. Clark, "Marx, Bakunin and the Problem of Social Transformation," *Telos*, No. 42, (Winter 1979-80), pp. 80-97.
22. Bakunin, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-67.
23. *Ibid*, p. 164.
24. *Ibid*, p. 249.

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Thomas arranges the quotations in such a way so as to imply that Bakunin advocated "the subjugation of land labor" by the proletariat, when in fact Bakunin was levelling this charge against Marx, because of the latter's insistence that the emancipation of the peasantry must depend on the good will of the proletariat. The peasants themselves, because of their primitive economic development, are precluded from achieving liberation through their own self-conscious action. Marx's position then entails the effective disempowerment of the peasantry, whose interests will be represented by a benevolent proletarian dictatorship. Thomas describes this as "non-alientating politics"!

Ironically, it is Thomas' contention that anarchists seek the effective disempowerment of virtually everyone. Conflating bourgeois parliamentary politics with liberatory social transformation in general, Thomas presumes that because anarchists oppose the former they must also oppose the latter. He makes the related claim that anarchists oppose political activity because it is "contaminating," when the main reason they oppose *bourgeois* political activity is because they do not think it will lead to real social liberation. Contrary to Thomas, anarchists, just as much as Marxists (if not more so), strive for "the reassertion of conscious social control by men [and women!], associated with one another, over their own lives, creations and relationships." The real dispute between the anarchists and Karl Marx, is how this control should be achieved — through participation in bourgeois politics (Marx) or through autonomous social movements and organizations (the anarchists); through the Dictatorship of the Proletariat or through free federation and social revolution; through increasingly complex and centralized production or through decentralization and human-scale technology.

Although social anarchists do believe in freedom from coercion, unlike individualist anarchists they also believe in equality, solidarity, mutual aid and community — Thomas' claims to the contrary notwithstanding. Thomas ignores the richly communitarian tradition in anarchist thought, exemplified by such thinkers as Kropotkin, Malatesta, Landauer, Buber, Goodman, and Bookchin among others. As Alan Ritter has recently argued, what anarchists truly seek can best be described as "communal *individuality*," "*the greatest individual development with the greatest communal* unity."[25] In fact, it is Marxism, with its productivist view of human nature, its uncritical view of technology, and its inability to understand the nature of political power, bureaucracy, hierarchy and domination, which really precludes any future prospect of genuine community.

In *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* propaganda masquerades as scholarship. Often, arguments are replaced by epithets and factual distortions. Instead of defending Marx's dubious view that modern capitalism is a progressive force, Thomas registers his assent. Instead of seriously criticizing anarchism he attacks a caricature drawn for the occasion. His treatment of Stirner, Proudhon and Bakunin rarely moves beyond character assasination. His treatment of Marx rarely goes beyond devotion. On the whole, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* is not a credible book.

Graham Baugh

25. Alan Ritter, *Anarchism, op. cit.*, p. 3.

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Peter Uwe Hohendahl, *The Institution of Criticism*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 187.

Histories of literary criticism are rare, and it may be useful to consider why. The initial confrontations between the early modernism of the nascent avant-garde at the turn-of-the-century and the conservatism of the critical establishment which attempted to stifle precisely those aesthetic innovations that subsequently came to be recognized as the classics of the age left a deep impression on literary life. Given this paradigmatic experience, criticism appears as the fundamental antagonist of authentic literature with which a popular taste, infused with an epigonic romanticism which has lost its radical thrust, is always eager to identify. A denigration of literary criticism ensues which, in its kinder moments, views the critic as merely irrelevant but more often denounces him as an evil creature, ontologically inferior to the truly productive creative genius. For — so the argument goes — it is the artist who, beyond reason, good and evil, wrestles with the gods, the cosmos or his soul (choose one), while the embarrassingly unheroic critic who can only nag and nudge is trapped in a secondary discourse, the parasitic dependent of the genuine writer. The dreary question quickly follows: what right does he have to criticize, if he cannot do it better himself? Obligatory humor, equally common, generally revolves around the distance between "real literature" on the one hand and, on the other, discussions about it, adjudged insignificant in a manner designed to evoke the sort of chortles which could be cited as evidence of the legitimacy of Foucault's end-of-man thesis. Consider the underlying tendencies which structure this response: a servile adulation of the heroic figure, a dogmatic irrationalism, and a basic antipathy toward discussion and criticism. Nor is this anti-critical stance restricted to literary and aesthetic matters: so much for democratic culture.

Where criticism has nevertheless been deemed a worthwhile object of study, attention was rarely directed toward the role of criticism in the literary system or society in general but rather toward the succession of opinions and positions that have supplanted one another in the apparently unbroken counterpoint to an equally unbroken history of literature: either as a matter of taste, as in George Saintsbury's *A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, or as a history of ideas, as in Rene Wellek's *A History of Modern Criticism*. In neither case is the social status of criticism thematized. Nor do traditional Marxism and Critical Theory successfully alter this lacuna. Certainly, Marxist literary critics have often attempted to intervene in or against the established critical discussion, but their efforts to explain the specific social character and function of literary criticism have rarely been more than peripheral. Critiques of bourgeois criticism as excessively parochial in its disinterest in the social context of literature — think of Mehring's denunciation of the manner in which Wilhelmine positivists appropriated Lessing for Prussian nationalism or of Lukács' efforts to hold onto a figure like Büchner against his fascist interpreters — can generate richer readings, but these alternative readings do not yet examine the societal prerequisites and consequences of the established critical discourse and the readings it generates.[1]

Peter Hohendahl's book, which includes seven essays that appeared in German during the 1970s as well as a new, long introduction, represents an important effort to

1. Franz Mehring, *Die Lessing-Legende*, in: *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 9 (Berlin: Diez, 1961) and Georg Lukács, "Der faschistisch verfälschte und der wirkliche Georg Büchner," in: *Deutsche Literatur in zwei Jahrhunderten-Werke*, Vol. 7 (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1964), pp. 249-72.

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transform the discussion about criticism from an examination of personal predilections or the expression of subjective theoretical commitments to the social function of criticism as an institution. Hohendahl himself explains this shift by placing his own work within a historical context. The prevailing literary critical mode in West Germany during the 1950s and early 1960s was even more conservative than the main contemporary trend in the United States: if new criticism relegated social matters to a merely "extrinsic" concern, the *Werkimmanenz* propagated by figures like Wolfgang Kayser and Emil Staiger insisted on the irrelevance of such matters altogether.[2] Post-war criticism turned its back to recent political history as well as to the modernism of the earlier part of the century and envisioned a return to the ideals of classical Weimar; indeed in 1949 an influential essayist seriously suggested that young critics should take Goethe as their model to emulate, especially his allegedly solely literary, non-political perspective.[3] Against this unctious conservatism, the student movement rebelled. The literary critical institution was a focal point of its attack which in turn contributed to the recognition of criticism as an institution. "For a number of years the crisis was so severe that the system itself appeared beyond repair. During the first half of the 1970s it was almost impossible for the critical observer to follow traditional paths of literary criticism and write just another scholarly book or concentrate critically on the latest novel or play. It woud have been a problematical pretense to insist on perpetuating the tradition of the discipline. Academic critics were literally besieged when students protested against conventional literary studies and occupied the seminar rooms and libraries. And journalists who earn their living by writing reviews for newspapers, contributing essays to literary magazines, and lecturing on the cultural programs of public broadcasting were confronted with outspokenly polemical criticism. Their more polite antagonists asked them to review their professional commitment and in particular to reflect on their highy elitist concern with questions of aesthetic evaluation, while their more radical opponents told them to keep quiet unless they were willing to address more important issues. The conventional attitude that kept literary and social issues separate became suspicious, to say the least" (pp. 11-12). In the essays collected in this volume, Hohendahl attempts "to come to terms with this crisis of criticism" in a variety of manners: through a re-examination of the arguments made by the various critics of criticism during the 1960s, reviews of significant junctures in the history of German criticism (especially in Heine's oeuvre), theoretical investigations of the function of criticism inspired simultaneously by Benjamin and Habermas, and discussions of specific problems related to criticism, e.g., the success of best-seller literature.

The suggestion that traditional Marxist thought never successfully thematized the social character of literary criticism does not hold of course for the work of Walter Benjamin, and it is not surprising to find Hohendahl drawing precisely on Benjamin's thought. Obviously it is not an unmediated Benjamin reception; the point is not to preserve his judgments or his faith in the imminence of a proletarian revolution. Hohendahl is less indebted to Benjamin's answers than to his questions: how is the self-understanding of the literary intellectual, in particular the critic, dependent on his social status and function? How does the process of social modernization and democratization change the function of the writer? How can one address the social function of literary intellectuals as a particular social group, given the fact that the members of

2. Cf. Bruce Mayo, "Introduction to Adorno's 'Lyric Poetry and Society,' " in: *Telos*, No. 20 (Summer 1974), p. 52.

3. Ernst Robert Curtius, "Goethe als Kritiker," in: *Kritische Essays zur europäischen Literatur* (Bern: Francke, 1950), pp. 31-56.

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this group regularly purport to speak in the name of either a broader collective or private subjectivity? These sorts of issues, raised by Benjamin especially in his own reviews during the late 1920s and, later, in essays like "The Author as Producer," are posed again by Hohendahl, but without the specific Benjaminian context of Communist politics and messianic faith. Instead, the concerns of the later Marxist Benjamin are linked, interestingly, to the early work of Jürgen Habermas where he is closest to the culture industry thesis of Adorno and Horkheimer.

In his still untranslated *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* Habermas examined the "structural transformation of the public sphere," i.e., the changing societal framework within which institutionalized modes of discourse can take place. While he briefly touches on the problem of the public in antiquity and in medieval Europe, the central agrument of the book works with the contrast between the characters of a "liberal public sphere" of the 18th and early 19th centuries and the subsequent emergence of a manipulated public; the distinction corresponds to alternative manners of the reception of culture: culture-reasoning and culture-consumption. Hohendahl reviews this material and some of the criticisms it has provoked in the final chapter. The basic framework is clearly indebted to the Frankfurt School's distinction between a phase of liberal capitalism during which the projects of enlightenment and individuation retain credibility and a monopoly capitalism marked by the "total administration of society" via the expanding bureaucracies and the culture industry leading to the demise of the individual. The frequent attacks regarding an alleged nostalgia for an early capitalism in Frankfurt School thought tend to overlook that precisely this distinction still works within the framework of an orthodox Marxist contrast between progressive and decadent periods.

Habermas maintains this distinction but pushes it away from the concern with immanent aesthetic structures and toward structures of communication. The liberal public sphere takes shape during the late 17th and early 18th centuries after the conclusion of the religious wars as the characteristic form of communication in the coffee houses of London, the salons of France and the reading circles of Germany. It is a dimension of social activity which inserts itself between the private sphere of family and property and the administrative sphere of the absolutist state. While participation may well have been empirically limited to members of the bourgeoisie and the urban aristocracy, counterfactual assumptions regarding the rules of discourse prevailed which fundamentally structured the substance of the sphere: the exclusion of private status and social class of any speaker as a legitimate topic of debate, a universal and equal access to language skills and knowledge (i.e., the asumption of a relatively homogeneous education and set of cultural values), and finally the non-exclusive character of the discourse which, in theory if not in practice, any speaker might enter. Given the rational and ideally universal character of the discussion, its conclusions could be posed as judgments for the public in general and not merely as the opinions of a collection of random individuals (Habermas later dehistoricizes this material and transforms it into the linguistic norm of an "ideal speech situation"). Furthermore these judgments represented the public in general against the individual subjectivity of personal privacy as well as against the administrative prerogatives of the absolutist state perceived as irrationally arcane or excessively limited by the private interests of the ruling dynasty. Thus the public sphere, due to its own self-understanding, was able to generate the specifically bourgeois opposition to monarchy and thereby set the ground rules for the modern liberal democracies.

Habermas goes on to describe the immanent collapse of this liberal public sphere

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due to the rise of the working class movement which challenged the universalist claims of the bourgeoisie and to the fundamental restructuring of monopoly capitalism: the virtual end of the liberal free market puts an end to the delicate balance of private, public and administrative dimensions which had nurtured the liberal discourse. As far as literary criticism and aesthetics go, it is however the earlier part of his argument which is of importance. For the initial phase of the liberal public sphere, before its radicalization and politicization in the period preceding the French Revolution, is characterized by a particular concern with literature, i.e., the literary discourse is the training ground for a bourgeoisie which must discover criticism and its rules before directing them against the absolutist state.[4] It is precisely in this context that modern literary criticism as an institutionalized activity emerges. The critic is a member of the public, a specialist perhaps in literary matters, but not gifted with special genius or talents that could set him above the public (aestheticist critics around 1900 regularly claimed such privilege). Thus his rational treatment of the literature at hand is not based on individual superiority nor does it rely on the unquestionable status of inherited norms (as for example in the invocation of the authority of ancient critics by a figure like Boileau); rather, the critic's reasoning is a course of thought which, ideally, could be followed and reproduced or criticized — in rational terms — by any member of the public.

The institutionalization of criticism in the 18th century provides Habermas with a foil to the manipulated culture of the 20th century. It provides Hohendahl with a starting point for a social history of literary criticism. The vicissitudes of criticism in the 19th and 20th centuries are no longer simply matters of the personal taste of individual critics. Nor is criticism simply an epiphenomenon of literary theory. Rather the manner in which the critical discourse can unfold — its gestures of speech, its assumptions regarding its addressee, its relationship to authors, to universities, to the press, etc. — can now be discussed as a set of sociological problems. Foremost among them, at least in Hohendahl's account, is the fragmentation of criticism which accompanies a progressive division of literary labor. During the early part of the 19th century, critics often wrote simultaneously for the general public, for other authors and in the context of academic literary historiography. After 1848, these realms tend to separate from each other. The tension between criticism in the press and criticism in the universities becomes particularly acrimonious, the journalists mocking professorial pedantry and the academics complaining of journalistic superficiality (p. 17). It turns out that both sides are right: the academic literary histories produced in the state-controlleed universities contributed to the elaboration of national identity and are therefore fair game for ideological criticism, while journalistic criticism, the so-called *Tageskritik*, is hopelessly entangled in the exigencies of an increasingly commercialized press. Indeed as opponents of journalistic feuilletonism as different as Karl Kraus and Bertolt Brecht repeatedly noted, the complicity in the commercialism of the culture industry is the cause of the genre's characteristic subjectivism and irrationalism: the restriction of the critical text to the impressions of the individual critic corresponds to the limitations imposed on criticism by the mode of production in which the mass media are grounded.

The combination of elements from Benjamin and Habermas turns out to be particularly auspicious. Hohendahl avoids the normative abstraction of Habermas' linguistic turn by holding onto Benjamin's recognition of the materiality of the practice of literary intellectuals; he avoids Benjamin's productivism with the help of Haber-

4. Cf. Reinhart Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1959).

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mas' concern for communicative structures but always in concrete historical settings. Drawing from both Benjamin and Habermas, Hohendahl insists on the emancipatory potential implicit in the project of criticism, i.e., criticism is not merely "literature about literature." Rather, "literary criticism that remains true to its public mission cannot be separated from the idea of a critique of ideology and social criticism" (p. 82). This mission however is not an abstract spirit; it is inseparable from the historical activity of critics who can only be understood in their particular institutional settings. This is the bridge that connects the initial institutionalization of criticism during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment to the critique of established West German criticism during the student movement. In this sense, one can understand Hohendahl's investigations into the history of criticism as an effort to substantiate the New Left critique of criticism which often had a superficial or ahistorical character, demanding of critics a sort of moral conversion. Instead, Hohendahl describes the historical institutional setting of criticism in contemporary society: "When the intellectuals broke free socially from the academic class, they were driven into the position of outsiders. Avant-garde criticism was at the same time a socially exiled criticism, looking down on the press industry. After 1945 the culture industry expanded into a system of interconnected large-scale organizations — a move that created a great numer of positions which could be filled only by intellectuals and offered the economically insecure intelligentsia a chance for social reintegration. (. . .) After being assimilated by the culture industry, this group places itself socially on the side of the status quo. The aesthetic claim to dominance accepts the gap between the privileged minority and the uneducated masses as natural and unavoidable. Literary criticism thus lies in the hands of a group whose consciousness is far removed from the convictions of the nineteenth-century journalist. The group, as an elite, stands isolated from the broad reading public and is linked to a communications apparatus over which it has no control" (p. 78). The passage echoes a theme from the early Habermas: the post-liberal public spheres in bourgeois democracies do not measure up to the democratic standards of the early nineteenth century Criticism is not carried on by a representative of the public in its name but by a self-conscious elite, allied to the established powers that be and sure of its own existential superiority.

While Hohendahl's history of criticism emerges from the tradition of Critical Theory and the New Left, it also participates in a central thematic concern of the post-1968 period: the social function of intellectual groups. Hohendahl's version is specifically leftist because of its concern with elaborating the possibilities of democratizing literary life and because of a repeated concern with the relationship between literary practices and the capitalist mode of production. This version competes with other contemporary examinations of intellectual groups; if all differ radically on important issues, they all call into question claims to intellectual autonomy. Thus Foucault distances himself increasingly from the political priority claimed in France by the literary intellectual, at least before 1968, while, in the United States and West Germany the neo-conservatives continue their jihad against the new class.[5]

In fact, the institutional setting of literary intellectuals has been thematized in regards to literary criticism in particular by figures other than Hohendahl, most notably Stanley Fish, and a brief comparison of the two approaches will be illuminating. Elsewhere Hohendahl has pointed out how the internal dynamics of reception

5. Cf. John Rajchman, "Foucault, or the Ends of Modernism," in: *October* No. 24 (Spring 1983), pp. 37-62, and Jürgen Habermas, "Neo-Conservative Culture Criticism in the United States and West Germany: An Intellectual Movement in Two Political Cultures," in: *Telos*, No. 56 (Summer 1983), pp. 75-89.

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theory or reader-response criticism, when taken to its logical conclusions, push toward an examination of the institutional setting of reading and criticism.[6] The problem however is the manner in which the problem of the institution is posed. Drawing on the traditions discussed above as well as, more recently, on other Marxist thinkers like Gramsci and Althusser, Hohendahl conceives of the institutional description as part of a social critical project. Fish, despite his reputation as a radical *enfant terrible* on the American critical scene, reduces the notion of institution merely to the obvious dependence of every critical judgment on contemporary conventions. This may prove shocking to anyone who thought the academy produced an objective knowledge free of historical contingencies, but it in fact ends up with a reification of any particular contingency as the iron cage of judgment, impervious to a process of rational change. Hohendahl's comment: "Fish's conventionalist theory of literature, which consciously refrains from transcendental norms, can only confirm what is the case anyway. This is no small thing, especially if it can show that our time-honored understanding of reading does not coincide with our actual practice. Yet — and this is its limitation — it cannot offer any direction for this activity to take as would be possible with a transcendental or ontological approach. Instead, conventionalist theory is indifferent to historical processes. No matter how radical its rhetoric may be, it supports the status quo in the end and reproduces the currently existing 'belief system.' It is therefore conventional in more than one sense. The social function of the conventions and norms which determine the reader remain beyond the boundaries of critical analysis."[7] Even when it is radical, contemporary American reader-response criticism ends up conservative. It does not introduce the anarchy which its traditionalist opponents had feared. On the contrary, Fish's interest in literary institutions concludes with the assertion of the "authority of interpretive communities." This is no hidden dialectic but the expressed intent: Fish assures his traditionalist opponents that his relativizing literary judgments cannot end up in a fragmented relativism, since the authority of conventions "always already" hold sway. Thanks to Fish, they can henceforth be recognized as authoritative and conventional.[8] From the standpoint of Critical Theory, Hohendahl can recognize how reader-response criticism enters into the process of artificial negativity. The purportedly liberalizing attack on the authority of the text harnesses its own radical energy in order to assert the authority of the critical establishment. Academic literary criticism can undergo a reformist modernization without ever running the risk of a genuine anti-authoritarianism: change serves to stabilize the system.

It would be an important task to spell out the connection between this cult of authority cum cynicism regarding intellectual activity and the neo-conservatism of Irving Kristol or Kurt Sontheimer. For the present suffice it to note that a thematization of the social function of intellectuals need not be conservative, as Hohendahl's book eloquently demonstrates. By presenting in English translation important ramifications of German critical theory for literary history, it will surely challenge many of the assumptions distorting the contemporary American discussion where even the most timid thought of breaking with New Criticism is still mistaken by many as the clarion call to storm the Winter Palace.

Russell Berman

6. Peter U. Hohendahl, "Beyond Reception Aesthetics," in: *New German Critique*, No. 28 (Winter 1983), pp. 108-46.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

8. Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 321.

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Yi-Fu Tuan, *Segmented Worlds and Self: Group Life and Individual Consciousness* (University of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis, Minn., 1982).

In *Segmented Worlds and Self,* Yi-Fu Tuan is sensitive to the fact that "the isolated, critical and self-conscious individual is a cultural artifact" whose development "is closely tied to the evolution of a world that is progressively more complex, specialized, and segmented." (p. 139) He argues that in the West this process of segmentation began at the end of the Middle Ages when communal forms of life started to disintegrate and gave way to more individualistic modes of experience and perception. Tuan explores certain manifestations of this process, particularly how the increasing preoccupation with individuality, privacy, and interiority is mirrored in the transformation of eating habits, living arrangements, and the nature of the theatre. He compares these social practices as they have evolved in Europe and the United States, often contrasting by way of juxtaposition the more communal life styles of non-Western cultures.

He begins with a discussion of food preparation and table manners which have become more complex since the Middle Ages. Unlike in China where there was an "ancient sensitivity" to the rules of etiquette which "were intended to enjoin, not separate" (p. 50), in the West there has been a movement away from the "open" and "boisterous" arrangements so conspicuous in ancient Rome to the relatively self-conscious, particularized habits that characterize modern styles of eating. In the past, meals were served with few eating utensils which were generally shared by several people who tended to consume food with their fingers in an indiscriminate manner. With the appearance of books on etiquette during the Renaissance, there was more discernment and segmentation in the manner in which people consumed food. The use of chairs instead of benches at the dining table, the employment of more utensils, a growing delicacy of table manners as well as a greater sensitivity to the distinctive qualities of a variety of dishes, particularly carved meats ratger than whole animals or joints, all suggest that after the seventeenth century people had an increased capacity to differentiate themselves from others as well as from the natural world.

Similarly, Tuan notices a relation between the "progressive spatial segmentation" which was evident in the construction of dwellings and the emergence of a "heightened self-awareness — even self-preoccupation" (p. 51). The early Neolithic, semi-pit dwellings which were partially buried in the earth gave way to larger above-ground houses, internally partitioned. However, during the Greek and Medieval periods, there was little possibility for privacy since people lived crowded together. In ancient Athens, there was more concern with maintaining public buildings than private abodes where rooms were arranged around a courtyard that allowed little opportunity for privacy. In ancient Rome, neither the *insula* whose windows and doors opened on to the street nor the *domus* where the wealthy were constantly preoccupied with political and social matters, afforded much isolation. During the early Middle Ages, most lived in a barn-like structure which barely provided the possibility for people to be alone since they were expected to congregate in a large hall, "uncluttered and unpartioned" that "served as an open and almost public arena" (p. 56).

It is only during the sixteenth century, especially in England, when more homes were built which contained a greater number of rooms, that the possibility for withdrawal existed on a widespread scale. Yet even here the "opportunity to be alone must have been rare" (p. 63) because of the number of people who usually gathered together in a typical domicile. For example, in England the home of a merchant often contained

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parents, children, apprentices, and servants. In France, several families often occupied the same building. In both countries, the availability of space was such a problem that several people might sleep in the same room and even the same bed. In addition, interconnecting rooms made privacy an anomaly until the latter part of the seventeenth century. Attempts to gain a measure of solitude during this time are reflected in the growing use of the four-poster bed with its enveloping curtains, the evolution of seats, and the use of wall mirrors.

For Tuan, a critical catalyst for further changes in the physical character of the house was the transformation of the family from a closely knit group consisting of more than blood relations to the relative isolation of modern nuclear arrangements. In the sixteenth century, servants began to have less contact with their employers who tended to confine their sociability to people of their own class. In addition, children came to be perceived as a special group to be shielded from society, so that in the nineteenth century, especially in the homes of the wealthy, additional rooms were created for them. The home itself became replete with furnishings which reflected the distinctive personalities of its few inhabitants. Thus Tuan describes the nineteenth-century bourgeois house as "a family haven and a symbolic embodiment of the psychic dimensions of the self" in contrast to the medieval dwelling which "was a microcosm of society" (p. 84).

That "process of interiorization" which "began some three hundred years ago, marked by withdrawal into the intimacy of the family, to interior scenes and the comfort of padded chairs" as well as "by a withdrawal into self and an intensification of self-awareness" (p. 82) is also reflected in the history of the theatre. While "in the West the theatre began as religious and communal activity," "by the late nineteenth century it was almost a private experience that spectators have as they sit in the dark in their separate chairs, gazing through the proscenium arch at dramas of family disintegration" (pp. 11-12).

Thus Greek drama took place outdoors in a public setting that invited the participation of a great many people. Similarly, during the Medieval period, drama was usually conducted in a public place, primarily the church, which was easily accessible to the populace for whom the event was a highly ritualistic, communal occasion. Just as Greek drama portrayed human problems "on a cosmic stage that amply provided for the machinations of the gods" (p. 87), Medieval plays made little attempt "to penetrate the core of another's being" and presented "emblematic figures and their clearly obsevable actions" (p. 92). And yet, in the plays presented at the festival of Corpus Christi from 1300 to 1600, Tuan sees in the depiction of Christ's suffering and passion a movement toward the modern emphasis on the self, given the focus on a unique sacrifice by a unique individual. The shift away from the miracle plays of the twelfth century to the morality plays of the fourteenth century provided further impetus for the later stress upon the individual because of the emphasis placed on the importance of personal responsibility in these didactic works. With the advent of the plays of the Elizabethans, particularly Shakespeare, religious content began to recede into the background as a focus upon the human personality replaced the earlier allegorical portraits of people.

Moreover, theater became less communal. The *teatrum mundi* in which there were few boundaries betwen rich and poor, or actors and spectators, all of whom inhabited an essentially circular space, was replaced by an elongated, enclosed building which people had to pay to enter before sitting in demarcated areas. In addition, whereas during the Medieval and Elizabethan periods the round theater made it difficult for

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one to have a "single privileged viewpoint," the elongated hall of the Renaissance often experimentally employed "perspective stage scenery" which "could be seen ideally from only one privileged position in the auditorium" and therefore suggested an "increasing awareness of the self as a unique source of knowledge" (pp. 104, 106). Scenery came to include not only "the view of a particular person at a particular point" (p. 104) but also a greater sense of realism. Once providing a minimal sense of locale, stage sets began to duplicate more closely the texture of daily life, a condition which "was concurrent with a deepening idea of the self in the real world and in the theater" (p. 104). With the use of the proscenium arch and curtain in the seventeenth century, spectators became even more detached as they watched plays whose secular and realistic content were increasingly evident.

Other changes in the theater after the eighteenth century indicated a considerably greater desire to mirror "real life," conceived in primarily personal terms. Unlike in the past when the focus of significant action was generally an outdoor public place, events focusing on family life inside the home became central to dramatic productions. Moliere, in particular, utilized indoor settings to portray "the personality and social status of his highly individualized characters" (p. 109). By the middle of the nineteenth century, the stage world had become "enclosed," a place to "explore human vulnerability at the core of private and intimate experiences," and the spectator, "isolated" in the "darkness," became a "voyeur" (pp. 110, 113).

The emphasis on the importance of sight here is significant. For in "observing the histories of table manners, household, and theater," Tuan is convinced that the very way in which people utilize their senses to "perceive external reality and self has undergone striking changes during the last three hundred years" (p. 114). The greater use that we make of our eyes reflects the fact that other senses tend to be underused.

Tuan speaks of the shift in Europe away from the earlier "inchoate, colorful and warmly human" world that was evident until the Middle Ages to the "cooler, larger, more deliberately conceived and precisely delimited order" (p. 124) that prevailed after the sixteenth century. The relatively small but complex sensory world so characteristic of the distant past where sights, odors, and sounds commingled gave way to the differentiated and disparate modern environment in which we are encouraged to feel detached and isolated in relation to our surroundings. Tuan graphically details the highly odiferous and boisterous Medieval ambience, an olfactory world of "pungency and instability," as well as a rich pandemonium. He compares the experience of walking through a Gothic cathedral with its enveloping presence consisting of the sound of the organ, the odors emanating from the walls and wax candles, as well as the ragged sense of the hard ground underfoot to the "limited sensory ambience" of the modern skyscraper with its "glass-sheathed walls" and its interior, usually "a trim handsomeness of glass, aluminum, and wood" (p. 114). Here, the sense of sight prevails because "The place has neither odor nor sound other than the muted noises of office work or of soft canned music; and it discourages touch" (p. 114).

Tuan adds that while the sense of sight playing over a more easily accessible world has expanded perception, it has created the basis for a certain degree of emotional impoverishment since there is a heightened experience of "a self detached from its milieu" (p. 115). Moreover, "Emphasis on seeing, and particularly on seeing with the mind's eye, has had the effect of isolating the individual and of promoting an awareness of the self as the lone framer of knowledge" (p. 115).

In presenting his ideas about the way the sense of sight has been elevated in importance in the context of changes in culinary habits, housing arrangements, and the

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nature of the theater, Tuan is essentially descriptive. He rarely elaborates upon the political, economic, and social transformations of the past which increased the possibility for people to experience the world in a more differentiated manner.

Though he is aware of how the shift away from a reliance on a religious framework to more secular modes of thought has contributed to the growing importance of the self, Tuan barely touches upon the movement from Catholicism with its heavy emphasis upon ritual in a communal context to the more private and individualistic nature of faith reflected in the emergence of Protestantism. Moreover, he does not describe the economic transformation which played so large a role in undermining whatever balance may have existed in the past between the public and private in Europe and America.

Not only the breakdown of feudalism but the shift from mercantile to laissez-faire capitalism helped destroy the restraints with which trade was conducted and therefore contributed to the growing importance of the self, particularly its activities in the market place. In opening up a new terrain of autonomy for a significant number of people, the political revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries contributed to this process of economic transformation which elevated unbridled appetite as a regulating principle within the realm of work. Under these conditions, private as well as personal life grew in importance as a way to ward off the increasingly predatory character of the external world. Many people retreated into the family to escape the alienating features of the factory system which helped to erode a feeling of individual competence as well as a sense of community. By the beginning of the 20th century, the consolidation of power within the economic realm entailed a willingness on the part of corporate leaders to find ways to penetrate this personal sphere. A huge advertising industry was developed which helped create new markets for goods and therefore encouraged an ethic of consumption, the economic basis for today's emphasis on the cultivation of the self.

In speaking of America, Tuan laments the rise of the new shopping center, today's answer to the town square of the past, which has turned into a "truncated world," "a place for consumption" (p. 193). But he does not extend his observation to acknowledge the possibility that the emphasis upon consumption today has contributed to the existence of a pervasive hedonistic non-morality, a way of life in which the absence for many people of a set of transcendent values encourages an obsession with the search for immediate gratification and the nuances of inner experience.

Moreover, it is the shift from production to an equally heavy emphasis on consumption that has given rise, in part, to studies of the decline of individuality and the emergence of "mass man," a phenomenon Tuan also neglects to discuss fully despite the fact that he notices the degree to which "melancholy" and "boredom" have seeped into American life. The movement from handicraft to factory modes of production and the subsequent takeover of the worker's technical knowledge by modern management virtually destroyed the American Adam of the 19th century, the rugged individualist who sought to shape the world through active engagement. Instead, we have social critics lamenting the appearance of the narcissist of the mid-20th century who reveals his/her individuality in various forms of self-absorption. If he is more generous than social critics like Lasch and Sennett, who unfortunately tend to dismiss contemporary forms of inwardness as a manifestation of public and private pathology, Tuan does not adequately discuss the possibility that the emphasis on the self today may have some disastrous psychological and social implications. He does state that a "condition of profound and sustained ennui or anomie — a total detachment from

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every object, person, and ideal" (p. 151) is a phenomenon with which we must contend. But he suggests that this is a necessary byproduct of our departure from the ancient communal past; and he states that "The freer and more technically developed a society is, the easier it is for its members to isolate themselves from each other and from society as a whole; and the greater the desire to do so in the interest of nurturing an integral sense of self" (p. 32). Here he fails to acknowledge sufficiently the full extent to which the process of segmentation has made it difficult to nurture a degree of inner wholeness. He simply speaks of the complexity of the public sphere which encourages people to withdraw into an intense and persistent awareness of self but never intimates that this may be, in part, the necessary result of a set of social arrangements embedded in a matrix of power and wealth.

In speaking of possible solutions to the painful isolation that was experienced as a sense of community waned, Tuan spends most of his time pointing to the highly individualistic pursuits of the wealthy or the artistically engaged who retreated to the privacy of their urban dwellings or the solace of their country retreats. He fails to differentiate fully and to elaborate upon the many social experiments, some of them utopian, which were initiated on both a limited and national scale since the 16th century. More recent innovations within the home and theater which he cites as improtant attempts to restore a sense of connection pale in significance, given the direction of modern life in the West toward increasing fragmentation, if not disintegration. At the end of his book, he basically acknowledges this fact when he states that the two major attempts to preserve community today, the restoration of central city neighborhoods and the creation of shopping plazas, have essentially failed. Though he argues that these failures are the result of living in a "complex urban fabric" which "is the product of political, social, and economic forces that extend far beyond a particular place or time" (p. 195), he is conventionally pluralistic in his analysis. When he states that "No individual or group has the power to call these large diffuse forces into being and direct their paths toward the recreation of a richly textured society," (p. 195) he fails to indicate that some are considerably better situated than others to initiate such a project.

We are left with what he rather vaguely calls "the paradox of consciousness: the need, on the one hand, to be aware so as to sustain a whole that owes its existence to forethought, and on the other to lose oneself in it as though it had always been there — objective and independent — able to subsist and function on its own" (p. 13). Despite his failure to think comprehensively about all of the issues which he has raised, it is important to remember that Tuan announces from the outset that he is presenting "an interpretative description, not a social scientific treatise" (p. 3). Thus, even if he does not adequately account for the emergence of the self historically or acknowledge enough the political and psychological implications of the stress that has come to be placed on individuality and interiority, he has presented in an interestng manner the evolution of certain aspects of self-experience. Less concerned with analyzing the reasons for the breakdown of community than he is with documenting the texture of daily life which reflects a growing preoccupation with the self as an increasingly differentiated and reflective agent, Tuan offers a striking set of details drawn from an impressive variety of sources which should help to dispel the belief, still shared by many, that the self can be understood outside of the social context.

Robert Ehrlich

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Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

Perhaps Hoffmann's quarter of a century residence in the U.S., explains some of the tics in this provocative and yet frustrating book. The author was born in Vienna and educated in France, where he was a student of Raymond Aron, an interpretor of Gaullism, and spiritual father of the well-known *In Search of France.* He knows how to turn theory against supposed pragmatists while brandishing a tactical realism in the face of utopian naiveté. As a Harvard professor, on the other hand, he is more relaxed and dialogues mainly with his contemporaries (whom he supposes well known and worthy of attention). Ethical questions are not rigorously discussed, but seen in relation to the debates between Rawls, Walzer, Beitz, Falk, and company. After all, the present project is not philosophy but "applied morality" (p. 189).

Hoffmann considers himself a Liberal. This, however, "does not mean necessarily to believe in progress, it means only to believe in a (limited and reversible) perfectibility of man and society and particularly in the possibility of devising institutions based on consent that will make society more humane and more just, and the citizens' lot better" (p. 8). This Liberalism is said to be compatible with a morality based on the individual, not on the group. It claims to be reformist, not revolutionary. Political action is structured by a double relation: of the individual to the state, and of the state to the world order. Individual rights can exist only within a sovereign state. This premise gives rise to a series of reflections on the morality of intervention into the affairs of a state which violates the rights of its own citizens. Hoffmann's discussion of the cases of Turkey in Cyprus or Somalia in the Ethiopian Ogaden, reinforce his argument that politics is the art of execution, not of formal, but of abstract moral principles. The state is itself bound to a world structure where reciprocal rights and duties are recognized. When that world structure is threatened or its fabric is torn, the state itself — and, therefore, the individual — suffers the consequences. Thus, the use of force against aggression threatening the very principles of a structured world order is justified (even though this may pose further problems as to whether the threat was truly serious, or whether a preventive action was necessary, not to speak of the difficulties posed by conditions of civil war). At the same time, however, this principle challanges the logic of nuclear deterrance whose paradoxical justification depends precisely on the reality of the threat to end all human order. This last reflection suggests that there may be situations in which the use of force is morally forbidden. The statesman must then seek other means to realize his politics.

This explains the logic of Hoffmann's liberalism. It is necessary, above all, to guarantee the rights of the individual. This explains the structure of the book. The first chapter justifies the ethical project, showing why and how an inquiry into international politics can and must make use of moral categories. Despite various difficulties the chapter concludes that a moral politics has at least the advantage of giving some direction to the actors as well as to those trying to understand their action (p. 43). Given the need to think politically, the first problem is that of the legitimate use of force. Although the old doctrine of the Just War is no longer applicable, it still provides methodological guidelines for reflection. The notions of proportionality, hierarchy and especially the "double effect" rule (concerning costs to civilians) are applied by the author to contemporary examples. The most interesting case of a legitimate use of force comes in the context of the neutron bomb, which Hoffmann eventually rejects. The conclusion to which this second chapter leads, is that morality is not situated at the

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level of the means to *make* war, but rather concerns the ways to *avoid war*. The citizen enters the picture here, but too briefly to do anything more than permit a transition to the third chapter of the book.

The "liberal's" discussion of human rights begins with the question of their nature, whether they are political or social, acquired or inherent. Hoffmann admits the criticisms of the various definitions of these rights, and analyzes the valid and often devastating incoherences to which they have led good intentioned politicians. To his own question "What is to be Done?" he replies with a "modest" politics which tries to integrate political and economic rights according to a doctrine whose major criterion is "coherence." Hoffmann, of course, recognizes that human rights violations are only manifestations of structural problems . . . which brings him to his fourth chapter, concerning distributive justice. Although, or perhaps precisely because, he does not pretend to have the competence of the technical economist, Hoffmann's analysis here is at once compact and clear. The different positions on the issues are laid out and confronted succinctly. The conclusion is that the prescriptions (or presuppositions) of the authors determine their diagnostics! It follows that the discussion of distributive justice cannot be left to technicians. Morality once again finds its place as the guide to a practical inquiry.

This return to the moral foundations of liberalism is the culmination of an otherwise broad-ranging discussion. It is, however, unsuccessful because Hoffmann forgets the principles on which his argument was founded. The logic of mutual implication between the World Order, the State and the Individual is lost. The fourth chapter thus closes with a kind of overview of possible economic positions, and the recommendation of an eclectic, balanced and "modest" politics. This leads to a disappointing final chapter, presenting "An Ethics of World Order." This title suggests the transition from an individualist ethics to something different. Nothing of the kind emerges.

The primacy of the World Order implies a *decentering* which breaks with a political philosophy conceived in terms of a constitutive subject or a totalizing actor. This means especially the end of a theoretical style whose operative subject is the nation-state. The primacy of the World Order does not abolish the state or eliminate its role. On the contrary, states will and must continue to exist in order to protect the rights of the individual. The decentering obtains at a second level: the co-existence of multiple cultures, values, and ways of living. Whereas the liberal model postulates a negative or limiting relation between the national order and the individual, this alternative thought seeks to establish a participative relation. Although Hoffmann does not use the term, the alternative model recalls the classical notion of *Republicanism*.[1] This would mean that there is not a relations of exclusion between the world order and the nation states. A world "republic" would establish a positive interaction between these two relations which, as Hoffmann has shown, define the space for a moral intervention into politics. This would not only explain the transition to a world-order-ethics; it would also permit a better understanding of Hoffmann's other transitions. For example, in his discussion of human rights, he concludes that "a human rights policy is a kind of first timid step, *faute de mieux* — an oblique way to handle political change as an international issue" (p. 139). Liberalism is a defensive politics which republicanism should permit the elaboration of a positive politics.

The republican position, futhermore, corresponds perfectly to Hoffmann's orienta-

1. For an elaboration of this viewpoint, see Claude Nicolet, *L'Idée republicaine en France* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), one of whose central arguments concerns the differences between liberalism and republicanism.

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tion. His book refers continually to the classical problems of political philosophy. Hoffmann's discussion of modern arms and planetary technology, and especially his recognition that the "world order" is in fact a powder-barrel full of "Austria-Hungaries" (p. 201) leads to one simple problem: *how to create a cosmos from chaos*. This is, of course, nothing other than the problem of the "state of nature" or the question of the origin of the state. It poses the classical problem: if obligation or duty is to exist, there must already exist the very order that this obligation or duty is obliged to create; if the social contract is to be valid, the legal order must already exist; if perpetual peace among states is to exist, they must already live just and ordered relations among themselves. Or, in Hoffmann's own words: "The aim of a human rights policy is to establish a moderate, livable world order, and yet the precondition for success, for the effectiveness of a human rights policy is that the world already be moderate . . . that there are not too many states or governments depending for their very life on violations of human rights" (pp. 139-40).

Hoffmann's analyses of the role of force, of human rights and distributive justice, were intended to indicate a modest but realistic path to the creation of order. The disturbing elements in his analysis are due to his forgetting the classical vicious circle on which modern political theory is founded. The practical translation of this problem is the need for pedagogy. This problem cannot be solved if one emphasizes morality. At best, morality provides that "direction" of which Hoffmann spoke earlier in opposition to the utilitarians. This permitted him to avoid the pessimistic conclusions to which his own account led him. Morality as *a priori* cannot be taught or learned. Hence, when it became necessary for Hoffmann to make practical recommendations, he tended to "phenomenalise" his morality. It becomes a "feeling" of "obligation" which did not exist 50 years ago (p. 157, 102), or an "incipient cosmopolitanism" (p. 95), a "fragile sense of duty" (p. 165) that must be reinforced somehow, or even something that needs somehow to be produced by a rigorously applied moral politics (p. 40-42). The result of this slippage from the *a priori* to the *a posteriori* is that Hoffmann finds himself returning to an analysis in terms of utilitarian costs and benefits while the reader gets bored or lost in a mass of details and examples whose guiding thread is not apparent.

Replacing Hoffmann's liberalism by a republican politics suggests a different direction, as do Hoffmann's frequent references to Kant.[2] Escape from the vicious circle of classical political theory depended on the invention of a pedagogy that would permit individuals to recognize their role and duties as citizen. The French Republicans of the 19th century called this a "démopédie," a learning through politics. Kant thought that it would occur as people came to recognize the costs of war. International politics, Kant saw, were the key to domestic advance.[3] His solution to "the most difficult problem for humankind," the "creation of a civil society under law," is not irrelevant

2. Hoffmann's use of Kant is frustrating but also gratifying. At a first level, "Kant" simply refers to the distinction between phenomena and noumena. This serves to refute utilitarian solutions. At a second level, "Kant" provides that ethical final goal which serves to guide the ethical actor along the way. These two "Kants" are not particularly interesting, save that Hoffmann's use of them suggests that he is aware that politics needs a moral theory which does *not* reduce "Kant" to Rawls! This brings Hoffmann to consider a third "Kant," the author of "The Idea of World History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" and of "Perpetual Peace." One may disagree with this interpretation of Kant, but his presence here explains to a large degree the success of the book.

3. Kant's claim was given interesting historical substantiation 150 years later in Otto Hintze's famous essay, "Weltgeschichtliche Bedingungen der Repräsentativverfassung," translated in Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: 1975).

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today. Hoffmann's book began from the observation that international relations imposes a *decentering* on our analyses. Concretely, this means that domestic problems do not exist in a vacuum, within the boundaries of one state; and that foreign policy cannot begin from the premise that one's own nation defines the terrain of action. The interplay of domestic and foreign, and of nations amongst themselves, creates the framework within which a modern politics can be elaborated. However, tough minded Hoffmann's account, and however well it criticizes the naivetés of the utopian, his arguments remain curiously a-political. He is unable to integrate the politics of the *citizen* into his analyses because his "liberal" premises force him to center the account around the choices of the stateman. A republican argument would not violate Hoffmann's positive insights at the same time that it would give them the basis from which to act politically.

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

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

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